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The period stretching from around 1880 to 1914 was one of great creative 
effervescence in France, marked by new trends in art and literature and the 
opening up of new fields of knowledge. A time of increasing political 
polarisation, it was also in this epoch that scholars, writers and artists began 
to get involved in the political life of the nation on an unprecedented scale 
and when the term ‘intellectual’ first came into common usage. 
Remembered today as the founder of the French school of sociology it is 
from this period that Émile Durkheim’s scientific breakthrough dates. 
Drawing on a set of conceptual tools elaborated by Pierre Bourdieu, this 
project delves into the early period of French sociology and seeks to explain 
how Durkheim managed to distinguish himself among his contemporaries as 
the legitimate representative of the new discipline in France. Through 
looking at his ties to the major institutions of the French intellectual field it 
traces Durkheim’s progress from a situation of relative marginality in the 
1880s to a dominant intellectual position by the eve of the First World War. 
The suggestion is that through enquiring into the sources of Durkheim’s 
legitimacy we can also gain an original perspective on the debated topic of 
his politics and conception of his own role as a public intellectual during the 
French Third Republic.  
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Introduction 
 If the name of Émile Durkheim is remembered today and if his work continues 
to attract scholarly interest it is largely due to the fact that he is recognised, alongside 
Karl Marx and Max Weber, as one of the founders of modern sociology.1 Indeed his 
four major works, the Division of Labour in Society, the Rules of Sociological Method, 
Suicide and the Elementary Forms of Religious Life, all endure as classics of the 
discipline.2 Yet what precisely stands out about Durkheim among the three figureheads 
of classical sociology is not exactly what he is best known for - his relentless effort to 
promote the institutionalisation of the discipline within the French university in a 
timeframe stretching roughly from around 1880 to 1914.3 Taking up the term 
‘sociologie’ first coined by Auguste Comte, Durkheim, as a scholar and ‘universitaire’, 
specifically identified himself as a ‘sociologist’ and saw his own professional goal as 
one of developing this new science, making it a respectable academic discipline and 
staking out a legitimate space for it within the French university curriculum.  
                                                 
1See for example Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis 
of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1971) and Ken Morrison, Marx, Durkheim, Weber: Formations of Modern 
Thought (London: Sage, 1995). 
2 Émile Durkheim, De la division du travail social: thèse presentée à la faculté des 
lettres de Paris (Paris: Alcan, 1893), Les Règles de la méthode sociologique (Paris: 
Alcan, 1895), Le Suicide: étude de sociologie (Paris: Alcan, 1897) and Les Formes 
élémentaires de la vie religieuse: le système totémique en Australie (Paris: Alcan, 
1912). The Division of Labour was subsequently published as De la division du travail 
sociale: étude sur l’organisation des sociétés supérieures (Paris: Alcan, 1893). The 
only difference between these two printings is the subtitle, and it is the first version, the 
thesis, that I have used throughout. Durkheim’s methodological treatise first appeared 
as a series of journal articles, ‘Les règles de la méthode sociologique’, Revue 
philosophique (hereafter RP), 37 (1894), 465-98, 577-607 and RP, 38 (1894), 14-39, 
168-82. It is however to the 1895 book version that my page numbers below refer.  
3 Kenneth Thompson, Émile Durkheim (London & New York: Tavistock, 1982), p. 8, p. 
27. 
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 In sociology textbooks it is generally Durkheim’s effort to develop a scientific 
approach to the study of society that often provides the starting point for the discussion 
of Durkheim in sociology textbooks.4  In this regard, it was in his second published 
book, the Rules of Sociological Method, that he most explicitly formulated the 
methodological principles guiding his scientific project, principles that had already been 
applied in the Division of Labour (1893) and whose analytical power he would later try 
to demonstrate in Suicide  (1897).5 And it was also in this methodological treatise that 
Durkheim famously declared the most basic ‘rule’ of sociology to be that of treating 
social facts as ‘things’, that sociology must start out from the controlled observation of 
social facts rather than from unverified, pre-conceived ideas.6 He wanted to establish 
that social reality was indeed a valid object of scientific study, distinct from the reality 
studied by other sciences such as biology or psychology, but which could nevertheless 
also be studied just as objectively.7 While social facts did consist of immaterial 
phenomena such as ‘feelings’ or ‘beliefs’ what made these facts recognisable and 
distinct from biological or psychological facts was, argued Durkheim, their external 
quality and constraining character in relation to the individual. Thus he defined social 
facts as ‘manners of thinking and feeling external to the individual, which are invested 
                                                 
4 See for example Anthony Giddens, ‘Introduction’, Émile Durkheim, Selected Writings 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 1-50 (p. 1) or Gianfranco Poggi, 
Durkheim (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 16-17. 
5 Frank Parkin, Durkheim (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 18, subsumes his 
discussion of Suicide under the chapter entitled ‘Sociology as science’. 
6 Durkheim, Les Règles de la méthode sociologique, pp. 20-23. Also see the English 
translation, The Rules of Sociological Method and Selected Texts on Sociology and its 
Method, ed. by Steven Lukes, trans. by W.D. Halls (London: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 60-
62 
7 Steven Fenton, Durkheim and Modern Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984), p. 18. 
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with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control over him’.8  Beyond the 
question of science however, Durkheim also presented a set of concepts upon which he 
based an assessment of modern society and of what he believed to be its most pressing 
problem. In the Division of Labour he presented a critical examination of the rapid 
advance of specialisation that was occurring not only in industry but in all areas of 
social life, and asked whether this was a positive thing to be embraced or something that 
one ought to resist.9 Contrasting two principal social types - the traditional and the 
modern - each one defined by the nature of its social tie, Durkheim called the solidarity 
proper to societies of the traditional type ‘mechanical solidarity’, and argued that here 
society was held together by a powerful ‘collective conscience’ or shared beliefs and 
values that allowed little space for individual difference. If, as he proposed, the division 
of labour ought to be embraced, it was because it acted as the source of another type of 
solidary, ‘organic solidarity’ built on differences that complement each other, which 
emerged as society progressed towards the modern type characterised by heterogeneity. 
There was, according to Durkheim, no necessary conflict between the demands of 
modern individualism and those of social solidarity. 
 Yet the modern social type cohering through difference was, he recognised, 
more of an ideal to be realised than a perfect expression of an actual existing reality, 
and alongside the concepts of ‘organic’ and ‘mechanical’ solidarity we also have the 
idea of social ‘abnormality’ exemplified in what Durkheim called in the third part of the 
Division of Labour the ‘anomic’ and ‘forced’ division of labour. If, under normal 
circumstances, society ought to progress towards organic solidarity, in reality 
                                                 
8 Durkheim, Les Règles de la méthode sociologique, pp. 5-8; trans, pp. 50-52. 
9 Durkheim, De la division du travail social, p. 4. 
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contemporary society found itself in the grip of social conflict and beset by crises in 
industry. That this situation has arisen, he argued, was due to the fact that the 
appropriate moral regulation and means of coordination between individuals and groups 
performing different social functions had not accompanied the advance of 
specialisation. Whereas the Division of Labour dealt mostly with modern society in its 
ideal or ‘normal’ state, Suicide was by contrast wholly taken up with the discussion of 
this idea of ‘social abnormality’. Taking the consistent statistical rise in suicide rates in 
nineteenth century as a social fact indicative of an underlying state of social malaise, 
Durkheim argued that both the degree of social integration and the capacity of society to 
perform its regulating function were key to explaining the intensity of the ‘suicidogenic’ 
currents in modern European societies.10 Constructing a typology of causes of suicide, 
Durkheim distinguished ‘egoistic’ suicide resulting from weak levels of social 
integration and ‘anomic’ suicide resulting from a lack of stable moral regulation as the 
two types specific to modern society. 
 Published some fifteen years after Suicide, the Elementary Forms of Religious 
Life was Durkheim’s last book and here he extended his sociological method to study of 
religion, which he explained as a social fact rooted in collective existence and 
irreducible to the psychic needs of the individual. A work built on an examination of 
Australian totemism, Durkheim argued that the existence of a divinity or divinities was 
not a necessary characteristic of religion at all and what was essential rather was that 
religious belief presupposed the division of the universe, the ‘classification of all things’ 
                                                 
10 Durkheim, Le Suicide, pp. 222-23, pp. 283-88. 
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into two separate classes, the ‘sacred’ and the ‘profane’.11 Consisting of both beliefs and 
ritual practices, and taking a definite institutional form, religion was defined by 
Durkheim as a ‘unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things... beliefs 
and practices which unite into a single moral community called a Church, all who 
adhere to them’.12 With the concept of ‘collective effervescence’ he also tried to show 
how, at times of intense social activity when individuals come out of their isolated 
everyday existence to participate in emotionally charged collective celebrations, the 
idea of the sacred is given shape and revitalised. It is at these times of collective ferment 
that individuals come to feel overpowered by a force greater than themselves and an 
awareness of a separate divine realm, different to ordinary or ‘profane’ existence - the 
division between the sacred and the profane - is awakened.13  
 In agreement with Anthony Giddens, we can say that over the course of his 
career as a sociologist, Durkheim concentrated on a number of principal themes.14  
Firstly, there was his effort to found the science of society, his definition of society and 
formulation of the ‘rules’ as to what it meant to study it scientifically. A second point 
was his conception of social things - religion, morals, laws, ‘ways of thinking and 
doing’ - as being of a supra-individual character, underpinned by the fundamental fact 
of sociability and his argument that moral authority and guiding ideals were generated 
from collective life. Finally, there were the implications of this for modern society. For 
Durkheim modern individualism was itself a social fact, which ought not ‘normally’ 
                                                 
11 Durkheim, Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse, p. 50; The Elementary 
Forms of Religious Life, trans. by Karen E. Fields (New York: Free Press, 1995), p. 34. 
12 Ibid, p. 65; trans, p. 44. 
13 Ibid, pp. 307-14. Also see Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, pp. 107-
10. 
14 Anthony Giddens, Durkheim (London: Fontana, 1978), p. 9. 
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entail the evaporation of collective ideals and moral norms. Where this happened, one 
was in a situation of social abnormality and it was in this light that Durkheim judged the 
society of his own time, which he believed was suffering from a weakness of social 
solidarity and corresponding lack of guiding moral ideas. At this point Durkheim’s self-
conception as a ‘scientist’ crossed paths with practical political demands, and he saw it 
as part of the work of sociology to put an end to this state of social malaise, to put 
modern society back on track towards the ‘normal’ realisation of organic solidarity.15 
Given this normative aspect of sociology, Durkheim’s idea that it could help resolve 
some of the problems of modern industrial society, a brief look at the social and 
political backdrop would be helpful. 
 
1. Context  
 The period in which Durkheim lived was without a doubt an important junction 
in French history. All over Europe, countries were experiencing great change in the 
transition to new social and political arrangements and France in the 1870s was no 
exception. After a turbulent century involving no less than eight regime changes since 
1789, a new Republican regime, the Third Republic, had been founded, one which 
sought to deal with the legacy of the French Revolution and to set its ideals on a firmer 
institutional basis.16 It was an ambitious goal, given that for a large part of the 
                                                 
15 On Durkheim’s theory of social solidarity see Steven Lukes, Émile Durkheim. His 
Life and Work: A Historical and Critical Study  (London: Allen Lane, 1973), chapter 7, 
and below sections 2.4, 3.2.1, 3.3.3. On the academic debate surrounding the question 
of Durkheim’s politics see my literature review below.   
16 Jeremy Jennings, Revolution and the Republic: A History of Political Thought in 
France since the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 27-
28.  
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nineteenth century, in the aftermath of the Revolution, the country had alternated 
between various forms of monarchy and empire. Indeed even after the Republic had 
definitively overcome the threat of a monarchist restoration in the late 1870s, it then had 
new forms of political extremism to contend with, ranging from an emergent right-wing 
nationalism to violent revolutionary syndicalism on the left, and a growing awareness of 
the need for social reform.17 Alongside these internal political problems there was also 
the question of French national prestige, which had suffered considerably after the 
defeat to Prussia in 1870.18 In the 1870s, as a student at the École normale supérieure in 
Paris, Durkheim formed part of an extraordinary generation, with the philosopher Henri 
Bergson and the future socialist leader Jean Jaurès being among his school-friends. The 
city was a hub of intellectual ferment and optimism in this era, and Durkheim believed 
that it would be part of his future role as a scholar to have some part to play in the 
political life of the new regime.19 And politics indeed became a central concern of 
Durkheim’s as he worked to establish sociology.20 On many of the issues of concern in 
the early Third Republic - national prestige, political consolidation and social reform - 
the sociologist was to have some input.  
                                                 
17For a general overview of some of the political challenges the regime faced see 
Michel Winock, La Fièvre hexagonale: les grandes crises politiques, 1871-1968 (Paris: 
Éditions du Seuil, 1987). On this new type of political extremism see Zeev Sternhell, La 
Droite révolutionnaire, 1885-1914: les origines françaises du fascisme (Paris: Éditions 
du Seuil, 1978). 
18 Jennings, Revolution and the Republic, pp. 197-98. For more on the concerns about 
decline also see the opening chapter to William Schneider, Quality and Quantity: The 
Quest for Biological Regeneration in 20th Century France (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990). This political context will be discussed in more detail in 
chapter 5 below  
19 Lukes, Émile Durkheim, p. 43, pp. 46-47. 
20 Bernard Lacroix, Durkheim et la politique (Montréal: Presses de l’Université de 
Montréal, 1981).  
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 Although Durkheim’s importance within the sociological tradition is 
unanimously recognised, his role as a public figure very much involved in the French 
society of his time tends to receive less attention. And yet, if it was Durkheim’s 
achievement to have established sociology as a serious academic discipline in the 
French university, he had, in order to be able to do this, to have been an academic of 
considerable weight, and his chair in the science of education at the Sorbonne that he 
held from 1902, which became a chair in the science of education and sociology in 
1913, would indeed testify to this.21 And at a time when Sorbonne professors were 
valued not just as academics but also as active participants in social and political affairs 
Durkheim, as a sociologist and a ‘universitaire’ also had a very specific understanding 
of his own role in public life.  
 These initial remarks indicate at least two possible ways of approaching 
Durkheim and his work: one could, for example, focus on the critical evaluation of his 
social theory and methodology, look at its place within the sociological tradition and the 
relevance of his concepts to sociologists today; or, one could instead approach the 
subject form the perspective of cultural and intellectual history, and ask questions about 
Durkheim’s role within the life and political institutions of late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century France. By way of an initial distinction therefore, it is to this second 
aspect that I propose to direct my attention. My interest will be in how Durkheim 
actually managed to found a distinct school of thought in sociology, how he introduced 
the new discipline into the French university and about the role he envisaged for it in 
the society and politics of his time.  
                                                 
21 See Giddens, Durkheim, p. 19 and Lukes, Émile Durkheim, p. 360, pp. 365-66. 
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2. Durkheim, Politics and the Republic: A Review of the Literature 
 Durkheim’s posthumous career has had varied fortunes from one period and 
country to another. Whereas in France, in the immediate aftermath of his death, sociology 
went into relative decline and his legacy into neglect, it was mainly in the United States 
that scholars first began critically discussing and producing works on Durkheim, his 
sociological theory and his politics. Indeed the readings elaborated here remained 
authoritative right up until the 1970s, when in both the United Kingdom and in France 
there was something of a revival of interest in Durkheim and a major re-assessment of his 
work on many different themes. For this reason I have divided up my discussion of the 
literature on Durkheim and his politics into two sections, the first dealing with the early 
reception and the second on this more recent body of scholarship. 
 
a) Early Representations  
 In some of the earliest posthumous commentaries in the English language on the 
political aspect of his sociology, Durkheim was represented as an extreme anti-
individualist, who believed that the solution to social unrest in the France of his time was 
the restoration of the moral authority of the traditional community. So Marion Mitchell, 
writing in 1931, attributed to Durkheim a fundamentally anti-democratic position, and 
argued that in his exaltation of the community and denigration of the individual was a 
philosophy of nationalism, which foreshadowed some of the principal doctrines of the 
extreme right wing, anti-Republican Action Française of Charles Maurras.22 This 
interpretation of Durkheim’s politics seems to have arisen from a particular 
                                                 
22 M. Marion Mitchell, ‘Emile Durkheim and the Philosophy of Nationalism’, Political 
Science Quarterly, 46.1 (1931), 87-106. 
19 
 
understanding of his methodological premises in sociology: as Roscoe Hinkle has shown, 
in the early reception of Durkheim by American sociologists his insistence on the need to 
treat social facts objectively as things was generally taken as evidence of an extreme 
social realism, and a radically determinist position that negated individual free will in 
social causation. 23 Thus, argued Mitchell, Durkheim’s nationalism derived logically 
from his ‘gospel of social determinism which exalted the group or “society” and 
minimised the importance of the individual’.24 In a similar vein Svend Ranulf described 
Durkheim as an anti-individualist who believed that individualism and the ideals of the 
French Revolution were at the root of the modern social malaise, and wished to see the 
re-establishment of the pre-capitalist ‘gemeinschaft’ or moral community in modern 
times. This, according to Ranulf, made Durkheim a ‘scholarly forerunner of Fascism’.25   
 Reading the letters he sent to his nephew Marcel Mauss during the First World 
War, there can be little doubt that Durkheim had a good sense of the way in which the 
academic world was developing at an international level and the predominant role that 
universities in the United States would come to play therein.26 Indeed, not only were the 
                                                 
23 See, Roscoe C. Hinkle Jr, ‘Durkheim in American Sociology’, in Émile Durkheim, 
1858-1917, ed. by Kurt H. Wolff (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1960), pp. 
267-95 (pp. 267-73), and also, Sue Stedman Jones, ‘Reflections on the Interpretation of 
Durkheim in the Sociological Tradition’, in Durkheim Today, ed. by W.S.F. Pickering 
(Oxford: Berghahn, 2002), pp. 117-41 (pp. 118-21). 
24 Mitchell, p. 88. 
25 Svend Ranulf, ‘Scholarly Forerunners of Fascism’, Ethics, 50.1 (1939), 16-34. 
26 On Durkheim’s ‘academic propaganda’ in the United States during the First World 
War see Marcel Fournier, Émile Durkheim:A Biography, trans. by David Macey (Malden 
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found in Durkheim’s letters to Mauss. See for example, Émile Durkheim, Letters to 
Marcel Mauss, 10 February 1915 and 11 June, 22 July, 12 August, 20 October and 14 
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first comprehensive studies of Durkheim in the English language penned by American 
scholars, but over the course of the 1930s and 1940s the interpretation of his social theory 
that emerged from the United States would guide critics and students alike for decades to 
come.  In terms of sociological theory, it was primarily the work of Harry Alpert, which 
helped to mitigate the conception of Durkheim as an extreme social realist who took 
society as a transcendental entity, literally outside and above individuals.27 Alpert argued 
that although Durkheim stated that social facts existed as an independent reality, he was 
not actually making an ontological statement about society itself, but merely asking that 
the principle of causation be attributed to social facts. In fact, as Alpert pointed out, for 
Durkheim, society was made up only of individuals associating together and existed only 
to the extent that it was represented in the consciousness of individuals.28 Two years prior 
to Alpert, Talcott Parsons had also called into question the anti-subjectivist reading, as he 
attempted to construe Durkheim as a forerunner of his own voluntarist theory of action.29   
He did this however by imposing an ‘epistemological break’ on Durkheim’s intellectual 
development, arguing that in his explanation of social conduct Durkheim shifted his 
emphasis away from an early ‘positivist’ focus on external social constraint to the 
subjective awareness of moral obligation.  
 On the question of politics however, it was on the basis of these readings of his 
sociology that Durkheim became known to the English-speaking world as a theorist 
preoccupied by the problem of order in modern society.  As Hinkle has emphasised, the 
                                                 
27 Stedman Jones. ‘Reflections on the Interpretation of Durkheim’, p. 121. 
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assessments of Durkheim’s work that were produced in this period were influenced by 
the concerns that the sociologists who read him had about the state of their own society. 
In a historical context of economic and social crisis in the years immediately following 
the Great Depression, they looked to Durkheim for what he had to say about social 
integration and the necessary conditions of social harmony.30 For Talcott Parsons,  
Durkheim’s main concern was the question of how to guarantee social order in a modern 
individualist society where the traditional supports of religion and community had 
become less solid.  
 This interpretation of Durkheim’s social theory continued to influence how he 
was situated politically. Robert Nisbet may not have referred to a link between Durkheim 
and nationalism or fascism, but he nevertheless rooted him firmly within the French 
conservative tradition. This conservative interpretation focussed on Durkheim’s supposed 
concern for social order above change, and with the stability of group life above demands 
of individuals, his insistence on the primacy of society in the explanation of social facts 
and critique of ideas of individual freedom. This viewpoint, according to Nisbet, 
amounted to a rejection of the ideals of the Enlightenment and French Revolution, and 
indeed had grown out of the conservative reaction to the French Revolution associated 
with Joseph de Maistre and the Vicomte de Bonald. Durkheim, in Nisbet’s view, 
represented a conservative reaction to individualism and rationalism, which he sought to 
build into a more scientific framework and to develop sociology as a means to restoring 
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order and authority in modern times.31  For Louis Coser, conservatism meant an 
inclination to maintain the existing order of things. He argued that whereas radical 
thinkers tend to start out from an ideal of how society ought to be, then criticise the 
existing state of affairs, imagining its transformation, Durkheim was only interested in 
what actually existed in reality, and in maintaining the status quo. For Coser, Durkheim 
idealised supposedly integrated societies and labelled social conflict as an abnormal 
deviation from the norm of order, rather than expressions of a need for social change.32  
 
b) Republicanism and Socialism 
 What soon becomes clear as one reads through the scholarship on Durkheim from 
the mid-twentieth century onwards is that the series of oppositions commonly used to talk 
about intellectuals and their work - materialist/idealist, objectivist/subjectivist, 
collectivist/individualist, theorist of order/theorist of change - are inadequate not only to 
an understanding of Durkheim’s social theory but also its place in the historical context. 
If Durkheim’s concern was with the question of order, this, Melvin Richter pointed out, 
did not in context of the late nineteenth century France translate into a politically 
conservative position: Durkheim was a fervent supporter of the French Third Republic. 
The real conservatives were those supporters of the Catholic Church and the army, and 
the enthusiasts of an emergent right-wing nationalism that attacked the existing order and 
                                                 
31 Robert A. Nisbet, ‘Conservatism and Sociology’, American Journal of Sociology 
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32 Lewis A. Coser, ‘Durkheim’s Conservatism and its Implications for his Sociological 
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wished to see its destruction.33 In a separate article Joseph Neyer emphasised that 
although Durkheim seemed to start out from a series of collectivist, philosophical insights 
that were generally associated with the opponents of the Republic and of democracy, he 
nevertheless developed these into a strong argument in defence of individualism.34   
 By far the most influential work in challenging the perception of Durkheim as an 
anti-liberal and anti-individualist conservative was Steven Lukes’s biography. Firmly 
placing Durkheimian sociology in its historical context, it is from here that we begin to 
get a bigger picture of how Durkheim’s scientific work related to the major political 
questions of his time and place.35 Not only did Lukes provide us with a much needed 
comprehensive catalogue of Durkheim’s writings, but he also drew attention to an 
important but previously ignored article, which he translated and had republished, 
Durkheim’s ‘Individualism and the Intellectuals’. Written at the height of the Dreyfus 
Affair, this article showed Durkheim in the role of the engaged social critic, who 
defended the values and ideals of moral individualism.36 Anthony Giddens also writing in 
the 1970s, emphasised the importance of distinguishing between Durkheim’s theoretical 
opposition to methodological individualism in sociological explanation and an adherence 
to the values of moral individualism in politics. 37  
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 Perhaps more so than any other author Giddens has cast doubt over Parsons’s 
interpretation of Durkheim as a theorist of order. He also questioned the account of 
Durkheim’s theoretical development from an early ‘materialism’ to a later ‘idealism’ and 
argued that Parsons tended to minimise the importance of the Division of Labour as a 
general framework for the rest of Durkheim’s studies. In Giddens’s view, Durkheim was 
primarily concerned not with order but with the question of changing forms of social 
solidarity and was, throughout his career, interested in immaterial phenomena such as 
moral beliefs and ideas.38 Giddens also emphasised Durkheim’s sociological defence of 
Republicanism and his concern with setting the ideals of the revolution on a more stable 
basis, while also pointing to the more socially critical aspects such as Durkheim’s interest 
in socialism and in occupational associations as a basis of democratic reform.39  
 A number of other writers have agreed with Giddens’s critique of Parsons. Robert 
Bellah, for example, having already argued that the historical dimension was of 
fundamental importance in all of Durkheim’s sociological work, also stressed that moral 
beliefs and ideals were considered by the sociologist throughout his œuvre as part of the 
essence of society.40 If furthermore, as Hans Joas has argued, Durkheim was indeed 
concerned with morality and modern solidarity throughout his life it was out of a concern 
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to see the germination of a new morality and new institutions.41 This perspective would 
seem to make more sense in context given that Durkheim in his own lifetime was 
immensely popular among French socialists and republicans. He did have his enemies 
too, but as Stjepan Mestrovic has pointed out, if he really did hold the conservative 
position earlier attributed to him, it would have made him more than some enemies: in 
fin-de-siècle Paris, it would have been a veritable intellectual suicide!42 
 While it seems clear that Durkheim was a supporter of the Republic, his 
relationship to socialism and his position on the ‘social question’ - another dominant 
political issue in his time and particularly so from the 1890s onward - still remains a 
debated issue. If, wrote Hans Peter Müller, Durkheim was indeed guided by the 
normative framework epitomised by the values of the French Revolution, and wanted to 
contribute to the realisation of these in appropriate institutions, he must nevertheless be 
situated politically between two poles considered to be an equal threat to the Republic: 
the anti-republican extreme-right on the one hand and revolutionary socialism on the 
other.43 It is in this guise that Marxists since Paul Nizan have read Durkheim, as one of 
the ‘watchdogs’ or ideological agents of the Third Republic, and as the major ideologies 
of the twentieth century congealed Marx and Durkheim came to be seen as occupying 
opposite poles of the political spectrum in social thought.44  
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 So even accepting the point that Durkheim was a Republican we nevertheless are 
brought back full circle to the theorist of order argument, and while Marx was the radical 
critic of capitalist society, Durkheim became the defender of modern industrial order. 
John Horton opposed a Marx, interested in problems of power and change, to a Durkheim 
interested in the maintenance of order.45 Likewise, Irving Zeitlin argued that Marx, at the 
one pole of the political spectrum, stood for social change and the full realisation of the 
ideals of the French Revolution, while Durkheim, at the other end, stood for the 
restoration of order in the post-revolutionary era.46 And even though Göran Theborn 
certainly recognised the progressive and reformist aspect of Durkheim’s thought, he 
nevertheless concluded that the aim of sociology was ultimately to restore order and to 
prevent a socialist revolution.47 For Sanford Elwitt the programme of  ‘bourgeois reform’ 
in late nineteenth century France was merely an attempt to ‘defend’ the Republic against 
the masses of workers, and through popular education and material improvements in 
social conditions to stem any revolutionary ferment and avoid real political change. In no 
uncertain terms he describes this, using the words of Freidrich Hayek, as the ‘counter-
revolution of science’.48  For Tom Bottomore, Durkheim was ‘a convinced opponent of 
Marxism’ whose political concerns were with defending the Republic not just against the 
traditionalists in the army and the church but also against the socialists.49 According to 
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Josep Llobera, Durkheim held a dim view of political activism, which he referred to 
disparagingly as ‘art’, and went to great pains to discredit Marxism, which he saw as a 
threat to his own  ‘scientific’ enterprise.50 
 At the same time however there is another body of work that would seem to 
question the theoretical opposition between Marx and Durkheim and that considers 
instead how Durkheim elaborated his own ideas in engagement with nineteenth century 
socialist thought. Since Lukes’s biography there has been revival of interest in Durkheim 
both in Great Britain and in France that has also helped move the work of interpretation 
in this direction. Philippe Besnard for example studied the evolution of concept of 
‘anomie’ in American sociology in the twentieth century and emphasised the contrast 
with the way in which Durkheim had originally employed it as part of a critique of 
modern industrial society.51 Alongside this re-evaluation of the concept of anomie, 
Besnard also highlighted the importance of Durkheim’s concept of fatalism, the opposite 
of anomie, in a critique of modern society: whereas anomie referred to a lack of 
regulation, the problem of fatalism had to do with unjust and excessive regulation.52 In 
his discussion of the concept of fatalism Frank Pearce suggested that for Durkheim 
excessive and unjust social constraint was one of the principal sources of social malaise, 
and also highlighted the sociologist’s attack on inherited wealth in his concept of the 
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forced division of labour.53 Carmen Siriani too has pointed to the critique of capitalism 
presented in the Division of Labour and recognised Durkheim’s commitment to a more a 
more just and equal society, arguing that his work can in fact be rescued for a critical 
analysis committed to democratic and egalitarian reform.54  
 In Jean-Claude Filloux’s study of the relationship between sociology and 
socialism, Durkheim appears as a sociologist committed to social reform or ‘action’, 
whose guiding concern was the theoretical and practical reconciliation of individualism 
and socialism. 55 With Filloux as with Giddens however, the question of Durkheim’s 
theoretical development as raised first by Parsons also came back into the picture, and 
thus within the contours of a ‘socialist’ reading of Durkheim another question was 
whether his œuvre was characterised by overall continuity or by a radical break between 
an early materialism and a later idealism. If Filloux came down on the side of an overall 
continuity of purpose and took the Division of Labour as a general framework for a 
critique of modern society, Jeffery Alexander, while building yet another case in favour 
of a socialist interpretation of Durkheim, came down on the contrary in favour of 
intellectual discontinuity. So, according to Alexander, whereas the early Durkheim was a 
materialist and empiricist he gradually moved towards a more idealist perspective out of 
a concern to differentiate himself from the type of economic determinist Marxism that 
                                                 
53 Frank Pearce, The Radical Durkheim (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989). 
54 Carmen J. Siriani, ‘Justice and the Division of Labour’, Sociological Review (hereafter 
SR), 32(1984), 449-70. 
55 Jean-Claude Filloux, Durkhheim et le socialisme (Geneva: Droz, 1977). Also see 
Filloux’s introduction and notes to Émile Durkheim, La Science sociale et l’action, ed. by 
Jean-Claude Filloux, rev edn (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France/Quadrige, 2010), 
first publ. in 1970. 
29 
 
was being introduced in France in the 1890s.56 On the question of Durkheim’s intellectual 
development therefore, there seems to be no definite consensus, although Warren 
Schmaus has suggested that we see it not as a matter of a fundamental break between two 
totally contrasting theoretical perspectives, but as a development of an original research 
programme into new intellectual ‘niches’.57  
 Collaborative projects for research in ‘Études durkheimiennes’ or ‘Durkheimian 
studies’ were formed both in France by Philippe Besnard and in the United Kingdom 
around W.S.F. Pickering and Willie Watts Miller. These projects continued to advance 
our knowledge of both Durkheim’s work itself and of those close to him and have in turn 
tended to reinforce the liberal, humanitarian and socialist side of Durkheim in his relation 
to politics.58 The re-awakening of interest in Durkheim also brought with it publications 
and translations of many of his lesser known writings (reviews, journal articles, lectures), 
as well as letter collections and, most recently, Marcel Fournier’s new biography of 
Durkheim, which was published in French in 2007 and translated to English in 2013.59 
Meanwhile numerous special editions of the Revue française de sociologie also greatly 
advanced our understanding of Durkheim’s work itself, the group of scholars that 
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gathered around him and of the competing schools of thought in sociology that existed in 
France at the time.60 Biographical accounts of individuals close to Durkheim have also 
shown that, far from being an ideological opponent of the socialist left during his 
lifetime, Durkheim actually counted a number of militant socialists among his scientific 
collaborators and was himself was a friend of the socialist leader Jean Jaurès.61 So while 
Durkheim had, in the English speaking world, initially been understood as a functionalist 
celebrant of the American way of life, more recently the socially critical aspect of his 
work and his closeness - both in terms of personal relationships and in terms of ideas - to 
a certain form of socialism have come to the fore.62 As both Frank Pearce and Mike Gane 
have pointed out, it is unfair to read Durkheim’s critique of historical materialism, of 
revolutionism and of communism as an outright rejection of socialism.  Indeed, they 
suggest, given what we now know about the future of these doctrines in the 20th century, 
we should perhaps consider Durkheim’s as a valid critique from an author who was also 
concerned with democratic and egalitarian reform.63 Indeed Pearce suggested that having 
harnessed the potential of Durkheim’s key concepts for critical analysis, we can build on 
his analysis of the shortcomings of Marxist theory in order to develop a more realisable 
political programme. Far from proposing a critique of modern industrial society that acted 
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as the foundation for either a traditionalist or an anti-socialist political position Sue 
Stedman Jones has suggested that we see Durkheim’s sociology as a close to the 
‘humanisitic’, intellectual socialism of Jean Jaurès which took individualism and 
socialism as interdependent and mutually reinforcing.64  
 
3. Thesis Question  
 The centrality of the political to Durkheim’s project is thus an important theme in 
Durkheimian studies. From having been represented as a nationalist, a ‘forerunner of 
fascism’, a theorist of order, a conservative republican, Durkheim, under the light of 
more recent scholarship, now appears as a left-leaning republican in context, with a 
sociology embracing what can either be described as a type of ‘humanistic’ socialism 
concerned about individual freedom, or  ‘communitarian’ form of liberalism concerned 
about social justice.65 Yet in the discussion of both the political implications of 
Durkheim’s sociology and his intervention in support of specific political causes, other 
aspects of his role within the political and social life of the Third Republic - his position 
within its educational institutions, or within the world of publishing for example, or his 
relationship to the dominant philosophical ideas of his day - seem to have been 
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neglected.66 Yet these less visible factors are, I believe, important in explaining how he 
came to develop political ideas he held and to conceive of his own role in politics in a 
certain light. Integrating these factors into an examination of Durkheim’s politics I aim to 
follow his professional, intellectual and political trajectory and answer what I consider to 
be a more fundamental question of how Durkheim became the academic, the social 
scientist and public figure that he was. My question is therefore, how did Durkheim 
become both the founder of the French school of sociology and a public intellectual with 
a political voice that mattered? At the same time I also suggest that through inquiring into 
the sources of a Durkheim’s intellectual prestige we can gain a new perspective on 
aspects of his social theory and politics.  
 In the mid to late nineteenth century, the idea of sociology was still a relatively 
new one in France and it was, I believe, Durkheim’s capacity to both move with what 
was most intellectually innovative while still drawing on more traditional sources of 
scholarly prestige that can go a long way towards explaining his success. With this in 
mind I have divided my thesis into six parts and, influenced by Marcel Fournier’s work, I 
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have mostly taken a chronological approach rather than the thematic approach more 
common in Durkheimian studies. So, after an opening chapter dealing mainly with 
theoretical considerations and a further exploration of the context, I move on to what I 
have called Durkheim’s ‘scientific debut’, where I discuss his early writings, those 
articles published between 1885 and 1890. The third chapter will look at Durkheim’s 
educational background and relationship to the world of academic philosophy, and will 
be based on the monumental works he produced in a crucial the period between 1892 and 
1896. In chapter four, I examine Durkheim’s position in relation to other schools of 
thought in sociology in France at the time and the significance of his foundation of the 
Année sociologique journal. Although politics come into all of this in an indirect way the 
fifth chapter will deal explicitly with the changing political climate in republican France, 
how this influenced the intellectual fortunes of Durkheimian sociology and Durkheim’s 
active involvement as an intellectual in the body politic. Finally I shall end with a chapter 
on what can be called the ‘hegemonic’ period of French sociology and will look at 
Durkheim’s position within the dominant spheres of French intellectual life towards the 
end of his career and his conception of his own role in public life. 67 
 In my reading of Durkheim’s work I have tried to work, as far as possible, from 
the original French texts, many of which can be found either online, on the ‘gallica’ 
catalogue of the French national library, or else at the Biblothèque nationale itself and at 
the French national archives both in Paris. In the case of Durkheim’s writings, where it 
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has not been possible to gain access to the original text I have read either from the three 
volume collection of his work edited by Victor Karady or from the much smaller 
selection of articles edited by Jean-Claude Filloux. 68 Although I have worked from 
French editions, quotations are in English and where I have drawn on an existing English 
translation I give the page number in the footnotes alongside the reference to the French 
version; where there is no reference to any text in English the translation is my own.  
 My reasons for wanting to work from the original French texts are threefold. 
Firstly, as I shall explain in chapter one, it is one of my theoretical assumptions that the 
journals in which Durkheim published and the publishing house with which his work 
originally appeared are themselves significant factors in explaining how he accumulated 
influence and elaborated his distinctive position. It thus seemed to make more sense to 
use the first French editions where possible rather than subsequent re-editions and 
translations where these original associations are generally effaced. Secondly, rather than 
focussing exclusively on his four main books, the argument of my thesis will be based on 
lesser-known articles, critical reviews, lectures and conference papers given by 
Durkheim. While most of this material has indeed been translated into English, it is 
dispersed between various different collections and there is no single work in English 
comparable to Victor Karady’s collection in French, a collection which groups together 
in one place all of this translated material. From a practical point of view I have therefore 
found it easier simply to consult the original French versions and either Karady’s or 
Filloux’s collections where this has not been possible. Finally, while most of Durkheim’s 
writings have been translated into English there are still some untranslated pieces - 
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1975) and Durkheim, La Science sociale et l’action, ed. by Filloux. 
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mainly collections of letters or archival material - that I have found important to my 
argument. For the sake of maintaining overall consistency it again made sense to work 
from the French texts throughout.  With these final considerations aside I shall now move 
on to chapter one and outline the contextual and theoretical foundations of the chapters 
on Durkheim to follow. 
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Chapter 1 
Durkheim as Sociologist and Intellectual 
  
 Stretching from around 1880 up until the eve of the First World War, the period 
under consideration here, the French fin-de-siècle, was a time of artistic and literary 
innovation, an exciting time of intellectual creativity when entirely new disciplines were 
formed.69 The era of the Dreyfus Affair, it was also one in which the word ‘intellectual’ 
began to be used to refer to the scholars, writers and artists who were getting involved 
in the political life of the nation on an unprecedented scale.70  Much in tune with the 
times, it was in this period that Émile Durkheim made his breakthrough in ‘founding’ 
sociology, and however much Durkheim himself styled his enterprise as ‘scientific’, it 
too was bound up with the dominant political issues of the day.  Since this epoch, the 
question of what exactly defines an ‘intellectual’ and what role intellectuals have in 
public life has been the subject of debate. In this opening chapter, before going on to 
consider Durkheim’s case specifically, I shall first introduce some of these questions 
concerning intellectuals and their role in politics.  
                                                 
69 H. Stuart Hughes, Sophisticated Rebels: The Political Culture of European Dissent, 
1968-1987 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 145. 
70Pascal Ory and Jean-François Sirinelli, Les Intellectuels en France de l’Affaire 
Dreyfus à nos jours, 2nd edn (Paris: Colin, 1992), pp. 5-6.   
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1.1 Intellectuals and their Social Role 
 If we are to draw any one significant marker in our discussion of the role of 
intellectuals in French political life, it would have to be Émile Zola’s intervention in the 
Dreyfus Affair in 1898. Such was the importance of this event that almost a hundred 
years later the period stretching from here until the end of the twentieth century has been 
described as the ‘century of the intellectual’.71 Indeed, it was during the Dreyfus Affair 
that the ‘myth’ of the French intellectual as a heroic figure speaking back to authority 
was born. 72 And over the course of the twentieth century questions regarding what or 
who exactly was an intellectual and whether there was a specific type of political 
involvement that characterised genuine intellectual commitment became topics for 
scholarly discussion. Some of the questions that emerge include: are the types of people 
considered to embody the intellectual always the same or do they vary according to 
historical and social context? And is there just one way of defining the relationship 
between the intellectual and society in which he or she lives?   
  
                                                 
71 The phrase is from Jeremy Jennings and Tony Kemp-Welch, ‘The Century of the 
Intellectual: From the Dreyfus Affair to Salman Rushdie, in Intellectuals in Politics: 
From the Dreyfus Affair to Salman Rushdie, ed. by Jeremy Jennings and Anthony Kemp-
Welch (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 1-21. 
72 Jeremy Ahearne, Intellectuals, Culture and Public Policy in France: Approaches from 
the Left (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2010), p. 1. 
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1.1.1 The Demand for Disinterest 
 In a series of lectures delivered in 1993, Edward Saïd defined an ‘intellectual’ in 
the broadest terms possible, as someone with a particular ‘vocation for the art of 
representing’, someone who ‘visibly represents a standpoint of some kind, and...makes 
articulate representations to his or her public’, be it through talking, writing, teaching or 
even appearing on television.73 For the French authors Pascal Ory and Jean-François 
Sirinelli intellectuals too were characterised not so much by what they did professionally 
or by any specific expertise, but by the fact that they communicated their thought 
publicly, intervening in the political domain and the value-loaded debates over the affairs 
of the ‘cité’.74 Yet, from the very point when it first came into common usage in France 
in the final decade of the nineteenth century during the Dreyfus Affair, the word 
‘intellectual’ was taken, both by those who proudly wore the title and those who used it 
as a derogatory term, to mean someone with a unique capacity for critical thought.75 If, 
wrote Émile Durkheim, intellectuals were in a privileged position to step into the public 
debate, it was not due to any specific expertise, but because they were individuals 
accustomed to the use of critical reason, to questioning unfounded assumptions and 
reserving judgement.76 With an acquired gift for critical analysis and abstract thought the 
intellectual was seen as having unique access to transcendental principles of truth and 
justice and was thus in a special position to act as a social critic, to recall temporal power 
                                                 
73 Edward Saïd, Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith Lectures (Bath: 
Vintage, 1993), p. 10. 
74 Ory and Sirinelli, p. 9. 
75 Ibid, pp. 5-6, p. 9 
76 Émile Durkheim,‘L’individualisme et les intellectuels’, in Émile Durkheim, La Science 
sociale et l’action, ed. by Filloux, pp. 263-79 (pp. 271-72), first publ. in the Revue bleue. 
4th ser (1898), 7-13. 
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and indeed society as a whole to these principles. The intellectual was therefore not just 
someone who took up a position in the public debate, but was also expected to do this 
from a wholly disinterested point of view, motivated by a thirst for truth alone. 
 Although this ideal of the ‘universal’ intellectual may strike us today as no more 
than a chimera, it has nevertheless proved to be a powerful myth and one that has 
dominated the discussion of the role of intellectuals in public life over the course of the 
twentieth century. When, for example, in the years prior to the outbreak of the First 
World War and in the interwar period intellectuals failed to act as disinterested social 
critics, the problem was not seen to be with the ideal of the ‘universal’ intellectual itself, 
but that intellectuals themselves had committed ‘treason’. In his celebrated essay, La 
Trahison des clercs Julien Benda lamented precisely this ‘treason’ committed by his 
fellow intellectuals in contributing to the rise of nationalist and class-based ideologies 
and their betrayal of what he considered to be their unique vocation. Intellectuals, in 
Benda’s view, consisted of a minority of extraordinary individuals set apart from the 
‘laity’ or secular majority and were individuals with a particular gift for critical thought. 
Above the base workings of temporal power, as disinterested scholars with no concerns 
for political or economic advantage, they had privileged access to the universal principles 
underlying human civilisation. Their vocation and role in society was thus to speak the 
truth back to secular authority, to denounce corruption and the violation of universal 
principles when necessary. However, in taking a stand publicly in favour of particular 
class-based or nationalist movements, in contributing to the ideological turmoil of his 
own time these intellectuals had, wrote Benda, committed treason.77 Whereas treason, in 
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secular terms would commonly be considered as a betrayal of one’s patriotic duties, 
treason, for the intellectual was the betrayal of one’s duty as a representative and 
interpreter of universal principles of truth and justice.  
 Benda’s description of the ‘universal’ intellectual has indeed proved appealing to 
intellectuals themselves. In the introduction to Edward Shil’s collection of essays The 
Intellectuals and the Powers, we find, for example, intellectuals again depicted as 
persons with an ‘unusual sensitivity to the sacred, an uncommon reflectiveness about the 
nature of their universe and the rules which govern their society’. They form part of that 
‘minority of persons’ who, in every society ‘more than the ordinary run of their fellow 
men, are inquiring, and desirous of being in frequent communion with symbols which are 
more general than the immediate concrete situations of everyday life’. Although Shils did 
not refer here to universal principles common to all humanity, but to principles 
underlying a specific society, his message was still that intellectuals were set apart from 
the ‘ordinary’ people preoccupied by their worldly concerns, and that their condition 
almost presupposed a situation of ‘tension’ between themselves and the ‘value 
orientations embodied in the actual institutions of any society’.78 Here again, the genuine 
intellectual appeared as an unyielding social critic.  
 Finally, however much he sought to recognise the problems with the Dreyfusard 
ideal, Saïd himself too ultimately re-asserted Benda’s vision of the intellectual vocation 
as one of social critique. Even if intellectuals were always involved in the world 
representing particular ‘secular’ standpoints, even if they were generally tied to and 
reliant on particular institutions or organisations or audiences, he argued that they could 
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nevertheless take the position of outsider in relation to society’s dominant values and 
groups. Intellectuals, according to Saïd, could do one of two things: either question the 
current order of things or contribute to its legitimation and naturalisation. The 
fundamental point was not whether one was visibly involved in party-politics, well 
established in academia or whether one appeared on television.  The real distinction to be 
made was between the ‘yea-sayers’ and the ‘nay-sayers’, between ‘those on the one hand 
who belong fully to the society as it is, who flourish in it without an overwhelming sense 
of dissonance or dissent, those who can be called yea-sayers; and on the other hand, the 
nay-sayers, the individuals at odds with their society and therefore outsiders and exiles so 
far as privileges, power and honours are concerned.’79 What made for a genuine 
intellectual then was the act of speaking back to authority.80 Before considering whether 
or not this distinction could be taken as a useful typology with which to judge the 
political commitment of a given intellectual, the next question is how or if this view can 
be reconciled with a recognition of the fact that intellectuals, like all individuals, are also 
preoccupied by what may be referred to as ‘secular’ interests.  
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1.1.2 Before  ‘Yea-Sayers’ and the ‘Nay-Sayers’ 
 In one of his several diatribes where Durkheim and sociology came in for 
particularly harsh words, Charles Péguy took issue with what he considered the base 
motives of the ‘intellectual party’ of his time, allured as they were by the ‘temptations’ of 
temporal power, by the opportunity to crucially influence the younger generation through 
control of the examination system, by the glory of university chairs and decorations, and 
by the money and public recognition they could derive from their position. The most 
irritating thing about it all was, he raged, that these intellectuals actually dressed up this 
temporal ambition as disinterest.81 And yet, a more worldly-wise reader in our present 
day might feel like responding to Péguy, “but what exactly did you expect?” As Edward 
Saïd underscored in his lectures, intellectuals are always largely beholden to institutions, 
from which they derive their authority and with which their own intellectual fortunes are 
intertwined.82 However much the interwar generation of French intellectuals (of which 
Péguy could perhaps been taken as a foretaste) railed against their intellectual 
predecessors at the Sorbonne, the fact is that later writers such as Jean-Paul Sartre also 
derived their prestige and authority from a particular set of social and cultural 
circumstances in which the role of publishing houses such as the Nouvelle Revue 
Française rather than the university became central.83 If we accept these general remarks, 
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the question however becomes one of explaining how certain cultural figures could 
indeed come to be seen as ‘genuine’ intellectuals, in the sense of ‘disinterested’ devotees 
to truth and justice, while at the same time reaping the ‘temporal’ rewards.   
Before even seeking to answer the question of whether an intellectual was a critic 
or a conformist, a more fundamental one would therefore seem to be how a given scholar, 
scientist, artist or literary figure could come to be endowed with a certain prestige and 
authority to speak on public matters. Furthermore, while Saïd’s distinction between the 
‘yea-sayers’ and the ‘nay-sayers’ is a helpful starting point, his characterisation of the 
‘genuine’ intellectual as a social critic existing in a situation of tension with the society’s 
dominant values and institutions, disregards the historical reality of political commitment 
- during the Dreyfus Affair intellectuals mobilised under the banners of both 
Truth/Justice and Order/Authority - and disqualified a whole series of thinkers from the 
title ‘intellectual’.84 Rather than fixing an ideal of ‘genuine’ intellectual commitment and 
weighing up whether or not a given figure fits the criteria or not, a more fruitful approach 
may be to try to account for the way in which an individual becomes an intellectual with 
a public voice that mattered in the first place and to account for the range of political 
alternatives that were open to them in a given historical context.  
 One of the most prominent French intellectuals of the late-twentieth century, the 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu provides us with a set of what can be called ‘conceptual 
tools’ for thinking about such sociological problems. 85 Worked out and refined largely 
through his anthropological work in Algeria (Kabylia), Bourdieu’s concepts of ‘field’, 
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‘habitus’, ‘practice’, ‘strategy’, ‘doxa’ to list just a few, could all be imported back into 
an analysis of what constituted ‘legitimate culture’ in contemporary France.86 And 
Bourdieu indeed suggested that his own sociology of intellectuals could help shed light 
on what was at stake in the dispute between the New Sorbonne as personified by 
intellectuals such as Durkheim, Ernest Lavisse and Charles Seignobos and its opponents 
in the first two decades of the twentieth century.87 Bourdieu’s theoretical model does 
therefore seem suitable here in what will be my attempt to explain how Durkheim gained 
recognition as a scholar, sociologist and public intellectual, and to understand 
Durkheim’s own political position as well as the ideological reaction (of which Péguy 
was just one expression) that developed around his persona. And particularly helpful 
would seem his point that within the parameters of a French society which viewed culture 
in terms of a high-minded detachment from economic or political gain, ‘disinterest’ could 
become a mark of distinction, precisely what allowed intellectuals become aristocrats of 
culture, as it were. 88  
 I shall come back to the Bourdieu’s sociology of intellectuals below. Returning to 
the idea of the ‘genuine’ intellectual as a social critic however, it is fair to say that Saïd’s 
lectures seem to have been in response to a wave of conservative anti-intellectualism that 
had been prevalent in Britain throughout the 1980s, and to plethora of works that sought 
to disparage the heroic Dreyfusard figure.89  As Anna Boschetti noted in her study of 
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Sartre, the very representation of the politically committed intellectual can indeed 
become a stake in political debates.90 Yet the point of Bourdieu’s sociology of 
intellectuals was not to discredit the ‘universal’ intellectual or to diminish science’s 
claims to knowledge, but more to encourage greater awareness of the social conditions 
and the limits of knowledge and action.91  Intellectuals may not be absolute outsiders and 
unyielding social critics but this does not mean that they can never be in a position to 
contest the established order. They can, in times of social change and crisis, for various 
reasons to do with their relation to the dominant cultural institutions, be either galvanised 
into contesting the established state of affairs or acting in defence of it.92  The task 
however is to try to explain the social and cultural mechanisms behind this.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Dilemmas of the Intellectual in Modern France’, in Intellectuals in Politics, ed. by 
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1.2 The Making of an Intellectual 
 From a position of relative obscurity at the beginning of his career in the 1880s 
Durkheim had, by the time of his death in 1917, become one of if not the dominant figure 
in French intellectual life. Not only this but sociology, which can hardly be said to have 
existed as a serious academic discipline before 1880, had been integrated within the 
university system and endowed with wider intellectual prestige, while Durkheimian 
sociology specifically had outdone all its competitors to become recognised as the French 
school of sociology. Yet apart from Terry Clark’s study of the early days of French social 
science and it relationship to the university system, one special edition of the Revue 
française de sociologie on Durkheim’s competitors and two articles by Victor Karady - 
one on the social sciences in the French university, another on the strategies of 
legitimation pursued by the Durkheimians - there has been little consistent analysis of 
this question.93 Inspired by Anna Boschetti’s study of Jean-Paul Sartre’s intellectual 
ascent in the mid-twentieth century, is it therefore this process by which Durkheim 
became an important public figure (an analysis which I believe is also crucial for 
understanding both his social theory and his politics) that I shall seek to explain in the 
chapters that follow. First however, I shall go through the set of concepts drawn from the 
work of Bourdieu that will underpin this analysis. 
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1.2.1 Symbolic Violence and the Intellectual Elite 
 From his anthropology of colonial Algeria, to his studies of education, art, culture 
and language, a concern underlying Bourdieu’s entire work was that of exposing the 
mechanisms of symbolic violence. Seeking to break the ‘enchanted circle’, to bring into 
focus the ‘social magic’ that hides from view the culturally arbitrary nature of social 
hierarchy, symbolic violence refers to how the categorisations that order the world and 
constitute people come to be misrecognised as natural.94 It is a violence that generally 
goes unperceived, as the established order is produced and upheld not so much by force 
but symbolically; hierarchies and systems of dominance are reproduced to the extent that 
both the dominant and the dominated take the social world as it is as legitimate, and 
cannot see it as product of history.  
 In Reproduction in Education Bourdieu explicitly defined the concept of 
‘symbolic violence’ and put it to work in his analysis of the ‘legitimate culture’ of his 
own society. This ‘legitimate culture’ he called a ‘cultural arbitrary’ in the sense that it 
embraced a specific set of values, ways of thinking, speaking and doing, capacities and 
tastes that, far from being of a universal character, are incorporated from childhood 
through socialisation in a ‘cultured’ bourgeois milieu.95 Although Bourdieu, in his later 
work seemed to express a more classical republican view of education and the role of the 
state, here he questioned the optimistic view of education as a vehicle for social change 
and equality. In modern French society, he argued, it was largely through a school system 
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that imparted a very specific type of learning and culture, that rewarded skills and values 
picked up through socialisation in the bourgeois environment but which it presented as 
‘objective’ indicators of intellectual ability, that the established symbolic order and its 
rules were naturalised.96 The school also being an institution of consecration for those 
who do well in it, a diploma from one of the Parisian elite schools or  ‘grandes écoles’ 
could also be a rare source of social prestige. At the same time it is through the culture 
received over their whole educational trajectory towards such qualifications that social 
actors come to develop certain worldviews and lifestyles.   
 This fundamental idea of symbolic violence is also important for understanding 
the idea of an ‘intellectual elite’, used by Christophe Charle to describe a particular group 
within the new social structure that came into being in the second half of the nineteenth 
century in France. While in official discourse decline of the ‘notables’ - the old 
aristocracy combined with the upper echelons of the bourgeoisie who had hitherto 
monopolised economic, social and political power - was said to have given way to  
‘meritocracy’ with the advent of the Third Republic, it would be more exact, going by 
Charle’s analysis, to say that what occurred was more a re-shuffling of the cards. If 
distinguished positions in the new social hierarchy - positions in political, economic or 
intellectual life - were in theory now accessible to anybody with the right natural 
capabilities and a taste for hard work regardless of their social origins, wealth or 
connections, in reality what we see is the emergence of new political, economic and 
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intellectual elites each with their own channels of access and criteria of distinction.97 
While access to positions of power opened up to a larger number and though intellectual 
credentials became an important source of prestige, it nevertheless remained the case that 
in politics as in the administration, the overwhelming proportion of those in the highest 
positions were drawn from a pre-selected section of the population – men from the upper 
or middle level bourgeoisie, with a secondary education and the distinctions of higher 
education.98  
 New among the ranks of society’s dominant groups, scholars with a high degree 
of the idealistic, ‘disinterested’ humanist culture imparted by the French university 
system may have set themselves apart from the politically and economically dominant as 
the new moral conscience of the nation, and yet this new elite had too its privileged 
channels of access and criteria of distinction.99 Part of my concern in this thesis will be to 
explain how Durkheim not only gained access to this world but also distinguished 
himself within it.  
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1.2.2 Field, Capital, Habitus 
 At this point however it is necessary to introduce three other concepts, central to 
Bourdieu’s theory of practice and to understanding the workings of the type of 
symbolically constituted social and intellectual world described above: field, capital and 
habitus.100 The term ‘field’ refers to such a historically shaped, structured social space 
within which knowledge is produced, a space where actors, be they individual or 
collective, meet and within which they take up different positions in relation to one 
another. There are various different fields making up the social world - the economic 
field, the political and bureaucratic fields, the intellectual field – and there are also 
subfields, such as the university field, which would occupy a place within the broader 
intellectual field. Participants in the field can be individuals or small groups, ‘schools’, 
even academic disciplines. While fields exist in definite historical and social settings, it is 
important to note that it is not a question of reducing matters to the surrounding context: 
fields have their own internal dynamics and over time a field will increasingly assert its 
autonomy from other fields, from demands external to it and come to be governed by its 
own internal logic or nomos.101 
 A field however is not just a network of relations; it is also a hierarchical social 
space governed by its own laws, with its own set of rules as to what counts as valuable or 
legitimate within it. Participants are recognised by the field as possessing varying degrees 
of power or authority within it and the field itself is, crucially, a site of struggle for the 
                                                 
100 This theory of practice was outlined in Pierre Bourdieu, Esquisse d’une théorie de la 
pratique, précédé de trios études d’ethnologie kabyle (Geneva and Paris: Droz, 1972) and 
in Le Sens pratique (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1980). 
101 Bourdieu, Raisons pratiques, p. 76, pp. 158-59. 
51 
 
monopoly of this authority.102 An actor or even a new academic discipline can only gain 
any authority within a field to the extent that it is recognised by pre-existing institutions 
of legitimation. In other words, there are stakes in every field, as the field is a distribution 
of symbolic power where actors have ‘interests’ and compete with each other for this 
power, for the authority to define what counts as legitimate and valuable within it. On the 
question of interest however it is important to note that what is of high symbolic value 
varies according to the specific demands of the field. Interest should not to be taken as 
interest in a narrow, economic sense of material interest and this is especially the case in 
the intellectual field where the blatant pursuit of economic or political power could 
indeed damage one’s legitimacy in a milieu where the supreme ideal is the disinterested 
pursuit of truth for its own sake.103 Some of the questions we might ask in relation to the 
subject of intellectuals would include, how a given intellectual type comes to appear as 
the very embodiment of disinterest; or how in a university field, with a given hierarchy of 
disciplines, sociology could make space for itself within the definition of what counted as 
legitimate knowledge; or how indeed within a sociological field made up of a set of 
competing schools and individuals Durkheim could come to gain the monopoly on the 
legitimate definition of what sociology actually was.  
 The concept of capital is, on this note, important in explaining the symbolic 
power that any actor, an individual or entire school of thought, holds within a field. On 
the one hand, capital is important for understanding the place of intellectuals within the 
social hierarchy generally. In a world where the socially dominant never maintain their 
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position by brute force and where social divisions are sanctified symbolically, cultural 
capital acquired mainly through institutionalised education helps to reproduce the 
divisions of the social space, and intellectuals owe their privileged position in society to 
their high levels of cultural capital.104 At the same time the concept of capital is also 
important for understanding the position of an agent within the intellectual field itself. 
Again, capital is not to be understood in the narrow sense of economic capital alone: as a 
field becomes more autonomous and comes increasingly to be ruled by its own internal 
logic, the more it develops its own symbolic economy and criteria of what counts as valid 
or valuable within it.105 The intellectual field and its subfields have their own ways and 
means of consecrating the hierarchy of authors, specialists, disciplines and so on. It is 
through the accumulation of specific forms of symbolic capital – examples would be 
graduation from certain schools, examination results, book reviews, journal articles, 
appointments and titles, inaugural lectures, the founding of a journal – that participants 
can come to wield symbolic power within the intellectual field. 106 It is certainly possible 
for someone such as Durkheim who, as we shall see, began from a relatively dominated 
position within the intellectual field, to reach a hegemonic position through acquiring 
specific symbolic capital. 
 Finally, the concept of habitus is important in explaining the strategies pursued by 
actors with given resources within a field presenting them with a range of possibilities. 
Habitus is perhaps best described as socially acquired ways of seeing and doing, 
‘structured’ by one’s lived history and present circumstances, but also as ‘structuring’ in 
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that this acquired habitus can orientate the behaviour of actors in the form of dispositions. 
In this sense the idea of actors in a field pursuing various ‘strategies’ of legitimation, 
seeking to acquire various forms of symbolic capital, is not to be understood as a rational 
means-ends calculation but as conduct informed by a ‘practical sense’ or a feel for the 
game within a given field.107 These inherited dispositions are transmitted in many ways, 
starting from the family, but in modern society, the role of the school, of institutionalised 
education is most important. In the case of Durkheim, as we shall see, his education in 
philosophy was crucial in the formation of his intellectual habitus.  
 The concept of habitus is a way of reconciling the theoretical opposition between 
social structure and individual agency, in that it can explain individual practice within the 
limits of incorporated habitus, in a given state of play of the field. Part of the effect of 
habitus is that participants in a field learn the rules and master the skills that the field 
requires of an actor. At the same time, all of these participants, whatever their position, 
are united in the sense that no one is indifferent to what is at stake in their encounters 
within the field; all believe that the stakes over which they struggle are fundamentally 
worthwhile. 108 A ‘universe of belief’, every field has as its very cornerstone a reigning 
doxa or common set of assumptions that rationalise the existing rules of the game, and 
regardless of one’s position within a field, be it more orthodox or heterodox, the habitus 
of an actor pre-disposes them to accept the underlying, unspoken ‘rules of the game’ as 
valid.109 Given importance of the concept of doxa and Durkheim’s feel for this game in 
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later explaining his intellectual success, it is on these points that I shall give, to finish, 
some further clarification.   
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1.2.3 Doxa, Orthodoxy, Heterodoxy  
 The concept of  ‘doxa’ refers to the ‘self-evident’, elemental assumptions that 
form the cornerstone of every field, the beliefs that are taken for granted by social actors 
to the extent that they do not even need to be explicitly formulated: doxic beliefs go 
without saying.110 As such, it is what underpins symbolic violence, what allows arbitrary 
social relations to be recognised as natural and gives the existing order of things its 
legitimacy. Also intimately linked to the concept of habitus, it is through internalising 
doxic beliefs or the unquestioned, unthought assumptions underlying a field, and through 
not merely a formal adherence to, but unreflective recognition of the legitimacy of its 
rules, that the doxa is perpetuated. All fields thus have a structuring doxa, ingrained in the 
worldview of its actors and I suggest that by considering Durkheim’s relationship to the 
intellectual doxa of his time, his instinctive sense for the ‘rules of the game’, we can 
understand his rise to intellectual prominence.  
 At the same time however, this idea of doxa does not mean that a challenge to the 
exiting state of affairs in a given field is never possible, and in terms of the intellectual 
order, Bourdieu’s analysis of the events of 1968 in Homo academicus showed how 
situations of crisis in a number of fields could combine to result in a questioning of the 
prevailing academic doxa. At times of crisis, which may or may not end up in a final 
overhaul, there can be two main positions in relation to the doxa: an orthodoxy, where 
doxic beliefs are made explicit but defended and held fast to, and a heterodoxy which 
opposes it and depends on the emergence of an alternative set of beliefs. Although the 
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heterodox position is usually constructed in opposition to the orthodox, it is actually 
mediated by doxa, which is after all what makes possible the polar opposition between 
orthodoxy and heterodoxy.111 These three terms - doxa, orthodoxy and heterodoxy - I 
suggest are useful in understanding the state of the French academic field that Durkheim 
met with when he began writing about sociology, the reciprocal relationship between 
Durkheimian sociology and academic philosophy, and how the position of Durkheimian 
sociology in relation to other sociological schools of thought was mediated by its position 
in the academic field.  
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1.3 A Specifically French Context 
 In order to be able to use the conceptual tools just outlined however it is first 
necessary to take into consideration the specific conditions of the French intellectual field 
in the late nineteenth century and how it worked to confer intellectual legitimacy in 
practice. Before trying to explain, in the chapters to follow, how Durkheim from a 
position of relative obscurity at the beginning of his academic career in the 1880s 
managed to reach the pinnacle of French intellectual life by the time of his death in 1917, 
I shall briefly outline here how the French intellectual field could work to both bestow 
this symbolic legitimacy and shape his intellectual habitus. In line with the distinction 
emphasised by Victor Karady between the institutional and the scientific forms of 
symbolic capital, I shall consider in two separate sections below the role of both the 
official academic institutions and then looser set of structures such as journals and 
professional associations in conferring of symbolic legitimacy.112 First, however, I shall 
start with a brief introduction on Durkheim’s initial penchant towards a teaching career 
and its relation to the wider historical context.  
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1.3.1 Durkheim’s Intellectual Vocation  
 Going by the published accounts of his childhood and family background, the 
young Émile Durkheim might seem an unlikely candidate for a prolific intellectual 
career. To begin with, one can only suppose that his family had other plans for him. Born 
into an orthodox Jewish community, rooted in Alsace-Lorraine since the Middle Ages, 
his future, it would seem, was to be in the rabbinate. His father Moïse was the Chief 
Rabbi of the Vosges and Haute-Marne, and his grandfather and great-grandfathers, going 
back eight generations, had also all been rabbis.113  His family’s means were modest, and 
growing up far from the capital in an austere household, Durkheim would have had none 
of the objective advantages of wealth or proximity to Paris facilitating access to the 
heights of French intellectual life. 114  At the local Collège d’Épinal he nevertheless 
distinguished himself as an outstanding student and decided early on that he wanted to 
continue his studies beyond school to which his father consented on the condition of 
being serious and working hard.115 After gaining his baccalaureate in ‘lettres’ in 1874 and 
in science the following year, and distinguishing himself in the nationwide competitive 
exams, the ‘concours généraux’, Durkheim left home to go to Paris to prepare for the 
entrance exams to the elite school, the École normale supérieure. One can only 
hypothesise as to why he broke with the family tradition and set his sights on an 
intellectual career instead; one may also wonder why his father readily agreed to him 
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following this path. The one thing that is clear though, is that Durkheim was part of a 
wider social movement that was affecting students like himself all over the country. 
Indeed, it was very much the social and political changes that were going on in the 
society of the time that opened up this path to him. 
 The École normale supérieure was an elite Parisian institution for the training of 
secondary school teachers, and the graduates of this school were something of nobility 
among the profession. Students would normally spend three years here, passing their 
‘licence’ (bachelor’s degree) in the first year, having a second year free from exams for 
more independent work and then a third year entirely taken up with preparations for the 
demanding and highly competitive final exam, the ‘agrégation’. However prestigious the 
school was in education and however much an achievement it was to gain the 
‘agrégation’, being a ‘normalien’ and an ‘agrégé’, was, in the mid-nineteenth century, 
still by no means a sure source of social status. For much of the century, teachers in 
higher education, even if they had the education and culture of the bourgeoisie, would 
have been in a subordinate position in the general field of power in terms of income, 
social origin and lifestyle, all of which confirmed the humility of their position.116 This 
all changed from the mid to late nineteenth century as, summarised by Smith, using the 
titles of two well-known works, the ‘republic of dukes’ gave way to an educative 
republic, the ‘republic of professors’.117  In the transition to a modern capitalist economy 
not only did education became an increasingly important factor in social mobility, with 
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the possession of rare educational diplomas from elite Parisian schools such as the École 
centrale and the École polytechnique becoming a coveted source of distinction, but we 
also see the arrival of university professors in particular among society’s dominant 
groups.118  With levels of education on the increase, the classical humanist secondary 
education dispensed by the lycée became a hallmark of distinction coveted by the new 
bourgeoisie.119  
 In this setting the graduates of École normale became members of a veritable 
aristocracy of culture. While many of them would still go into secondary education, 
towards the end of the nineteenth century, as new possibilities opened up in the 
universities many normaliens would go on to brilliant careers in higher education or in 
research.120  Although an elite training school, the École normale was nevertheless 
impregnated with the meritocratic ideology of the new society that was coming into 
being, in which talent and hard work, it was believed, would trump wealth and family 
connections. The myth of the school painted it as the perfect realisation of the democratic 
ideal, as a school open to students from all social backgrounds, which offered 
scholarships to the outstanding students from poor families. Indeed, the state actively 
sought out the brightest students from the lycées in the provinces, and the academic 
authority called on these schools to encourage the ‘valuable elements’ within their 
establishments to try out for the elite schools in Paris.121 If a student demonstrated 
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promise in the concours généraux, as Durkheim did, it was likely that they would be 
encouraged to set their sights on one of the Parisian elite schools.  
 The accounts of Durkheim breaking with a family tradition and indeed literally 
moving away from his community to continue his studies in Paris are echoed by a whole 
generation of students in a similar position to himself.   Smith, in making this point, cited 
the case the young Edouard Herriot who, having impressed an inspector from the 
Ministry of Public Instruction with his Latin to French translation skills, was offered a 
scholarship for the École normale. Although Herriot’s father, a military officer, had 
planned on a military career for his son he soon renounced such plans when he read up on 
the ‘prestigious’ school in Paris.122 For these students, however the transition was a 
difficult experience and Durkheim, some years later, wrote of  ‘that feeling of emptiness 
and isolation familiar to all those who come to complete their studies in Paris’.123 He 
certainly shared with many other students an experience of isolation and hardship on his 
arrival in Paris: living away from home in a boarding house for students from outside 
Paris, with scant financial resources and with his father having recently become ill, the 
young Durkheim, we are told, worried about his family responsibilities, his insecure 
future and struggled with both the harsh regime of the preparatory school and weight of 
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the classical curriculum. On his third attempt at the tough entry examinations he managed 
to be admitted to the school.124   
 On the one hand we can see Durkheim’s eventual graduation from the École 
normale as a first step on his path towards establishing himself as an intellectual and 
developing the academic credentials other potential founders of sociology would lack. Of 
all of the Parisian grandes écoles, the École normale was the supreme institution for 
scholarly consecration and most of France’s leading intellectuals, philosophers such as 
Henri Bergson and Jean-Paul Sartre, were graduates of this school. At the same time 
politics mediated Durkheim’s intellectual formation. If, contrary to the official ideology, 
the elites of republican France (be they political and administrative, economic or 
intellectual) did not exactly become any more open to those most deprived of economic, 
cultural and social capital, within the intellectual field the creation of scholarships and the 
system of competitive examinations did, in exceptional cases, allow students, like 
Durkheim, of ‘humble’ origins to take the ‘royal road’ (the ‘concours général’, the École 
normale supérieure and agrégation) to the pinnacle of the academic edifice.125 These 
students - who were referred to collectively as the ‘boursiers’ or the ‘new men’ - saw 
themselves as the living embodiment of the regime’s ideology of an ‘open meritocracy’. 
Like many of the students at this school in the 1880s, Durkheim too was a fervent 
supporter of the Republic, identified with the ideals of 1789, revered the figure of 
Gambetta and hoped to be able to contribute something, in his future as an academic, to 
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the ‘re-building’ of France and the consolidation of the Republic.126 If he could feel that 
the life of a scholar would put him into a unique position to live up to this task, it was due 
to a unique conjunction of social and historical circumstances. 
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1.3.2 Paris and the Academic Structure 
 Perhaps the most striking feature of the French intellectual field in the period 
under consideration is the extreme centralisation of its institutions. All of the most 
prestigious sources of symbolic capital - a degree from one of the ‘grandes écoles’, a 
university chair, a nomination to or an award from the parallel set of scientific and 
cultural bodies - came from Paris. While the history of the French universities goes back 
to the Middle Ages, with the foundation of the University of Paris in the thirteenth 
century, its structure had been largely demolished during the French revolution and in its 
place specialised educational institutions for the professional training of experts were 
created in the nineteenth century. The most prestigious of these Parisian ‘grandes écoles’ 
were located in Paris and included the École polytechnique and École centrale for the 
training of engineers, and the École normale supérieure for the training of lycée teachers. 
 Parallel and related to these professional schools, there was however the 
‘university’ another highly centralised Napoleonic construction, referring not to any one 
particular institution of higher education but a unified administrative and teaching body. 
It had its central authority in Paris at the Ministry of Public Instruction and was 
comprised of the separate university faculties (arts, science, law, medicine) and of the 
secondary schools (lycées). This system was divided up into various administrative units 
(académies), each administered by a ‘recteur’ under whom was the ‘doyen’ of each 
faculty within a given academy. While, for most of the nineteenth century, the faculties 
of law and medicine functioned as professional schools, the role of the arts and science 
faculties was simply to provide examination juries for the baccalaureate, while graduates 
from the École normale or from the arts or science faculties provided a steady supply of 
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teachers for the lycée system.127 A strict hierarchical system, the best positions were 
those in the prestigious Parisian lycées and if an ‘agrégé’ started out teaching in a school 
in the provinces, a clear indicator of progression in the hierarchy would be a move to a 
position in the capital. Every year those who ranked highest in the agrégation were 
awarded the best teaching positions, often also being awarded a year’s travel scholarship 
for research abroad, while the less prestigious posts in provincial lycées and collèges 
were distributed among those lower in the ranking and among those with only the 
bachelor’s degree.128  
 Another step in the progression through the academic hierarchy, the possibility of 
an appointment of those with the agrégation to positions as faculty professors was also a 
way of accumulating symbolic capital, and, up until the final two decades of the 
nineteenth century, these professors would usually have been chosen from among the 
senior lycée professors. Again Paris exerted its dominance with the most prestigious 
chairs being at the Sorbonne, and indeed a teaching post at one of the Parisian grandes 
écoles or lycées could often be considered more prestigious than a chair in a provincial 
faculty. Before 1870, the arts and science faculties had few full-time students (since the 
degrees they granted could be obtained without actually studying at a faculty) and the 
public lecture aimed at the cultivated bourgeoisie was their main teaching activity. This 
however began to change after 1870 as a home-grown movement pushing for the 
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foundation of ‘modern universities’ - large, intellectually unified, multidisciplinary 
establishments devoted to science rather than merely professional training - combined 
with an increased awareness of the advances of the German universities put university 
reform on the political programme of the new republican regime.   
 With the creation of 300 fellowships for licence students in 1877 in the 
humanities and science and 200 more for aggregation candidates in 1880, not only did the 
faculties now have serious students, but more teaching positions below the rank of 
professor - the position of ‘maître de conférence’ and ‘chargé de cours’ - were created. 
Candidates were drawn, as before, from among advanced lycée teachers but increasingly 
from those who had demonstrated a capacity for original, independent research through 
completion of a doctorate.129 At the same time there was a move towards 
decentralisation, with the authority for the selection of courses, the creation or 
suppression of chairs, the selection and supervision of teaching staff and management of 
the budget given over in 1885 to new bodies made up of members of the faculties 
themselves. Both in the capital and in the provinces the literal reconstruction of faculty 
buildings was perhaps the most obvious sign of the times.130 In this context, minor 
university positions could become another valued source of symbolic capital and 
although a position at the Sorbonne would have generally remained the ultimate aim, a 
position in one of the provincial faculties was no longer necessarily as humble as it 
previously would have been.  
 With the foundation of the École pratique des hautes études by Victor Duruy in 
1868 yet another possibility and source of symbolic capital emerged up for scholars 
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pursuing independent research, and here it became possible to pursue a career in research 
without ever having worked within the national education system of secondary schools 
and university faculties.131 Intended as a loose structure for promoting research and 
communicating specialised scientific work, this initiative was the first response to a 
growing awareness of the problems with the Napoleonic university and of concerns about 
the decline of French science. The school offered no official diplomas, nor did one even 
need any specific qualifications (agrégation or doctorat) to study or teach there; there 
were no professors but ‘directors of studies’ who were paid less than professors in the 
mainstream faculties. Yet the idea behind it was to provide the resources for professional, 
scientific laboratories and research projects, and to train scientists who would push 
knowledge beyond the contours of what was taught in universities.132 Although the 
original structure contained four separate sections (mathematics, physics and chemistry, 
natural history and physiology, history and philology), by the 1880s the only one which 
had developed a distinct identity was the history and philology section, which was run by 
Gabriel Monod and housed at the university library at the Sorbonne.133 With the closure 
of the Catholic faculties of theology in 1885, another section for the ‘religious sciences’ 
was added, which also flourished.134 Declaring its aim to be that of rejecting religious 
dogmatism and applying scientific methods to the study of religious facts, this new 
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school was at the cutting edge of developments in the human sciences and a position here 
could be a valuable source of symbolic capital.135 
 This school was not however the only intellectual institution existing parallel to 
the university  - there were also the old institutions, the Collège de France and the Institut 
de France. Like the École pratique, both of these had been founded out of a response to a 
situation of stagnation in the university, though in a completely different era.136 Founded 
in 1530 and initially called the Collège royal, the Collège de France was another loosely 
structured institution for the support and diffusion of original research by advanced 
scholars in a variety of disciplines across the sciences and humanities.137 Again, it did not 
have any degree-granting capacity and its professors were not required to have any 
official academic qualification, but a nomination to a chair at the Collège de France, was 
like chair at the Sorbonne, a supreme source of intellectual consecration. Another extra-
university institution with roots going back to the old regime, the Institut de France was 
reconfigured after the revolution and came to consist of five ‘académies’: the Académie 
française, the Académie des inscriptions et belles lettres, the Académie des beaux arts, 
the Académie des sciences and the Académie des sciences morales et politiques. With 
regards to the social sciences, a prize from this last class for a piece of work or 
nomination to one of its chairs was not only an honour, but could also bring one in 
contact with centres of political power, and this type of symbolic capital was important 
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for social scientists more orientated towards government, administration and policy-
making.138   
 A symbolic moment, the traditional inaugural lecture given by a professor on their 
nomination to a chair either in the university or at one of these scholarly institutions has 
been described by Pierre Bourdieu as a sort of rite of passage and investiture when the 
new incumbent is allowed to speak with authority and whose words are instituted as a 
‘legitimate discourse’.139 As such, inaugural lectures at these institutions provide us with 
an invaluable source of evidence not only of the accumulation of symbolic capital by 
individual intellectual figures, but also of the kind of ideas that were held up as legitimate 
within the intellectual field at given points in time. 
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1.3.3 Journals, Associations and the Privilege of Philosophy 
 If it is important to consider scientific capital as separate to institutional capital it 
is because alongside these official institutions for the consecration and diffusion of 
knowledge there was also a whole series of academic journals and professional 
associations that were just a important in conferring intellectual legitimacy. The term 
scientific legitimacy thus refers to recognition by the scientific community more 
generally, beyond the contours of the official institutions, and sources of symbolic capital 
here could include critical reviews, articles and papers, or indeed the founding of a 
journal or an association.  
 On the one hand, these two forms of symbolic capital - institutional and scientific 
- may actually reinforce one another, and in an epoch when the academic publishing 
industry was in full growth certain journals became associated with a certain academic 
readership as journals in which professional academics would choose to publish. In 
France in the late-nineteenth century, for example, the publishing house Felix Alcan 
came to be the name immediately associated with the publication of journals and books 
by professional academics, usually in the human sciences.140 At the same time, while 
many new journals in many different domains were founded in this epoch - the Revue 
historique, the Revue de l’histore des religions, the Année psychologique, the Année 
sociologique, to name but a few, the relative capacity of a journal to impart symbolic 
capital was also associated with its relationship to the official intellectual institutions. So 
for example the prestige of a journal could be reflected in an editorial board comprised 
mainly of chair holders at dominant Parisian institutions or the fact that it managed to 
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attract articles and a readership from among ex-graduates of the École normale. At the 
same time, in a world where the ‘disinterested’ pursuit of knowledge for its own sake (as 
against knowledge for practical aims) was the hallmark of distinction, the relationship of 
a journal to academic philosophy also counted in the generation of its scientific capital. 
Taught in the final year of the lycée in an era when disciplinary specialisation in higher 
education was in its very early stages, philosophy was considered not only to be the 
privileged fiefdom of disinterested study, but also to be the ‘crowning’ of a bourgeois 
education.141 Thus a journal or an association’s ties to academic philosophy and its 
capacity again to attract the elite of this universe, the ‘normalien, agrégé de philosophie’, 
could also be taken as an indicator of its symbolic, intellectual worth. Given that different 
journals and associations, with their ties to different institutions, could be a source of 
varying sorts of legitimacy, the choice, as we shall see, on the part of the aspiring 
sociologist of one journal or society over another can be interpreted as a definite strategy 
of legitimation, itself informed by intellectual habitus. 
 At the same time however there may at times be a tension between what or who 
the education system and official institutions recognise as legitimate and what the wider 
intellectual field considers to be so. This was indeed the case, as we shall see, in the 
epoch under consideration where demands for the introduction of new methods of study 
and new specialisations into the classical curriculum first articulated themselves within 
the wider network of journals and professional societies. In this way, the opening 
declarations of the various newly founded journals also provide us with valuable 
indicators of the innovative trends and cutting-edge ideas within the field, proposals 
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which were bound only later to become integrated within the official institutions of 
intellectual consecration. Again association with such new journals can be indicative of a 
certain strategy of legitimation on the part of the individual academic, an effort to align 
oneself with the most innovative positions. I shall come back to all these points more 
concretely in the discussion of Durkheim’s manoeuvrings within the intellectual field.  
Suffice to note for now however that nominations to academic institutions, opening 
lectures, publications, journal contributions, involvement with certain learned societies 
will all serve as evidence in determining what or how certain new ideas came to be 
instituted as intellectually legitimate, the figure that the individuals who voiced them 
sought to cut and the strategies pursued towards this end.  
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Conclusion 
 At the beginning of this chapter I aimed to do two main things: firstly, to 
introduce the figure of the public intellectual and consider some different viewpoints on 
his or her role in modern society. From this I arrived at what seemed to be the more 
fundamental issue regarding the process by which an intellectual such as Durkheim came 
to be recognised as an important public figure. Secondly I wanted to go through the set of 
concepts that I will draw on in trying to answer this question and to indicate how they 
might be applied in context.  
While still a student at the École normale, we are told that Durkheim could not 
imagine a philosophy without a social or political application, and that it was indeed a 
vague idea of his to devote the first half of his life to pure science and the second half to 
politics. 142 Before asking about the nature of his politics later on in life, whether he was a 
social critic or whether on the contrary he sought to legitimise and naturalise the 
established order of his time, the theoretical model that I have chosen refers us back first 
to the aspiring sociologist’s initial heterodox position in the intellectual field when he 
started out in his career. With this in mind, it is to Durkheim’s ‘scientific debut’ in the 
late 1880s and his engagement with German social theory that I shall now turn.  
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     Chapter 2 
 Durkheim’s Scientific Début and the Question of Legitimacy 
 
 Prior to the publication of his first book, the Division of Labour in Society, Émile 
Durkheim had already published a significant body of work consisting mainly of reviews, 
journal articles and lectures.  It is this lesser known material that I have chosen to focus 
on in this chapter. A number of critics already agree that these texts are important, though 
for different reasons. They can, we are told, provide us with an insight into the early 
development of Durkheim’s sociological theory and method, and about the influence of 
the organicist ideas then prevalent in Germany on his intellectual development.143 We 
could alternatively trace out Durkheim’s early political views in these texts, though 
commentators tend to disagree in their conclusions: what has been interpreted in one 
reading as traditionalism, has from another point of view been seen as a concern for 
national re-generation, and yet elsewhere an interest in reconciling individualism with 
socialism.144 
 I shall argue here however that these texts are significant in another way. When 
Durkheim started out as a critic and as an aspiring author, when he had his first review 
articles published in 1885, sociology simply did not exist as a legitimate academic 
                                                 
143 Anthony Giddens, ‘Durkheim as a Review Critic’, SR, 18 (1970), 171-96, Robert A. 
Jones,‘La Science positive de la morale en France: les sources allemandes de la Division 
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discipline and its scientific credentials were hardly recognised. A decade later, the 
situation had changed considerably. What I propose is to read these early writings with a 
view to understanding the initial legitimation of sociology and the strategies pursued by 
Durkheim towards this end. The aim is not primarily to ask whether the early work can in 
itself be labelled ‘organicist’ or ‘positivist’ but more to understand its position within a 
changing intellectual field. If on the one hand, Durkheim’s main concern was to insist on 
the scientific credentials of sociology, he also sought to overcome an opposition he 
himself drew on, between a ‘disinterested’ scientific study of society and one motivated 
by more practical, political concerns.145 It was, I suggest, this rather contradictory effort 
to answer twin demands, to present himself as both devoted to science and concerned 
about the state of his own society that gave the normative dimension of his sociology its 
particular form.  
                                                 
145 This opposition between ‘disinterested’ study and practical concerns is inherent, 
according to Bourdieu, in the ‘scholastic point of view’ and can be taken as one example 
of the influence of Durkheim’s philosophical education. See Pierre Bourdieu, Méditations 
pascaliennes, p. 24-27. I shall discuss this further in chapters 3 and 6.  
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2.1 The Scientist and the Intellectual Field 
 When Pierre Bourdieu employed the term ‘interest’ to speak about the universe of 
intellectuals, he was not referring, as I have indicated above, to interest in a narrow 
economic or political sense. The cornerstone of the functioning of any field, interest can 
mean different things according to the specific demands of a field, and in the intellectual 
field, where culture is defined in terms of a high-minded opposition to material concerns, 
a disinterested devotion to truth can become a powerful source of distinction.146 In France 
in the second half of the nineteenth century, one figure in particular, the scientist, 
emerged as the dominant intellectual type, as the very embodiment of disinterest, whose 
high-minded devotion to truth was built up and sustained through innumerable public 
speeches, inaugural lectures, official banquets and state funerals.147 And it was this 
situation that Durkheim met with - an intellectual field in which the scientist held the 
monopoly on disinterest - when he started out in his career as a published author, with his 
first review article in 1885. 
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2.1.1 From the Laboratory to the People 
 Imagining life in the year 2000, the French chemist Marcellin Berthelot presented 
the society of his ‘dreams’, where scientific progress would have solved all the problems 
of agriculture, industry and international relations. Indeed, he wrote, there would be no 
longer any need for agriculture or coal mines as chemistry and physics would have 
discovered better and more reliable ways of producing inexhaustible quantities of food 
and energy, while the development of air travel would mean that boundaries between 
nations would cease to exist, and along with them excise duties, economic protectionism 
and war.148 Written less that two decades before the outbreak of the First World War, this 
vision is striking in its naivety, its faith in the benignity of science. And yet it is reflective 
of the mood of the times when there was a widespread belief in the power of science to 
satisfy all human needs.  
 Although there had been no shortage of brilliant French scientists in previous 
decades, it was in this context that scientists were called on to exit, not the ‘ivory-tower’ 
as we are used to saying in relation to twentieth-century intellectuals, but the laboratory, 
to take up their duties towards the nation and become involved in the life of the ‘cité’. Far 
from actively seeking out popularity or political success, scientists, according to 
Berthelot, would perhaps prefer to devote themselves to their specialist research, but their 
services had been called upon in industry, in national defence, in education and in 
politics.149  A disinterested figure, as Ernest Renan said of Claude Bernard, who sought 
out the truth for its own sake, the scientist was believed to be above all political factions; 
                                                 
148 Marcellin Berthelot, Science et morale  (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1896), p. 510.  
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similarly Louis Pasteur was described as a someone who ‘never wore a glittering 
uniform, was never involved in political quarrels and never flattered the masses’.150 In 
this way, according to Avner Ben-Amos, the scientist could also become a figure of 
political unity and while Bernard had been a senator during the Second Empire and died a 
Catholic, with Pasteur having been a Bonapartist and a Catholic, both could be hailed by 
the Republic as benefactors of humanity.151 
 If, as Ben Amos writes, the public honouring of ‘great men’ - artists, writers, 
philosophers - had been part of the republican culture since the time of the Revolution, a 
phenomenon itself part of the effort to establish forms of emotionally fulfilling but 
secular ceremonial life, it was from around 1878 that the scientist in particular became an 
object of public veneration.152 If 1878 stands out as a significant juncture it is because it 
was the year in which the eminent physiologist and founder of experimental medicine 
Claude Bernard was accorded a state funeral, the first time that such an honour had ever 
been bestowed on a scientist in France. More state funerals of scientists were to follow 
including that of Paul Bert in 1887, Louis Pasteur in 1895 and Marcellin Berthelot 
himself in 1907.153 Among the living, 1878 also marked an important moment, being the 
year when two figureheads of secular, scientific culture, Ernest Renan and Hippolyte 
Taine were elected to the Académie française. Through the myriad reception speeches 
given on such occasions, or at the jubilee banquets at the Sorbonne in honour of eminent 
                                                 
150 Ernest Renan ‘Discours de réception et réponse de Alfred Mézières’, www.académie-
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scientists during their lifetime or at the unveiling of statues after their death, what we see 
after 1878 is the transformation of the scientist into the model of intellectual 
legitimacy.154 In Marcellin Bertholot’s words, science had now become the only possible 
basis of authority: ‘No man, no institution, will any longer have any lasting authority 
unless they conform to its teachings’. 155 And new entrants to the intellectual field 
certainly took note.  
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2.1.2 Positivism and the Cult of Science 
 The fortunes of positivist philosophy were also very much tied to this public cult 
of science. A marginal figure during his lifetime, indeed ridiculed as something of an 
eccentric, Auguste Comte gained a new popularity after his death, bordering on the 
intellectual mainstream. While the author of the Cours de philosophie positive had never 
in his own time held any official academic position, nor received an appointment to any 
of the important Parisian institutions and while his doctrine had remained obscure, known 
only in restricted intellectual circles, by the 1880s his thought had come into the domain 
of public acquaintance, largely through the efforts of his disciplines Émile Littré and 
Pierre Laffitte.156 Indeed Littré himself, after having had his candidature opposed by the 
Archbishop of Orléans Msr. Dupanloup in 1863, had by 1871 been nominated to the 
supreme institution of intellectual consecration the Académie française, where he would 
later be remembered as ‘great and faithful friend of truth’, while in 1892 Laffitte was 
appointed to a new chair that had been created for him at the Collège de France in the 
history of science.157 As a final salute, a statue of Comte himself was erected in Place de 
la Sorbonne in 1902. 
 Yet, although there were many scientists, intellectuals and indeed politicians who 
employed the vocabulary of ‘positive science’, what positivism actually meant, and who 
exactly could be considered a genuine ‘positivist’ is in fact a contentious matter. Indeed 
pages have been written debating the question of whether or not a Claude Bernard, an 
                                                 
156 W. M. Simon, European Positivism in the Nineteenth Century: An Essay in 
Intellectual History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 74. 
157 Simon, p. 63. The description of Littré is from Ernest Renan, ‘Réponse au discours de 
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Ernest Renan, a Hippolyte Taine, or the so-called ‘positivist’ historians, Charles-Victor 
Langlois or a Charles Seignobos, can really be considered positivists.158 The issue is 
further complicated by the fact that in the context of nineteenth-century France, 
positivism could be taken to mean a number of things. Firstly, it could be understood as 
simply the philosophy developed by Auguste Comte and expressed in the opening lesson 
of the Cours de philosophie positive, which affirmed the priority of observation and 
empirical verification in the formation of knowledge and which rejected any unverifiable 
claims about the nature of the absolute, the origin of the universe or anything that was 
unobservable.159 This interpretation of positivism was popularised after Comte’s death by 
Émile Littré, who argued that the true essence of Comte was contained in the Cours.  
 Yet, on a uniquely ‘scientific’ definition, Comte himself, who also professed 
positivism as a new ‘religion of humanity’ must be disqualified as a ‘genuine positivist’. 
This other understanding of positivism involved a philosophy of history which saw 
human society as having progressed from a theological stage in which traditional religion 
and superstition predominated, to a metaphysical or negative stage in which traditional 
beliefs were torn down, towards a positive stage where science itself would become a 
‘new religion’ with its own calendar, feast days and rituals.160 During his lifetime Comte 
himself took on the role of the positivist high priest of humanity and was succeeded after 
his death in 1857 by Pierre Laffitte as ‘president of the religious committee’.161  
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 Yet, from the point of view of understanding the strategies pursued by new 
entrants to the intellectual field, it is not so much the essence of positivism that is most 
important but more which interpretation of positivism that predominated as the legitimate 
one. And although Laffitte did eventually have his chair at the Collège de France it was, 
in the context of republican France, the positivism of Émile Littré, proclaiming the 
superiority of empirical science while avoiding the authoritarian overtones of the 
‘positivist polity’,  that won out.162 Hailed by Renan before the Académie française as a 
democrat and republican, Littré was the point of contact between republican politicians 
such as Jules Ferry and positivist philosophy.163  Against an abstract, metaphysical 
thinking that worked by deduction from a priori axioms, Marcellin Berthelot defined 
positive science as that which observed empirical facts, in order to construct the chain of 
relations between them without asking about where the chain began or ended and sought 
to arrive at new convictions more in conformity with the real nature of things.164 So if 
Comte’s doctrine could, as Simon argued, be divided into a philosophy of history ending 
in the positivist polity and the theory of knowledge, where each science progressively 
extricated from the metaphysical viewpoint it was the latter, the theory of knowledge 
associated with Émile Littré, that became intellectually legitimate.165 In many ways, this 
popularity of Littrean positivism can explain how the Comtiam science/metaphysics 
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opposition became a central idea in the nascent human sciences, as many new entrants to 
the field proposed to free their discipline from the ‘yoke’ of metaphysical thinking.166  
                                                 
166  Brooks, The Eclectic Legacy, pp. 29-30. 
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2.1.3 The Allure of Germany 
 In a sense, the public veneration of the scientist and the enthusiasm for positivism 
in the context of the 1870s was rather paradoxical in that beneath the surface what we 
find is actually a profound anxiety about the state of French science. It was indeed Louis 
Pasteur, one of the great heroes of the cult of science, who best gave expression to this 
anxiety in three short pieces published in 1871, where among other things he lamented 
the state of French scientific laboratories and the lack of resources available to 
scientists.167 Experimentation, he insisted, was absolutely crucial in the natural sciences, 
and while, all over Europe, investments were being made in scientific laboratories, 
nothing was being done in France: even at the country’s most illustrious institutions, the 
Collège de France and the Sorbonne, resources were tight and laboratories were dark, 
damp and unhealthy places.  168  
 The decline of French science marked a sharp turnaround, which was only too 
clear to contemporary observers such as Pasteur. Although France had, up until the mid-
nineteenth century, led the world in scientific discovery, from around 1850, in various 
disciplines, the foundations established in France earlier on in the century were being 
built on mainly in Germany.169 After the events of 1870-71 the alarm-bell sounded all the 
more urgently and in Pasteur’s view the French collapse in the Franco-Prussian war came 
down to the decline of French science and the ascendancy of German science. In the 
opening statement to his collection of essays he warned those in power and the general 
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public alike that one must work, by all possible means to guarantee, ‘the scientific 
superiority of France’. Germany, in short, with its laboratories and spirit of discovery had 
become a model of scientific legitimacy, which France needed to emulate and surpass. 
 However, not only was German science admired in France, its universities were 
also held in high esteem among the French academic community, and when, from the 
1860s onwards, academics began to express their dissatisfaction with the French 
university system, they took the German university as a model and called for the reform 
of the French system along German lines.170 A university system characterised by its 
extreme centralisation under one administration in Paris, whose faculties of medicine, 
law, arts and science were, as we have seen, essentially professional schools for the 
training of doctors, lawyers and teachers, higher education in France for much of the 
nineteenth century was the polar opposite of the German model.171 With the French 
professor’s primary role being the administration of the baccalaureate and delivering 
public lectures to the cultivated bourgeoisie, there was a clear division between research 
and teaching and most innovative scientific work went on not in the university faculties 
but in the parallel set of research institutions, such as the Collège de France. By contrast, 
the German model that had developed in the nineteenth century consisted of largely 
autonomous, intellectually unified, multidisciplinary establishments, which housed both 
teaching and innovative research, as renowned scholars were also university professors.  
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 If a movement in favour of university reform already existed in the 1860s, the 
military defeat and political change of 1870-71 gave it increased momentum. By 1880 a 
powerful pressure group the Société de l’Enseignement Supérieur, had been founded and 
in the pages of its journal the Revue internationale de l’enseignement all the important 
questions relating to the university reform were brought up.  With a general secretary, 
Ernest Lavisse, who was also on the advisory board to the minister of public instruction, 
the Conseil supérieur de l’instruction publique, and the participation of other intellectual 
dignitaries including Pasteur, Taine and Renan, this pressure group and its journal had 
considerable influence on government policy on higher education.172 As the republicans 
consolidated their power in the late 1870s, the reform movement met with political will, 
and the appointment of Louis Liard as Director of Higher Education in 1884 marked the 
decisive turning point. If he had been told on his appointment by Jules Ferry, the Minister 
for Public Instruction at the time, that his job would be to ‘make French universities’, 
during his time in office he undertook numerous measures towards this end: the creation 
of scholarships in arts and science, the investments in buildings and resources, the 
granting of autonomy to universities over their budgets and over the creation of 
courses.173 What is important here however is not so much the precise nature of the 
reforms, but more that these reforms opened up space for innovation in the traditional 
university curriculum and also offered new career opportunities for graduates. At the 
same time Germany again with its superior science and its superior universities stood as a 
model of scientific legitimacy, one to be learned from and surpassed.  
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2.2 Sociology and its Scientific Credentials 
 When Pierre Bourdieu described sociology in the mid-twentieth century as 
‘doubly dominated’ he was referring to the discipline’s marginal position within official 
academic institutions and to its status as a science among the intellectual community 
generally, independently of academia.174 This idea is helpful in understanding the place 
of sociology within the intellectual field at the time when the discipline first emerged in 
France the 1880s, and indeed Victor Karady, invoking the theoretical distinction referred 
to in chapter one between institutional capital and scientific capital, has written of its 
‘doubly dominated’ status in this period.175 When Durkheim started out with his first 
published review article in 1885, sociology did not have a legitimate place within the 
official academic or educational structures; and while neighbouring disciplines such as 
history and psychology had already begun to introduce the rhetoric and procedures of 
‘positive science’ through their newly founded journals, sociology as a late-comer, 
lacking its own firmly established journal or professional society, was at a disadvantage. 
The first issue refers to sociology’s institutional legitimacy, the second its scientific 
legitimacy more generally. It is the second aspect, Durkheim’s initial effort to establish 
the scientific credentials of the new discipline that I shall focus on first.  
 During the period under consideration Durkheim published a total of 11 review 
articles, two opening lectures, one independent study and one report. Most of this 
material was published either in the recently founded journal, the Revue philosophique  
(11 pieces), or the reform-orientated journal, the Revue internationale de l’enseignement 
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(three pieces). Through examining these articles and the image Durkheim projected of the 
new science, we can begin to see some of the strategies he employed towards the 
scientific legitimation of sociology, strategies which in several respects responded to the 
state of the intellectual field. 
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2.2.1 History, Psychology and Sociology 
 In a sense it is perhaps mistaken to say that when Durkheim started out on his 
academic career there were no existing sociological journals for him to publish in: the 
term ‘sociology’ itself had earlier originated with Auguste Comte and the idea of a 
science of society was, since the 1850s, already being put into practice by the group of 
‘social economists’ that had formed around Frédéric Le Play.176 Yet - and this is where 
we begin to see in practice how habitus informs strategy - within the intellectual universe 
that Durkheim inhabited these other schools of thought may as well not have existed and 
in terms of the symbolic capital he sought out, he had no interest in getting involved with 
the Leplayists or even for that matter with the Parisian positivists of Littrean inspiration. 
In fact, it is not possible to entirely separate institutional capital from scientific capital, 
because, as in Durkheim’s case, the type of institutional capital he started out with, his 
educational background as a philosophy graduate of the École normale supérieure guided 
the strategies he pursued within the wider intellectual field. When he sought to publish 
his first review articles he aligned himself, as we shall see, with a journal that had definite 
ties to the arts faculty and to elite academic philosophy.177 
 If the distinction between institutional capital and scientific capital remains 
helpful here however it is because, in the context of the 1870s, developments in the wider 
field of journals very much anticipated developments that would occur within higher 
education. In the field of history for example after the École pratique des hautes études, 
with its fourth section for the historical and philological sciences, the foundation of the 
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Revue historique by Gabriel Monod in 1876 gave voice to the demand for a more 
rigorously methodological approach to history and the introduction of German scientific 
methods to French historical scholarship.178 Looking back on the period, Ernest Lavisse 
remembered his own extreme dissatisfaction with the type of classical bookish learning 
that predominated when he himself had been a student, the disdain for the natural 
sciences and the endless translations of random extracts from Latin to French and vice 
versa, offering little contact with concrete historical facts.179 With the introduction in 
1880 of some amount of specialisation at bachelor’s degree level, with the foundation of 
three separate ‘licence’ options in history, a crucial step was taken towards the creation of 
professional scientific training for future historians.180 In the meantime however, the 
Revue historique from 1876 served as the forum for the promotion of professional 
solidarity and more rigorous scientific research methods inspired by German scholarship. 
 It was however not among the dissatisfied ‘normaliens agrégés d’histoire’ that 
Durkheim first sought company but among his fellow philosophy graduates at the Revue 
philosophique, also in a situation of minor rebellion against their philosophical 
predecessors. While the provocative statement, ‘every time a social phenomenon is 
directly explained by a psychological phenomenon, we may rest assured that the 
explanation is false’, would certainly make us expect an absolute opposition between 
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sociology and psychology, it was to a certain extent, on the back of experimental 
psychology that Durkheimian sociology actually came into being.181 Founded in 1876 
with Théodule Ribot as its editor, the Revue philosophique gave expression to a body of 
new ideas that were emerging from within the philosophical tradition. Ribot himself, like 
Durkheim, had a background in philosophy, was graduate of the École normale and had 
also taught philosophy for a period at the lycée. Like all academic philosophers of his 
generation, Ribot had been educated in the tradition of eclectic spiritualism but, 
influenced by evolutionary, biological and associational perspectives from England and 
Germany, broke with the spiritualist method of psychological introspection and proposed 
to study psychological phenomena in an ‘objective’ and ‘scientific’ manner.182 Against a 
philosophy in which spiritual beings escape the determinism of the physical world, Ribot 
argued that other facts such as heredity could explain consciousness and that this could be 
analysed through observation and experimentation. His views were controversial and 
although he successfully defended them in his doctoral thesis in 1873, he was not initially 
offered any university position and took an indefinite leave of absence from his teaching 
obligations.   
 Although the Revue claimed to be a ‘neutral ground’, open to all philosophical 
schools, in reality it opened the door for the diffusion of the new ideas in the human 
sciences through its openness to ‘positivism’ and to the ‘experimental school’ both in 
France and abroad and on its contents pages the names of Taine, Renan, Herbert Spencer 
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and Wilhelm Wundt stand out alongside mainstream philosophers such as Paul Janet and 
Louis Liard.183 Alfred Espinas, the author of the first doctoral thesis in sociology, an ex-
classmate of Ribot at the École normale and fellow-enthusiast for Herbert Spencer, was 
also very much involved and most of the early volumes of the Revue featured several of 
his contributions. Thus the creation of the Revue philosophique and collaboration of 
Ribot and Espinas in activities such as the translation of Herbert Spencer’s Principles of 
Psychology into French were important in creating the conditions for the development of 
sociology and its promotion among the intellectual elite associated with the École 
normale and the university.  As Raymond Lenoir tells us, these activities helped to spread 
a ‘new spirit’ among a new generation of academics and laid the groundwork for a more 
rigorously scientific approach to the study of psychological phenomena.184 So when 
Durkheim published his first reviews of contemporary work in sociology he was not 
introducing a radically new subject to an unprepared audience. The appropriate journal 
and readership already existed. What his work involved however was convincing this 
public of both the scientific credentials of sociology itself and of his own authority in the 
subject. 
 
                                                 
183 Théodule Ribot, RP, 1(1876), 1-4 (pp. 1-2). 
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2.2.2 The Fouillée/Espinas Encounter 
 The year 1885 is an important one in the history of sociology being the year in 
which Dukheim’s first publications, three review articles, appeared in Ribot’s Revue 
philosophique. It is to one of these articles, his review of Alfred Fouillée’s La Propriété 
sociale et la démocratie, that I shall turn here, while I shall consider his views on German 
social theory contained in the other two articles in the next section.185 Compared to his 
later monumental works, these reviews may seem unimportant. Yet at this point in time, 
three years after Durkheim’s graduation from the École normale, while he was working 
as a lycée philosophy teacher and still not having left for his year of research in Germany, 
these articles offer a window onto how he viewed his own intellectual position, the 
figures with whom - be they orthodox or heterodox forces within the field - he aligned 
both himself and the set of ideas eventually to be developed in his doctoral thesis. In the 
case of the Fouillée review we see Durkheim consciously aligning himself with the 
position of Alfred Espinas and calling into question ‘out-moded’ conceptions of 
scientificity and approaches to the study of social phenomena.  
 Of course, Durkheim did not mention Espinas at all in the article, but he didn’t 
need to. Espinas would have been well known to readers as the author of the very first 
doctorate in sociology, the controversial thesis, Des sociétés animales, which he had 
defended before a jury of spiritualist philosophers in 1877.186 A polarity that would come 
                                                 
185 These were Émile Durkheim, ‘Schaeffle, A., Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers: 
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up again and again in the academic debate over sociology, Espinas’s thesis was built 
around what he presented as a fundamental opposition between an  ‘artificial’ conception 
of society, which he associated with Rousseau, and the idea of society as a ‘natural’ 
reality, which he deemed necessary for it to become an object of scientific study. Against 
the view of society as an artificial human creation, one which can be built in conformity 
with an abstract principle and which be changed by an act of will, Espinas proposed that 
society was natural, a living whole made up of co-ordinated parts, governed by laws like 
a biological body and that association was to be observed at all stages of animal and 
human life.187 So it was not something that a lawmaker or politician one day just created 
in accordance with an ideal, and if, he argued, a genuinely scientific knowledge of human 
societies was to be developed at all, the practice of deriving the best form of society from 
unobserved a priori principles must broken with.  
 His thesis may read more like a work of zoology, the main part being almost 
wholly taken up with the observation of animal societies, but he suggested that biology 
then zoology actually prepared the way for social science and that from teasing out the 
laws governing animal societies one could gain insight into those of human societies.188 
Following Herbert Spencer, he suggested that human societies were governed by the 
same laws as all organic and inorganic matter. From an initial state of homogeneity they 
became increasingly differentiated, with social evolution bringing ever increasing 
structural complexity. The formation of social organs working in co-ordination with each 
other and with each one essential to the functioning of the whole was,  he argued, what 
                                                                                                                                                 
of French Liberalism, 1870-1914 (Deklab, ILL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1983), 
pp. 100-11 and Brooks, The Eclectic Legacy, chapter 3. 
187 Espinas, Des sociétés animales, p. 9 
188 Ibid, pp. 93-94 
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guaranteed social stability. In the higher forms of society, not only did relationships of 
hierarchy develop between the various organs, with a central organ, a ‘social brain’, co-
ordinating the activity of the whole, but in human societies the links between the 
component parts took on a predominantly psychological or moral nature.189  
 Although this work caused something of a controversy in 1877 what was at issue 
was not so much the thesis itself - his adjudicators awarded him the doctorate in the end - 
but, John Brooks tells us, the historical introduction. The jury of spiritualist philosophers 
took issue with his description of the history of sociology as the battle between the 
artificial, philosophical view and the natural, scientific view, and with the pivotal place 
Espinas accorded to Auguste Comte in developing the latter. The condition they set 
Espinas for its complete publication was the removal of the sections on Comte and when 
Espinas refused, the entire introduction was suppressed in the first edition. 190 It was thus 
principally through the Revue philosophique that his thesis was introduced to the French 
public, with Ribot reviewing the first edition in 1877 and the second edition (complete 
with the historical introduction) in 1879.191  
 Now, when Durkheim set about writing his review of 1885, a conversation on 
sociology had already been held in the pages of the Revue philosophique between 
Espinas and Alfred Fouillée.192 Fouillée was a highly respected and self-trained 
independent philosopher and both Espinas and Durkheim recognised the immense 
                                                 
189 Espinas, Des sociétés animales, pp. 114-28, pp. 514-26. 
190 The Sorbonne was wary of being perceived as promoting ‘radical positivism’, fearing 
a reaction from the religious authorities, see Célestin Bouglé in ‘L’oeuvre sociologique d’ 
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192 See Alfred Fouillée, ‘Vues synthétiques sur la sociologie’, RP, 9 (1880),369-96 and 
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authority invested in Fouillée.193  What was significant about Fouillée however is that he 
was the first important figure in the world of philosophy to open up to the science of 
society proposed by Espinas. Departing from a tendency in philosophy to associate the 
term invented by Auguste Comte, sociology, and the naturalist view of society with 
materialism and fatalism, Fouillée in La Science sociale contemporaine, and in his 1880 
article in the Revue philosophique, had tried to reconcile Espinas’s organicism with ideals 
and action. He argued that while society may have developed like a biological organism, 
the higher one goes in the chain of development the more adherence to the organism 
becomes conscious, and that when one reached the highest stage of evolution, that of 
truly human society, it becomes possible to direct society and to pursue ideals, or what he 
called the ‘idées-forces’, immanent in every society. The social body thus became for 
Fouillée a voluntarily adhered to ‘contractual organism’.194  Although in his response, 
Espinas welcomed the openness of the philosopher to the naturalist perspective, he did 
criticise Fouillée for building his entire argument from logical deduction rather than 
empirical observation and also for passing back over to the idealism of the ‘politicien 
logicien’ in the end. Rather than trying to explain contemporary political consciousness, 
Fouillée was, in Espinas’s view, content to locate the source of action in ideals, and 
ignored the role of traditions and instincts in modern life.195  
                                                 
193 Espinas, ‘Les études sociologiques en France’, p. 338, Émile Durkheim, ‘L’état actuel 
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 It was on these comments that Durkheim built his own case against Fouillée in the 
1885 review. The work in question here was another of Fouillée’s books, La Propriété 
sociale et la démocratie, in which the author had sought to reconcile individualism and 
socialism.196 Given what we know about Durkheim’s own interest in this same issue at 
the time we would indeed expect a more positive review.197 Yet in his critical comments 
Durkheim took issue not so much with the actual social and political content of Fouillé’s 
argument, one which was based on a rejection of extreme conceptions of both an 
‘individualism’ where one owed nothing to anybody beyond one’s self, and of a 
‘socialism’ which subordinated the individual to the needs of the community. For 
Fouillée society and the individual were not two mutually exclusive terms but, given that 
society was made up only of individuals and that individuals needed society to live and to 
work, actually implied each other. He concluded that in modern individualist society 
there was no contradiction in the idea of a duty of charity to ensure greater social 
equality, and advocated a moderate re-distribution of wealth, while suggesting that 
universal suffrage combined with civic education should be promoted to permit equal 
participation in politics.  
 However it was not so much Fouillée’s political arguments but more his 
conception of society and his method of logical reconciliation that Durkheim opposed. 
Viewing Fouillée’s solution to what he considered to be one of the most pressing 
questions of the day as too simple, Durkheim doubted that it would work in reality. The 
point was not whether individualism and socialism were mutually exclusive in terms of 
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logic, but that they referred to very complicated real-life issues, which did not lend 
themselves to such quick and easy logical fixes: ‘sociology’, he wrote, cannot be too 
wary of such ‘simple solutions’.198 In short, he criticised Fouillée’s conception of 
scientific method, and argued that while the method of reconciliation may be 
intellectually attractive it was merely a form of logical gymnastics. In his own later 
attempt in the Division of Labour to analyse the relationship between individualism and 
socialism, Durkheim would display a new conception of scientificity in social studies, 
involving empirical observation and induction. In this article, for the meantime, he 
aligned himself with Espinas in criticising the excessive role accorded to human action 
by Fouillée and argued that even in its modern form, society still needed to be considered 
as an organism, not an artitificial creation of a lawmaker.199 Finally, he pointed out holes 
in Fouillée’s knowledge of the topic under discussion, in particular, his caricature of 
socialist thought as implying the annihilation of the individual and ‘mis-reading’ of the 
work of the German social theorist Albert Schaeffle.  
 In this review, unlike in the Espinas article, there was little expression of 
gratefulness towards the eminent philosopher for putting his weight behind sociology, as 
Durkheim confidently refused the offer to accommodate sociology within the ‘logical 
gymnastics’ of philosophy. Although, this critique of a highly respected figure from a 
newcomer to the field could have easily backfired, the risk was actually minimal given 
that Espinas had already softly indicated some of the problems with Fouillée’s viewpoint. 
Durkheim, in the hospitable territory of the Revue, criticised the philosopher’s method of 
logical reconciliation, his intellectualist bias and indicated the need for a more 
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sociological, more ‘genuinely scientific’ approach. In the process he presented himself as 
better informed than his eminent opponent on one crucial point, developments in 
Germany.  
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2.2.3 The German Connection 
 The question of the German influence on Durkheim in the development of his 
sociology would become a controversial one in the years running up to the First World 
War as anti-German feeling and bitterness over the events of 1870-71 began again to be 
stirred up.200 Indeed, when the Catholic polemicist Simon Déploige accused Durkheim of 
repeating German ideas to an unsuspecting French public, the latter replied, clearly 
offended, that while he did introduce certain German authors to France, the English 
influence on his work was more important, and he even seemed to try to play down any 
debt to German social theory.201  Yet it is undeniable that Durkheim devoted much 
attention to German authors in his early work.202 However, beyond debating the precise 
nature and extent of the German influence, it is worth considering how Durkheim, with a 
clear sense for the opportune, was attracted to recent developments in German social 
theory and incorporated his knowledge of it into a strategy of scientific legitimation. If by 
the early twentieth century the German influence had become like an accusation to 
defend oneself against, twenty years earlier, in the 1880s, German science was invested 
with immense prestige in France; it was the model to be emulated and surpassed. One of 
the distinguishing features of new journals such as the Revue philosophique, Karady tells 
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us, was precisely the eye to intellectual developments abroad, to Germany especially, and 
Ribot himself had written books on experimental psychology in England and Germany.203 
German science thus offered more than inspiration: it was the embodiment of scientific 
legitimacy.   
 However, whereas the scientific history proposed by Lavisse and Monod or the 
scientific psychology proposed by Ribot already had a base from which to work, with 
sociology it was not simply a question of introducing new methods into a pre-existing 
field of studies; the discipline itself had to be built practically from scratch. And in order 
to convince the French intellectual public of the legitimacy of such an effort Durkheim 
played on concerns about the decline of French science and the progression of German 
science. If sociology was born in France with Auguste Comte, he argued, it was, almost 
echoing Pasteur’s concerns, becoming more and more a German science: the seeds laid in 
France, he lamented, were being cultivated elsewhere.204 While Durkheim may have been 
highly critical of some of the sociological work being carried out in Germany, whatever 
its faults the very fact that work in sociology was being conducted at all, he argued, was a 
further demonstration of the perseverance of German thinkers in developing the new 
science.205 
 Throughout these early articles, Durkheim constantly presented himself as both an 
admirer of and expert on the German social theorist Albert Schaeffle. In the same 1885 
volume of the Revue in which his Fouillée review was published, Durkheim wrote a 
highly favourable account of Scaheffle’s Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers, praising 
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the way in which the author, like Espinas, took society as a natural reality and used the 
organic analogy to show how its various parts were linked together like the organs of a 
body.206 If Spencer had been concerned with what Comte called ‘social dynamics’, 
Schaeffle worked on ‘social statics’, analysing the composition of contemporary nations 
and their principal social groups. While Schaeffle used the organism as a metaphor he 
also, wrote Durkheim, highlighted the fundamental difference between the individual 
organism and the social organism in that these groups were made up of and linked to each 
other by ideal bonds.207  
 This distinction was important, argued Durkheim, and although he aligned 
himself with Espinas at the outset, he sought to draw a clearer distinction than Espinas 
ever did concerning the difference between biology and sociology. And in his effort to 
draw this distinction, Schaeffle, was the pivotal figure. The problem in France, Durkheim 
complained, was that Schaeffle was completely misunderstood as a biological 
sociologist.208 While Schaeffle used the biological analogy, he also, Durkheim claimed,  
understood that since social science studied a different type of reality to that of biology it 
also needed its own methods. So, Schaeffle, argued Durkheim, could not therefore be 
called a biological sociologist, as Fouillée and other French readers had argued; his 
message was, on the contrary, that sociology could not be subsumed under biology, that it 
must establish itself on an independent basis.209 Unlike Fouillée, Schaeffle in fact 
understood the complexity of social life and the methods needed to study it; he proposed 
not a grand logical synthesis but emphasised the need for detailed, precise studies, for 
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painstaking observation of society’s constituent parts and the links between them.210 In 
this way, Durkheim did not just introduce his own conception of scientific method in 
sociology, but through his comments on the failure of French readers to properly grasp 
Schaeffle’s thought, he presented himself as an authority where it mattered, on German 
science. Indeed it was not just Fouillée’s mis-interpretation that Durkheim highlighted: in 
his reviews of Ludwig Gumplowicz in Austria and Guillaume de Greef in Belgium he 
lamented that neither had managed to properly grasp Schaeffle’s message. 211 The type of 
organicist theory that people erroneously attributed to Schaeffle should, wrote Durkheim, 
in actual fact really be attributed to Paul de Lilienfeld, who, beyond using the biological 
organism simply as a metaphor, sought to derive laws of society directly from biology. 212 
 Given the prestige of German science in France, and indeed given that the 
German university too served as a model for the French university reform movement, it is 
not surprising that Durkheim himself should have chosen to spend part of the academic 
year of 1885-86 in Germany. On his return, like most of the graduates sent there on 
government scholarships, he produced a report detailing his observations at the German 
universities, which was published in the reform-orientated Revue internationale de 
l’enseignement. 213  He also wrote a second article, his survey of ‘positive moral science’ 
in Germany, which was published in the Revue philosophique. 214 In an effort to prove 
the scientific legitimacy of the new approach to the study of moral facts that he himself 
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was trying to introduce to France, Durkheim told his readers that only in Germany was 
any real attempt being made to go beyond deductive approaches which seek to artificially 
reduce very complex moral reality to a single principle, and to develop a ‘truly inductive 
method’. Only the German moralists, he wrote, saw moral phenomena as both ‘empirical 
and sui generis’ and have tried to develop moral science as an autonomous science, 
irreducible to biology and psychology, with its own object - morals, customs, law, 
economic facts - methods and explanatory principles.215 
 I shall also come back to this second article further on in relation to Durkheim’s 
effort to outline the subject matter and internal divisions of sociology and on the relation 
between social ‘science’ and social ‘art’ (by which he meant conscious human action on 
society). For now however it is interesting to note how the image of Wilhelm Wundt in 
the report on philosophy in the German universities serves almost as a symbol of what 
had been lost in French science and what the university reformers were seeking to 
retrieve.  Emphasising the international renown of Wundt, Durkheim depicted hordes of 
enthusiastic students flocking every year to his laboratory in experimental psychology at 
Leipzig, conjuring up an image of the previous epoch when students from all over Europe 
would have travelled to Paris to come into contact with the newest ideas and discoveries. 
At the same time however, Durkheim seemed to be suggesting that all was not lost to 
Germany. Indeed he was not uncritical of the German universities, which, he suggested, 
failed in reality to live up to the ideal. In these institutions he argued, the ‘old 
metaphysics’, of Kant and Schopenhauer continued to dominate: not only was Herbert 
Spencer hardly studied at all, but, he complained, the new ideas in sociology and 
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experimental psychology represented by Schaeffle and Wundt were almost completely 
ignored at an official level.216 Durkheim depicted both figures as relative outsiders, 
seeking to introduce new ideas and methods: Wundt was described as an ‘original mind’, 
who shook the ‘yoke of tradition’, by breaking with metaphysics, but who met with 
hostility and indifference from the establishment. In a subtle plug for Ribot’s work 
Durkheim remarked that Wundt was in fact better known in France than in Germany.217 
His message here and overall is, I suggest, that the direction indicated by Schaeffle and 
Wundt ought to be built on in France and that the development of sociology could 
represent something of an opportunity to regenerate French science, and to perhaps even 
overtake Germany on this count.   
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2.3 An Institutional Foothold 
 Having hitherto focused on Durkheim’s initial interaction with the scientific 
community generally, without mention of the official channels of intellectual 
consecration and diffusion of knowledge, the aim here is, by contrast, to look specifically 
at the legitimation of sociology within the institutions of French academic life. In the 
French system, this institutional legitimacy, as distinct from scientific legitimacy, can 
come from two sources: firstly, it can derive from appointments within the national 
education system, which I call here university capital, or it can come from appointments 
to a parallel set of academic institutions of consecration such as the Collège de France or 
the Académie française, which we can call academic capital.218 Between 1887 and 1892, 
there were no appointments in sociology to any of these important academic institutions, 
nor was any space made for the discipline in the prestigious Parisian educational 
institutions such as the Sorbonne or the École normale. Nevertheless, Durkheim’s 
appointment to a minor position in a provincial university, as chargé de cours in 
pedagogy and social science at Bordeaux, was no slight development. It was in this 
period that sociology gained an initial foothold within the educational system.  
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2.3.1 The Appointment to Bordeaux 
 Scientific and institutional capital, although never entirely distinct from one 
another, do not necessarily imply or reinforce each other: an author or a discipline may be 
widely recognised as legitimate by the intellectual field generally - their work may be 
respected among learned societies or among the readership of specialist journals - while 
being denied a place within the official institutions. Indeed, the career paths of both 
Théodule Ribot and Alfred Espinas should highlight the difficulty in assuming a direct 
passage from scientific legitimacy to institutional legitimacy or vice versa. What both 
Ribot and Espinas had in common was that they both sought to develop new approaches 
to the study of psychological and moral phenomena, to introduce into these subjects 
insights and methods from the natural sciences. Although Ribot successfully defended his 
doctoral thesis in 1873, the university administration, not wanting to be accused of 
endorsing positivistic ideas, was not prepared to offer him a university position. He 
subsequently remained outside academia for some 12 years. It was not until 1885 that 
there was any prospect of his return to the educational system when a ‘cours 
complémentaire’ in experimental psychology was created at the Sorbonne; in 1887, with 
the support of Ernest Renan a chair was then created for Ribot in comparative and 
experimental psychology at the Collège de France.219   
 The case of Espinas was less extreme, but he too had a long wait before being 
offered a post in his chosen subject. After his thesis defence in 1878 he was appointed to 
the University of Douai as a lecturer in philosophy; he then moved to Bordeaux in 1880 
to replace Louis Liard as a professor of philosophy, and here he also created a course in 
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pedagogy; in 1887 he was appointed Dean of the arts faculty at Bordeaux. In spite of 
what may seem like institutional acceptance, Espinas was never offered a position 
teaching social science and indeed in his philosophy lectures he seems to have spent 
much energy denouncing traditional philosophy and advocating positive science. It was 
not until 1895 that he was nominated to take on a newly created course in ‘économie 
sociale’ at the Sorbonne.220  
 In Durkheim’s case by contrast, his recognition by the philosophy avant-garde 
associated with the Revue philosophique (with its informal attachments to the arts faculty 
and the academic elite) as an authority on social science could be readily converted into 
institutional, here, university capital. Due to the changes occurring within the university 
itself, Durkheim’s career path, unlike that of Ribot or Espinas, met with considerably 
fewer obstacles early on. In the years immediately after his graduation from the École 
normale, he followed the road of most successful agrégés and for three academic years 
between 1882 and 1885 he taught philosophy in a number of provincial lycées. However, 
for the year 1885 he requested and was given what is described as a ‘congé d’inactivité’, 
or time off from his teaching duties on half salary, so that he could begin to develop his 
doctoral thesis.221 Although he did not yet have a doctorate, it seems that, at this point, he 
already aspired towards a university position.222 Furthermore given changes that were 
occurring in the university field, this aspiration was not entirely unrealistic. In the past, 
the career path of a philosophy agrégé would have involved first spending several years 
teaching in the provinces, then moving to the more prestigious Parisian lycées before 
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taking on a university teaching post. With the university reform however, positions below 
that of professor, such as ‘chargé de cours’ were created and it became common for the 
lycée teacher aspiring to a university career to pass from the provincial school into one of 
these minor posts in a provincial university, rather than onto a Parisian school as 
before.223 Such was the route embarked on by Durkheim. 
   In January 1886 he had a crucial meeting with Louis Liard, the Director of 
Higher Education, in which there was talk of a possible promotion to a university 
position in the following academic year, and it was directly after this meeting that he left 
for Germany. However, if Durkheim at this point was hopeful about a university 
appointment, the prospect of it being in ‘social science’ did not even enter his field of 
vision – what he sought from Liard was, like Espinas before him, a position in 
philosophy.224 The day after his return from Germany, in August 1886, Durkheim wrote  
a letter to Liard enquiring about the possible appointment referred to during their meeting 
in January. For the year 1886, nothing materialised and he was sent as a philosophy 
teacher to the lycée of Troyes. Meanwhile however, Espinas  had recently been made 
Dean of the Arts Faculty at Bordeaux and with the backing of Liard, himself an honorary 
professor at the same university, created a new course in social science, added to that of 
pedagogy. Although Liard was no positivist, as his book La Science positive et la 
métaphysique indicates, he believed that, as part of the reform, universities needed to 
open up to the new intellectual trends, to make space for the new approaches and new 
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disciplines.225 Thus, in what has been described as a ‘revolutionary measure’ introducing 
into the traditional curriculum an ‘entirely new discipline’, an opening emerged for 
Durkheim within the university not in philosophy but in the new discipline of social 
science.226  
 When it came to choosing someone for the new post, Durkheim’s authority was 
immediately recognised. His work of intense reading and reviewing, his collaboration 
with the Revue philosophique and his trip to Germany paid off. In contrast to the case of 
Ribot or Espinas, Durkheim, within two years of his debut as a review writer and without 
yet having his doctorate, was offered a university position in his chosen subject. The 
critique of traditional philosophy and the desire for innovation did not work against his 
university career as it did in the case of Ribot or Espinas. The university field itself was 
changing, and Durkheim’s scientific authority this time reinforced his search for 
institutional recognition. Not only had he got the appropriate background in academic 
philosophy, he had also proved himself to be ‘perfectly informed’ on the ‘most recent 
works in social science’: ‘Nobody’, wrote René Lacroze ‘was better qualified than he 
was.’ 227 
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2.3.2 The History of Sociology 
 An inaugural lecture, wrote Bourdieu, is loaded with symbolism: it is a sort of 
‘rite of passage’, similar to the medieval inceptio, whereby the members of an existing 
corporation of teachers come to recognise a new ‘maître’. 228 Durkheim’s opening lecture 
at Bordeaux is doubly significant in that it marked both his own passage into the 
university and with him, a new course of studies. At the same time, the choice of lecture 
topic, the history of sociology, and his particular approach to this subject, announced this 
entry with gusto.  
 In his 1886 survey of current state of sociological studies, Durkheim had 
remarked on the importance of tracing the history and the intellectual roots of a science: 
people, he wrote, are wary of a science which just seems to have appeared out of the blue, 
without any ‘historical antecedent’.229 It was finally to this issue that he turned in his 
opening lecture to his course on sociology at Bordeaux.230 In itself, there was nothing 
remarkable about tracing the history of an idea or a school of thought, a common practice 
in philosophy at the time. However, it was precisely this topic, Espinas’s introductory 
chapter on the history of sociology, that had proved so explosive ten years previously. 
Not only this but the main problem with Espinas’s historical sketch was the way in which 
he wrote this history as a struggle between ‘science’ and ‘philosophy’. There were, he 
had argued, two opposing ways of seeing society: one a metaphysical, unscientific view 
that took society as an artificial, human creation and another scientific view, which took 
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society as a natural reality. 231 It was, he had claimed, only through the triumph of the 
latter, of science over a priori thinking that sociology could come into being. 
 It was therefore significant that Durkheim’s lecture opened with a similar 
opposition between ‘science’ and ‘art’, between science which studies what exists and 
art, which is concerned with what ought to be. If sociology was to constitute itself as a 
science it must, he argued, observe the social reality; it must break with the practice in 
philosophy of starting out from an a priori principle posited as a universal ideal and 
deriving the best form of society from it. Durkheim’s lecture, like Espinas’s history, was 
constructed around this opposition between the artificial and the naturalist view. While 
the former started out from an unobserved, timeless ideal and derived from it the best 
form of society, the sociologist, argued Durkheim,  must start out from the observation of 
facts and proceed by induction.  
 Since antiquity, Durkheim argued, philosophers had been concerned with the 
study of society. However up until recently the tendency to view society as an artificial 
creation, entirely constructed by individuals and infinitely malleable to will, had 
prevented the development of a genuinely scientific perspective on society.232 In France 
certain theorists in the eighteenth century, such as Condorcet and Montesquieu, realised 
that societies, like all natural phenomena, were governed by laws. It was however the 
classical economists who first applied this idea to the economic realm, which they took to 
be governed by laws as necessary as those of the physical world. They considered efforts 
by governments to modify societies as pointless or even harmful: ‘Extend this principle 
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to all social facts and sociology is established’. 233  Although Durkheim praised this 
insight of the classical economists, he also argued however that one must step back from 
their tendency to see in society only the individual. While they derived their laws from an 
abstract human nature, proposed as always and everywhere the same, Durkheim argued 
that the reality was in fact far more complex.234  
 The name of Auguste Comte which had provoked so much controversy ten years 
previously was pivotal here and while the classical economists, in Durkheim’s view,  
‘stopped at the halfway point’, Comte built on their work and founded sociology. For 
Comte, as for the classical economists, social facts could not be viewed as artificial 
constructions, but his big advance was to show that society was ‘as real as a living 
organism’.235 Social things could not, for him, be explained in terms of individuals, as 
nothing more than an aggregate of individuals. Society was something more than the sum 
of its individual parts and had its own nature and laws. To study society scientifically one 
could not start out from metaphysical speculation about individual nature but should 
begin by looking at the empirical social reality.236 
 Comte almost always emerged as the decisive figure in Durkheim’s writings on 
the history of sociology and these consistent references partly explain the ‘positivist’ 
label that has stuck to his sociology. However, these references to positivism need to be 
seen as part of a strategy through which Durkheim built his own definition of sociology 
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through engaging with a set of well known, if controversial references in late nineteenth 
century thought. Comte’s very name was, at the same time, symbolic of the rebellion 
against the traditional introspective philosophy, and placing it at the centre of his lecture 
was an act of intellectual position taking. However, the idea of Durkheim as a positivist 
needs some qualification. If he welcomed Comte’s insight into the distinct nature of 
social reality and the need for any genuine science of society to break from a priori 
thinking, when it came to the other aspect of the positivist doctrine - the philosophy of 
history and the evolutionary law of the three stages - he stepped back. The problem with 
Comte, Durkheim argued, was that he assumed there was only one Society, a universal 
Humanity following along the same path towards the ideal. This, according to Durkheim, 
was an abstraction, nowhere confirmed in reality and denied the immense complexity of 
social life. 237  
 So although Comte was central to the progress of sociology, Durkheim implicitly 
situated himself within the Littrean tradition and criticised Comte’s descent into 
metaphysical speculation. Indeed it was on similar grounds that he criticised Herbert 
Spencer, another common reference point in experimental psychology and early 
sociology. Spencer, through his detailed empirical studies and focus on specific 
questions, went beyond Comte in making society altogether less abstract. However, he 
too had started out from an assumption about the law of evolution, and the facts he 
gathered only served to prove his ‘grand hypothesis’, that humanity was evolving 
towards ever-greater happiness.  238 The scientific path to be followed, argued Durkheim, 
was that indicated by Espinas who highlighted the need for detailed empirical studies, 
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and that of the German social theorists who had taken a historical approach to the study 
of morality, the economy and legal institutions.239  
 So according to Durkheim the triumph of sociology as a ‘positive science’ would 
involve overcoming what he depicted as the hitherto dominant philosophical approach to 
society, coined as ‘social art’. One must leave behind the artificial view with its tendency 
to derive everything from a few abstract principles and follow Espinas in viewing society 
as a natural reality, governed by its own laws, which could be grasped through 
observation. In short, what had been a taboo topic in 1877 had now definitively entered 
the establishment. Not surprisingly, Espinas, the new Dean at Bordeaux, hailed the 
occasion as a ‘great event’.240      
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2.3.3 A Strategy of Moderation? 
 In the confidential annual reports of the rector of Bordeaux to the Ministry of 
Public Instruction social science was initially described as an ‘idea which could bear 
fruit’, but the tone was distinctively careful: the ‘difficult’ and ‘delicate’ nature of both 
this subject and the class in pedagogy was stressed.241 Over the next few years the tone 
changed considerably: by 1889 Durkheim’s  ‘great success’ was being applauded, and by 
1893 the faculty was pressing for the course in social science to remain at Bordeaux and 
for Durkheim to be promoted to a permanent chair.242  Durkheim clearly impressed his 
colleagues with his intellectual and scientific authority and was described as the ‘only 
one in France who is up to date on the sociological movement’, and as someone who 
‘lives only for science’.243  His teaching and public lectures were referred to as 
‘excellent’ or ‘remarkable’, and he was praised for being able to appeal to a diverse and 
difficult audience, ranging from primary-school teachers, to all those  ‘curious about 
sociology’ including the law professors, attracted by the newness of the subject.244 
However, what seemed to impress his colleagues the most was the capacity of the young 
‘maître’ to deal, in a sensitive manner, with  ‘the most delicate questions’.245  
 In the opening lecture it is as if Durkheim had a sense of the concerns about the 
nature of the subjects he had been employed to teach. Almost echoing the terms used by 
the rector in his first report, Durkheim began by recognising the ‘difficulties’ of his task. 
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Rather than presenting the course in sociology as a ‘revolutionary break’, as he could 
well have done, he consciously avoided making any exaggerated claims for science. 
Social science was ‘born only yesterday’ and as yet could only claim a small number of 
definitively established principles. He himself had not come to reveal a doctrine that was 
the ‘secret possession of a tiny school of sociologists’, but to progressively construct a 
science, to ‘pose a certain number of questions about society which are related to each 
other’ and to ‘propose a method which we shall experiment together’.246 Throughout the 
lecture he insisted on the complexity of social life, which is why he stepped back from 
Comte’s descent into scientism.247 Durkheim, it was later remarked, constructed his 
sociology ‘patiently, piece by piece, year by year’; he was against those sort of ‘vague 
generalities’ typical of Spencer and focussed his attention on specific questions, the 
solution to which he would then build into his theory’.248   
 The political counterpart of this scientific moderation was expressed in the refusal 
of simple intellectual solutions to social and political issues. He was not offering ‘ready-
made remedies to cure our modern societies. Science does not move so quickly. It needs 
time, a great deal of time, to become of practical use’.249   This should not be seen as a 
rejection of politics per se, but more a recognition of the depth and complexity of social 
life. Durkheim’s point was that one should not jump to hasty political conclusions and 
dress them in the language of science. Indeed it was precisely this tendency to become 
dogmatic, to jump prematurely into politics in a way that had nothing scientific about it 
that he criticised in Comte and Spencer.  
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 This may have reassured the more traditionally inclined sectors of the audience, 
and those in the establishment such as Liard, who wanted to innovate but who were 
nevertheless wary about some of the exaggerated claims of a certain type of positivism. 
Yet, paradoxically, the moderate tone also enabled him to appeal to the new ideal of 
scientificity in the intellectual field, while disarming those critics who were still in doubt 
as to the scientific credentials of sociology. He himself realised that a ‘young 
‘science...enjoys greater credibility among scientific minds when it presents itself with 
greater modesty’.250 He described sociology as a science that had only just come into 
being and as one yet to be made. It was a science of discovery, and, depicting himself in 
the image of the German teacher-researcher dear to the reformers, he argued that 
alongside the chairs from which ‘established science and acquired truths are taught’, 
there was room for a professor who ‘creates his science even as he is teaching it’.251  
Indeed each of his lecture courses were constructed around research topics many of 
which would later be published as book-length studies. In the first year at Bordeaux he 
lectured on  ‘La Solidarité Sociale’, where many of the central concepts of the Division of 
Labour were introduced.252 In a similar fashion his lecture course of 1889-90 dealt with a 
topic, suicide, on which he had recently published a short study in the Revue 
philosophique.253  
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 So the depiction of sociology as a science of discovery was also a way of 
enhancing his scientific standing in the public view. In his introductory lecture on the 
family he rejected again the practice of starting out from abstract assumptions about the 
ideal family, and outlined his experimental approach. In doing this he appealed to Claude 
Bernard, the ultimate symbol of scientific legitimacy, and his conception of 
experimentation as means of comparing how phenomena vary in differing circumstances. 
The sociological method towards the study of the family, he argued, would also involve 
‘indirect experimentation’: it would look at how domestic relations vary according to the 
family types found at different points in history and in different places. Such a study 
would proceed from observation, using external indicators such as legal codes and 
statistics where possible.254 Significantly, Durkheim’s presentation of sociology as a 
science of discovery also helped him to distinguish his sociology from other versions, 
which started out with a preconceived definition of a ‘social problem’. Thus whereas 
Frédéric Le Play had started out from the idea of the patriarchal family as the best form 
of family life Durkheim argued that we can have not such preconceptions, at least not at 
the beginning of research.255  
 According to Célestin Bouglé one of the most striking differences between 
Durkheim and Espinas, was that Durkheim’s tone was altogether ‘more modest’.256 
While both sought recognition as a ‘scientist’, and emphasised the need for sociology to 
break with a priori thinking, to pass to the positive stage of empirical observation, 
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Durkheim did not attack ‘philosophy’ as Espinas sometimes seemed to. In fact he 
consciously sought to appeal to philosophers, arguing that sociology could indeed offer a 
new perspective on ethics.257 Furthermore, his very definition of sociology, as involving 
the study of morals, religion, collective ideals as well as legal and economic institutions 
as they evolved through history, reinforced the interdisciplinary guise of the new course 
of studies.258 This could only serve to reinforce its scientific legitimacy in that it again 
appealed to the ideal dear to the university reformers of breaking down the divide 
between the faculties of law, science and arts. So although the moderate tone may have 
reassured the more traditional sectors of his audience at Bordeaux, it also helped him to 
reinforce the scientific credentials of his subject. 
 Given the traditional prestige of the Parisian institutions it would be easy to 
assume that Durkheim’s appointment to Bordeaux was an effort on the part of a hostile 
establishment to keep a positivistic sociology at bay. All the evidence however points to 
the contrary. The university field itself was becoming more receptive to social science. At 
the same time, more opportunities for agrégés were opening up within the universities 
and the reform movement sought to develop institutions outside the capital. Just as 
Durkheim found in the Revue philosophique an organ through which he could diffuse his 
ideas long before the foundation of his own journal the Année sociologique, at Bordeaux, 
he found a base from which to introduce sociology into the university curriculum. As one 
witness to Durkheim’s doctoral defence remarked, it was no longer necessarily the case 
that the intellectual elite would automatically set their sights on Paris: Bordeaux, where a 
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number of important figures, including Durkheim, were based, was already proving itself 
to be an  ‘université avant la lettre’.259  
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2.4 Science and Politics  
 While a line can certainly be traced from Alfred Espinas and organicist social 
theory to Durkheim, it is also important to emphasise Durkheim’s efforts to draw a clear 
distinction between both biology and psychology, and the science of human societies, to 
explicitly define the distinct subject matter and method of the latter. 260 A strategy of 
legitimation informed by his philosophical education, this argument was also pursued by 
Durkheim as a way of setting apart his sociology from other existing definitions of social 
science. 261 I shall come back to the influence of academic philosophy in the next chapter 
and look at here the strategy of distinction in his effort to define sociology and its subject 
matter. And although the opening lecture at Bordeaux had been built around the 
opposition between ‘science’ and ‘art’, his very outline of subject-matter of sociology 
elaborated before 1890, as we shall see, led directly on to the question of politics. 
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2.4.1 Sociology and its Divisions 
 If Durkheim could praise Albert Schaeffle for his use of the organic metaphor, he 
was nevertheless careful to point out that is was just a metaphor, a useful source of 
insights, and that if sociology was to constitute itself as a legitimate science it must 
‘prove that its object was distinct from the phenomena studied by other sciences’.  This 
point, he remarked approvingly, had been made by both by De Greef and by 
Gumplowicz, who had also insisted on the importance of distinguishing sociology from 
biology, of constituting it as an independent science ‘sui generis’. 262 Where the organic 
analogy was helpful in Durkheim’s view, was in that it guided one against the two 
extreme views on the relationship between the individual and society, one represented by 
De Greef, the other by Gumplowicz: according to the former social life in its highest 
form of evolution would be a result of individual free choice, while Gumplowicz went to 
the opposite pole of defining society as an immense collective force acting on individuals 
wholly from without.263  
 Society, in Durkheim’s view, and this is where he drew on the organic analogy, 
had its own internal cohesion, a ‘solidarity that comes from within’, that is not imposed 
from without by any external power.264 Rather than starting off with the economy or the 
state or religion, for Durkheim it was this primary fact of ‘sociability’ that served as the 
basis from which all these other facts grew. 265 So if he did not accept the methods or the 
conclusions of either Gumplowicz or De Greef, he nevertheless drew out what he 
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considered to be the grain of truth from their work - their recognition that sociology must 
establish itself on an independent basis - which he would in turn build into the 
presentation of his own social theory. 
 Distinct from biology, sociology however must also avoid becoming just another 
chapter of psychology, and in this vein Durkhiem praised De Greef for drawing attention 
to a particular contradiction in Herbert Spencer’s thought: if on the one hand Spencer had 
recognised that sociology must distinguish its object from the facts studied by other 
sciences, his very conception of society as an aggregate of individuals itself undermined 
the independent disciplinary status of sociology and reduced it to psychology.266 
According to the Comtian theory of scientific progress, each science (astronomy, physics, 
chemistry, biology) had, over the course of history, progressively disentangled itself from 
both theology and metaphysics, to embark on the search for positive laws. In the positive 
stage, each science thus would have its own specific object of investigation, irreducible to 
any other, and its own distinct methods. Biology and psychology were the most recent 
sciences to free themselves from external doctrines and reductionism. With yet another 
reference to Claude Bernard, Durkheim hailed the physiologist’s great achievement in 
freeing biology from the ‘yoke’ of physics and chemistry and constituting it as an 
independent science.267 Now, he argued, it was the turn of sociology, which must also 
reject biological and psychological reductionism and begin to study the ‘facts 
themselves’, to ‘determine their laws’ and ‘special properties’.268 If there was a parallel 
between biology and psychology therefore, the conclusion drawn from it was that 
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sociology needed to distinguish itself from both. Against those who would class his 
method as ‘materialist’, Durkheim’s message even at this early stage was on the contrary 
that a genuinely scientific sociology must resist all forms of reductionism.  
 Given that sociology was a new science in the 1880s, there were, as Durkheim 
himself pointed out, still many critics who doubted its scientific validity and were not at 
all convinced that it had any future. However, he argued, the best way to prove such 
critics wrong was simply to demonstrate that sociology was actually being practiced, that 
the discipline was ‘alive and progressing’ and to explicitly define its object, the internal 
division of its subject-matter and its method.269 It was again through his review writing, 
that Durkheim sought to establish an initial outline of this subject-matter, by bringing 
together in a general survey of the field a number of recently published authors in 
sociology. In his 1886 collective review of Spencer’s Ecclesiastical Institutions, 
Regnard’s, L’État, ses origines, sa nature et son but and of Coste’s Les Questions 
sociales conemporaines, each of the authors in the survey served to elucidate the internal 
division of the subject-matter: first there was the branch which studied immaterial forms 
of social regulation such as religious beliefs and morals (Spencer), then there was the 
study of political institutions and the state (Regnard) and finally the study of economic 
institutions.270  
 Durkheim was far from uncritical of these authors and expressed his reservations 
about the excessive ‘simplisme’ of Spencer’s individualist account of religion and of 
Coste’s views on economic regulation, while at the other extreme, he criticised Regnard’s 
denial of natural internal solidarity, his postulation of an initial state of war and 
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explanation of the state in terms of a need for a less precarious existence.271 In an almost 
mocking tone he deplored the lack of any coherent scientific method on the part of both 
Regnard and more generally at the ‘recent discussion’ of the state at the Académie des 
sciences morales et politique - referred to almost ironically as  ‘la savante assembée’ - a 
passage in which his sense of entitlement, as a philosophy graduate of the École normale 
with a research trip to Germany and university position on the horizon, shines through.272  
 While these ‘authorities’ on the social sciences thus serve more as a starting point 
from which to outline the basic subject matter, through the critique of their methods 
Durkheim at the same time cleared the field around him and suggested the possibility of a 
‘more scientific’ approach. A similar line of argument was taken up in his survey of 
‘positive moral science’ where the critique of a number of German theorists was built 
into an attempt to outline sociology’s subject matter, its internal divisions and method. 
The article was divided into three main parts, again corresponding to the division of the 
subject matter of sociology: German economists (Wagner, Schmoller and Schaeffle), 
German legal theorists (Ihering and Post) and finally, theorists of religious and moral life 
(Wundt).  Presenting their ‘positivist’ approach to morality as something different to 
anything known in France with its penchant for a priori moral philosophy, Durkheim 
admired how these authors approached moral rules and actions as observable properties 
of social organisation, which varied throughout history and from one society to the 
next.273  The German economists, for example, did not try to derive the best form of 
economic or legal institutions from an abstract moral principle or argument about 
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individual nature or interest, but sought to understand existing institutions in relation to 
the concrete moral norms and customary regulations presented by specific societies.274 
Similarly, Wilhelm Wundt’s efforts to create a moral science, starting out from the 
empirical study of religion, custom and law and tracing the evolution of moral rules and 
obligations from their origins in religious beliefs and custom, to their crystallisation in 
positive law also resonated with Durkheim, himself seeking to break with Kantian and 
utilitarian explanations of morality.275 
 If Durkheim had a criticism to make of the German economists generally, it was 
their premature eagerness to move from science to political action, a hasty step he argued, 
given that the social reality was too complex for them to be able to claim to have grasped 
it once and for all in a manner to be able to base an infallible politics on ‘scientific’ 
knowledge of it. Their final conclusion that society could be transformed through the will 
of the legislator had in fact ‘nothing scientific about it’.276 Again, however, Schaeffle, 
with his patient work of observation, description and classification, represented the truly 
scientific position, and while building on the economists’ historical viewpoint he also 
understood that however advanced science might be, society was not infinitely 
malleable.277 Durkheim also praised the same work of patient observation and 
experimentation in Wilhelm Wundt, who stuck to the study of what existed and avoided 
of the premature leap to the question of what ought to be.278 
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 However just as Durkheim’s distinction between sociology and psychology did 
not mean that facts of a psychological nature such as religious ideas and morals did not 
form part of the subject matter of sociology, his cautious remarks on the relationship 
between ‘science’ and practical ‘art’ did not mean that sociology would have no political 
role in modern society. Through his reference to the authorative figure in early French 
sociology, the criminologist Gabriel Tarde, Durkheim indicated what form political 
intervention could take: alongside the branches of sociology studying religion, morals, 
legal and economic institutions, there would also be a branch devoted to cases of social 
pathology.279 Although in these early articles Durkheim insisted primarily on the need to 
develop sociology as a science that observed and explained what existed, rather than as a 
means of social change, he did say that this was because the science was still in its 
infancy and that a day would come in the future when it would be able to guide 
practice.280 And from his early work we can also gain an idea of what form this ‘social 
art’ might later take and how it might be reconciled to the scientific ideal. 
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2.4.2 Solidarity and Social Action 
 If on the one hand the scientist could be held up as the embodiment of disinterest, 
it was paradoxically, in this role as eternal devotee to truth that scientists were called on 
to exit the laboratory in order to contribute to the betterment of their society.281 Although 
the ‘social science’ and ‘social art’ opposition was central to Durkheim’s definition of 
sociology, he also however understood the contemporary demands on science to fulfil a 
social and political role, to contribute to the cause of national regeneration, political 
consolidation and social reform.282  Indeed, as we have seen above, in his review articles 
he presented the very act of developing a positive science of society as part of the effort 
to return France to its place of prestige in the context of German scientific advances. On 
the question of reform, he told his audience at Bordeaux that while  ‘science’ studied 
what exists and has existed and ‘art’ involved action in accordance with an ideal, the two 
were not mutually exclusive: if art could improve the reality, it was science that helped us 
know the reality we want to improve. And it was by constructing social types and 
classifying societies in terms of their social tie, that Durkheim avoided contradicting 
himself here and sought to overcome the opposition between ‘science’ and ‘art’. 283 
Postulating natural sociability as a fundamental fact from which all other social facts 
crystallise - religion, morality, codified laws, political and economic institutions - he 
proposed to go beyond the ‘simplisme’ of philosophy where everything was explained 
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with a ‘single principle’, while avoiding the opposite danger of empiricism or the ‘dust’ 
of ‘small facts’.284  
 In the first instance, his argument concerning a natural sociability already implied 
a definite normative judgement in relation to modern society. If against Spencer, religion 
was a system of representations that both hid and expressed underlying social conditions, 
then changes in the nature of these representations did not occur simply because the 
human mind changed. It was thus likely in Durkheim’s view, that beliefs, values and 
rules which, like older religious systems, had extra-individual origins and which imposed 
themselves on the individual consciousness, would continue to exist in modern society.285 
If sociability gave rise to religion, then although the content of religion may change as 
society changes, it would be hard, argued Durkheim against Guyau, to envisage the end 
of such socially generated religious-like beliefs and rules themselves. Even the revolution 
in thought or the progress of science, would not, he predicted, lead to the total 
disappearance of religious beliefs and rules.286 In modern society, rather than implying 
the disintegration of collective beliefs and obligations, individualism, argued Durkheim, 
in his praise of Ferneuil’s ‘scientific’ or sociological explanation of the values of the 
French Revolution, actually implied a new set of collective beliefs and moral rules.287  
 In another review of the previous year, his discussion of the German theorist 
Ferdinand Tönnies, Durkheim had indeed already presented his own conception of the 
modern social type. Accepting on the one hand Tönnies’s construction of two principal 
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social types, the traditional and the modern, and also with the characterisation of the 
traditional ‘gemeinschaft’ as a homogenous community sharing similar beliefs and 
values, Durkheim disagreed that the life of modern individualist society was any less 
natural or cohesive than that of small traditional social aggregates.288 Modern life implied 
neither social disintegration nor an artificial social harmony imposed from without by a 
strong state, but it too had its own internal harmony. This proposition however, as he 
remarked towards the end of the Tönnies review, would in fact need a whole book to 
prove scientifically, which was precisely what he would go on to do in his doctoral thesis, 
the Division of Labour. 289 Meanwhile, in his study of the statistical variations in suicide 
and birth rates across different societies, he suggested, against biological and racial 
explanations, that only social causes could account for the combined rising suicide and 
declining birth rates in France at the time: both, he argued, against the optimistic and 
ideal picture of modern society he presented in the Tönnies review, could be traced to a 
social milieu experiencing a loss of ‘family feeling’, which had become a place where the 
‘cold wind of egoism’ blew.290  By this point however Durkheim had already out-lined 
the direction his research would take over the course of the next decade.  
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Conclusion 
 By looking at these early articles and lectures I have sought to bring to the fore 
Durkheim’s efforts to establish both the scientific legitimacy of sociology and his own 
scientific authority in the new discipline. Alongside this I have also looked at his related 
pursuit and establishment of institutional legitimacy through the appointment at 
Bordeaux. While Durkheim’s university appointment was itself made possible by 
developments within the university field, it also seems clear that the way in which he 
defined both sociology as a science and its social role was very much shaped by  
demands of the intellectual field. At the same time however, if, with his articles in the 
Revue philosophique and the Revue internationale de l’enseignement, he sought to appeal 
to a certain ideal of scientificity, the strategies pursued here reveal more than an acute 
sense for the opportune: in his very definition of science, of sociology and its social role 
we can, I suggest, also find the influence of his philosophical education. It is thus to the 
roots of Durkheimian sociology in French academic philosophy, its ties to the École 
normale and the arts faculty that I shall turn next. 
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Chapter 3 
Philosophy, Sociology and the Confrontation  
over Moral Science 
 
 
 At the top of the disciplinary hierarchy in France in the late-nineteenth century, 
philosophy acted both as an important instrument of intellectual consecration and a 
vehicle through which a certain intellectual worldview could be imparted. Among those 
in possession of the rare diploma, the ‘agrégation de philosophie’, the graduates of the 
elite École normale were perfectly positioned and  - after the years of training at both the 
institution itself and at its preparatory schools - conditioned as the ‘nobility’ within this 
philosophical edifice.291 Since it was precisely from within this milieu that Durkheim 
came, it is important to consider the relationship of the sociology he would go on to 
develop to this philosophical background. Not only were the first confrontations over his 
work with philosophers but the way in which he defined sociology and its social role was 
also marked by this philosophical heritage. So before considering in chapter four, as 
Jean-Marie Berthelot has suggested one ought to do, the rivalry in early French sociology 
between different schools of thought in the new discipline, I shall first look at 
Durkheim’s position in the field of philosophy.292  
 Drawing on the work of John Brooks which has highlighted the continuity 
between philosophy and the nascent human sciences of experimental psychology and 
sociology, and on that of Warren Schmaus who has shown how Durkheim can be situated 
within the history of French academic philosophy, I shall in this chapter approach 
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Durkheim’s publications of the period roughly between roughly 1892 and 1896 with 
specific focus on their relationship to philosophy. An important few years, it was during 
this period that Durkheim defended his doctoral thesis, which appeared as his first book 
the Division of Labour in Society, and outlined the methodological principles that would 
be published as the Rules of Sociological Method. Before going on to a discussion of 
these works however it is necessary to begin by considering the state of the philosophical 
field Durkheim met with just at the point when he was starting out on his academic 
career.  
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3.1 The Crisis in Philosophy 
 What immediately stands out from different accounts by philosophers 
commenting on the state of their own discipline towards the latter part of the nineteenth 
century is a widespread perception of crisis. For one of the main representatives of the 
discipline during most of the period under consideration, Paul Janet, the ‘crisis’ was more 
of a threat, and in his view positive science and the ‘anti-spiritualist breeze’ were 
undermining philosophy and the university.293 From another perspective, slightly later in 
the century, the ‘crisis’ could however have a more positive connotation: the decades 
before 1914, wrote Dominique Parodi, were a period of expansion and innovation when 
the dominant philosophy of first half of the century was challenged and philosophers set 
off in a multitude of new directions.294 While the second interpretation, will, as we shall 
see prove instructive with regards to Durkheim’s position in the field, it is nevertheless 
only against the background of the Napoleonic university and philosophy’s place within 
it earlier on in the century that the term ‘crisis’ makes sense any at all.  
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3.1.1 The Edifice of Victor Cousin 
 Although the name of Victor Cousin may spark little interest nowadays, he was 
without a doubt the most important figure in French academic life in the early to mid-
nineteenth century, being the person who shaped both the university and the discipline of 
philosophy during this formative period. Indeed, the contrast between his position in the 
nineteenth century and his contemporary irrelevance couldn’t be more clearly reflected in 
the number of older studies devoted to him, by important nineteenth century philosophers 
in France.295 If Cousin’s memory was so important to the philosophers of the time it is 
because it was through him that their discipline acquired its central place within the 
French education system and came to be invested with immense prestige, as the 
‘crowning’ of a liberal education.296  
 It was with the foundation by Napoléon I of the Université de France - the 
corporation of teachers and administrators working in second and third-level education, 
employed directly by the state - that philosophy was instituted as a subject to be taught in 
the final year of the lycée, necessary for the baccalaureate and necessary to proceed to 
higher education. And within the university Victor Cousin came to wield immense 
power. Having started out as a suppléant to Royer-Collard in 1815, delivering immensely 
popular public lectures at the Sorbonne, he was forced out of his chair in 1822 being 
considered, in a period of monarchical reaction, as too much of a liberal.297  However 
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with the arrival in power of the Orléanists, or the July Monarchy in 1830, Cousin was not 
only restored to his old chair, but became ‘all-powerful’, to use the words of Adolphe  
Franck.298 Within the space of a few years in the early 1830s he had monopolised a 
number of important positions and appointments: alongside his chair at the Sorbonne he 
served on the Royal Council of Public Education, was elected to the Académie française, 
the Académie des sciences morales et politiques and became director of the École 
normale supérieure between 1835 and 1840.299    
 In certain respects, Cousin’s teaching can be seen as part of an effort to deal with 
the legacy of the French Revolution and to create a new consensus in the post-
revolutionary era. As Durkheim himself wrote, it was a philosophy which grew out of the 
needs of French society of the time.300 During the revolutionary epoch, ‘idéologie’ (a 
type of empiricism associated with Condillac that traced the roots of ideas and concepts 
to sensation) dominated philosophical discussion. Although by the early 1800s the 
ideologues had definitely fallen out of favour with Napoléon I, philosophy had remained 
locked into an opposition between idéologie (represented by Laromiguière) and the anti-
idéologues (represented by Royer-Collard).301 In his early public lectures at the 
Sorbonne, Cousin, rather than simply refuting the theses of idéologie, built up a new 
system altogether and founded a new philosophical consensus.302 
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 The two terms used to describe the system built by Cousin are eclecticism and 
spiritualism, though the combination ‘eclectic spiritualism’ perhaps best describes this 
type of philosophy.303 The term eclecticism refers to Cousin’s rejection of exclusive 
thinking, his effort to combine different philosophies into an eclectic synthesis. This, as 
Adolphe Franck tells us, derives from the idea that we do not create philosophy out of a 
void but build from ideas already present in the mind, out of a common stock of reason 
that forms part of our nature. The reason why different philosophical systems seem so 
contradictory is that each only accesses a small portion of truth, but believing to have 
accessed the whole truth they denounce other philosophies as false. The job of the 
eclectic philosopher is therefore to distil the element of truth out of each system and to 
combine these in a synthesis. The second term spiritualism, refers to the idea that within 
each human being there is an immaterial substance, the soul or the mind, independent of 
body and of sensation, that acts as an independent criterion of the true, the good and the 
beautiful. There are, wrote Franck, universal and necessary principles to which nature 
conforms and to which our mind conforms, and we have the capacity to access these 
principles to some extent through introspection.304  
 Cousin’s method was thus psychological and historical, being based on an inquiry 
into the nature of the mind and the distillation of the ‘element of truth’ from other 
systems in the history of philosophy. Being the person who controlled what was taught in 
the philosophy class in schools and universities throughout France, his influence was 
imprinted on the syllabus, which started off with psychological inquiry and concluded 
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with the history of philosophy. From the nature of the human mind, and its faculties, the 
‘natural subdivision’ of the subject matter of philosophy is derived from which one 
proceeds into logic and ethics, and then onto metaphysics or theodicy.305  Furthermore, as 
Brooks has also demonstrated with reference to the syllabi of 1832, 1874, 1880 and 1902, 
even though Cousin retired in 1852 his influence on French education remained right up 
until the end of the nineteenth century.306  Given that Durkheim came through this 
education system, given that he studied at the École normale between 1879 and 1882 it is 
reasonable to expect that the Cousinian heritage would form part of his intellectual 
habitus and in turn condition the formation of his sociology.307   
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3.1.2 Spiritualism and Positive Science 
 Cousin’s influence continued to be felt in the second half of the nineteenth 
century through the work of three figures in particular: Adolphe Franck (1809-93), Elme 
Caro (1826-87) and Paul Janet (1823-99). 308 Franck, to begin with, was a member of the 
Académie des sciences morales et politiques and titular holder of the chair of natural law 
and international law at the Collège de France from 1856; he espoused a philosophy 
which was both eclectic and spiritualist.309  While Franck’s best-known work, the 
celebrated philosophical dictionary, represented an important contribution to the history 
of philosophy, this work itself bore the clear stamp of his spiritualism.310 A strident critic 
of materialism and empiricism, Franck vigorously attacked Auguste Comte and 
positivism in his writings on the history of philosophy, and as Alfred Fouillée remarked, 
figures such as Taine, Spencer and Wundt were conspicuous by their absence from the 
dictionary.311 Adhering to the spiritualist distinction between the body governed by 
sensations, appetites and inclinations and the soul or mind irreducible to anything in the 
material world (economic factors, the physical environment or society), Franck depicted 
the human personality, or human soul/mind, acting consciously in accordance with duty, 
as the highest form of human activity. He saw in the word ‘sociology’ invented by 
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Comte, a new form of authoritarianism, which denied human freedom to choose between 
good and evil and did away with moral responsibility.312 
 Although Franck was important as a member of the Collège de France and the 
Institut, perhaps of more interest here would be Caro and Janet, both of whom held top 
positions at the Sorbonne and could more directly influence national education. Caro, 
who had been elected to both the Académie des sciences morales et politiques in 1869 
and to the Académie française in 1874, held the chair of philosophy at the Sorbonne until 
his death in 1887. It is from Charles Waddington, another spiritualist philosopher, holder 
of the chair of the history of ancient philosophy at the Sorbonne and a member of 
Durkheim’s doctoral dissertation jury in 1893, that we get a brief account of Caro’s life 
and works after his death. Caro, Waddington tells us, was, like Franck, a sworn enemy of 
positivism and materialism, who not only believed that materialism was bad science, but 
that it also had moral consequences, of which the rising suicide rate was clear proof. 
Materialism ‘affected souls’ and led to the decline of ideals in favour of fleeting pleasures 
of the flesh, reducing human to animal life.313 He contested the right of utilitarianism to 
found morality, saw positivism as a sickness of the heart and of the mind and, says 
Waddington, believed that only spiritualist beliefs would be capable of combating the 
moral ‘mal de siècle’.  
 On Caro’s death in 1887 it was Paul Janet who took over from him in the chair of 
philosophy at the Sorbonne, and who was therefore to be one of Dukheim’s main 
interlocutors during the thesis defence in 1893. Unlike Franck and Caro, Janet had come 
                                                 
312 Logue, From Philosophy to Science, pp. 22-25.  
313 See Elme Caro, Études morales sur le temps présent (Paris: Hachette, 1855) and Le 
Matérialisme et la science (Paris: Hachette, 1867). On Caro see Charles Waddington, 
Notice sur M. E. Caro, (Paris: Alphone Picard, 1889).  
142 
 
into direct contact with Victor Cousin, having worked as his secretary for two years 
before embarking on his own career in education. By the 1890s having, from 1889 to 
1896, served on the advisory board to the Minister for Public Instruction, the Conseil 
supérieur de l’instruction public, and as holder of the chair of philosophy at the Sorbonne, 
Janet was the dominant figure in academic philosophy.314  
 Janet thus had considerable influence on what was taught in the philosophy class 
in French schools and was also the author of a philosophy teaching manual, published in 
1879 to coincide with the publication of the new syllabus of 1880. 315 This manual was 
intended to be used by teachers in need of guidance on the new curriculum, and it seems 
that Durkheim himself also consulted it when he was working as a lycée philosophy 
teacher in the 1880s.316 Again Janet’s philosophy bore the clear spiritualist stamp of the 
distinction between the body and the soul and the association of the ‘truly human’ with 
the latter. What is indeed striking about this manual, as Schmaus has highlighted, is that it 
started off with a long section describing the physical body, something that would almost 
seem out of place in a philosophy textbook.317 The point in this I would suggest, was to 
recognise, on the one hand, the progress that was being made in the biological sciences, 
while at the same time re-affirming the distinction between the physiological body and 
‘truly human’ intelligence. He argued that in the human being there resided an 
irreducible, superior principle, an active volonté, a capacity for conscious reflection and 
ability to determine one’s own actions. While, for Janet, animals were not automatons 
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and had a ‘certain intelligence’, this intelligence was almost wholly passive: animals 
know the world mainly through sensation and when they act they are fatally driven by 
spontaneous, unconscious inclinations. What distinguished the truly human from the 
animal was the active intelligence of the personne humaine or personnalité. Distinct from 
the ‘individu’ who goes blindly about the world, this human person is endowed with 
understanding and volition and can ‘think’, ‘love’ and ‘want’.  
 Although the spiritualists, as William Logue has argued, certainly did interpret 
materialism and positivism as the new enemies of metaphysics, it is not the case that they 
were against science itself.318 What they rejected was a certain type of science, which 
banished philosophy from the search for truth and took only that which was empirically 
observable and measurable, only that which was accessible to sense perception as part of 
science. The spiritualists believed that science should combine reason with observation, 
which meant that metaphysics and the inquiry into the first principles of thought and 
existence could never totally be ruled out. While Elme Caro, for example, was concerned 
to show the falsity of positivism and materialism, he nevertheless embraced experimental 
science and praised the method of Claude Bernard, which combined reason with 
empirical observation.319 More than anyone else in the circle of elite philosophers, it was 
perhaps Janet who went to most lengths to show that philosophy was not anti-scientific. 
While refuting materialism he not only engaged with the new scientific ideas (which also 
partly explains the long section on the workings of the physical body in his philosophy 
manual) but wanted to show that philosophy itself was a science that combined reason 
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and observation.320 As we shall see, although Durkheim claimed to be founding a 
scientific approach to ethics, distinct from existing philosophical approaches, his doctoral 
thesis, the Division of Labour, actually bore the stamp of the spiritualist definition of the 
human person, as did his very definition of science.  
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3.1.3 The Demand for Originality 
 A recurrent theme in Durkheim’s writing is his criticism of what was then and 
indeed still is taken as a characteristically ‘French style’ of thought and philosophical 
discussion, with its taste for abstractions and the ‘a priori’, for clear and distinct ideas, 
and literary brilliance. 321 In his article on philosophy teaching and the philosophy 
agrégation Durkheim, while not attacking either philosophy or metaphysics themselves, 
voiced his distaste for the type of ‘verbal and formal’ philosophy that valued the 
simplicity of clear ideas and rhetorical flair over empirical content. As such, philosophy 
had become no more than a logical gymnastics or an exercise for the mind that had little 
positive content.322 In his commentary on Durkheim’s survey of philosophy teaching in 
German universities, Christophe Charle too noted the implicit criticism that Durkheim 
made of his teachers in France, of a philosophy that was too much like ‘literary art’. This 
criticism, wrote Charle, was all the more bold, given that the author was still a young 
philosophy graduate whose career was by no means assured.323 Yet, there is something 
not entirely surprising about Durkheim’s critical remarks, and just as in the Fouillée 
review I referred to in chapter two, I would argue that at no point was he risking coming 
across as an upstart, let alone putting his career in jeopardy.  
 To explain this it is helpful to refer back to the changes that were occurring in 
academic philosophy at the time, drawing on Jean-Louis Fabiani’s analysis of the 
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evolution of the field in late nineteenth century France.  Defining the community of 
academic philosophers as made up of all those bearing the title ‘professeur de 
philosophie’, Fabiani argued that this field drew its coherence from the lycée philosophy 
class and its syllabus, which structured the year and provided an identifiable range of 
themes.324 Now, although during Cousin’s era philosophy had come to occupy its 
prestigious place in French education, the discipline was then still very much conditioned 
by external demands of a political, religious or economic nature. With the educational 
reforms of the Third Republic however and the exaltation of teaching in political 
discourse, the members of this community of professional academic philosophers began 
to enjoy ever increasing social prestige and better employment prospects.325 It was 
precisely in this period, coinciding with the foundation of the Third Republic, that 
academic philosophy began to assert itself as an autonomous domain, made up of a 
network of positions with its own internal logic. 326  
  There are different possible ways of explaining Durkheim’s trajectory from 
philosophy to sociology: in terms of an epiphany or a moment of illumination that struck 
him during his reading of Comte or on his German trip; at the other extreme, one might 
suggest it was a result of macro socio-economic developments, a reflection on the nature 
of the problems brought forth by the advent of industrial society.327 However what 
Fabiani’s work indicates is that the explanation can be found in the more local context. In 
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accordance with Bourdieu’s theory of fields, the development of a type of sociology from 
within academic philosophy can in fact be viewed as an effect of the field of philosophy 
itself. As this field consolidated itself as a self-sufficient, self-regulating whole it also 
contested the instrumentalisation of philosophy as in Cousin’s era and resisted any 
conditioning by external political, religious or economic demands.328 This explains, how, 
although the syllabus still retained the stamp of Cousin, the dominant theme in French 
philosophy of the late nineteenth century became that of intellectual freedom: as 
Domique Parodi stated, ‘we no longer have any official doctrine’.329 In short, the mood 
had turned decidedly against the imposition of a unique philosophical line, to the point 
that the defiance of one’s teachers, the demonstration of originality and independence as 
a philosopher became a hallmark of distinction. Given the nature of the changes that were 
taking place in the field, Durkheim, by criticising his teachers, was actually doing 
something that was highly legitimate: the rejection of the past was part of a strategy for 
those destined to brilliant futures. 
 At the same time, the increasing confidence and independence of the philosophers 
of Durkheim’s generation was made possible by specific structural developments. The 
university reforms offered the possibility of a quicker rise through the system for those 
who began teaching in the 1880s, while the secularisation of public education encouraged 
philosophers to go into more specialised domains such as ethics, pedagogy and the 
science of education.330 Meanwhile, an expanding philosophical book market, the 
expansion of the ‘librairie savante’, saw the entrance of new editors into the field, Felix 
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Alcan being the most prolific university book publisher in the humanities. These 
increasing possibilities encouraged the emergence of an entirely new figure, the 
‘university author’.331 Alongside book publications, the communication of ideas was 
made possible through the new specialised reviews that also grew up in the same period, 
a number of which (the Revue philosophique and later the Année psychologique and 
Année sociologique) were also published by Alcan. Whereas before philosophers either 
wrote in politico-literary journals or else in journals tied to a particular school of thought, 
the ‘university’ philosophy journal was defined not so much by its adherence to a specific 
editorial line, but more by the fact that it was open to all schools of thought. At the same 
time its contributors all bore similar professional and intellectual credentials, their writing 
adhered to university criteria and the journal itself was designed for an audience of 
professors and educational administrators.332  
 Durkheim was not only part of this community, but as a normalien agrégé he was 
also part of its elite. If he did not come top of the class at École normale, in hindsight, his 
biographers say, the problem was with the old style of teaching: the Latin and Greek, the 
excessive emphasis on classical learning and the formal, rhetorical character of the 
studies that were too literary and not scientific enough.333 In contrast to the long lycée 
apprenticeships of the previous generation (where 10-15 years would have been normal 
before receiving a university post), Durkheim only spent four years as a lycée teacher, 
benefiting from the university reforms to get the post at the University of Bordeaux. By 
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the late 1880s he was already a published author with his contributions to the Revue 
philosophique and the Revue internationale de l’enseignement, and was writing his 
doctorate, itself destined for publication with Alcan. 
 Although Durkheim would become an actor in a new field of studies, sociology, 
and indeed become widely known not as a philosopher but as a sociologist, his passage 
from one to the other began as part of the general rebellion against the philosophical past 
and the search for originality that was predominant within the field. While one expression 
of this mood was the critique of one’s teachers, another was the attraction of the younger 
generation to more modern authors. Whereas, Fabiani tells us, the classics of antiquity 
and of the seventeenth century had hitherto formed the staple of the philosophical 
heritage, the younger generation sought out inspiration among nineteenth century writers 
such as Comte, Schopenhauer or Maine de Biran and often among ones from outside the 
boundaries of the French tradition.334 Indeed, it was through his reading of precisely such 
a set of philosophically non-conventional authors - Comte, Spencer, the German theorists 
- that Durkheim began his elaboration of a new approach to an old question in 
philosophy, that of determining what moral end contemporary man ought to desire.  
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3.2 Durkheim’s Doctoral Thesis  
 The Division of Labour in Society was not only Durkheim’s first published work 
and one which would become a classic in sociology, it was also his doctoral thesis 
defended before a jury of philosophers at the arts faculty at the Sorbonne on 3 March 
1893.335 As such, both the thesis itself and the response it received can act as window 
onto the relationship between the academic philosophy of Durkheim’s education and the 
nascent sociology. Although Durkheim tended to present himself as ‘breaking’ with 
philosophy, this very attempt to set off in a new direction on the part of someone who 
was trained as a philosopher can itself be viewed as an effect of changes that were 
occurring in the field. As Bourdieu tells us, it is only those who have thoroughly 
mastered the rules of the game that are in a position to play with them, to go beyond them 
while remaining within the contours of legitimacy.336  And while as we shall see, 
Durkheim’s doctoral thesis paid homage to the philosophical tradition, in presenting his 
work to the jury Durkheim also managed to play with this same heritage.  
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3.2.1 Specialisation and Solidarity 
 If Durkheim had from early on been interested in the relationship between the 
individual and society, and if he did touch on this topic in some of his early review 
articles, it was in his doctoral thesis, the Division of Labour, that the question really came 
to the fore. Focussing on the increasing specialisation that was spreading to all areas of 
modern social life, particularly to industry, the ‘moral’ question he sought to answer in 
this regard was whether the phenomenon was something desirable or something that 
ought to be resisted. The problem when it came to the individual was to know whether 
the modern person should agree to become one part of a social whole, where all 
individuals with specific skills and talents are interdependent, or seek rather to jealously 
guard one’s own autonomy, to be a self-sufficient whole, a rounded and complete 
being.337 His suggestion was that individual differences actually complement each other 
and as such cultivate feelings of mutual dependency; not only could life in a modern 
society characterised by an advanced division of labour be fulfilling for individuals but 
far from undermining the social tie, individual difference and professional specialisation 
could actually become a source of social solidarity. Far from being simply an economic 
link or a source of greater material prosperity, the division of labour therefore, Durkheim 
proposed, was the very foundation of modern solidarity.338  If this were to be proved then, 
he argued, given how beliefs, values and rules emanate from such spontaneous social 
solidarity, it would follow that the modern division of labour also had a moral role.  
 Built around a contrast between two principal social types - the traditional and the 
modern - which corresponded to two different types of social solidarity, Durkheim’s 
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argument was that although these social types were very different both structurally and 
ideologically, it was not the case that the traditional type was naturally cohesive and the 
modern one was not. It was rather a case of  a solidarity of a different nature. Going back 
to the Tönnies review, he turned this author’s polar opposition on its head and employed 
the term  ‘mechanical solidarity’ to refer, not, like Tönnies, to a modern type threatened 
by dissolution and where harmony had to be imposed by a strong state, but to the 
traditional type of structurally simple and ideologically homogenous communities. Given 
that in such societies a common set of beliefs and values was at the source of social 
cohesion, individual difference would generally be experienced as a threat to the life of 
the community. The community in this case would generally react negatively to 
individual difference and punish as an offence anything that went against the conscience 
collective, or the totality of common beliefs and values. 339 On the other hand, Durkheim 
employed the term ‘organic solidarity’ to describe the type of solidarity by difference he 
believed to be preponderant in modern society. 340  
 From an initial situation of ideological homogeneity, over the course of history, as 
the population density grows, as new technologies and means of transport and 
communication links develop, previously isolated, self-contained communities spread out 
beyond their original boundaries and mix with other communities to form a more 
structurally complex and more ideologically diverse society. 341 While the importance of 
common beliefs and values in guaranteeing social cohesion declined, this did not mean 
however that solidarity itself evaporated in the process, as Tönnies’s Geselleschaft would 
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suggest. On this point Durkheim drew a parallel between his own vision of modern 
society and that of Herbert Spencer, who as we have seen, was an important reference 
point for intellectuals in France in the late nineteenth century, particularly popular in the 
pages of the Revue philosophique. If Spencer had theorised the process of change from 
traditional to modern society as an evolution from simple to more complex forms of 
social organisation and established two contrasting social types, the ‘militant’ and the 
‘industrial’, he had, unlike Tönnies, considered the movement from social homogeneity 
to increasing heterogeneity, in an optimistic light.342 Durkheim thus welcomed Spencer’s 
thesis that in modern society the division of labour could guarantee solidarity.343 
 Yet if Durkheim could agree that the division of labour was more that just a 
source of economic improvement and increased productivity, in that it linked different 
functions closer together, establishing bonds which stretched considerably beyond the 
moment of exchange and founding ‘a social and moral order sui generis’, he disagreed 
that the modern social order resulted spontaneously from freely contracted agreements 
between rational agents.344 While Spencer had argued that as society approached 
contractual solidarity the sphere of social action would grow increasingly smaller, that 
state intervention would no longer have any purpose ‘save to prevent individuals from 
encroaching upon one another and from doing mutual harm’ and that the sole remaining 
link between individuals would be that of  ‘absolutely free exchange’, Durkheim pointed 
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out that this was in clear contradiction with the reality.345 On the one hand, the modern 
community does not generally punish individuals for offences against a set of strongly 
held collective sentiments, while it comes to consider the breaking of a contractual 
agreement as an offence with reparation consisting merely of the restoration of the status 
quo ante.346 However, taking the legal code as an indicator of obligations imposed on 
individuals by society, Durkheim pointed out that such obligations did not in fact 
decrease but continued to grow and become more complex, while the state took on a 
whole range of new tasks in ensuring education, healthcare, public assistance, transport 
and communication.347 Furthermore, he argued, if the number of contracts multiplied 
with social evolution, these same relationships also had a non-contractual aspect that also 
became more ‘weighty and complex’.348 Contracts, in short, were more than just private 
agreements between two individuals: they had a public character and society conditioned 
the way in which agreements were entered into and dissolved. So ‘in a contract not 
everything is contractual’, and not only did society lay down certain conditions in which 
contracts must be drawn up to be binding, but contracts could give rise to obligations of a 
customary nature which have not been explicitly expressed in the terms of the 
agreement.349 Spencer’s explanation of modern solidarity as resulting spontaneously from 
individual agreements was, according to Durkheim, therefore insufficient; the social type 
characterised by the division of labour and co-operation had its own ‘intrinsic morality’, a 
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higher moral law inherent in the nature of society from which our modern beliefs and 
values, duties and obligations derive.350 
 However beyond simply analysing the difference between the traditional and 
modern social types, and the process of evolution from one to the other, Durkheim was 
clearly and self-consciously seeking to engage with a moral question of contemporary 
relevance, seeking to formulate some practical maxims as to how the modern society in 
which he lived ought to be. More than the question itself however, what seems to have 
struck his audience most on the day of the thesis defence was his effort to apply a 
genuinely scientific method in answering it.    
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3.2.2 The Question of Moral Science 
 Where the originality of Durkheim’s work lay was not I suggest primarily in his 
effort to reconcile modern demands for greater individual freedom with the demands of 
the modern collectivity on the individual. The question of the moral value of the division 
of labour was a particularly urgent one, wrote Durkheim, given that its advance could not 
occur without  ‘profoundly affecting our moral constitution’.351 And although modern 
industrial and individualist society had often been viewed negatively as the source of all 
kinds of moral vices, Durkheim’s optimistic view of this society as naturally cohesive, 
had, as the philosopher Henri Marion emphasised during the subsequent thesis defence, 
certainly already got its supporters.352 Marion here may have been thinking of Spencer’s 
concept of contractual solidarity and his argument concerning the correspondence 
between individual interest and the interest of society, an idea which many French 
economists at the time also espoused.353 He was perhaps more likely thinking of Alfred 
Espinas who had defended his thesis at the Sorbonne over a decade ago and of the 
philosopher Alfred Fouillée both of whom considered individuation and social cohesion 
to be mutually reinforcing.354  
  Durkheim’s suggestion that a modern society characterised by individual 
difference was not only cohesive but that it too had its own ‘intrinsic morality’ was 
therefore not exactly all that new. What was most innovative about his work, as both 
Durkheim himself and the public who received it recognised, was the method he 
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employed in answering his question as to the moral value of the division of labour.355 
Against the a priori approaches of moral philosophers who started off from an abstract, 
timeless ideal and then worked by deduction to construct an entire moral system, 
Durkheim in the Division of Labour sought to put into practice the scientific method he 
had praised in the work of the German moralists.356 In this regard, his Latin thesis on 
Montesquieu - the subsidiary thesis that all doctoral candidates in France at the time were 
required to prepare - is also important as a statement of what he was trying to do in the 
main thesis, the Division of Labour.357 In Durkheim’s view, Montesquieu merited 
attention as someone who had understood the objective character of customs, ideals and 
institutions, and had seen that social things were not infinitely malleable but governed by 
laws and had a stable nature of their own: rather than addressing moral questions from 
the point of view of an abstract ideal, Montesquieu always started out from the 
observation of the empirical facts of social existence.358 The thesis on Montesquieu could 
thus serve as a perfect introduction for the exercise in ‘positive moral science’ that 
Durkheim would elaborate in the main thesis to follow, while at the same time avoid 
risking a hostile reaction among the jury of philosophers that a thesis on Auguste Comte 
might have provoked. 
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 In practice, Durkheim’s originality and claims to scientificity on the question of 
modern morals had its basis, as one member of the audience on the day of the thesis 
defence recognised, in his ‘objective’ method and his claim to have found an external 
indicator of social solidarity. Rather than starting out from a pre-conceived idea and 
proceeding by deduction, Durkheim sought instead some external indicator of the 
phenomena under examination. Taking law codes as an expression of underlying social 
solidarity and moral ideas, he thus managed to establish his two principal social types: 
one in which ‘repressive’ law punishing offences against the collective consciousness 
was predominant and another in which ‘restitutive’ law was predominant.359  These two 
types of law he argued, acted as indicators corresponding to two different types of social 
solidarity to be found in two different social types, the traditional and the modern 
respectively; the advance of restitutive law and the regression of repressive law stood, he 
argued, as evidence that solidarity by difference was taking over from mechanical 
solidarity.  
 Yet, for all this emphasis on empirically observable facts, it was not the case that 
Durkheim’s concerns were limited to the observation of positive law. Just as it would be 
mistaken to view Montesquieu’s interest in what exists or what has existed as a lack of 
concern for ethical principles, a disregard for how things ought to be, it would be equally 
erroneous to take Durkheim here as a ‘positive scientist’ unconcerned with the practical 
moral questions he called ‘social art’.360 For Montesquieu as for Durkheim it was only 
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through studying what is that one can understand what can or ought to be.361 Having 
posited at the beginning of his work a moral question of contemporary relevance, 
Durkheim saw his work not simply as an exercise in detached scientific observation, but 
as an effort to form a judgement about how his own society ought to be without however 
falling back on unobserved, a priori principles. While his insistence on observation and 
induction and critique of existing approaches to moral questions may have been new, in 
this fundamental intention Durkheim was, as we shall see, carrying on a long French 
academic and philosophical tradition.  
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3.2.3 Spiritualism, Utilitarianism and the Jury 
 The Division of Labour was received at the Sorbonne by a jury composed of six 
philosophers (Paul Janet, Henri Marion, Charles Waddington, Émile Boutroux, Victor 
Brochard and Gabriel Séailles), on which Cousinian spiritualism was well represented. 
The most senior member was Paul Janet, who held the chair of philosophy, while Charles 
Waddington, another spiritualist held the chair of the history of ancient philosophy.362 
Henri Marion held the chair of the science of education at the Sorbonne and led the 
discussion. Émile Boutroux, who held the chair of the history of philosophy was a neo-
Kantian and Durkheim’s thesis supervisor, while the less senior members, the two 
‘chargé de cours’, Victor Brochard and Gabriel Séailles were neo-criticist and neo-
spiritualist respectively. Given the positivistic rhetoric of the early review articles and the 
subsequent mythology depicting the  ‘sociologist’ battling from the corner against a 
hostile establishment, we would expect the candidate to have gotten a rather tough time 
from his adjudicators. And yet, from the three reports that we have of the session, it is 
clear that not only was there no outright hostility to his work, but that he made a big 
impression and that the thesis was unanimously approved.363 Indeed, it seems that 
Durkheim, as a ‘normalien, agrégé de l’Université’, ex-philosophy teacher, regular 
contributor to the Revue philosophique, would have had more in common with, in terms 
of both cultural and symbolic capital and intellectual habitus, than what separated him 
from the philosophers on the jury.  
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 This shared habitus shows through in Durkheim’s view of academic work as a 
serious activity, and his belief that scholars devoted as they were to the disinterested 
pursuit of truth, also had an important moral and social role. While biographers tell us 
that Durkheim had an extremely serious personality and could not imagine a philosophy 
without a social or political application, what they fail to mention is that the philosophers 
who traced their intellectual lineage back to Victor Cousin also had a very serious 
conception of philosophy and its social role.364 Philosophy was for them no mere logical 
gymnastics, detached from reality, but was a guide to life, a guide to how one should act 
in society, to what kind of society one ought to desire.365 Adolphe Franck’s Philosophie 
du droit civil, for example, shows how the philosophical theorisation of the ‘human 
personality’ (the spiritual being, distinct from the material body) was not just an 
intellectual exercise but served as the basis for outlining a whole series of rights and 
duties towards oneself and others, and for judging actually existing laws.  
 This ‘serious’ conception of intellectual activity, of philosophy as a contribution 
to the betterment of man and society, as a guide to a good moral life can also be seen in 
the work of Henri Marion and Paul Janet. Holder of a newly created chair at the 
Sorbonne in the science of education (a chair Durkheim would later come to hold) 
Marion in La Solidarité morale, had examined the formation of individual moral 
character. Arguing that while there were many elements within the individual 
constitution, within society and within the surrounding environment, which can pre-
determine our moral formation, we can through enlightened self-knowledge and correct 
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understanding of external influences, still take control of the development of our own 
personality and build a strong moral character.366 The serious nature of the activity is 
emphasised by Marion when he concluded that in becoming aware of our duty and of 
how doing our duty affects others, we work towards the future happiness of our family, 
of our country and of humanity in general.367 Paul Janet, with just as serious a conception 
of the nature of his enterprise, looked however not at the formation of individual moral 
character, but sought to define the higher moral good towards which humanity should 
aim and to outline its implications for society and for individual well-being.368 
 Alongside this conception of scholarly work, French academic philosophy of the 
period was also characterised by a distinct conception of the human person as being made 
up of a body-soul dualism and a conception of the nature of human happiness. Setting 
apart the physiological, material body from the spiritual human person or the intellectual 
and moral being, Paul Janet argued that the good consisted of ‘preferring’ in ourselves 
and in others the distinctly human qualities. This meant elevating oneself above the 
‘senses, appetites and instincts’, overcoming the blind passions and appetites which can 
sometimes dominate the individual, and becoming capable of conscious and freely 
chosen activity.369  The idea of a moral law, for Janet, presupposed a prior natural good 
that acted as its foundation.370 This ‘natural good’ cannot be derived from what causes us 
pleasure or happiness, nor can it be equated with an overall sum of pleasures or even with 
social utility. For this reason he refuted utilitarian moral philosophy in its various 
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forms.371 It was not that Janet disregarded happiness, but according to him, although we 
do ultimately become happy when we live a moral life, the desire for happiness cannot 
explain the good.372 At the same time he conceived of this happiness as distinct from 
material gain and pleasure, as a modest and sober spiritual joy which one experiences in 
being able to understand and freely choose to live in accordance with the moral law. 
Philosophy, for Janet, was again more than just a theoretical activity, and from the maxim 
that we must prefer in ourselves and in others what it is that distinguishes us as truly 
human, he derived practical moral obligations and duties for social life.373 In his 
philosophy-teaching manual therefore, in the section on ‘practical morality’, we find a 
whole series of duties and obligations towards inferior beings (animals), towards 
ourselves and other human beings, towards our family, towards society and towards God. 
All of these duties he claimed, had their theoretical justification in a prior law which was 
independent of the material realm and which we have the capacity to understand through 
the exercise of reason. 
 In terms of his ideas on the social role of the scholar and on the nature of 
morality, I suggest we can find much of this academic philosophical tradition 
incorporated into Durkheim’s intellectual worldview and it is from this perspective that 
his argument with Herbert Spencer again becomes important. While this intellectual 
encounter with Spencer is generally taken as part of a strategy to distinguish the 
sociological approach from an individualist one, his rejection of utilitarian social theory 
can, I suggest, be traced to his intellectual habitus formed within the contours of French 
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academic philosophy. What indeed is apparent from Durkheim’s discussion of Spencer’s 
happiness thesis - that the individual desire for greater material wealth and happiness is 
what drives the advance of the division of labour -  is a conception of human nature as 
consisting of a body and a spiritual being, or soul. Durkheim, in his effort to refute 
Spencer, defined happiness as the contentedness we gain from the satisfaction of our 
separate bodily and spiritual needs: the body, on the one hand, has certain, limited needs 
and its happiness derives from their satisfaction (just as hunger is assuaged with a certain 
quantity of food), while spiritual happiness or the happiness of the mind, derives from the 
satisfaction of our intellectual and moral needs. The individual mind and its faculties 
need not absolute freedom from all constraints, but certain intellectual and moral 
parameters within which its capacity to understand and to form value judgements can be 
exercised. 374  
 Highlighting the increasing suicide rates in modern society, Durkheim stressed 
that while this did not mean the progress of division of labour was harmful in itself - the 
two variables were merely concomitant - it did show that material advancement did not 
necessarily lead to increased happiness, that happiness and material pleasure were two 
different things. 375  One aspect of spiritual happiness or the satisfaction of the soul was, 
according to Durkheim, to be found through living consciously in accordance with a 
higher moral principle. In all of this Durkheim was still very much speaking the same 
philosophical language as his examiners: he assumed the same distinction between body 
and soul, associated the moral and intellectual with the ‘soul’ and conceived of happiness 
not as infinite material improvement, but as contentedness arising from the satisfaction of 
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one’s dual physical and spiritual needs. One aspect of spiritual happiness or the 
satisfaction of the soul was to be found through living consciously in accordance with a 
higher moral principle, and for both the philosophers in the French academic tradition 
and for Durkheim, it was the work of ‘moral science’, however conceived, to work out 
what exactly this principle could be and what it would imply.  Ironically, in an era 
when Cousin’s edifice was increasingly coming under attack from the younger generation 
of philosophers, Durkheim at times seemed to portray his sociology as faithful to the 
Cousinian tradition on two points - the moral and social value of intellectual activity and 
spiritual nature of the moral law. Indeed, in his criticisms of philosophy he did not take 
issue with Cousin’s edifice itself, which he argued had grown out of the needs of the 
society of its time, but with the fact that the discipline had lost its connection with social 
life, and had become too abstract and formal. 376 In this way he could implicitly cast his 
positive moral science as a modernisation of Cousin’s conception of the moral role of 
philosophy. Where the real debate started on Durkheim’s work was however over the 
question of method, and in his claim to have derived practical moral conclusions from the 
study of society and not from psychological introspection. 
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3.3 The Constitution of Positive Moral Science  
 While Durkheim was, as we have seen, very much expressing himself in the same 
terms as the philosophers on the jury, his claim to originality lay in a method, which, he 
argued, made possible a genuinely scientific approach to moral questions. Yet, even this - 
his claim to be doing ‘moral science’ - was not something entirely new. If his approach to 
the study of morality differed from that of the French academic philosophers it was not in 
the sense that one could be considered scientific and the other could not. As John 
Brooks’s work shows, the philosophers in the Cousinian tradition already defined their 
own work as ‘moral science’, and what we have is rather the confrontation of two 
different methods, each laying claim to scientific status.377   
 Well versed in the philosophy taught in French schools Durkheim was on the one 
hand, able to use this to his advantage, and we see him in the original introduction to the 
Division of Labour playing with his philosophical heritage, seeking to derive his 
sociological approach to morals from principles that the jury could not but concede. 378 
Although a large part of it was subsequently omitted from the second edition of 1902, this 
introduction to the 1893 thesis remains an important document, in that it acts as further 
testimony to the roots of Durkheimian sociology in academic philosophy.379 At the same 
time it provides a good illustration of how the university field, just like all fields, could be 
a site of struggle over specific stakes.380 As we shall see, the fact that ‘moral science’ was 
already part of the domain of philosophy meant that the exchange between Durkheim and 
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philosophy turned into a confrontation over legitimate method in this science, a struggle 
for the monopoly on the definition of scientificity. 
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3.3.1 Moral Philosophy as Science 
 In his early articles for the Revue philosophique and in his opening lecture at 
Bordeaux Durkheim had introduced his sociology as a development of the scientific 
project of Auguste Comte and espoused the opposition between sociology and 
philosophy: sociology, unlike philosophy, was to be a genuinely scientific approach to 
the study of society and its institutions. When it came to moral beliefs, values and rules 
the aim was to ‘constitute the science of morality’.381  However, in presenting himself 
here as the founder of something entirely new, Durkheim willingly ignored the fact that, 
as he would have well known, the eclectic spiritualists already considered their discipline 
to be a science in its own right and called the branch dealing with ethics moral science.382  
 This conception of philosophy as a science, as John Brooks has shown, is clearly 
reflected in the work of Adolphe Franck. In his dictionary of the ‘philosophical sciences’, 
Franck wrote under ‘philosophie’ that the discipline had grown out of the human need to 
know, and that its aim, like that of all sciences, was to go beyond fleeting impressions, 
common sense and faith, to constitute ‘true knowledge’. Like all science again, 
philosophy had its own distinct subject matter, the human mind. However, Franck 
continued, given the nature of this subject matter philosophy was a ‘superior science’ 
because it studied the principles of thought itself and sought to access the truth behind all 
existence. For this reason, Franck claimed, it formed the basis of all knowledge, the trunk 
from which the many different branches of science have grown.383 While many different 
specialised sciences may have grown out of philosophy, two subjects in particular, logic 
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and ethics, still remained specifically within its domain. The appropriate scientific 
method for their study, argued Franck, was that of psychological introspection, a method 
which he considered to be neither exclusively empirical nor exclusively idealist, but 
combined self-observation with reason. 384  
 Right to the end of the nineteenth century Paul Janet continued to defend this 
conception of philosophy as science. In his philosophy teaching manual of 1879 we find 
him repeating Franck’s argument that philosophy was a science with its own distinct 
subject matter (the human mind, with its intellectual and moral faculties) and that given 
this subject matter, it also sought out the first principles of all knowledge, acting therefore 
as a synthesis of the specialised branches of science.385 What stands out about Janet’s 
discussion of philosophy as science however is its defensive tone and he was clearly 
concerned about mounting attacks on philosophy’s claims to scientific status. Indeed, he 
used the occasion of his appointment to the chair of philosophy at the Sobonne in 1887 to 
defend, in his inaugural lecture, the conception of philosophy as science.386  Philosophy, 
he reiterated again, had, like all other sciences, its own subject matter and sought to 
answer questions relating to it through the formulation of hypotheses. Far from being a 
purely abstract activity, in philosophy one started out from the observation of facts (that 
is, the observation of the human mind), which it described then classified, before 
becoming able to choose between competing hypotheses and forming laws.387  Janet 
seemed to be concerned here with defending philosophy against the claims that it was 
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abstract and dogmatic, firstly emphasising the role of what he understood to be 
‘empirical’ observation (psychological introspection), then in saying that although 
philosophy aspired towards absolute truth, in reality its capacity to access this truth was 
limited.  There were rather, ‘stages of truth’ and while the answers one finds may be 
relative or provisional, they are ‘approximations’, small steps towards the final truth, 
which does exist but which may never be fully grasped.388  
 So as well as presenting philosophy as a science of observation, Janet was trying 
to avoid making exaggerated claims for the discipline and present it too as a non-
dogmatic science of discovery. He was not denying that absolute truth existed but 
admitting that the human science of the absolute was fallible. As Brooks’s work has 
indeed indicated, neither in its aims (true knowledge) and its method (observation 
combined with reason) was philosophy conceived of as any different to other sciences. 
What distinguished it was the subject matter (the human mind) and the break down of 
this subject matter into specific areas of study - logic (the true), ethics (the good) and in 
theory also aesthetics (the beautiful). And it was precisely into one of these domains 
(ethics) that Durkheim went with his sociological method. Rather than constituting a 
moral science from scratch, he was actually challenging the scientific claims of moral 
philosophy in the Cousinian tradition. What he proposed was a new method, befitting 
moral science as a genuinely non-dogmatic science of observation.  
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3.3.2 The Original Introduction to the Division of Labour 
 Coming himself from within the field of philosophy, Durkheim would have been 
well aware of this conception of moral philosophy as science, and about the concerns of 
Janet to defend philosophy’s scientific status. Indeed in a 35-page section from the 
original introduction to the Division of Labour, where he presented the method followed 
in answering his thesis question (the section omitted from the second edition and from the 
English translation) we find him playing with the spiritualist conception of moral science 
in order to present his method as more rigorously scientific. Far from being, as a 
sociologist, on the outside of academic philosophy, he is more like someone so sure of 
their own cultural heritage that they are able to play with it. As Bourdieu wrote, the 
‘privilege of privileges’ is that of being able to ‘take liberties with one’s privilege’.389  In 
this passage from the original introduction to his thesis we find him employing precisely 
the same piece of advice he would later offer his nephew Marcel Mauss for the 
philosophy agrégation exam: ‘Introduce them into your thought progressively, taking 
theirs for your point of departure’.390  
 Durkheim is well known for this opposition to any moral system which derived 
duty from an abstract general formula, established a priori and which dispensed with 
empirical observation, and here again he stated categorically that this could not be the 
method employed.391 Although it is usually on the basis of this abstract, a priori method 
that we find him rejecting ‘philosophy’ en bloc and promoting sociology as the solution, 
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he was well aware that philosophers in the eclectic spiritualist tradition held that the 
proper scientific method in philosophy and in moral science combined both reason and 
empirical observation. As he told his students in his philosophy classes at the lycée of 
Sens, the method held to be the most appropriate to science was one which cut between 
idealism and empiricism - the experimental method - and involved observation, 
classification and generalisation of facts, then the formulation of hypotheses and finally 
the verification of the hypotheses by means of experimentation.392 So far the philosophers 
could not but agree with the critique of abstract reasoning, and Janet too would have 
stressed the importance of observation, classification and inductive generalisation in 
moral science.393  Indeed in the original introduction to the Division of Labour Durkheim 
actually quoted Janet to the effect that moral science must be based on observed facts.394    
 However, the problem with all of moral systems known so far - be they utilitarian, 
Kantian or spiritualist - was that in practice they never really did start out from 
observation but sought to build a whole moral system out of a pre-conceived idea, such as 
utility, duty or human perfection.395 It was here that he began to implicitly question the 
scientific validity of introspection. While the philosophers would agree that moral science 
required the combination of reason and observation, for them empirical observation 
meant psychological self-observation. Now Durkheim clearly refused to recognise this as 
‘empirical’ observation and for him, observation meant the observation of things in the 
external world, outside of one’s own mind. To pass from one to the other however, he 
was able to use as leverage the belief among French academic philosophers that 
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‘theoretical’ morality (that is, philosophising about the nature of the ideal) and ‘practical’ 
morality (what moral rules should be abided by in daily life) were not two separate, 
disjointed spheres. ‘Applied’ morality was not, wrote Durkheim an ‘inferior branch of 
ethics’; moral philosophy does not just occupy itself with ideal theoretical principles 
without concern for the social reality. 396 Indeed, as Durkheim also pointed out, Janet 
himself rejected the idea of two absolutely separate moralities and believed that 
theoretical morality must be able to account for practical morality.397 So while any moral 
philosophy worthy of the name of moral science must be able to account for external 
facts of morality, so far the problem with all systems known so far was that they could 
not account for many of the moral maxims that we actually do abide by in real life. For 
example, the principle of utility could not, according to Durkheim, account for the fact 
that we look after the sick, that we are kind to animals or we follow certain religious 
practices.398 The fact is that the totality of obligations and rules we ordinarily call moral 
involves a whole series of particular rules and is extremely complex. All moralists so far 
have tried to do is jump straight away to a single formula which would account for all 
these real laws, but given the complexity of the real situation their method is bound to be 
insufficient as moral science.399    
 In order for a ‘general law’ of moral behaviour to be of any scientific value, 
argued Durkheim, it must be able to account for ‘the diversity of moral facts’. Therefore, 
he continued, it would make more sense, if one really wanted to be scientific, to start out 
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from observing existing moral facts and then work back to the higher general principle.400 
‘Obviously’, Durkheim wrote, in his first direct criticism on the spiritualist method, ‘it is 
not enough to look attentively inside ourselves’: we must confront morality where it 
exists, in the outside world and in the rules in which it is manifested. Yet at the same 
time, the very authority he cited to back up this statement was none other than Paul Janet, 
who, in his teaching manual, had placed the section on ‘practical morality’ before 
theoretical morality, arguing that it was important to start from positive rules and then 
move to the theoretical principles behind them.401 In starting out by observing the moral 
maxims that actually exist in society, Durkheim thus presented himself to the jury as 
merely developing the teaching of Janet.   
 This much drawn out from Janet, Durkheim then, in the space of a few lines, 
proceeded to his conclusion that moral science must be sociological if it is to be scientific 
at all. A genuinely scientific method, he argued, would require that an objective indicator 
of moral obligation be found in the external world. Now one way of recognising moral 
facts, he continued, would be by their obligatory character and what is obligatory also 
came with a sanction. It is not that we act in a certain way out of an interest in avoiding 
the sanction, but the moral law nevertheless implied a sanction. Durkheim thus defined 
moral behaviour as ‘sanctioned conduct’.402 In this way, he went on, we can come to 
understand the moral ideal not through psychological introspection, but through studying 
actually existing law codes. However, he continued, one cannot very well say, as Janet 
did, that the positive laws, the practical moral obligations in one’s own society expressed 
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something about the general moral ideal while those of other societies did not.403  Either 
the moral ideal is always expressed to some extent in positive law or it is not at all.404 If 
however this positive law changes from one social and historical context to another, so 
therefore does the moral ideal, which is why, he concluded, genuine moral science is a 
branch of sociology, and why sociology itself does not just confine itself to noting 
historical forms of law but can also access the realm of the ideal.  
                                                 
403 Durkheim, De la division du travail social, p. 21. 
404 Ibid, p. 26. 
176 
 
3.3.3 Normality as a Critical Concept 
 In his methodological treatise published the year after the Division of Labour first 
as a series of articles in the Revue philosophique then in book form in 1895, Durkheim 
emphasised that scientific sociology did not bar the formation of value judgements about 
how society ought to be.  Indeed, he wrote, for this science to have any ‘real justification 
for its existence’ it must be able to instruct us as to what is ‘desirable’ in practice, to 
instruct us as to what ought to be and help improve the reality.405 Yet, so far, the obvious 
problem with the method as presented in the original introduction to the Division of 
Labour is that, by itself, the observation of positive facts such as legal codes would seem 
not to offer any way of looking beyond or judging what actually exists or has existed.406 
As Durkheim himself noted, society may in fact accord an outward sign of morality to 
rules of conduct that may not have any real foundation in morality at all while also 
leaving unsanctioned other rules that are wholly moral.407 
 Scholars often interpret Durkheim’s concept of normality as an inherently 
conservative idea, which idealised orderly, integrated society devoid of conflict.408 
However looked at in context, it was to get around the above difficulty, to make possible 
a judgment between social facts that were ‘entirely appropriate and those that should be 
different from what they are’, while still employing the same scientific rhetoric that 
Durkheim introduced the concepts of normality and pathology.409 Drawing on the 
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contemporary intellectual legitimacy of the biologist and physiologist to boost his own 
scientific claims, Durkheim employed a medical metaphor here, describing his concept of 
social normality as a ‘state of health’ of the social body, with pathology being a departure 
from this.410 The idea was first to construct social types, defined by the nature of their 
social tie, then for each social type form an idea of the state of affairs which would 
correspond to the ideal of what ought to be, and which could be called the ‘normal’. 
While life in society can never be totally free of constraint, while laws, duties, obligations 
are a normal part of social life, there are nevertheless certain types of constraint, certain 
social facts which are wholly abnormal, and have no basis in the underlying collective 
life or state of the social milieu. At the same time certain aspirations for change can be 
wholly moral, even if they have not yet passed into codified law.  
 Normality could only be judged in reference to a specific social type and to 
establish whether or not a moral fact is normal for a given social type, one did need to 
have an idea of what would be general in a society of that type.411 However, neither 
society, which is continually evolving, nor the ideal state is fixed so it is necessary to 
distinguish what would be normal at different stages of development. The difficulty was 
that when societies were in a state of transition, one needs to seek out the ‘normal’ type 
or the ideal they are tending to and from this discern what facts would be conducive to 
such a ‘state of health’, or which facts would be in synch with the conditions of existence 
of this future state.412 Normality therefore is perhaps best seen as a critical concept 
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introduced as a means of making it possible to judge what was desirable for society, to 
judge what ought to change, without falling back on ‘universal’, a priori assumptions.413 
 In practice too, when used to judge nineteenth century French society, rather than 
implying a conservative adherence to the status quo, the concept also seemed to imply a 
progressive programme of social reform.  While contemporary society, Durkheim argued, 
was undergoing a process of transition there were many facts still impeding the 
realisation of the ideal of organic solidarity. If the concept of organic solidarity presented 
an optimistic view of the future in that it showed that individualism did not necessarily 
lead society into conflict this, as he showed in the third book of the Division of Labour, 
was really an ideal still to be realised. The rising suicide rate he had analysed in his 1888 
study and had discussed here in his argument against Spencer was one indication that all 
was not right in modern society. This however was not part of the normal state of modern 
society and he argued that certain morbid phenomena (the ‘anomic division of labour’ 
and the ‘forced division of labour’) were hampering the development of organic 
solidarity. 
 The first of these problems, the ‘anomic division of labour’, referred to the lack of 
appropriate economic regulation and rules governing labour relations. 414 While society 
had changed, appropriate regulation had not yet emerged, leading to crises of 
overproduction in industry, a disjunction between supply and demand, and a mounting 
conflict between capital and labour. However, if the lack of appropriate legislation was a 
problem so too was the continued existence of abnormal constraints. The conflict 
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between labour and capital, Durkheim noted, was due to the fact that very often the 
working classes did ‘not really desire the status assigned to them and too often accepted it 
only under force, not having any means of gaining any other status’.415 Society should be 
progressing towards a state where all individuals would be equal and free to develop their 
own human potential, and a situation in which workers from specific sections of society 
were condemned to the execution of meaningless, repetitive tasks contradicted the 
modern ideal.416  
 Durkheim believed that both prejudices more appropriate to mechanical 
solidarity, whereby certain individuals are believed to be ‘superior’ by virtue of their 
birth, and the continued existence of socio-economic equality impeded the realisation of 
organic solidarity.417 Far from saying that what existed was necessarily right, his point 
was that there was a difference between what was morally right and the current situation 
where workers were oppressed by employers and only accepted their situation under 
abnormal constraint or force that did not have any real ‘moral foundation’.418 At the same 
time, aspirations of these workers towards change were moral and collective action in 
pursuit of the ideal of justice and did not ‘represent a deviation from the normal state’ but 
rather was an ‘anticipation of the normal state to come’.419  
  In short, sociological moral science did not imply an uncritical acceptance of the 
status quo and the concept of normality was elaborated as part of what Durkheim 
considered to be a new, more scientific approach to moral life and a way of passing 
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judgement on social facts without however falling back on psychological introspection or 
a priori assumptions. Rather than deriving the social ideal from human nature Durkheim 
sought to derive it from the nature of society. It was however precisely this point that 
proved particularly contentious. 
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3.3.4 Sociology and Philosophy  
 Although the Division of Labour as Durkheim’s doctoral thesis was generally 
well received by both the jury and the audience at the Sorbonne in 1893, there seems to 
have been a point during the session when the debate stalled, and the issue was precisely 
with the author’s claims to be doing ‘moral science’.420 It is not that the university did not 
recognise social science as a valid science. In his philosophy teaching manual Janet had 
fully recognised social science as an ‘exterior moral science’, like political science, which 
studied institutions and laws, past and present. Indeed, if Durkheim had simply stuck to 
the observation of law codes and their evolution, there would have probably been little 
for the jury to react against.421 However the problem was that sociology did not confine 
itself to analysing legal codes and ‘external’ facts but addressed the more fundamental 
question of the moral ideal for society, of what contemporary ‘man’ ought to desire. 
Indeed, it is almost as if Janet wished Durkheim hadn’t presented his work as a treatise 
on ethics and asked, ‘Pourquoi M. Durkheim a-t-il donné son livre comme un livre de 
morale?’422  
 This reaction of the jury is wholly understandable, once we consider that ‘interior 
moral science’ (which derived the moral ideal from introspection, as distinct from the 
‘exterior moral science’ or the study of laws and institutions) was the territory of 
philosophy; in asking a question about the nature of the moral law and the ideal to which 
modern individuals ought to aspire Durkheim crossed the line between exterior and 
interior moral science and explicitly set foot on the domain of moral philosophy. In this 
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Durkheim was challenging the claims to scientificity of philosophical moral science, and 
questioning its scientific validity. He was, as John Brooks has put it, initiating a battle 
over the legitimate definition of moral science.423 To derive the ideal not from a timeless 
human nature but from the nature of society was anathema to the spiritualists, and for this 
reason, the jury refused to recognise the thesis as ‘moral science’. As Marion commented, 
the work was not ‘assez fin pour atteindre la morale’; it was a work in the ‘physique de 
mœurs’, meaning that while it dealt merely with external rules, customs and laws, it 
could not access the higher echelons of ‘theoretical morality’.424  Waddington explicitly 
stated that he considered such a ‘physique de mœurs’ to be inferior to the morality of the 
inner man saying that with sociology one was in the ‘régions inférieures de la morale’.425   
 Of course, this was no longer an era, as in Cousin’s time, when the university was 
largely closed to different schools of thought in philosophy. In spite of these objections 
the scientific value of Durkheim’s work was recognised and the thesis was unanimously 
approved. At the same time however the objections to the idea of a sociological moral 
science bear witness to the attachment of the philosophers to the logical primacy of the 
individual subject and a refusal to contemplate any sociological explanation of the ideals 
and value held by this subject. Ultimately this opposition would spill out into the wider 
field to form the first formidable barrier to the acceptance of Durkheimian sociology 
within the circles of academic philosophy, and indeed perhaps the greatest barrier to 
achieving the consecration he so valued. 
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3.4 The Response from the Field 
 Nothing testifies better to the embededness of Durkheimian sociology within the 
field of philosophy than the fact that the publication of the Division of Labour and the 
methodological treatise of the following year, the Rules of Sociological Method, than the 
fact that these publications seem to have become the talking point within philosophy in 
1894 and 1895. If the thesis defence had caused quite a sensation at the Sorbonne, the 
commotion did not subside in the aftermath and the debate quickly spilled over into the 
two main philosophical journals, the Revue philosophique and the recently founded 
Revue de métaphysique et de morale. 426 Indeed, as Georges Sorel remarked, the Division 
of Labour ‘made a lot of noise in the philosophical world’, while Paul Lapie also informs 
us that in 1894 the sociological method was the ‘object of all discussions’.427  
 Although these publications also attracted the attention of other sociologists in 
France my aim here is look at Durkheim’s position within philosophy.428 For this reason I 
shall discuss only his reception in the pages of the two main philosophical journals and 
deal with his position within the field of sociology in the following chapter. While these 
reviews show up again the tension between sociology and philosophy, we also see that 
Durkheim was far from indifferent to the response of the philosophers but highly valued 
the capacity of their journals to endow his sociology with scientific legitimacy. 
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3.4.1 Objectivity and Democracy 
 Between the two principal philosophical journals which existed in France in the 
mid-1890s, the Division of Labour and the Rules of Sociological Method combined 
received eight critical reviews or commentaries within more general articles on sociology 
between 1894 and 1896. While two articles appeared in the Revue philosophique, it was, 
perhaps rather unexpectedly, in the pages of the newly founded Revue de métaphysique et 
de morale, where Durkheim received most attention.429 If this may be surprising it is 
because, unlike the Revue philosophique which had opened up its pages to scientific 
psychology and sociology, the Revue de métaphysique et morale, was founded with the 
explicit aim of doing something different. The journal, founded in 1893, aimed to take 
the lead in a return to ‘philosophy strictly speaking’, leaving aside the neighbouring 
sciences of experimental psychology and sociology, to focus once again on ‘the general 
theories of human thought and action’.430  This did not necessarily mean that it was to 
keep silent and ignore developments in these sciences however. Invoking a conception of 
philosophy as the ‘science of sciences’, the trunk, as Adolphe Franck had put it, out of 
which all other branches of science grew, the review acted in part as a forum where 
judgement was passed on sociology and its underlying principles.  
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 Given the self-identification of the Revue de métaphysique et de morale as a 
return to pure philosophy, it is not surprising that the reception of Durkheim’s work, in 
particular of his methodological principles, was generally reserved if not decidedly 
hostile. In their reviews, the philosophers invariably echoed the fundamental assumptions 
of their discipline regarding the logical primacy of the autonomous subject. Although for 
Durkheim ‘objectivism’ was a point relating to methodology and was not an ontological 
statement about the nature of social facts, his reviewers invariably understood ‘objective’ 
as implying the denial of all subjective and individual ends in the definition of social 
facts.   
 Gustave Belot, for example, argued that Durkheim’s theory excluded individual 
consciousness and finality from moral life and sacrificed the ideas and desires of the 
individual to the sole concern of uncovering the ‘natural laws’ to which society is 
subject.431  Similarly, Marcel Bernès, who wrote for both the Revue philosophique  and 
the Revue de métaphysique et de morale, declared the insufficiency of objective 
sociology as a guide to moral practice.432 While he saluted the Rules as an effort to 
initiate a reflection on the question of method in sociology, he again repeated Belot’s 
interpretation of ‘objectivity’ as implying the exclusion of all psychological elements 
from sociology. A purely ‘objective’, that is non-psychological, definition of social facts 
would always be ‘insufficient’ since social facts themselves, he argued, hard facts such as 
institutions and laws, had their roots in ideas.433 For Bernès it was better to work from the 
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internal to the external, not to just describe how social institutions constrain individuals 
but to show how these institutions grow up from a milieu of ideas.434  
 Perhaps the most damning critique of Durkheimian sociology however came from 
precisely those who were most in a position to consecrate the new science. According to 
Louis Pinto, Léon Brunschvicg and Elie Halévy, can be considered two of the dominant 
figures among the new philosophical avant-garde in the 1890s: educated at the École 
normal, they were in close contact with the editor of the Revue de métaphysique et de 
morale, Xavier Léon, and Halévy indeed had helped found the journal with Léon.435 
While they manoeuvred in the elevated theoretical domain of epistemology and 
questioned the validity of Durkheimian sociology as science, ultimately their issue with it 
again came down to the place accorded to the individual subject. Labelling the causal 
explanation furnished in the Division of Labour - the ‘increase in the social mass and 
density’ - as ‘materialist’ and ‘anti-psychological’, they rejected Durkheim’s claim to 
have brought society and morality within the ‘unity of nature’.436 The exclusion of  
psychological facts, they wrote, ‘sterilises and paralyses’ science since the unique focus 
on material, quantifiable facts such as volume and density ignored the role of the 
individual in social causation, and barred all the possible ‘perturbations’ or ‘accidents’ of 
which the individual was the source.437  However, they argued, this was an illegitimate 
interpretation of mechanical explanation since for it, nothing is insignificant: even the 
‘slightest movement of the foot can cause an avalanche’.438  
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 Such an anti-individualist, social deterministic reading of Durkheim’s sociology 
was seen not only to have consequences for its validity as science, but also for politics. 
This aspect was drawn out by Charles Andler, who in more aggressive terms denounced 
the ‘so-called science’ sociology for fetishising the social and setting it up as a  ‘thing’ 
distinct from individuals.439 On Andler’s interpretation, the claim that there were ways of 
acting, thinking and feeling external to the individual was like setting up in the place of 
individual psychology a collective or group mind.440 The deterministic and anti-
democratic bent of sociology consisted in the fact that it turned society into the absolute 
and ‘generalised the Marxist error’, by generalising the  ‘economic thingism of Marx in 
making it a sociological thingism’.441 In short, the initial reception of the Division of 
Labour and the Rules was reserved, and from whatever angle the critics were coming 
(applied moral philosophy, the philosophy of science, democratic politics) the 
understanding of ‘objective science of society’ was that it meant the exclusion of ideals 
and values held by individuals from sociological explanation.  
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441 Ibid, p. 255, footnote 1, Alexander, p. 144.  
188 
 
3.4.2 A Triumph for Gabriel Tarde 
 It has therefore been right from the earliest reception of Durkheim in France that 
his work was discussed in terms of those sets of mutually exclusive oppositions - 
objectivism/subjectivism, materialism/idealism, individual/social - that now seem to be 
so antithetical to the understanding of his sociology.442 Yet, beyond the problem of 
interpretation, the very fact that Durkheim felt it was important to respond to his 
philosopher critics is in itself significant. In clear recognition of the power of philosophy 
to consecrate and the right of philosophers to pass judgement on science, acceptance of 
his sociology within this wider field of academic philosophy mattered to Durkheim. So 
over the course of the following years, through his own review writing and second 
editions of books he went to great lengths to address their criticisms and to clarify his 
position.  
 However, out of all of the critiques two in particular were deemed sufficiently 
urgent as to require immediate clarification. The first was Charles Andler’s claim that 
objective sociology meant anti-democratic politics, and although Durkheim considered 
replying directly to Andler himself, he opted to leave the matter in the hands of the 
younger Célestin Bouglé, another ‘normalien, agrégé de philosophie’, who was also a 
personal friend of Elie Halévy. Responding to Andler’s interpretation of Durkheim with 
an article in the Revue Bouglé showed how Andler had mis-understood the work he had 
criticised, and pointed out that objective sociology neither excluded psychology nor 
defined social facts as material things. Indeed, he continued, although social facts were 
ultimately different in nature to the facts of individual psychology they still had 
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individuals associating together as a substratum, and a sociological perspective could 
perhaps improve and add to psychology.443  It is clear from the letters received by Bouglé 
that Durkheim felt that a good enough job had been done with this article and rather than 
himself also publishing a long article in response simply sent a letter to Xavier Léon in 
protest at the mis-representation of his ideas in the pages of the review.444 
   The second article that Durkheim responded to immediately was a particularly 
harsh review of the Rules by the sociologist Gabriel Tarde, which appeared in the Revue 
philosophique.445 At first it may not be immediately apparent why Durkheim should have 
felt it more urgent to respond to Tarde and not to Marcel Bernès or Brunschvicg and 
Halévy for example. However if we consider who Tarde was and what his position was in 
relation to philosophy, the issue makes more sense. Gabriel Tarde was a sociologist and 
contemporary of Durkheim, known for his theory of imitation, which explained social 
facts psychologically in terms of imitation between individuals. In his review of the Rules 
he ridiculed what he described as Durkheim’s attempt to construct ‘a sort of sociology... 
purged of all psychological considerations’.446  A judge and specialist in criminology, 
Tarde took issue with Durkheim’s concept of normality and in particular his argument 
that both crime and punishment were socially normal, in the sense that wherever we have 
society we necessarily have both.447  What Durkheim meant by the normality of crime 
and punishment, was that there was not an absolute definition of right, which will one 
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day reign and not an absolute wrong, which will one day be abolished, but that wherever 
there is society there is a socially conditioned idea of right and there will always be those 
who deviate from this who are considered criminal.448 Tarde however, took the argument 
differently, as meaning that the present elevated crime rates were normal, and that we 
should not want to try and improve the situation.449  Deemed serious enough to merit a 
direct response, Durkheim offered a point-by-point rebuttal of each of Tarde’s arguments 
in the Revue philosophique.450  His own argument, Durkheim emphasised, had not been 
that the rise in the crime rates, nor even the rise of the suicide rates for that matter was 
normal, but that there can never be a society in which there would be no cases at all of 
divergence from the collective type. Indeed, Durkheim took Tarde’s critique so seriously 
that, as he pointed out, he was currently preparing a book dealing with the rise in suicide 
rates, which would show that his sociology could in fact deal with and judge such 
‘abnormal’ phenomena.  
 Yet to understand the issue with Tarde we need to go beyond the content of the 
articles and consider the contrasting reception of both figures from the elite of the Revue 
de métaphysique et de morale. In the mid-1890s Gabriel Tarde was the most significant 
competitor of Durkheim in the effort to gain the acceptance he so valued for his 
sociology by the philosophers. As a social theorist, Tarde was a staunch opponent of the 
various forms of organicism and social realism, and had developed his own system of 
sociology, founded entirely on psychology, an ‘interpsychology’, based on a theory of 
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imitation.451  Now it was precisely this individualist and psychological theory of society, 
which explained social facts as a product of imitation between individuals, that Léon 
Brunschvicg and Elie Halévy at the Revue de métaphysique et de morale endorsed in the 
same breath as they rejected the Durkheimian theory.452 Indeed, this endorsement must 
have been particularly hard to swallow given that Tarde did not even have a background 
in philosophy but in law, and was by profession not a professional academic but a 
magistrate, a criminologist and a statistician.453 
 At the same time the preference of Brunschvicg and Halévy for Tarde’s theory of 
imitation itself tells us something about the tension between philosophy and Durkheimian 
sociology. Just as the dissertation jury took issue with the idea of sociology as ‘moral 
science’, the philosophers who responded to his work, as Louis Pinto has shown, refused 
to recognise any ‘inferior’, external explanation of the moral law and the thinking 
subject. While Durkheim sought to explain the collective representations held by the 
thinking subject, Tarde, on the other hand, in positing the logical primacy of this subject 
simply echoed back to the philosophers the fundamental assumptions of their discipline, 
where scientific explanation stopped with the individual subject. Almost repeating the 
comments of Henri Marion on the Division of Labour, that as moral science the thesis 
was not ‘refined enough’, Durkheim complained, in a letter to Bouglé, of the 
philosophers who say that there are things that are ‘too refined’ and ‘too complex’ to be 
grasped by the ‘vulgar procedures of science’, things which only ‘sentiment’ and 
‘intuition’ can grasp. Durkheim, of course, had his own equally valid response to this: the 
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refusal of any external explanation of the thinking subject and the placing of  ‘individual 
instinct’ at the basis of explanation was anti-scientific, was the excuse of those who ‘do 
not want to think’.454 With this argument he continued to defend his case before the 
philosophers. Tarde’s theory, which placed instinct at the root of sociological 
explanation, Durkheim insisted, implied irrationalism in that it elevated ‘sensation, 
instinct, passion - all the base and darker parts of ourselves’ above reason and so made 
science impossible. 455  While he situated his own sociology square within French 
rationalism he referred to Tarde’s method as the very ‘negation of science’. 456  
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Conclusion 
 Although there was a growing enthusiasm for sociological studies in the mid-
1890s, the period directly after the publication of the Division of Labour and the Rules of 
Sociological Method seems to have been a low-point for Durkheim and one of triumph 
for Gabriel Tarde. While Durkheimian sociology grew out of philosophy and in many 
ways retained its stamp, the reaction against his sociology also had to do with its tight 
relationship to philosophy. Not only was sociology as ‘moral science’ treading on the 
territory of philosophy, but Durkheim’s effort to overcome what he called the 
‘intellectualist’ bias of moral philosophy also seemed to undermine one of the 
fundamental assumptions of the discipline regarding the primacy of the individual 
subject. Over the course of the following decade, the situation would change somewhat 
and for reasons both intellectual and political Durkheim would eventually succeed in 
gaining acceptance for his sociology within this universe of elite academic philosophy. 
Beyond seeking to clarify his position and discredit the theories of Tarde as anti-
rationalist and anti-scientific, perhaps the most decisive strategy in the constitution and 
consolidation of what has come to be known as the ‘French school of sociology’ was one 
that grew out of the collaboration with Bouglé in the response to Charles Andler. In the 
space of two years what emerged from this initial collaboration was the foundation of the 
journal, the Année sociologique, and this shall be the topic of my next chapter.  
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Chapter 4 
The Foundation of the Année Sociologique 
 
 Although Durkheim may today be recognised as the founder of the ‘French school 
of sociology’, in the mid-1890s in France he had numerous rivals in the new field and his 
intellectual authority was by no means assured. Indeed, one of the questions this thesis 
seeks to address is precisely how Durkheim did in the end actually come to be recognised 
as the main representative of the new discipline in France, and why so many once 
prominent names (Gabriel Tarde, Jean Izoulet, René Worms...) have since faded into 
oblivion. In the previous chapter, I have indicated that Durkheim’s background in 
philosophy and place within the university arts faculty would ultimately be decisive 
factors in the establishment of a hegemonic position in the field, even if his work did 
initially receive some lively criticism from his fellow academics.  
 In this chapter, I shall focus on the latter part of the 1890s, roughly from 1896/97 
to 1900, a period that was decisive in the establishment and consolidation of Durkheim’s 
scientific authority. In these years there were two main additions to his ‘scientific titles’ – 
the publication of Suicide in 1897 and the foundation of the journal the Année 
sociologique the following year.457 While Durkheim himself had hoped that Suicide 
would clear up some of the ‘mis-understandings’ generated by his previous work and win 
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over the academic community to his sociology, I shall suggest here that the foundation of 
the Année sociologique was in fact far more effective towards this end.458 
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4.1 Durkheim’s Position in 1897 
 If the decade of the 1890s, brought with it a veritable explosion of interest in 
sociology, this new popularity and enthusiasm for the discipline was something of a 
mixed blessing for Durkheim.459 While various teaching institutions and journals now 
existed for the communication of sociological research, Durkheim was not at all 
convinced as to the scientific value of much the work being produced. At the same time 
however, his own capacity to turn this new popularity of the discipline to his advantage 
seemed to be rather limited: while on the one hand his own publications had not received 
the reception he would have perhaps hoped for, openings for sociology within the 
important Parisian institutions of the intellectual field ended up benefiting one or other of 
his competitors. It is to this situation, immediately prior to the first issue of the Année 
sociologique that I shall now turn, starting first with the appointments of two of his rivals 
to two newly created sociological chairs, one at the Sorbonne and the other at the Collège 
de France. 
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4.1.1 Two Parisian Chairs 
 
 Symbolic capital, as I explained in chapter one, can come in two forms: scientific 
or intellectual capital (deriving from publications or involvement with journals and 
professional societies) and institutional capital (appointments to posts within institutions 
such as the Institut, the Collège de France and the Sorbonne). On both fronts, in terms of 
the reception of his publications received and in terms of appointments to newly created 
chairs in sociology, the period immediately prior to the first issue of the Année 
sociologique seems to be one of frustration and disappointment of legitimate 
expectations. From 1887, with his appointment as ‘chargé de cours’ in social science and 
pedagogy at Bordeaux (which became a permanent chair in social science in 1895) 
Durkheim held the only teaching post of its kind in any French University. 460 However, 
over the course of the 1890s his institutional position weakened somewhat with the 
creation of two new, more prestigious Parisian chairs - one in the history of ‘économie 
sociale’ at the Sorbonne in 1894, and one in ‘philosophie sociale’ at the Collège de 
France - and the appointment of two of his competitors to these new posts.  
The idea of sociology as a means to tackle some of the problems of modern 
industrial society had long been cited to support the introduction of the new discipline 
into the university curriculum, with Durkheim himself arguing in his inaugural lecture at 
Bordeaux that scientific sociology had a ‘social mission’ of ‘re-kindling’ solidarity. 461 
Once again, as George Weisz has documented, it was precisely such concerns about 
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social unrest, augmented by a series of anarchist attacks and strikes in the early 1890s, 
which led to calls for the further integration of social science within the university. When 
the wealthy philanthropist and patron of the social sciences, the Comte de Chambrun, 
offered to provide funds for a new chair, the course in the history of ‘économie sociale’ at 
the Sorbonne was created in 1894.462 Having been in charge of the course in social 
science at Bordeaux since 1887, Durkheim could certainly consider himself as being in a 
prime position to be nominated and put himself forward as a candidate in a carefully 
worded letter to Louis Liard.463 Indeed even Alfred Espinas seems to have recognised 
that on a purely scientific level, Durkheim would have been the most suitable candidate 
and promised that, if the new course at the Sorbonne were to be in ‘pure sociology’, then 
he would not present himself for consideration but leave the position open to his younger 
colleague. 464 In the end however Espinas did put himself forward and was nominated to 
the chair, telling Durkheim that the proposed teaching was actually to have more 
historical than sociological character. If Durkheim had hitherto pursued a strategy of 
alliance with Espinas, their relations cooled considerably over this issue. Sensing that 
Espinas was not being entirely honest about the nature of the proposed teaching, he was 
dismayed to hear that, once settled in Paris, Espinas had indeed begun teaching a ‘vague 
sort of sociology’. 465 
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 However much an achievement the foundation of the course in social science at 
Bordeaux had been, Durkheim certainly felt that a chair at one of the main Parisian 
institutions was of huge strategic value. Yet the next possible opening in Paris, the 
creation of the chair of ‘philosophie sociale’ at the Collège de France in 1897 also 
brought disappointment.466 On this occasion external political considerations blatantly 
trumped intellectual merit as Jean Izoulet, a contemporary of Durkheim who had in 1894 
published his doctoral thesis La Cité moderne et la métaphysique de la sociologie, was 
the chosen candidate.467 Izoulet, a normalien and philosophy agrégé, had close political 
connections to centres of republican political power, having once been the personal 
secretary of Paul Bert, the minister of education in Gambetta’s cabinet. Recounting to 
Mauss information received from Théodule Ribot, Durkheim told of how the latter had 
written to him to warn him that a new chair at the Collège de France was being created by 
a ‘group of politicians’, specifically for Izoulet and that the Collège was ‘disarmed’.468 
Not wanting to oppose the creation of the new chair, all Durkheim could do was to apply 
for the position, leaving it up to the minister ‘to weigh up Izoulet’s and my own 
qualifications and works’.469 Yet with little chance of being judged on the basis of strict 
intellectual merit, the affair put Durkheim in a difficult position: while, he wrote to Liard, 
he had ten years ago been given the task of establishing sociological instruction in the 
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university, it would seem like a failure on his part if  ‘such a chair were to be created at 
the Collège de France and given to someone else, it would be ... a diminution and a sort 
of disgrace’. 470  
Seeking to re-assure his uncle after the appointment of Izoulet, Mauss wrote that 
Durkheim was at least the ‘university’ representative in sociology.471 Little comfort at the 
time perhaps, and while the creation of these two Parisian chairs did indicate on the one 
hand the growing enthusiasm for sociological studies and the official recognition of the 
relevance of such studies, these were not only two big missed opportunities for the 
institutional consecration of Durkheim and his sociology, but also a weakening of his 
position. 
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4.1.2 Suicide and its Reception 
 Appointments such as these - a chair at the Sorbonne or the Collège de France - 
are of huge strategic importance in the establishment of intellectual legitimacy, and yet if 
Durkheim could write to Mauss that he had put up with the Izoulet affair ‘fort 
allégrement’, it was because he hoped to at least be able to exercise scientific authority 
independently of his institutional position.472  While it certainly would have helped to be 
based in Paris, what, he told Mauss, he really cared about was not ‘administrative 
success’ but to ‘exercise some intellectual influence’.473 What he seems to have had in 
mind here was the type of intellectual legitimacy deriving from his research and 
publications and the esteem of the scientific community more generally. Yet, even in this 
regard Durkheim again met with disappointment. As we have seen in the last chapter, his 
previous two books had already received a rather reserved reception, with critics 
opposing what they interpreted as Durkheim’s materialist, anti-psychological formulation 
of sociology.  
 In the years that followed he repeatedly sought to clarify what he meant by 
objectivism in sociology, an effort, he told Célestin Bouglé, he intended to continue with 
his next book Suicide.474 In response to Gabriel Tarde’s interpretation of the concept of 
normality, as we have seen, Durkheim had indicated that he was already preparing a book 
which would demonstrate that his sociology was not a ‘science’ incapable of forming 
value judgments or guiding action, but could indeed help understand and tackle problems 
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in contemporary society.475 This book would be Suicide, and would deal with the rising 
suicide rates in modern industrial society amply documented by moral statisticians, a 
question which had already grabbed his attention in 1888 and which he had cited in the 
Division of Labour in his argument against Spencer’s ‘happiness thesis’.476  While, 
according to Durkheim’s theory of organic solidarity, modern society should be just as 
good a moral environment as traditional society, these rising suicide rates would indicate 
not that the passage from traditional to modern society inevitably brought such problems 
but that difficulties had arisen in the realisation of organic solidarity. With sociology 
however, one could hope to gain correct understanding of the problem and to put things 
right.  Suicide was, therefore, one of those books which, wrote Gaston Richard, ‘ justified 
all the hopes which enlightened spectators of the present crisis place in social science’.477 
 Beyond this however, Durkheim also wanted to use Suicide to clarify what he 
meant by ‘objective’, ‘scientific’ sociology, and in the process question the scientific 
value of Gabriel Tarde’s theory of imitation, the psychological explanation of society 
which had proved popular with philosophers. Interpreting the book as essentially a 
demonstration of the methodological principles laid out in the Rules of Sociological 
Method, Paul Fauconnet concluded that the variation of suicide rates from one society to 
the next offered a powerful indication of the fundamental proposition, the essential 
condition of a scientific sociology, that social facts have an objective existence, a ‘reality 
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of their own’.478 What Durkheim was interested in was not individual cases of suicide but 
in the suicidal tendencies of social groups. However, more than simply noting how these 
suicide rates varied with society, he set out to prove that the social-suicide rate was not 
the sum of individual cases but the result of social forces ‘sui generis’. The first book of 
Suicide was therefore primarily concerned with demonstrating the insufficiency of 
existing individualist and non-social explanations of the social suicide rate, (madness, 
alcoholism, hereditary inclinations or the instinct of imitation on the one hand, cosmic 
forces like climate or temperature on the other), with an entire chapter devoted to the 
refutation Gabriel Tarde’s imitation theory.479 
 Having demonstrated the explanatory insufficiency of competing theories, 
Durkheim then presented his own theory of the social causes of suicide in the next part of 
the book and individuated four types of suicide each one resulting from a different social 
cause: suicide deriving from either insufficient or excessive social integration (egoistic or 
altruistic suicide respectively) or from insufficient or excessive social regulation (anomic 
or fatalistic suicide respectively).480 Reflecting his theory that the problem with modern 
European societies was more the weakness of rather than the excessive strength of the 
social tie, and the difficulties of modern society in performing its function as a source of 
ideals, values and moral regulation in individual lives, Durkheim gave far more space to 
the problem of egoism (weakness of social integration) and anomie (weakness of social 
regulation), than he did to altruism or fatalism. To ease the modern malaise, individuals 
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needed to be more closely integrated into social groups, but since neither religion nor the 
family nor political society would be appropriate, Durkheim suggested that a certain sort 
of professional society could more readily become the source of new ideals, values and 
rules to live by.481 
 Such was the argument of Suicide, a book intended to prove to critics first that his 
sociology could deal with and offer a solution to the problems of modern society, second 
that ‘objective’ sociology did not exclude psychology and finally that his sociological 
method was more valid as science than that of his closest rival Gabriel Tarde. However, 
although it would later go on to become a sociological classic, Suicide did not 
immediately have the desired effect of winning over the academic public. As Durkheim 
lamented in a letter to Mauss the ‘proofs’ that seemed to him the most ‘convincing’ did 
not seem to have any effect.482 In short, he felt that Suicide was going to be like a ‘slash 
of a sword in water’ and that the ‘doctrinal resistance’ to his work had not diminished.483   
 Far from Durkheim being already recognised at this point as the triumphant 
founder of a new discipline, his personal letters to Mauss betray a sense of profound 
disillusionment with events and with the reception of his work, to the extent that the year 
before the appearance of the first issue of the Année sociologique, he was even 
questioning the point of founding a journal at all. If, in spite of the Izoulet affair, he had 
hoped to be able to exercise a certain intellectual and scientific authority, after the 
reception of Suicide he wrote, ‘I see I must renounce this’.484 The aim of the new journal 
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would be to ‘orientate sociology in a more objective direction’, but given the resistance 
his work had received he asked ‘what was the point of an Année sociologique...?’485 Of 
course, we know that he did in the end go ahead with the journal, which furthermore 
turned out to be a great success. What I hope to show however was that it was not any 
one of Durkheim’s individual works that did most to help build and consolidate what 
would become the ‘French school of sociology’: more so than the publication Suicide, it 
was the foundation of the Année sociologique that did most to turn the situation around. 
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4.2 Sociology and Sociological Journals 
 If the identification of Durkheim and his collaborators as the ‘French school’ of 
sociology was therefore not automatic but an end-result, we can certainly say that the 
Année sociologique was an important instrument in this process.486 Since the early 1880s, 
there had been various individual figures competing for intellectual authority in sociology  
(Alfred Espinas, Gabriel Tarde and Durkheim himself to name just a few), but it was only 
by the mid to late 1890s that it became possible to identify a number of collective 
positions or schools of thought, each with their own organs of diffusion (journals, 
teaching institutions and/or professional societies).487 The foundation of the Année in a 
sense responded to this tendency towards sociological collaboration and brought together 
a group of scholars with a common purpose, facilitating the process by which a 
recognisable ‘Durkheimian’ school established itself as distinct from its competitors in 
the developing field. In order to understand the relative strength of the Durkheimian 
position in sociology however, it is first necessary to consider its relationship to these 
other schools of thought. This is what I aim to address here, starting with the school of 
Frédéric Le Play.  
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4.2.1 The Disciples of Le Play 
 Although Frédéric Le Play’s work represents one of the earliest efforts to develop 
empirical social science in France, Le Play, unlike Espinas, can in no way be classed 
among Durkheim’s scientific predecessors. Educated at the École polytechnique 
(graduating in 1827) and the École des mines (graduating in 1832) and with professional 
expertise in mining Le Play had an entirely different intellectual background to 
Durkheim. It was, as Terry Clark argued, largely through his travels in Europe and Asia 
as an authority on mining that Le Play began to write on society, and over the course of 
some twenty years he filled notebooks with his observations of social life in the various 
places he visited. Taking the family as the basic cell of society, his method, known as the 
monographic method, involved the direct observation of individual working-class 
families; the notes he took during fieldwork would then be organised around a budget for 
each family, which was meant to be a quantification of the total activity of each family.488 
 Imbued with an enthusiasm for science and its capacity to solve all kinds of social 
problems, Le Play’s main concern was social stability and he proposed social science as a 
‘way of healing’, a society in a state of agitation or ‘suffering’.489 He was at his most 
influential during the Second Empire, enjoying the financial support of the Académie des 
sciences, as well as personal contact with and the political favour of Napoleon III.490 
With the fall of the Empire however he did not fade into insignificance and within the 
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contours of the Third Republic found other ways of continuing his work, particularly 
among reform-minded Catholics.491 Believing that it was the ‘social mission’ of the 
‘superior classes’ to reform society, he founded in 1872 the  ‘Unions de la paix sociale’, a 
largely Catholic network of groups which met to discuss ‘social problems’ and ways of 
restoring ‘social peace after the disaster’ of 1870-71.492  
 When Le Play died in 1882, he left behind him an impressive network of organs 
for the communication and diffusion of his thought - the Société d’économie sociale and 
its journal, La Réforme sociale (published by the Catholic house Mame), the Unions de la 
paix sociale, and a number of dedicated younger associates. Soon after his death however 
the group split in two, with the ‘reformists’ more interested in social and political action, 
and the ‘social scientists’, more interested in developing the scientific method.493 In 
practical terms the split occurred in 1885, and when Edmond Desmolins (of the ‘social 
science’ tendency) was deposed as editor of La Réforme sociale, another leading 
Leplayist, the abbé Henri de Tourville, provided funds for a new journal to be entitled La 
Science sociale suivant la méthode de Le Play (later to become La Science sociale 
suivant la méthode d’observation). Demolins was made editor of this new journal and the 
new group gathered around de Tourville and this journal.494 Some twenty years later, 
looking back on the scission, Demolins characterised the innovations pursued by the 
‘science sociale’ group not so much as a break with Le Play but as a continuation and 
perfection of his methods by Henri de Tourville, who went beyond simply compiling 
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monographs on individual family life, and with his ‘nomenclature of social facts’ 
developed a means of studying the individual family in its relation to the rest of 
society.495 In terms of doctrine, the ‘social science’ tendency continued to accept Le 
Play’s assumption that stable social organisation derived from stable family organisation, 
however De Tourville contested the argument that the patriarchal form of family 
organisation family alone best guaranteed social stability. Arguing that while the modern 
‘particularist’ family type may instil children with a strong sense of individuality and 
personal initiative rather than respect for authority and tradition, this, he emphasised was 
not the same as the ‘unstable’ family type (the real problem) which instilled neither 
respect for authority nor a taste for individual initiative.496 
 Although the ‘réforme sociale’ tendency did hold onto the main institutions 
founded by Le Play and continued to be concerned with practical social issues (‘social 
peace’ and ‘family stability’) the group did not exactly stick unimaginatively to Le Play’s 
doctrine. Here too, there were innovations in method with Émile Cheysson developing a 
way of combining case studies with statistical methods, while also encouraging 
monographs on social units other than the family, like the workshop and the commune.497 
At the same time, the difference between the two groups in terms of methods and 
doctrines masked a more fundamental affinity between their leading representatives, a 
similar mix of wealthy, conservative Catholics and industrialists.  
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 While the Leplayists may not have been influential within the state arts faculties, 
it is not the case that the group had in general become irrelevant by the late 1890s. On the 
one hand they retained credibility in other fields (such as business and the 
administration), with Cheysson and Pierre du Maroussem involved in the Office du 
Travail, which would later evolve into the Ministry of Labour.498  At the same time, many 
of the Leplayists were active in the various teaching institutions outside the official 
university that were clustering in Paris. As Dick May (the pen name of Jeanne Weill) 
wrote in her overview of ‘enseignement social’ in Paris, although the ‘réforme sociale’ 
teaching may have been, by 1896, some forty years old, many of the new organisations, 
such as the ‘Musée social’ and the ‘Défense sociale’, had their roots in Le Play’s 
movement.499  The ‘Comité de Défense et de Progrès social’ wrote May, was full of men 
from the ‘réforme sociale’ group, who gathered together with the explicit aim of 
combating socialism and the ‘false ideas’ being preached to the youth by the ‘adversaries 
of  family, of property, of propriety and of society’.500 The ‘Musée social’, founded from 
the union of the Société d’économie politique with the Société d’économie sociale and 
endowed by the wealthy philanthropist the Comte de Chambrun also included many 
Leplayists (Pinot, who was the director, du Maroussen, Cheysson, de Roussiers).501  
Similarly, the École libre des sciences politiques, founded in 1871/72, which by the mid-
1890s had opened its doors to social science, also recruited a number of prominent 
Leplayists: Émile Cheysson, having previously taught at the École des mines, held the 
                                                 
498 Savoye, p. 340. 
499 Dick May, L’Enseignement social à Paris (Paris: A. Rousseau, 1896), pp. 3-5. 
500 Ibid, pp. 43-44. 
501 Ibid, p. 37, Clark, Prophets and Patrons, pp. 114. 
211 
 
chair of political economy from 1887, which became ‘social economy’ in 1901; Paul De 
Roussiers, also held a chair here from 1908, as did Pierre du Maroussem, from 1912.502  
 Although the Leplayist organisations continued to function up until the end of the 
nineteenth century, their activities gradually petered out and its members were absorbed 
into new societies, schools and state structures. With their mix of Catholic affiliations and 
anti-interventionist ideology, they nevertheless remained marginal within the state 
university and arts faculties, so important for the establishment of the specific type of 
intellectual legitimacy that Durkheim sought.  The same however cannot be so readily 
said for the ‘international sociologists’.  
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4.2.2 The International Sociologists 
 The term ‘international sociologists’ can be taken to refer to all those involved 
with the institutions founded by René Worms in 1893, a journal, the Revue internationale 
de sociologie and the association or discussion forum the ‘Institut International de 
Sociologie’.503 A dynamic figure, conscious that the time was opportune for the 
foundation of such structures, Worms managed to gather together some of the most 
distinguished names in sociology and neighbouring disciplines from both France and 
abroad. Among the names listed on the front page of the journal over the years we find 
the French sociologists, Alfred Espinas, Alfred Fouillée, Gabriel Tarde, Charles 
Letourneau, Marcel Bernès, with Louis Gumplowicz, Ferdinand Tönnies, Albert 
Schaeffle, Georg Simmel figuring among the foreign contributors. There was also an 
equally impressive list of representatives from neighbouring disciplines, including the 
social economist Charles Gide, the social statisticians Jacques Bertillon and Le Playists 
Cheysson and du Maroussem, the historian Gabriel Monod (editor of the Revue 
historique and professor at the École normale) and Théodule Ribot (editor of the Revue 
philosophique and titular of the chair of experimental psychology at the Collège de 
France). Alongside the journal and the Institut, Worms also set up the Société de 
Sociologie de Paris for members based near Paris and, for the publication of work by 
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members of the group, founded the ‘Bibliothèque des Sciences Sociales’ series, which, 
like the journal, appeared with the law-orientated publisher, Giard and Brière.504  
 One of the dominant characteristics of the ‘international sociologists’ was what 
Célestin Bouglé has called ‘sociological eclecticism’, as both the Revue and the Institut 
brought together a number of very different theoretical perspectives.505 Worms himself, 
in the mid-1890s, precisely when the scientific value of the doctrine was most under fire 
from professional academics in France, espoused a type of organicist social theory, and in 
his Organisme et société developed an approach to the science of human society from the 
analogy with biology and the biological organism. 506 Within the group organicist social 
theory also had a number of adherents including Schaeffle, Fouillée, and various 
members of the Russian ‘immigré’ contingent, including Maxime Kovalevsky, Paul de 
Lilienfeld and Jacques Novicow, well-known figures in Parisian positivist circles. 507 
However, it is not the case that organicism functioned as the theoretical line of the group, 
and there was at the same time also considerable internal opposition to the theory, not 
least from Gabriel Tarde, the theorist of imitation, best known for his opposition to 
precisely such biological theories of society. 508  
 Although in his opening statement of the Revue internationale de sociologie 
Worms sought to defend this ‘sociological eclecticism’, as ‘non-dogmatic’, ‘non-
judgemental science’, with the journal being open to ‘all those of good will’, to ‘all 
science and to all schools’, the group nevertheless appeared like a rather incoherent 
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mix.509  ‘Sociological eclecticism’ was also reflected in a new teaching institution, the 
Collège libre des sciences sociales, intended as a sort of faculty for social science, which 
had been founded, in quick succession after the Revue and the Institut, by Dick May, the 
private secretary of the Comte de Chambrun. Defending it against the accusation of 
doctrinal incoherency, Dick May argued that the school sought to avoid becoming the 
fiefdom of any particular school, be it ‘political economy, socialism, social Catholicism, 
the school of Le Play, the school of Comte’. The undertaking, May claimed, proved 
successful, with the Collège attracting conscientious students from various prestigious 
institutions and had the support of both the influential Comte de Chambrun and Alfred 
Croiset, the Dean of the Paris arts faculty (with whom May was also in close personal 
contact).510   
 Given the impressive list of names that Worms attracted to his journal, the organs 
that the ‘international sociologists’ had at their disposal for the diffusion of their work 
and the apparent success of the group, the question remains as to why Durkheim avoided 
association with them. It is, as Clark has pointed out, unlikely that he did not receive an 
invitation to work on the journal.511 Indeed, at one point in 1894 Worms seems to have 
solicited a contribution from Durkheim, who refused, and sent his articles on the 
sociological method to the Revue philosophique instead, a move which further provoked 
the animosity of Espinas, who suggested that it was motivated by jealously.512 Incensed, 
Durkheim explained to Mauss that what put him off this journal was Worms’s ‘reputation 
                                                 
509 René Worms, ‘Notre programme’, RIS, 1 (1893), 1-3.  
510 Clark, Prophets and Patrons, pp. 155-56 and Dick May, pp. 62-65.  
511 Clark, Prophets and Patrons, pp. 152-54. 
512 Émile Durkheim, Letter to Marcel Mauss, 18 June 1894, in Durkheim, Lettres à 
Marcel Mauss, pp. 34-36. 
215 
 
as a joker’ and furthermore that he was not prepared to collaborate on a review ‘of which 
the director has no scientific title’.513  A doctor of law in 1894, without much published 
sociological research to his name or any official teaching position in sociology in the 
university faculties, Durkheim refused to recognise the scientific authority of Worms.  
 Beyond objections to Worms himself, and strained personal relations with 
Espinas and Tarde, another factor which could explain Durkheim’s aversion to the group, 
would be the intellectually amateurish impression it gave.  While there were many 
scholars of national and international renown attached to it, the fact is that unlike the 
Revue philosophique or the Revue de métaphysique et de morale, the Revue 
internationale de sociologie was not principally a review for professional academics from 
the French university or even for aspiring specialists in sociology. As Clark’s analysis of 
the biographical details of the ‘international sociologists’ indicates, the group was made 
up of a mix of professors (the majority of whom taught either at the law faculties or at 
other institutions of higher education outside the university such as the Collège libre des 
sciences sociales or École libre des sciences politiques) of government officials, civil 
servants and some representatives from other liberal professions.514  Furthermore, the 
organicist theories of Worms and his Russian collaborators, criticised by the future 
Durkheimian François Simiand as ‘insufficient and scientifically useless’, combined with 
the theoretical incoherence of the rest of the group would have contributed to this 
perception of amateurism.515  
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 In short, behind Worms’s call to ‘all those of good will’ from ‘all science’ and ‘all 
schools’, there seems to be a mis-conception about what ‘intellectual freedom’ would 
have meant to the community of professional academics in the late nineteenth century. As 
Durkheim well understood, scientific freedom did not mean ‘anything goes’, regardless 
of how facts have been observed or regardless of the training of an author. The idea was 
more of a freedom practiced within the boundaries of a tacit understanding of what it 
meant to actually do science, with the entitlement to offer a scientific assessment of given 
phenomena and be taken seriously by the scientific community pertaining to those with 
the recognised training and academic credentials. While Clark suggested that Worms’s 
project benefited in the long term from its sociological eclecticism, I would argue to the 
contrary that in an epoch when the intellectual field was tending towards professionalism, 
the semblance of intellectual amateurism, the theoretical incoherence and apparent lack 
of rigour of Worms’s project would have been damaging.516 At the very least this 
perception can explain Durkheim’s aversion to the ‘international sociologists’ and why, 
rather than combining his effort with theirs, he decided, in the mid to late 1890s, to opt 
for the far more laborious route of founding his own journal.  
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4.2.3 Objective Affinities of the Durkheimians 
 Although he was the one who, by the mid-1890s, had done most for the 
organisation of structures for the promotion and communication of sociological research, 
there was, significantly, no mention at all of René Worms in Durkheim’s 1895 overview 
of the field of sociology in France. Outlining three principal schools of thought and their 
representatives - the École d’Anthropologie where Charles Letourneau held the chair of 
sociology, the criminologists represented by Gabriel Tarde, and the sociology of the 
university beginning with Alfred Fouillée and Alfred Espinas, and continued by himself - 
Durkheim failed not only to include a reference to Worms but also to mention that all of 
the other names he cited were actually involved with the institutions founded by 
Worms.517 Not only did he not recognise the scientific authority of Worms, he wanted to 
emphasise that the type of sociology represented by himself, which had developed within 
the arts faculties and out of philosophy, was something entirely distinct. Thus he avoided 
association with the Revue internationale de sociologie or the ‘Institut’, finding the Revue 
philosophique or even the Revue de métaphysique et de morale more appropriate journals 
in which to publish his articles on sociology. 
  If Worms’s journal was not deemed to be adequate, the implication would be that 
there was space for the foundation of yet another specialised sociological journal, a move 
indeed necessary if Durkheim was not to be outdone by the former. It was however, not 
only the aversion on Durkheim’s part to Worms’s project that brought this issue into 
focus; there was also a wider demand from the field for an alternative journal. To begin 
with, there were a number of recent philosophy agrégés, figures such as Célestin Bouglé 
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and Paul Lapie who both wrote for the Revue de métaphysisique et de morale, beginning 
to orientate themselves towards sociological studies, but who seemed to have little 
inclination to get involved with Worms. Neither Bouglé nor Lapie were particularly 
enamoured with what they had read of Durkheim either: Lapie had already been rather 
critical of the latter in his ‘année sociologique’ column for the Revue de métaphysique et 
de morale and defining sociology as the science of ‘désirs suggérés’ seemed to be closer 
to the social theory of Tarde; although Bouglé had defended Durkheim against Charles 
Andler, he nevertheless also had his reservations about the Rules of Sociological Method, 
which he expressed in his conclusion to his book on German social science.518 Yet, when 
Bouglé had the idea that there would be room for another sociological journal, it was to 
Durkheim, a fellow ‘universitaire’ and ‘normalien agrégé de philosophie’ that he 
spoke.519 After an initial exchange of ideas between Bouglé and Durkheim, the idea for a 
new sociological journal took shape between 1896 and 1897, and after some negotiations, 
the university publishing house Felix Alcan (already responsible for the two main 
philosophy journals and for the publication of all of Durkheim’s books) agreed to publish 
yearly the new sociological review, the Année sociologique.  
 Appearing with Alcan, and with a title recalling the ‘année sociologique’ column 
of the Revue de métaphysique et de morale, the new journal attracted a very definite type 
of figure. As Clark has shown, almost all of those recruited to the new journal, had 
traditional academic backgrounds: they were agrégés and professional academics, many 
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seeking to pursue a career if not in national education then as professional researchers.520 
The group that assembled for the first issue were mostly all philosophy agrégés, with a 
number having also come through the École normale. Between Bouglé, Lapie and 
Dominique Parodi (introduced to the journal by Bouglé and Lapie) all had backgrounds 
in philosophy with Bouglé and Parodi being also being normaliens. The group that 
assembled around Durkheim’s nephew, Marcel Mauss, also a philosophy graduate, was 
made up of individuals with the same sort of qualifications (with both François Simiand 
and Paul Fauconnet having come through philosophy, the former having studied at the 
École normale). This pole however also had an added association to the École pratique 
des hautes études in Paris where Mauss was a student, and Henri Hubert, a normalien, 
agrégé d’histoire, was the most prominent of Mauss’s fellow students here to be 
introduced to the journal. With an average age significantly younger than that of the 
international sociologists (29 as opposed to 45 in 1898) the Année in the pre-war period 
tended to attract young agrégés, in the early stages of their career.521  Unlike the 
international sociologists, many of whom had already made a name for themselves 
professionally, only Durkheim (a professor at Bordeaux), Bouglé (a lecturer at 
Montpellier) and the jurist Emmanuel Lévy (who taught at the law faculty in Aix) were 
somewhat professionally established.522 
 In Clark’s view, the main difference between the Année group and Worms’s one 
was the dogmatic character of the former, and while the international sociologists 
harboured far more intellectual diversity, Durkheim sought to ‘dominate a cohesive and 
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obedient ‘school’.523 Yet although the group that assembled around the latter did, as we 
shall see, give a greater impression of coherence and common purpose, it would be 
mistaken to overstate its intellectual homogeneity.524 For example, two important 
collaborators of the journal, François Simiand and Gaston Richard both voiced criticisms 
of Durkheim’s Suicide, with the harshest critique (by Richard) appearing in the pages of 
the Année itself. Furthermore, as I have already mentioned, both Bouglé and Lapie 
initially expressed grave reservations about Durkheim’s conception of objective 
sociology and its relationship to psychology.525  Added to this, in the first issue of the 
Année, among the two opening original contributions we have one from Durkheim and 
alongside it one from a German sociologist particularly admired by Bouglé, Georg 
Simmel.526 Although he was ‘far from being an enthusiast’ of Simmel, Durkheim was 
nevertheless aware of the need not to appear dogmatic, the need not to place himself in a 
situation of ‘proud isolation’ or to ‘only publish my own manuscript’ and with Simmel 
being a professor of philosophy at the University of Berlin, it was this illustrious 
foreigner he felt he could most readily approach.527 None of this escaped contemporaries, 
and Gustave Belot, in his review of the first issue of the Année for the Revue 
philosophique, praised Durkheim for not seeking to produce a ‘doctrinal work’ or present 
a ‘manifesto of a school’.528 What drew the team together I suggest, were affinities of a 
more objective nature such as shared educational backgrounds, institutional attachments 
                                                 
523 Clark, ‘Marginality, Eclecticism and Innovation’, p. 14. 
524 Besnard, ‘La formation de l’équipe de l’Année sociologique’, p. 12. 
525 Ibid, pp. 12-13. 
526 Émile Durkheim, ‘La prohibition de l’inceste et ses origines’, 1-70 and Georg Simmel, 
‘Comment les formes sociales se maintiennent’, AS, 1(1898), 1-70 and 71-109.  
527 Émile Durkheim, Letter to Marcel Mauss, June 1897 in Durkheim, Lettres à Marcel 
Mauss, pp. 57-60. 
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and similar career aspirations. Unlike the Revue internationale de sociologie, the Année 
sociologique was a journal for professional academics, more like the Revue philosophie 
and the Revue de métaphysique et de morale, with its identity deriving from this fact and 
not from the imposition of a particular theoretical line. 529  
                                                 
529 Fabiani, pp. 34-36. 
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4.3 The Année, its Aims and its Programme 
 
 While the Année sociologique managed to avoid the ‘sociological eclecticism’ 
typical of Worms’s organisations, it does not exactly seem correct to say that, at the other 
extreme, the Durkheimian school was dogmatic and intellectually homogenous. 
Conscious of the contemporary hostility to theoretical dogmatism and to the demand for 
intellectual freedom, what, I suggest, Durkheim tried to do with the Année was to create a 
setting for scientific freedom, practiced within certain boundaries. The first, most 
obvious, common denominator among the individual group members was not primarily a 
common theoretical position, but similar academic training and professional trajectories. 
In terms of doctrine, as we shall see, the only agreement that Durkheim required from his 
collaborators was that sociology should be done scientifically. However, given their 
shared academic backgrounds, the group had a very specific conception of what it meant 
to do science in the first place, and thus from Durkheim’s apparently very minimal initial 
requirement the group managed to elaborate a distinct and coherent position on what a  
scientific sociology should look like.  
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4.3.1 The ‘Scientific’ Common Denominator 
 If readers in the late nineteenth would have expected from the typical ‘année’ type 
of journal an annual account of the literature published over the course of the previous 
year in a given discipline, Durkheim, in the preface to the first issue of the Année 
sociologique, was quick to warn his audience that this was not in fact to be the aim of the 
new journal.  Such an endeavour would not anyway have been possible, he argued, since  
‘properly sociological literature’ was still in too short supply: sociology was a science 
still to be made.530 Yet, we may retort, had Durkheim himself not been doing sociology 
for the past decade, and had there not also been just recently an explosion of activity in 
the discipline? His apparent modesty was of course strategic, and through presenting 
sociology as a science still to be made he was able to take a step back from the most 
contested aspects of his own methodological treatise, while implicitly questioning the 
scientific legitimacy of rival sociological journals and institutions. Depicting sociology as 
a science of discovery, to be constructed piece by piece from the advances in specialised 
branches of research, Durkheim took the offensive against those ‘sociologists’  - no doubt 
meaning here his rivals such as Gabriel Tarde or René Worms  - who  ‘dogmatise every 
day on law, morality or religion’.531 The aim of the Année was, by contrast, more to keep 
sociologists informed of the research underway in the specialised social sciences, which 
was the basic material out of which sociology would be constructed.532   
                                                 
530 Émile Durkheim, ‘Preface’, AS, I (1898), i-vii (p. i). For the English translation see 
‘Prefaces to L’Année sociologique’, in Émile Durkheim, ed. by Wolff, pp. 341-53, (p. 
341). Also see Besnard, ‘La formation de l’équipe de l’Année sociologique’, p. 10. 
531 Durkheim, ‘Preface’, AS, 1, p. i;  trans, p. 341. 
532 Ibid. 
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  An expression of the basic agreement achieved between Durkheim and his 
collaborators as to the aims and programme of the Année, the preface to the first issue 
depicted the group as defined only by their common acceptance of the fundamental 
rationalist tenet that social facts were indeed explainable, that they were characterised by 
intelligible relations and accessible to scientific investigation. Yet the Durkheimians also 
shared a common conception of what ‘science’ meant, and if scientific sociology must 
draw on empirical research to avoid abstract dialectics, they also agreed that it could not 
be just empirical and descriptive, but must combine reason and observation.533 The 
sociologist as a scientist must undertake specialist empirical work as historians do, but to 
elaborate a genuine scientific explanation, to avoid the extremes of both dogmatism and 
empiricism, it would be necessary to introduce the comparative method, as it is only 
when one begins to form types, to compare how facts vary from one type to the next and 
seek out laws that facts gain ‘significance for the intelligence’.534  As I have argued in 
chapter three, this definition of science as the combination of reason and observation was 
typical of the academic philosophical tradition in which many of the Durkheimians were 
trained.  
 Thus it was not exactly the case that sociology was to be built out of empirical 
work in the individual social sciences and in the preface of the following year Durkheim 
stated the point more explicitly: the aim of the Année was to introduce the new scientific 
spirit into what he considered to be the specialised branches of sociology, to go beyond 
mere erudition and description of facts, to  ‘constitute types and to establish relations’. 
However, he added this time, one of the fundamental conditions of the comparative 
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method was that all of these different facts, which specialists have hitherto studied 
independently of each other were taken as being related and of the same nature, that is, as 
social facts. So, be it to describe or to explain ‘religious, legal, moral or economic facts’ 
it was necessary to ‘relate these to a particular social milieu’ or ‘social type’ and it is in 
‘constituent characteristics of this type that one must seek out the determining causes of 
the phenomenon under consideration’.535 With this we already have Durkheim’s 
controversial but fundamental principle that social facts must be explained sociologically, 
and the assumption that for a science of society to be possible it must have its own 
distinct set of facts, different to those studied by individual psychology. 
 It was working on these fundamental axioms, based on a shared conception of 
science, that Durkheim was thus able to elaborate an immensely coherent programme, 
while still avoiding dogmatism. Unlike Worms’s journal, the Année sociologique was 
distinguished by the fact that its collaborators were all professionally trained academics, a 
background reflected in their shared conception of science which was voiced by 
Durkheim in the first two issues of the journal. If sociology has, wrote François Simiand, 
carried the weight of  ‘too much bad work published in its name’, it is nevertheless 
‘unfair to judge a science on the basis of what the “amateurs” have made of it’. 536 The 
aim of the Année sociologique was therefore to show what a genuinely scientific 
sociology, practiced by specialists and professional academics, could be and to distance 
itself from work of the ‘amateurs’ who had, in their view, so far only served to discredit 
the discipline.  
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4.3.2 Durkheim on the Family 
 In contrast to the typical ‘année’ journal, as I have indicated above, the Année 
sociologique aimed from the start to be more than just a bibliographic work: it had an 
opening section with two or three original memoirs, followed by the review articles 
organised into various sections (in the first issue we have ‘religious sociology’, ‘legal and 
moral sociology’, ‘criminal sociology’ and ‘economic sociology’) with each branch 
representing a sub-division of the subject-matter of the same science, sociology. The idea 
of starting with original studies was to offer concrete examples of research in sociology, 
but also to increase the journal’s appeal. There was, as Durkheim told Mauss, already a 
‘tradition’ established by other journals, of publishing such original memoirs, a tradition 
typical not of the standard ‘année’ journal, but of other university journals (both the 
Revue philosophique and the Revue de métaphysique et de morale contained original 
articles followed by reviews), and of the recently founded Année psychologique (1895), 
attached to  Charles Binet’s laboratory at the Sorbonne.537  
 Each section was to be the responsibility of one or more collaborators who 
complied a list of books they planned to review for a given issue, sending it to Durkheim 
who then procured and distributed the books accordingly. Durkheim himself contributed 
numerous original articles over the years, while as a book critic he developed a sub-
branch of the section ‘sociologie morale et juridique’, reviewing works every year on the 
topic of the family, (though from 1899 he also took charge of a new section entitled 
‘social morphology’). If Durkheim had set very broad parameters in the preface - the 
minimum requirement that sociology be done scientifically - he was nevertheless able to 
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continue to pursue his interest into an area that had been one of his ‘subjects of 
predilection’ since his lecture course at Bordeaux of 1888.538    
 Not only was the sociology of the family at the centre of his focus for the Année, 
but these contributions offer, as Mauss later confirmed, a complement to his 1888 and 
1892 lectures on the subject.539  And here, as in his earlier work, Durkheim’s interest was 
in understanding specific elements of contemporary morality - for example in his article 
on incest, the question was why most societies have prohibited incest and classed it as 
among the ‘most immoral of all practices’ - by tracing such moral sentiments and rules 
back to their earliest social origins.540  In the Division of Labour domestic morality had 
been cited by Durkheim to demonstrate the extreme complexity of moral life and the 
insufficiency of abstract rationalism where a single principle is offered as the explanation 
for all our contemporary, practical moral maxims: sociology, he suggested here and 
elsewhere, could indeed provide welcome relief to what he had described as a sort of 
rationalist closed-circle where everything is explained in advance.541 In 1888, he had 
described the sociological method as historical and comparative, as the introduction of 
the experimental method of Claude Bernard into the human sciences. The first step in the 
sociology of the family was thus to observe the organisation of family life throughout 
history, after which family types could be established; only then could one examine the 
variation of domestic morality through history according to family types, and finally 
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explain our contemporary domestic morality.542 Of course, this required the preliminary 
specialist historical research in order to be able to establish types at all, a job which he 
proposed to do over the course of the year, work which continued in the pages of the 
Année where his reviews focussed on research on the family in tribal society (the totemic 
clan), the Slavic or ‘zadruga’ family type and the patriarchal family.543   
 Perhaps the most notable difference between the reviews for the Année and the 
early lectures however was a new and preponderant focus on so-called ‘primitive’ 
societies and the totemic clan. Whereas before Durkheim had questioned the scientific 
value of ethnographical fieldwork, in the pages of the Année such empirical work became 
a crucial support of his social theory.544  If anything however, this turn to totemism and 
tribal society simply helped labour an old point, to insist on the family as a social 
institution. According to the first ‘rule of sociological method’, to treat social facts as 
things, it would be incorrect to start out from one’s own already socially conditioned 
assumptions about given institutions. Specifically, on the subject of the family, he argued 
that we cannot assume that marriage in its original form was monogamous nor that the 
nuclear family we know today was universal and he had already criticised contemporary 
authors such as Westermarck for such an ‘erroneous’ starting point.545 Through his 
reviews in the Année, he continued to argue against the prevalent idea of kinship as 
defined by blood relations resulting from monogamous marriage, while at the same time 
rejecting the opposing theory that there was an original state where domestic morality 
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was completely unknown.546 Defining kinship ‘objectively’ as the rights and duties that 
family members have towards each other, he argued that consanguinity was not the 
essential thing and that in tribal society it was the clan’s totem that defined the family tie. 
The totemic clan was thus the family ‘par excellence’, since although the clan members 
were not literally blood relations they still considered each other as descendant from the 
same totem and as therefore having definite rights and duties towards each other. In short 
the very things which, in contemporary society, are assumed to be essential traits of the 
family were not in fact essential at all; cohabitation, for example, was not necessary for a 
family to exist, nor was consanguinity sufficient to establish kinship: the essential thing 
was that there were ‘rights and duties, sanctioned by Society and which unite the 
individuals that make up the family. In other words, the family only exists as a social 
institution’.547  Marriage may produce actual blood relations, but whether or not these 
become relations of kin depends on how the family is conceived of in a given society.548  
 So, in the pages of the Année, Durkheim continued his effort to develop an 
‘objective’, ‘scientific’ way of thinking about domestic morality and the family. This did 
not mean literally starting out from ‘material’ things such as the state of the economy or 
the environment, and he was careful to also criticise the methods of economic 
materialism in discussing the family.549 If he had been rather unsuccessful with Suicide in 
his effort to clarify matters concerning the meaning of objectivity in sociology, he seems 
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to have made a better impression here. The only risk now - with Gustave Belot insisting 
on the ‘essentially psychological’ character of the demonstration in Durkheim’s article on 
the prohibition of incest - was of being perceived as having gone over to the other 
extreme of subjectivism, perhaps why from 1899 an extra section of reviews dealing with 
works on social morphology was added.550  
                                                 
550 Belot, ‘L’Année sociologique’, p. 655. 
231 
 
4.3.3 Sociology and the Social Sciences 
 If, by the late nineteenth century the term ‘social science’ had long been in use 
and considered intellectually legitimate, the same cannot be said for Auguste Comte’s 
neologism ‘sociology’, understood as a general and over-reaching theory of society.551 
Indeed, wrote Mauss, some ‘purists’ refused to even recognise the term itself, formed as 
it was, out a Latin root and a Greek ending.552 Part of Durkheim’s strategy therefore, in 
an effort to overcome the opposition that his Rules of Sociological Method had met was 
now to place the emphasis almost entirely on the individual social sciences, to present 
sociology as if it were simply the synthesis of empirical work in these branches. 
Avoiding further programmatic statements on the nature of sociology, Durkheim, in the 
prefaces to the first two issues of the Année, took the offensive against the tendency to 
see sociology as a ‘purely philosophical discipline, or metaphysics of the social 
sciences’.553  In his ‘general sociology’ section of the Année Célestin Bouglé (joined by 
Dominique Parodi in later issues) continued this negative critique of sociology as an 
‘unscientitifc’ general philosophy of society, with his critical comments on the organicist 
theories or Tarde’s theory of imitation.554  
 However, it is not exactly the case that Durkheim had abandoned the theoretical 
principles he had earlier set out; it is just that for further explicit statements from both 
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himself and other members of the group we need to look outside the Année.555  In the first 
of a series of such articles published in France in this period, Durkheim still avoided 
references to the most contested parts of his earlier definition of sociology and presented 
his methodological precepts as fully within the French rationalist tradition. It was, he 
wrote, the important insight of Saint-Simon and Comte, that society was not an artificial 
creation or product of individual action but a part of nature - a reality sui generis 
governed by its own laws and accessible to the intelligence - that made scientific 
sociology possible in the first place. However, distinguishing himself from these early 
positivists, he added that since then sociology had remained at a metaphysical phase, as a 
general theory of society and failed to become genuinely scientific. It was, he wrote, with 
the view of undertaking the specialised empirical work necessary to constitute sociology 
as a science that the Année sociologique had been founded.556 Without mentioning the 
words exteriority, generality or constraint, he argued that for a science to exist at all, it 
must have its own object distinct from that of other sciences, from which it logically 
followed that the facts studied by a scientific sociology could not simply be traced to 
individual, psychological facts.557  So the empirical social facts of various sorts which 
made up the subject-matter of sociology, must not be taken as the expression of 
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Textes, i, pp. 13-36, first publ, in Italian in the Rivista italiana di sociologia, 4 (1900), 
127-48, trans. to French by Armand Cuvillier in Où va la sociologie française? (Paris: 
Marcel Rivière, 1953), pp. 177-208 ; Émile Durkheim and Paul Fauconnet, ‘Sociologie et 
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individual sentiments but as the product of profound forces in the nature of society that 
are not immediately apparent.558    
 In another article written this time for an Italian audience, he again emphasised 
that the fundamental axiom of sociology was that social facts did indeed exist as a 
distinct reality, being the specific phenomena which would not exist without society and 
were what they were because society was how it was. As such, he continued, social facts 
could not be traced to individual psychology, adding this time that the ‘constraint’ 
exerted on the individual could act as a criterion by which to recognise a social fact 
(something which cannot be violated with impunity), though making sure to emphasise 
that ‘constraint’ was meant in the sense of a moral authority generated spontaneously 
from collective life and not a coercive external force.559   
 When it came to another effort to define sociology for the French audience, it was 
not Durkheim but his two collaborators, Mauss and Fauconnet in their article for the 
Grande Encyclopédie, who presented their group’s position. Here again however we find 
many of Durkheim’s earlier postulates re-stated, though in a more nuanced and less 
extreme form. Repeating the ‘necessary’ axiom for sociology to exist as a science (ie that 
there are indeed social facts, distinct from the facts of other sciences, which are logically 
related to each other and are intelligible) they again rejected Gariel Tarde’s ‘anti-
scientific’, individualist explanation of society.560 The point was, they insisted, not to 
exclude psychology, nor reduce social life to a material substratum, but that there was 
indeed a whole category of things, existing externally to the individual, which imposed 
                                                 
558 Durkheim, ‘La sociologie en France au XIXe siècle’ , pp. 135-36. 
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themselves upon the latter, and that there were beliefs, ways of acting and doing which 
individuals owed to collective life, which would be incomprehensible without society. 
There were, they argued, many things in economic life, in language and in religion, 
which individual sentiments could not explain, and which were manifestations of the life 
of the group.561 Social facts came from outside the individual and the best way of 
recognising social ways of acting and thinking was by their ‘obligatory character’, with 
violation being met with a sanction.562  What Mauss and Fauconnet added however was 
their recognition that there were also cases where ‘social pressure did not make itself felt 
under the explicit form of obligation’, and their definition of social facts as ‘institutions’, 
understood not just as ‘political constitutions’ and ‘legal organisations’, but also as 
‘customs and fashions, prejudices and superstitions’, which are in constant process of 
becoming. The ‘science of society’ is the ‘science of institutions’, the ‘social ways of 
acting and thinking...that the individual finds pre-established, and that are generally 
transmitted by education’.563  
 While Mauss and Fauconnet formulated the definition of sociology, it was 
Durkheim and Fauconnet who defined the relationship of sociology to the social sciences. 
Highly polemical in tone, and echoing the preface to the first Année sociologique, the 
article opened lamenting the fact that sociology, conceived of as a general theory of 
society, was still immersed in philosophy, that the discipline had stagnated since the time 
of Comte.564  While there may have been an explosion of sociological literature over the 
past twenty years, Durkheim and Fauconnet warned their readers as to the scientific value 
                                                 
561 Fauconnet and Mauss , pp. 141-44. 
562 Ibid, p. 144 
563 Ibid, p. 150 
564 Durkheim and Fauconnet, p. 466, p. 469. 
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of much of this work. They argued that almost always what was given the name 
sociology was just another philosophical system where, like with Comte and Spencer, 
everything is reduced to a single problem of discovering the ‘law which governs social 
evolution as a whole’: while for some it is the ‘law of imitation’, elsewhere it is the ‘law 
of adaptation or struggle for survival’.565 Rather than trying to furnish the ‘key to open all 
locks’, a genuinely scientific perspective in sociology would, they argued, realise that 
there were many doors and many keys to be found, that science was made up of various 
branches, each asking a multitude of specific questions.566  
 Durkheim and Fauconnet on the one hand presented sociology as if it were the 
synthesis, constituted from collaborative empirical work in the specialised branches of 
the social sciences.567 And yet in reality what they really were proposing was the 
introduction of a pre-established sociological method (the method of the Durkheimians, 
stated earlier by Durkheim himself, and more recently in a more up to date form by 
Mauss and Fauconnet) into the different social sciences. While one problem, they argued, 
was the persistence of the philosophical viewpoint in sociology, another was that the 
specialised, empirical social sciences in fact pre-dated sociology and had hitherto been 
pursued independently of each other and of general sociology.568  The challenge the 
Durkheimian school set for itself was thus to integrate these particular sciences, which all 
dealt with social facts - economics, the science of religion, the study of law and morality - 
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within the natural sciences, that is to make them into ‘positive sciences’, by adopting the 
Durkheimian method.569  
 
                                                 
569 Durkheim and Fauconnet , p. 485. 
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4.3.4 Law, Economics, History 
 What Durkheim proposed to do with the Année sociologique was therefore not 
exactly, as he claimed, to constitute sociology out of the synthesis of empirical research 
in the social sciences, but rather to introduce his method of sociological enquiry into 
these disciplines as the only genuinely scientific method. Working on the fundamental 
assumption that the religious, moral, legal and economic sciences all dealt with facts of a 
social nature, he held that the phenomena studied by these various sciences needed to be 
explained sociologically and formed part of the subject-matter of sociology. This 
conception of the relationship between sociology and the social sciences had the 
advantage of making possible an intellectual division of labour, which was reflected in 
the internal organisation of the Année, and formed the basis of a coherent 
interdisciplinary project. Every year, in each of their specialised fields, reviewers 
produced a series of critical articles of what they considered to be the most relevant 
recent publications, reviews which, more than just neutral summaries, were critiques 
from the perspective of Durkheimian sociology.  
 Paul Fauconnet for example, had, every year from 1899 a substantial column 
within the section on the sociology of morals and law, where he dealt with a very specific 
question, ‘responsibility’. If, unlike the Revue intermationale de sociologie, the Année 
had few actual international contributors, its authors nevertheless sought to address the 
most important debates at an international level in their given field. Fauconnet was no 
exception and in his reviews he sought to present the position of French sociology in 
relation to the main European schools of thought in legal theory on the question of penal 
and civil responsibility. Thus in the early issues of the Année sociologique his attention 
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was drawn to the Italian, ‘positivist’, school of criminology and the then current debate 
between it and the ‘neo-rationalist’ school.570  Both schools of thought, he explained, had 
grown out of a problem with the classical, rationalist conception of punishment and 
responsibility, which considered the sanction as an objectively defined compensation 
paid by an offender for the violation of the established law, and considered each person 
as equally endowed with the freedom to choose between possible courses of action. The 
problem with this theory was that it took no account of the individual offender, so while 
some criminals convicted for minor crimes were actually dangerous and likely to re-
offend, those who were actually harmless could be made worse by too harsh a sanction. 
The neo-rationalist school therefore proposed to derive the sanction then from the degree 
of responsibility of the criminal, while the Italian school focused entirely on the greater 
or lesser propensity of individuals to harm society and on putting them out of a position 
to do so.  
  In a sense, Fauconnet argued, both schools actually ignored the real point, which 
would be to explain why in given social contexts punishment takes the form it does, and 
why responsibility is conceived of in a certain way. What he found valuable in one 
particular work he reviewed, a study on the individuation of punishment, was precisely 
the emphasis on the sanction as a social reaction against crime, to be traced to a 
collective idea of justice.571 Elsewhere he praised the same author’s effort to socialise the 
notion of responsibility, to show that it was the ‘conscience collective’, which called for 
                                                 
570 He brings this debate up indirectly through his review of a French author, R. Saleilles, 
as this debate provided the context for the work in question, a study on the individuation 
of punishement. This was by far the longest review in his ‘droit pénal’ section in 1899. 
See, Paul Fauconnet, ‘Saleilles, R, L’Individuation de la peine’, AS, 2 (1899), 358-64.  
571 Fauconnet, ‘Saleilles’. 
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the punishment of the person responsible and judged as responsible ‘every man who 
seemed normal from a physiological point of view’.572 This work, argued Fauconnet, 
optimistically, was an expression of the new historical and sociological trend in 
criminology, towards the rejection of the idea of crime as a timeless, universal thing; 
there was a new tendency towards the consideration for how crime and related notions of 
punishment and responsibility change throughout history and towards accepting that they 
cannot be studied apart from their social representations.573 With regards to his own 
specific subject of interest, he argued that the objective study of responsibility would 
involve the search for the origin of this notion and ‘the causes of the changes that it has 
gone through up to our time’.574  
 In his section on economic sociology, in the first issue of the Année, François 
Simiand was also drawn to the debates at a European level about the new theory of value, 
the theory of ‘utilité-limite’. In Simiand’s reviews we see an approach similar to 
Fauconnet’s as he distinguished two opposing schools of thought on the specific question 
of value, demonstrated the insufficiency of either to provide a scientific account of value 
and proposed a sociological approach as a better alternative.575  While the the ‘utilité-
limite’ theory (which defined value in terms of a thing’s capacity to satisfy human needs, 
though also taking into account the relative difficulty in satisfying such needs) tended to 
                                                 
572 Also see Paul Fauconnet, ‘Alimena, I limiti e I modificatori dell’imputabilità‘ AS, 3 
(1900), 428-37 where we find a summary of the Italian school and the difference between 
it and the new Italian school. 
573 Fauconnet, ‘Saleilles’, p. 363. 
574 Paul Fauconnet ‘Hamon, A, , Déterminisme et responsabilité’, AS, 2 (1899), 367-69 
(p. 369).  
575 See for example François Simiand,’Berardi, La legge del Valore secondo la dottrina 
della Utilità-Limite’, AS, 1(1898), 458-64 and ‘Buch, Leo von, Intensitaet der Arbeit, 
Wert und Preis der Waren’, AS, 1 (1898), 464-67. 
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be labelled the subjective or psychological explanation (as opposed to an ‘objective’ 
theory that derived value from the work involved in the creation of goods) Simiand 
argued that ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ should not be taken to refer to the nature of the 
economic facts themselves but to the method used in accounting for such facts. Echoing 
the Durkheimian conception of objectivity, he argued that objectivity was not a 
distinction between a psychological or non-psychological explanation of value; it was 
more the recognition that economic phenomena such as value were part of nature and 
subject to laws that were intelligible and could not be derived from individual 
psychology.576 Value and price, he argued, existed outside of and imposed themselves 
upon the individuals, but the purely economic factors of production (natural resources, 
the work-force, technology) were not the only things to be considered: varying social 
factors (socially generated needs, the distribution of wealth, working conditions, social 
and political development) were just as important.577  Like Fauconnet, Simiand also 
optimistically noted a tendency at an international level towards the historical and 
sociological perspective, and an increasing concern in economics to emphasise the ‘social 
factor’. This he argued could indeed provide the way out of the constant shuttling 
between the so-called psychological (‘subjective’) and materialist (‘objective’) 
theories.578    
  Durkheim’s broad definition of the aims and programme of the Année, his basic 
requirement that sociology and the social sciences be conducted ‘scientifically’, thus 
                                                 
576 François Simiand, ‘Wernicke, Dr J, Der objective Wert und Preis’, AS, 1 (1898), 467-
72 (p. 467). 
577 Ibid, pp. 470-71 and François Simiand, ‘Stolzmann, R., Die Soziale Kategorie in der 
Volkswirtschaftslehre’, AS, 1(1898), 472-75 (p. 475). 
578 Ibid, p. 475. 
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made possible an intellectual division of labour between specialists in different branches 
of social science, who shared a conception of what it meant to pursue objective, scientific 
research in their related fields. There was a drawback however, and, as we shall see in 
chapter six, it led to accusations, from scholars outside the Année group, who were 
working in neighbouring disciplines such as history, of  ‘sociological imperialism’. 579 I 
shall discuss this question further in chapter six. While this reaction might lead one to 
retort that Durkheim’s strategy in defining the aims and programme of the Année was not 
therefore very logical in that it alienated a section of the French academic community 
from his project, it also brings up an important point about the meaning of ‘strategy’ as I 
am using it throughout this thesis. Whatever the overall end-result of Durkheim’s 
approach, his course of action was bound up with the objective affinities of the group. 
While Durkheim’s strategies in defining the aims and programme of the Année 
sociologique did have definite advantages, such strategies need to be seen not so much as 
the result of a rational means-ends calculation but more as choices made which were 
themselves informed by an intellectual habitus shaped within nineteenth-century French 
academic philosophy. 
 
                                                 
579 See Philippe Besnard, ‘L’impérialisme sociologique face à l’histoire’, in Besnard,  
Études durkheimiennes, pp. 299-310, who takes issue with Victor Karady’s argument in 
‘Stratégies de réussite et modes de faire-valoir de la sociologie’. Also, Henri Hauser, 
L’Enseignement des sciences sociales (Paris: Chevalier-Maresq, 1903), Charles 
Seignobos, La Méthode historique appliquée aux sciences sociales (Paris: Alcan, 1901).  
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4.4 The Accumulation of Symbolic Capital 
 
 It may have been the last of the sociological journals mentioned here to be 
founded, but the Année sociologique certainly tapped into a specific type of intellectual 
demand and within the space of a year or two it had established itself as a successful 
publication.  While all bode well for its continuation, the biggest problem that began to 
present itself seems to have been the workload. Such was the effort that just one issue 
required that it became, as Durkheim lamented to Mauss, impossible to produce anything 
else and he feared that rather than producing new work, his collaborators would become 
immobilised in ‘this bibliographic work’.580 Yet if he was encouraged by all those 
involved to continue with the Année it was because it really was not  just bibliographic 
work. The journal, in the first instance, served as a point around which a recognisable 
school of thought in sociology was formed and consolidated. Although perhaps less 
tangible and immediate than the symbolic capital deriving from individual book 
production, this impersonal and collective project itself had its returns. Through a 
collective accumulation of both institutional and scientific capital, the continuity of the 
Durkheimian school of thought seemed guaranteed at least into the next generation.  Two 
points are particularly significant in this regard: the gradual establishment of the 
Durkheimians within the university and the re-investment of scientific capital into the 
new and expanding domain of religious science.  
 
                                                 
580 Émile Durkheim, Letters to Marcel Mauss, February 1902 and February-March, 1901, 
in Durkheim, Lettres à Marcel Mauss, pp. 315-17 and pp. 276-77. 
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4.4.1 Institutions and Appointments 
  In response to the Izoulet affair, Durkheim, as we have seen, had written to 
Mauss, that what he cared about was not so much ‘administrative success’ but more to be 
able to exercise some scientific influence, regardless of his institutional position, and, in 
many ways, through founding the Année, he managed to do precisely this. Yet while 
institutional and scientific legitimacy can be treated as distinct things, they are 
nevertheless not totally separate. Just as Durkheim’s own position as the university 
representative in the field of sociology had initially helped to attract future collaborators 
to his project, the appointment of central members of the group to various strategic 
teaching posts could only enhance the group’s intellectual authority. What had, as I have 
already indicated, distinguished the Année group in 1898 was the relative lack of 
professional titles:  only Durkheim, with his chair at Bordeaux, Emmanuel Lévy and 
Célestin Bouglé with teaching posts in the faculty of law at Aix and the faculty of arts at 
Montpellier respectively already had university positions.581 Very soon however, this 
situation changed and in the space of four years the combined institutional capital of the 
group increased considerably, the first important appointment being that of Bouglé to a 
newly created chair of ‘social philosophy’ at Toulouse in 1901. With the Durkheimians 
now occupying two of only three existing sociological chairs (alongside the new 
Toulouse chair, there was Durkheim’s chair at Bordeaux and Espinas’s one at the 
Sorbonne) this appointment in a way made up for the Izoulet affair.582  
                                                 
581 Clark, Prophets and Patrons, p. 180; Besnard, ‘La formation de l’équipe de l’Année 
sociologique’, table II. 
582 On Bouglé’s career see Clark, Prophets and Patrons, p. 178, Weisz, ‘L’idéologie 
républicaine et les sciences sociales’, p. 104 and W. Paul Vogt, ‘Un durkheimien 
ambivalent: Célestin Bouglé, 1870-1940’, RFS, 20.1 (1979), 123-39. 
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 Whatever disdain he expressed for ‘administrative success’, Durkheim recognised 
the value of such appointments and did what he could to keep these assets within the 
group. When, for example, he himself would later move on from Bordeaux to a chair in 
the science of education at Paris, he made sure that one of the members of the Année 
team should replace him, and manoeuvred in support of Gaston Richard.583  Likewise, in 
1907 when Bouglé was promoted to Espinas’s chair at the Sorbonne, Durkheim 
manoeuvred in favour of Paul Fauconnet so as not to lose the Toulouse chair. Writing to 
Louis Liard, he reassured the latter that although ‘M. Fauconnet was not yet a doctor’, he 
was still more than qualified for the post given his years of immersion in specialised 
historical and statistical work and involvement with the collective and ‘impersonal’ 
scientific enterprise that was the Année sociologique.584 While on the one hand, these 
promotions were important in establishing and consolidating the intellectual authority of 
the Durkheimian group as a whole, in the case of Fauconnet, we also see how association 
with the journal could confer scientific authority in an individual capacity, which could 
then be converted into individual institutional gains.  
 However, not all of the central members of the Année group had, like Boulgé, 
Richard and Lapie, mainstream university careers, and Marcel Mauss and Henri Hubert 
pursued careers, not at the arts faculties but at the more marginal École pratique des 
hautes études.  In a sense ‘marginal’ is the wrong word, since the capacity of this 
institution to confer scientific legitimacy was just as powerful as that of the mainstream 
arts faculties. One of the earliest concrete results of the pressure for university reform and 
                                                 
583 On Richard see W.S.F. Pickering, ‘Gaston Richard: collaborator et adversaire’, RFS, 
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584 Émile Durkheim, Letter to Louis Liard, 4 December 1907 in ‘Lettres de Durkheim’, 
115-116. 
245 
 
the promotion of scientific research, it was indeed, as we have seen in chapter one, the 
very embodiment of scientific legitimacy, and this was particularly true in the fields of 
history and the science of religion.585 Now it was in this religious sciences section of the 
École pratique that, after his philosophy agrégation in 1895, Marcel Mauss enrolled; it 
was also here that he met Henri Hubert, who, after his history agrégation in 1895, also 
took courses at the school.586 Rather than pressing his nephew to take a more traditional 
academic route beginning with lycée teaching, Durkheim seems to have had a high regard 
for the school, and continually advised his nephew to continue on with his studies here. 
 The eventual appointment in 1901 of both Hubert and Mauss to teaching posts at 
this school after the deaths of Auguste Sabatier and of Léon Marillier was greeted 
enthusiastically by Durkheim. Writing to congratulate Hubert, he said, that it was ‘not 
without interest’ that sociology had gained entry to the school and that if it was not 
exactly on the programme, it was there in the choice of person, which was, at least 
‘something to be pleased about’. 587 Not a bad year for the group, and all seemed to be 
finally falling into place as Durkheim wrote in a letter to Mauss: ‘Enfin, d’une manière 
ou d’une autre tout s’arrange’.588  
 
                                                 
585 Clark, Prophets and Patrons, pp. 42-44. See chapter one above, section 1.3.2. 
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4.4.2 English Anthropology and Scientific Legitimacy 
 Not only did Durkheim welcome his nephew’s and Hubert’s involvement with the 
religious section of the École pratique, but it was precisely around this time, in the mid-
1890s that he himself also began to take far more of an interest in developing the 
sociology of religion than he ever had done before. Looking back on the period, he 
referred to the academic year of 1894-95 when he delivered a lecture course on the topic 
of religion at Bordeaux for the first time, as ‘a watershed in my thinking’. It was only 
then, he wrote, that he developed a ‘clear view of the capital role played by religion in 
social life’ and ‘found a means of tackling sociologically the study of religion’.589 Such 
was Durkheim’s own enthusiasm for the new field of religious science that was opening 
up that he accorded the section on religious sociology, of which Mauss and Hubert were 
in change, a dominant place in the overall organisation of the Année. Indeed, as he wrote 
in a letter to Mauss, he hoped that from the journal a new theory of society would 
emerge, which would be the ‘exact opposite of historical materialism, so vulgar and 
simplistic, in spite of its objectivist leanings’. This new theory, he stated, would see 
religion, rather than the economy, as the ‘matrix of social facts’.590 So as to ‘emphasise’ 
as clearly as possible this ‘orientation’, the second issue in 1899 opened with two original 
                                                 
589 Durkheim,‘Deux lettres sur l’influence allemande dans la sociologie française’, p. 
404. For the English translation see Émile Durkheim, ‘Influences upon Durkheim’s View 
of Sociology’, in Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, ed. by Lukes, trans. by 
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articles on religion: a definition of religious phenomena written by Durkheim followed by 
Hubert’s and Mauss’s essay on the theory of sacrifice.591  
 The exact nature of this religious turn has been the object of considerable debate 
ever since Talcott Parson’s argument that it marked a decisive point in the development 
of Durkheim’s thought from an early empiricism and materialism towards later idealism 
and voluntarism, which would cumulate in the Elementary Forms of Religious Life.592  
Yet Durkheim himself never accepted the description of his early work as ‘materialist’ or 
‘empiricist’, a perspective indeed entirely at odds with his philosophical education, and 
while he did seek to subsequently address such criticisms, to clarify the meaning of 
‘objectivism’ in sociology he never re-wrote a new Rules of Sociological Method. For 
this reason I find more convincing Warren Schmaus’s argument that if the content of 
Durkheim’s original research programme did evolve into something quite different, as he 
re-orientated his perspective towards the new ‘niche’ of religion, his philosophy of 
science was characterised by overall continuity. However, while Schmaus thought it 
unnecessary to refer to the wider context to account for this turn, it is difficult, without 
reference to the intellectual climate and the connections between the Année group and the 
École pratique, to understand why Durkheim would have been so enthusiastic about 
developing the sociology of religion or to explain the symbolic returns his enterprise 
gained from this. 593  
                                                 
591 Émile Durkheim, Letter to Marcel Mauss, February 1898, Durkheim, Lettres  à 
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 One of the most significant contemporary developments in the human sciences, 
the science of religion could not have been more popular. Demand from the field had led 
in the 1880s not only to the foundation the religious section of the École pratique, but 
also to a new journal, the Revue de l’histore des religions. Again, the stated aim of this 
new journal was to cut between religious ‘fanaticism’ or ‘dogmatism’ on the one hand 
and a type of ‘rationalism’ which ridiculed all religious beliefs as useless superstition, in 
order to develop a genuinely scientific explanation of religious phenomena. And it was in 
this journal that Marcel Mauss’s first articles were published in 1896, before the 
foundation of the Année. 594 Yet not only was the idea of submitting religious facts to the 
rigours of the historical and critical method intellectually legitimate, there was also an 
increasing interest developing in non-European religions, with the founders of the Revue 
de l’histore des religions declaring that the aim was to explore with equal rigour religions 
of the East and the West, ancient and modern. 595   The major intellectual turn to 
‘primitive’ religion in France was marked, as Mauss told his audience at his inaugural 
lecture at the École pratique in 1901, by the nomination in 1890 of his predecessor Léon 
Marillier as lecturer in what was then called the ‘history of the religions of non-civilised 
peoples’. 596  
 Whereas in the 1880s Germany stood as the embodiment of scientific legitimacy 
and had been the place to which Durkheim was drawn, now, in the field of religious 
history, it was the so-called English anthropological school that was perceived in France 
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as the most advanced in this new domain. Mauss recounted the interest generated by the 
translation of E.B. Tylor’s Primitive Culture into French, of Andrew Lang’s article on 
‘Mythology’ in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, and ‘definitive works’ such as William 
Robertson Smith’s the Religion of the Semites or James Frazer’s the Golden Bough that 
highlighted the importance of ‘primitive’ religions as one of the ‘foundations of the 
comparative science of religions’. It was precisely these publications and translations, 
recalled Mauss, which convinced those in charge of the École pratique to create a course 
of studies in this field and to appoint Marillier.597  Unlike Durkheim or Bouglé, who had 
previously travelled to Germany, when Mauss requested a scholarship to study abroad for 
the year 1896-97, it was to Holland and then to England that he was led.  And Durkheim 
himself was also drawn to the English anthropological school, writing that his turn to 
religion was due to his studies of ‘the works of Robertson Smith and his school’.598  
 After 1895 there was in short a definite re-orientation of focus on Durkheim’s 
part, and whereas before he had paid very little attention to non-Western societies and 
had questioned the scientific value of much ethnographical work, now this became his 
principal focus, as he came to value the potential of ethnography for constructing a 
sociological perspective in religion.599 More than of an extreme theoretical nature 
however, I suggest that this re-direction was more a re-conversion of symbolic capital 
and re-investment in the new, thriving field of religious science.  
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4.4.3 Taboo and Sacrifice 
 If Durkheim could write to his nephew Marcel Mauss to tell him that his 
participation was central to the success of the Année it was not just because, being based 
in Paris, Mauss was able attract a number of fellow philosophy graduates and students 
from the École pratique to the review.600 His specialisation in religious studies, in non-
European religions, and his position within the religious section of the École pratique 
meant that, through him, the Année would be in a good position to gain from new and 
relatively unexplored territory that was opening up in the science of religion. And it was 
indeed clear from Mauss’s first published articles that he intended not only to introduce 
the Durkheimian sociological perspective into the study of religion, but also to develop 
from this work on religion a perspective on the religious origins of social facts more 
generally.  
 In his 1896 review of Steinmetz’s work on the ‘religious’ origins of penal law, 
Mauss had drawn out insights important for developing a sociology of religion, and 
simultaneously proposed to ‘rectify’ the explanation, to give it a genuinely ‘sociological 
character’.601  On the one hand Mauss welcomed Steinmetz’s insight into the ‘lack of 
finality’ of the vendetta in tribal society, his description of it as passionate reaction where 
the ‘first one to come along’ could become the victim without even being the one actually 
responsible for the offence, and his general argument as to the  ‘religious’ origin of 
punishment. What Mauss contested however was Steinmetz’s individualist, psychological 
understanding of religion, which assumed that ‘primitive’ man was vindictive by nature, 
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which attributed to the dead murder victim a ‘great thirst for revenge’, and then 
considered the vendetta to be part of a religious cult of the dead as an act which provided 
the victim necessary to pacify the spirit of the deceased.  
 It is no wonder that Durkheim himself in the pages of the Année drew attention to 
Mauss’s analysis of Stenimetz: drawing on the concepts of mechanical solidarity and 
conscience collective, Mauss had proposed to explain punishment by the collective 
sentiments of the clan, the desire to stay in communion with the deceased and the desire 
to restore the vitality of the group after the death of a relative.602 While Steinmetz 
considered the private vendetta as the origin of the penal system, Mauss retorted that 
there were a whole series of offences in primitive society sanctioned by the death penalty. 
Any man, animal or thing wrote Mauss, which has  ‘any kind of intimate relationship 
with the cult...is sacred or...tabooed’, and any unsanctioned contact with these sacred 
things is strictly forbidden, and the violation of the taboo being ‘severely punished’.603 
The vendetta he suggested was thus best seen as part of a whole system of prohibitions 
and punishments, with its origins in the religious institution of the taboo, the breaker of 
which is considered a ‘dangerous being, a threat to those around him’, one who must be 
‘kept at a distance’, or ‘killed’ or ‘made inoffensive’. Whereas Mauss had indicated here 
his debt to the Division of Labour and the concept of collective consciouness Durkheim 
himself preferred to emphasise the originality of this proposal and singled out the 
argument concerning the origins of penal law in the primitive taboo as a ‘fertile idea’.604
 It was through the column of the Année sociologique on religious sociology 
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shared with Henri Hubert that Mauss not only sought to introduce the principal figures 
and main discoveries of the English anthropological school to France, but also to draw on 
the school’s work to develop a sociological perspective on the origins of religious 
phenomena.605 Identifiable by its evolutionary perspective on religion, its search for the 
common ‘human principle’ behind all religious practices, the English anthropological 
school proposed the  ‘fundamental identity’ of ‘primitive religion’, the ‘religions of 
ancient civilised peoples’ and the ‘survival of beliefs and rites in local practices and 
traditions of Europe and Asia’.606 This was precisely the sort of lens through which the 
Scottish theologian William Robertson Smith viewed the Old Testament and in his 
Religion of the Semites (the work that influenced Durkheim so much) he had argued that, 
like all the major religions, the religion of the Hebrews did not develop in isolation but 
had grown out of other earlier religions. Beyond the evolutionary perspective however, 
Robertson Smith’s emphasis on the practical element of religion, on the ritual over the 
belief component and in particular his work on sacrifice, especially influenced both 
Mauss and Durkheim.607 Unlike E. B. Tylor, who, in his Primitive Culture, interpreted 
sacrifice as a gift to pacify the gods or win their favour, Smith concluded that sacrifice 
was originally not an interested gift, but a communal meal between kin, traces of which 
were to be found in later religions more familiar to contemporaries. Presenting totemic 
sacrifice as the first phase of religious evolution, he argued that the communal meal, 
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where the clan members eat some of the usually forbidden totem, consecrated the unity of 
the clan and guaranteed the well being of its members.608  
 Yet the English school proposed that totemism was not only the earliest form of 
religion but also the oldest form of social organisation, the clan, and that the totem 
functioned as the symbol of the clan’s kinship system. In totemism a certain species of 
animal or plant, taken as the totem, was considered holy, and religious respect was due to 
all those beings who were believed to be part of the totemic species; thus within a clan, 
whose members considered themselves to originate from the same totemic ancestor, 
individual clan-members were considered sacred to a greater or lesser degree. For the 
English anthropological school, the totem was therefore also at the centre of moral life, 
with the notion of sin and punishment deriving from offences against the totem, 
considered dangerous for the life of the clan, while totemic sacrifice was a means through 
which the clan communicated with its gods through eating one of the totemic beings.609  
Yet however influential the English anthropological school was on Durkheiman 
sociology, Mauss nevertheless noted in their work a ‘certain intellectualism’ in that 
religious practices were always traced to individual psychology, and the actions of 
individuals were assumed to depend on their view of the world. Thus, he regretted, the 
‘method was not sociological’.610 
 In their ‘Essay on the Nature and Function of Sacrifice’ Mauss and Hubert, setting 
out from the work of the English school (Tylor, Frazer and Robertson Smith) sought to 
develop a sociological theory of sacrifice. While they saw the work of Robertson Smith 
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as the most advanced on the question so far, and welcomed his conception of sacrifice as 
a communal meal amongst kin, a meal that guaranteed and re-vitalised the communal 
bond, they disagreed with the chronological priority he accorded it.611  There were, they 
wrote, many different types of sacrificial acts to be found alongside communion, which 
could not be reduced to or derived from the latter, and so the ‘unity’ of the sacrificial 
system ‘must be sought elsewhere’.612 
  At the root of sacrifice was, for Mauss and Hubert, the division of space into the 
worlds of the sacred and the profane, the desirability of contact with the sacred but also 
danger of such direct contact with it. While on the one hand the sacred things were 
normally the objects of taboo, contact with them could also have beneficial effects for the 
individual and for the life of the clan. The aim of sacrifice was thus to make such 
communication between the profane and the sacred possible.613 Mauss and Hubert 
defined sacrifice as a religious act through which an object is consecrated, through which 
it passed from the ‘domain of the common’, to acquire either a ‘religious character it did 
not have before’ or to be ‘rid of an unfavourable character with which it is afflicted’.  
Through sacrifice an object is either ‘elevated to a state of grace or brought out of a state 
of sin’.614 The point of the rite was however for the consecrated thing to serve as an 
intermediary between a ‘sacrifiant’, or the subject who benefits from the sacrificial rite - 
a subject which can be an ‘individual or collective’, a ‘family, clan tribe, nation or secret 
society’ - and the gods.  As the consecrating effects spread out from the sacrificial victim 
to the ‘sacrifiant’, the rite is a way of making the sacrifiant holy in a moderate and 
                                                 
611 Hubert and Mauss, ‘Essai sur la nature et la fonction du sacrifice’, AS, 2, 29-33. 
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mediated fashion and sacrifice is in essence the ‘means for the profane to communicate 
with the sacred by the intermediary of a victim’.615  Rather than reducing the whole 
sacrificial system to the communal meal as Robertson Smith did, Mauss and Hubert 
argued that there were a whole range of sacrificial rites which mediated contact between 
the profane and sacred - rites of entrance, which served to progressively purify the 
sacrifiant in order to gradually approach the sacred, to prepare the ascent towards the 
divine, and rites of exit to make it possible for the sacrifiant to return to the common life, 
to prepare the descent towards the profane.616   
 Whereas for Robertson Smith the sacrificial victim came to the rite with a 
religious character already defined, for Mauss and Hubert the very purpose of the rite 
conceived of as a collective practice was to consecrate the victim. The communal meal 
where the sacrifiants ate the consecrated totem was part of a whole vast system of 
consecration and de-consecration.617 The sacred things were social things, the product of 
collective beliefs and practices; sacrifice served to bring individuals into contact with the 
sacred, while it also re-affirmed and consolidated collective belief. This was an explicit 
affirmation of the social function of religious rites and was indeed what was so new about 
Mauss and Hubert’s work. 618  
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4.4.4 From Religion to Morals and Knowledge 
 With Mauss being abroad in England for most of the time work on the essay on 
sacrifice seems to have been slow and difficult.619 Yet, from the beginning Durkheim was 
particularly enthusiastic about the planned essay, which, he wrote, was ‘absolutely 
important’, and even advised his nephew not to worry for a while about his doctoral 
thesis but to devote himself entirely to the essay on sacrifice.620 Whatever difficulties 
arose, he wrote that he really wanted to see this work completed and in other letters we 
find evidence of a ‘hidden collaboration’ from Durkheim on the project, from a suggested 
definition of sacrifice, to advice relating to the actual production of the work and 
organisation of the workload.621  No doubt the importance Durkheim attached to this 
essay resided in the fact that, through their critique of the English school and their stress 
on the social nature and social function of sacrifice, Mauss and Hubert provided a 
concrete example of how and with what results the sociological perspective could be 
introduced into religious science. While, they argued, the gods to whom the sacrificial 
acts were addressed may seem like ‘vain and costly illusions’ these ‘religious notions’ do 
exist objectively because they are collectively believed. The sacred things were social 
things, which existed outside the ‘sacrifiant’, but which were also close enough for 
believers to enter in and out of contact with, to find the strength and re-assurance they 
expected from the rites - the relationship of ‘immanence and transcendence’ which was 
                                                 
619 Fournier, Marcel Mauss, p. 156. 
620 Émile Durkheim, Letter to Marcel Mauss, January 1898, in Durkheim, Lettres à 
Marcel Mauss, pp. 99-102. 
621 Émile Durkheim, Letters to Marcel Mauss, 19 March 1898, 15 June 1898 and 4 May, 
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257 
 
distinctive of social things.622  Addressed to the sacred things, the function of sacrifice 
was also social as through individual acts of abnegation, collective representations were 
re-vitalised and social authority conferred on the things the participants hold dear.623  
  Lest anyone miss the point that religious facts were social facts and as such part 
of the subject matter of sociology, Durkheim supplied an opening ‘note on the definition 
of religion’ to accompany Mauss and Hubert’s essay, so as to mark out ‘as strongly as 
possible’ the Année’s orientation and really highlight ‘the social character of religious 
phenomena’.624 Echoing his first ‘rule of sociological method’, Durkheim insisted that to 
study religion scientifically, one’s definition of religious facts could not derive from pre-
conceived ideas about religion, the ‘confessional prejudices’, which very often have led 
scholars to miss the religious character of primitive beliefs and practices: seeing ‘only 
gross superstition in the religions of primitive peoples’ they ‘refuse to compare them too 
closely to the idealised cults of civilised peoples’.625 Citing the example of Albert Réville 
(the founder of the religious section of the École pratique) who defined religion as an 
ethic which regulated man’s conduct towards superior, god-like beings, Durkheim argued 
that such a modern European perspective, which saw God as essential to religion 
immediately excluded from view religions such as Buddhism which did not have gods at 
all.626 Rather than defining religion on the basis of the content of beliefs, Durkheim 
proposed to start out from the religious cult, from ritual practices and argued that prior to 
                                                 
622 Hubert and Mauss, ‘Essai sur la nature et la fonction du sacrifice’, pp. 136-37. 
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the idea of God, the distinction between the sacred and the profane was more 
fundamental and that the religious cult was the ‘totality of practices concerning sacred 
things’.627 While in this emphasis on ritual practice we see an expression of the new 
direction developed out of English anthropology, Durkheim also sought here to 
incorporate religious facts into his earlier definition of social facts. Religious 
communities, he argued, were characterised by an obligatory set of beliefs about sacred 
things and by pre-established and defined ways of acting in relation to these sacred 
things: religious facts consisted of ‘obligatory beliefs, connected with clearly defined 
practices which are related to given objects of those beliefs’, with religion itself being a 
more or less organised ensemble of phenomena of this type.628  Given that society was 
the only thing that surpassed the individual so as to impose a rule and to inspire respect 
then religious facts must be of social origin and required, in short, a social explanation. 
Religious science was therefore part of sociology.629    
 Beyond simply annexing the science of religion to sociology, Durkheim, as we 
have seen, hoped that from religious sociology an alternative, objective theory of society 
would emerge to replace historical materialism.630  Given that the  ‘sacred things’, were 
‘those whose representation society itself has fashioned’ and ‘profane things...those 
which each of us constructs from our own sense data and experience’, he could suggest 
that everything resulting from social life and surpassing the empirical individual - morals, 
                                                 
627 Durkheim,‘De la définition des phénomènes religieux’, pp. 15-17; trans, p. 88. 
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laws, political institutions - was originally of religious origin.631 Hence the immense 
interest he now showed in ethnographical research on the totemism of native Australian 
and American tribes and in the English anthropological school, which considered 
totemism as both a religion and a form of social organisation. Not only did totemism 
come to inform his sociology of the family, of morals and the law, it also prepared the 
ground for developing the sociology of knowledge. If Durkheim had already written 
about his wish to tackle from a ‘new point of view’ the ‘traditional questions’ in 
philosophy, and had sought to introduce a new approach to the study of morality, in his 
1903 essay with Mauss on ‘primitive classification’, they offered a social explanation of 
the categories of thought. 632 While the turn to religion and primitive society allowed 
Durkheim to re-convert symbolic capital into a new and expanding field of studies, to 
annex the science of religion to sociology, it also offered a way of tackling sociologically 
traditional questions in both moral philosophy and logic, which would cumulate, some 15 
years after Suicide, in his masterpiece Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse. This 
however will be discussed further in chapter six.  
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Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have tried to show that although Durkheim had been writing on 
sociology since the 1880s, with many published articles and three books to his name, his 
authority in the new field of studies was by no means assured. Through bringing together, 
around a new journal the Année sociologique, a group of academics with an interest in 
sociology and a similar intellectual world-view he managed to establish a coherent, 
collaborative research programme in sociology, which very much helped to turn the 
situation around. As I have tried to show, the great success of this journal was that, unlike 
the Leplayists or the International Sociologists, the Durkheimians managed to meet the 
growing demand for intellectual specialisation and professionalisation in sociology, while 
they were at the same to the forefront of the new developments in the human sciences 
such as the development of the science of religion. Although in this chapter I have 
focussed purely on the intellectual basis of Durkheim’s future consecration at the 
pinnacle of the academic edifice, politics also had a role to play. It is to this question of 
the relationship between the Durkheimians and the field of political power that I shall 
now turn.  
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Chapter 5  
Sociology and the Republic: Between Legitimation and 
Contestation  
 
 Although Durkheim often drew on the science/art opposition to describe what he 
was trying to do in developing sociology it is not the case, as I have indicated in chapter 
two and three, that social ‘science’ disregarded all questions relating to social ‘art’, 
questions, that is, of politics and social reform.633 He may have presented sociology as an 
objective science that limited itself to observing how societies are or have been, but at the 
same time Durkheim also made it perfectly clear that this science would also be of 
practical use.634 The aim of this chapter therefore is to look more closely at Durkheim’s 
conception of this social role of sociology and how his thinking on this matter evolved. 
More so than in previous chapters, I hope to emphasise here the political context, and 
Durkheim’s conceptualisation of the role of the sociologist in politics. Furthermore, 
alongside specifically intellectual factors, politics also counts in explaining the ultimate 
success of the Durkheimian school in establishing itself over other schools of thought as 
the French school of sociology, and this is another issue that I want to address here. With 
these aims in mind it is to the early period of sociology and Durkheim’s relationship to 
the new republican regime that I shall first turn. 
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5.1 The Politics of Moral Education 
 Although Talcott Parsons’s interpretation of Durkheim as a theorist of modern 
social order has had its various critics, it is difficult not to concede that the question of 
order did occupy at least an important place in Durkheim’s thinking.635 More debatable is 
however the conclusion that his work therefore had conservative political implications. 
To begin with, the ahistorical definition of political right and left that these conservative 
interpretations suppose, one independent of context and reduced to a binary opposition 
between for example order and change, liberty and equality, community and individual, 
would seem to be an inadequate base on which to build an assessment of Durkheim’s 
politics. In the context of the 1880s in France, as we shall see, the concern for order was 
not exactly the principal characteristic of the conservative coalition, and before 
considering Durkheim’s politics it is first necessary to look at the historical context and 
the shifting conceptions of right and left in this period.  
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5.1.1 The ‘Opportunist’ Republic 
 In 1879, when Durkheim entered the École normale supérieure, the Third 
Republic may have been the political regime of France for some nine years, but it was 
only in this year that the new regime finally came to be firmly in the hands of 
republicans. Although, as Maurice Agulhon has pointed out, the country was declared to 
be a ‘Republic’ from the 4 September 1870, it did not constitutionally become so until 
1875, and it was not until 1879 that the republicans actually came to really hold power.636 
Indeed, in 1871, and particularly after the general elections of the 8 February which 
returned a large monarchist majority, it must have seemed to the Catholics of France, 
who tended to be ‘conservative’ (meaning here monarchist and anti-republican) that 
salvation was nigh.637  The restoration of the legitimist heir to the throne, the Comte de 
Chambord, looked imminent and with it a return to ‘religious principles’ or ‘moral order’ 
in the near future. The problem with the moral order however was that it soon came to 
seem anything but orderly, and just as a general desire for peace and stability among the 
population can explain the conservative victory in February 1871, it could also work 
against the right.  The intransigence of Chambord in insisting on replacing the tri-colour 
with the Bourbon flag put off the more liberal Orléanist monarchists and made a united 
monarchist cause difficult, while Pius IX’s continued calls for French Catholics to 
support the independence of the Holy See risked stirring up a confrontation with Italy and 
Germany. While the anti-republican groups were busy plotting to overthrow the regime 
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and seemed out of touch with reality, the Republic came for many people to represent the 
best chance for peace.638  
 On paper it may have looked more like a constitutional monarchy, with a 
Chamber of Deputies and a Senate, whose combined vote elected a President with a 
seven year term and eligible for re-election, but in these constitutional laws of 1875 the 
country found lasting political institutions. Meanwhile, over the course of the decade 
continuous electoral gains by the republicans in both chambers and the strategy of 
republican unity, or ‘no enemies on the left’, first employed in response to the political 
crisis of the 16th May 1877 served to further consolidate the Republic. 639 Displaying a 
united front, in contrast to the divided right, the republican majority returned stronger and 
more confident after 1877, and with the President’s power to dissolve the Chamber 
discredited and the monarchist vote decimated, we can say that by 1879 the Republic was 
firmly in the hands of the republicans.  
 While republicanism itself did indeed have its own internal divisions between, 
broadly speaking, the government ‘opportunists’ and more ‘radical’ republicans to their 
left (groups which can be differentiated on questions such as the nature of the 
constitution, on social reform, colonial policy or Alsace-Lorraine) the need to defend the 
Republic against clericalism and monarchism meant that it was still difficult at this point 
to clearly appreciate these divisions.640 For most of the 1880s the ‘opportunists’ who 
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counted the politicians Léon Gambetta and Jules Ferry among their leading 
representatives, were the dominant political group in parliament. Having dropped the 
bellicose language of the ‘levée en masse’ and the theme of revenge against Germany, 
the opportunists believed in the gradual implementation of republican reforms, 
prioritising stability and seeking to build a solid social edifice less exposed to the wind of 
revolution. Grossly underestimating the problem of poverty and economic inequality, the 
actions of the government were largely of a moral nature: through the reform and 
secularisation of education, and through the generation of a new national symbolism (the 
‘Marseillaise’ as the national anthem, the 14 July as the national festival, the state 
funerals of important scientists and writers) the opportunists sought to build the moral 
basis of unity.641 However conservative this may seem to us today, at the time, to be on 
the parliamentary left was to be a republican, in favour of the consolidation of  
democratic institutions and secular society, against a traditionalist conservatism that 
opposed everything this new order stood for.642  
 A central tenet of republican ideology before 1890, which can perhaps help us 
understand this underestimation of the social question was the idea, first expressed by  
Léon Gambetta in 1872, that society was witnessing the arrival in positions of power 
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once reserved for men of birth and fortune, of the ‘new social strata’.643 A diffuse social 
group, often defined as neither proletarians nor upper middle class, the label ‘new men’ 
was generally taken to refer to all those who had managed, in spite of  ‘humble’ origins, 
to take advantage of universal suffrage, economic development and educational reform to 
climb the social ladder, or at least envision a place, if not for themselves then for their 
offspring, in the higher echelons of society.644 Nowhere was this optimism and faith in 
the capacity of a secular Republic to solve the problems of social inequality by virtue of 
its political consolidation alone more marked than within the teaching professions, where 
education was seen as the key to this ideal society of the future. 645 Having studied at the 
École normale precisely in these optimistic early years it is hardly surprising, as we shall 
see, that Durkheim in the 1880s was an enthusiastic supporter of the new regime.  
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5.1.2 Secularisation and Education 
 As we have seen in chapter one, it would not be entirely correct to take the 
regime’s ideology at face value and say that the elite sphere of political, administrative, 
economic or intellectual life had, with the advent of the Republic, finally become 
accessible to those most deprived of economic, cultural and social capital. 646 And yet, we 
have also seen how developments in the intellectual field allowed, in exceptional cases, 
for outstanding students of ‘humble’ origins (students such as Durkheim) to reach the 
pinnacle of the academic edifice. 647 It is thus not surprising to find that Durkheim, like 
many of his fellow students at the École normale in the 1880s, was a supporter of the 
Republic and hoped to be able to contribute something in his future career as an academic 
to its political consolidation.648  
 It was in education that the republican government, once firmly established in 
power, took most decisive action and between 1879 and 1886 a series of laws initiated by 
the opportunist Minister of Education Jules Ferry were promulgated.  Conceived of as a 
way of providing the new regime with a positivist inspired moral unity, to replace that 
which Catholicism had given to previous regimes, these laws can be interpreted as a 
reversal of a trend, underway for much of the nineteenth century, towards increasing 
Church power in education. From the Guizot law of 1833 declaring religious instruction 
to be a fundamental part of primary education and guaranteeing the Catholic Church’s 
‘freedom to teach’ in primary education‘, to the Falloux law of 1850 again declaring 
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religious instruction to be primordial and further extending the Church’s ‘freedom to 
teach’ to secondary education, the educational ideals of the French Revolution had been 
progressively buried.649 This trend had continued right into the 1870s, with one of the last 
victories of the ‘moral order’ coming in 1875 when the Church’s  ‘freedom to teach’ was 
extended to higher education.650 Motivated by a desire to consolidate republican 
democracy, Ferry responded in presenting to the Chamber, on a highly significant date, 
15 March 1879 (exactly 29 years after the voting of the Falloux law) his first two 
proposed reforms.651 His intention seems to have been very much what his supporters bid 
him on the day of his nomination to office, to give the country a new ‘Ferry law to erase 
the Falloux law’, to curtail the activity of the Church which was undermining the regime 
and to assert the right of the state in education.652 The best-known of these laws 
concerned the extension of free primary education to all public schools, obligatory school 
attendance between six and thirteen years, the deletion of religious instruction from the 
school curriculum and secularisation of the school building, though the law concerning 
the secularisation of teaching staff had to wait until October 1886. In a similar spirit the 
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complete reversal of the 1875 law was pursued, as was the denial of the permission to 
teach to any non-authorised religious congregations.653 
 There can be little doubt that Durkheim, a student at the École normale between 
1879 and 1882, and many of his co-students would have seen these reforms as part of the 
realisation of the ideals of the French Revolution. Their attitude would have been one of 
optimism and faith as to the prospects for the future transformation or egalitarian 
‘opening up’ of society. With his first university appointment being that of ‘chargé de 
cours’ in social science and pedagogy at Bordeaux, Durkheim was thus in a prime 
position to be involved in all this activity.654 And the area into which he first intervened 
with sociology was on the controversial issue of moral education.  
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5.1.3 Discipline, Ideals and Autonomy 
 With no explicit reference to the term ‘laïcité’, Ferry’s law on the secularisation 
of primary education simply stated that primary education involved moral and civic 
instruction, where the word ‘civic’ replaced what had previously been ‘religious’. 655  The 
idea was clearly not to banish the teaching of morality from public schools, and yet this 
was enough to create a confrontation with the Church, for whom the idea of a moral 
education without religion was impossible. Indeed the Church condemned the very 
concept as the first and most fundamental ‘error’ contained in the new teaching manuals 
for moral and civic instruction in public schools. 656 Secular education, its opponents 
argued, would lead the country to ‘moral anarchy’. 657 However, education for the 
secularising republicans just as much as for their Catholic opponents, was not simply 
about learning how to read and write or about learning objective facts about the world; 
the teaching of duties and values was believed to be an integral part of schooling. While 
the fundamental assumption was that a morality independent of revealed religion was 
indeed possible, what exactly this consisted of and how it could be taught to children was 
less easy to pinpoint. Defined negatively as ‘not Catholic’ as the conservative press put it, 
or at the other extreme, as not a ‘new gospel’ either, secular morality could seem a rather 
pale and lifeless concept.658 In terms of positive content, it merely consisted, according to 
Ferry, of age-old, almost self-evident principles common to all people in society, that 
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have been handed down from generation to generation: it was the ‘good and old moral 
code we have received from our fathers and mothers’ generally believed to have 
something to do with honesty, hard-work, discipline, respect for property, love of one’s 
family and country.659 
 In his pedagogy lecture course on ‘moral education’ given in numerous years at 
Bordeaux and Paris, Durkheim clearly situated himself within the republican camp, 
arguing that it was indeed possible to formulate ‘a purely secular moral education’, a 
moral education derived not from ‘revealed religion’, but one that rests ‘exclusively on 
ideas, sentiments and practices accountable to reason only’.660  In fact, he argued, there 
was no sphere of reality at all that was ‘fundamentally beyond the scope of human 
reason’, or  ‘irrational in its essence’, and morality was no exception.661 When it came to 
determining what this rational morality actually consisted of Durkheim was, not 
surprisingly, highly critical of the method of moral philosophers who sought to derive 
practical moral maxims from one guiding, supposedly universal principle such as utility 
or human dignity.  The starting point of any scientific approach to morality had to be, he 
argued, an examination of the empirical reality, and this meant treating morality itself 
objectively as a ‘social fact’. Proceeding in this manner, he argued, one can see that the 
common trait of all behaviour ordinarily called moral is that it ‘conforms to pre-
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established rules’.662 There may not be one single moral law valid for all of humanity and 
the content of moral maxims may vary with time and place, but morality can be said to 
consist of ‘a system of rules of action that predetermine conduct’,  ‘an infinity of special 
rules fixed and specific, which order man’s conduct in those different situations in which 
he finds himself’.663 Imparting a spirit of discipline, a capacity for regular conduct, more 
so than inculcating specific rules or ideas was, for Durkheim, an essential part of moral 
education for children. 
 This was not all however, and if people acted in accordance with given rules it 
was not out of habit or fear but because certain maxims were genuinely felt to have an 
aura of authority. Deference to moral rules was not about utility, as when one followed 
the doctor’s advice, nor fear of the consequences of failing to do so, but resulted from a 
genuine respect or attachment to something beyond ourselves. However, outside or 
beyond individuals, there was, Durkheim argued, nothing other than groups formed by 
the union of individuals and so distinctly moral goals were those which took as their 
object society, and ‘to act morally’ was ‘to act in terms of collective interest’. The moral 
action, for Durkheim, was that which had ‘impersonal aims’, which necessarily 
concerned ‘something other than individuals’, which was in short ‘supra-individual’.664 
 So alongside the spirit of discipline we have attachment to the social group to 
which one belonged as two of the defining characteristics of moral behaviour. Morality 
and society thus went together, with society being the source of the rules we live by and 
the ideals we are attached to, rules and ideals which themselves varied according to the 
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social milieu.665 There could not conceivably be a society without a morality, and 
furthermore since it was impossible to live in isolation from others, since the social 
milieu ‘pervades us’ and ‘blends with us’ morality was both outside us and within us, 
transcendent and immanent. So there was, argued Durkheim, always in us ‘something 
other than ourselves’. When we ‘hold to ourselves’ we also ‘hold to something other than 
ourselves’ and to live a completely amoral life would be ‘quite as impossible as escaping 
our shadows’.666  
 In annexing his sociology to the legitimation of republican educational policies, in 
arguing that a rational moral education was entirely possible, Durkheim’s position 
cannot, in context, be considered conservative. However, also at a more fundamental 
level the argument he made about discipline and collective ideals was not exactly anti-
individualist in the sense of a call for the indoctrination of values in view of guaranteeing 
social unity. Durkheim’s point was that it is only through life in society that individuals 
become moral beings, with a capacity for self-mastery and commitment to impersonal 
ends, and that gradually as the ‘animal we are at birth’ incorporated its surrounding 
culture,  ‘the human being’ emerged. 667 Moral education was not about the inculcation of 
specific doctrines on how to live a good life, or of specific articles of faith, but involved 
developing in children a general capacity for self-discipline and for devotion to ideals 
that stretched beyond themselves, things Durkheim believed necessary if one was to 
become capable of acting in the world as a free and rational subject. For Durkheim, the 
classroom, as a sort of mini-society, provided a moral milieu governed by a set of rules, 
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where children could develop these capacities. Unlike in the family, authority here must 
not be too narrowly attached to one person, to the person of the teacher, but derived from 
a respect and attachment to an impersonal law of which the teacher was merely the 
interpreter. At school, Durkheim argued, more so than in the family, children could 
develop that respect for legality, so important in modern democratic societies, where one 
fulfilled their duty not out of fear of punishment but out of genuine respect for and 
understanding of the ‘impersonal law’ governing social life.668 For Durkheim individual 
freedom did not mean a complete lack of moral boundaries, going blindly about the 
world wherever instinct led; true freedom was about living consciously in accordance 
with a moral law, about developing a capacity for self-mastery and for the pursuit of 
one’s ideals.  
 In this regard, the third and last element of morality, autonomy, also merits 
attention as we see that Durkheim was not disputing the right of the individual moral 
conscience to any claims to autonomy, nor saying that we are the passive products of our 
social environment, but simply rejecting the other extreme where ‘any kind of restriction 
on our interior being seems immoral as it does violence to our personal autonomy’.669 
Autonomy, Durkheim argued, was however essential to moral behaviour. Indeed, he 
continued, Immanuel Kant, who, more than any other philosopher felt ‘the imperative 
quality of the moral law’, and also refused to acknowledge that the will could be 
completely moral when it deferred ‘passively to a law of which it is not the maker’.670 
However, whereas Kant argued that one became free through gaining understanding of 
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the rational basis of moral precepts, Durkheim argued on the contrary that our faculty of 
reason itself was not a transcendent faculty outside the human world, but actually 
developed within bounded or constraining social contexts. Reason itself was deeply 
‘implicated in society’, and the autonomy that our modern moral conscience demanded 
was not an absolute autonomy but one that had grown as society had changed, one which 
was ‘progressively becoming’ and evolving through history.671 Individuals do not receive 
this autonomy ready-made from birth but fashion it ‘to the extent that we achieve a more 
complete knowledge of things’. And since morality was a social fact it would be through 
the development of correct knowledge about the society in which we live, that one can 
understand what values and what rules are worthy of respect. Sociology could therefore 
make this moral autonomy possible, since through it we gain greater knowledge of our 
society: science was, in short, the ‘wellspring of autonomy’.672  
 So not only did a purely secular education not mean the disintegration of morality. 
the development of a rational morality was on Durkheim’s analysis,  part of the general 
progress of social transformation, stretching back through history: ‘the secularisation of 
education’, he wrote, ‘has been in process for centuries’.673 This rational morality was not 
however, a timeless, universal moral code, valid for man in general, nor was it, as in 
Ferry’s letter, the same moral precepts that have been handed down from generation to 
generation.  For Durkheim social life was the ultimate source of moral rules and ideals, 
and given that social arrangements were never fixed once and for all but were in a 
process of continuous becoming, one could not be content with ‘complacent possession 
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of acquired moral results’. The teacher must ‘guard against transmitting the moral gospel 
of our elders as a sort of closed book’, must encourage in children ‘a desire to add a few 
lines of their own, and give them the necessary tools to satisfy this legitimate 
ambition’.674 Here we seem far from a conservative moral theory, which would inculcate 
in children a respect for pre-established rules and values, one with an over-riding 
emphasis on social order. Yet, while Durkheim’s contribution to the legitimation and 
political consolidation of the new regime cannot in the 1880s be labelled conservative, 
traditionalist or anti-individualist, in a changed political context of the following decade, 
his politics become less clear-cut.  
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5.2 Solidarity and Social Peace 
 While in the 1880s, the actions of successive governments testified to a belief in 
the efficacy of political and educational measures to solve problems of inequality and the 
material and moral issues that industrialisation brought in its wake, it was from around 
1890 that the ‘social question’ began to make its way more forcibly onto the main 
political agenda.675 In this next decade, the consolidation of republican power and the 
electoral destruction of traditionalist conservatism led to the re-organisation of the 
political landscape, its polarisation around the social question and the emergence of a 
republican conservatism (to be distinguished from the earlier traditionalist conservatism), 
which dominated parliament for most of this period. 676  In the intellectual field this re-
direction of attention towards the social question fuelled the growing interest in 
sociology, leading to the creation of new academic chairs in a discipline, which was 
quickly coming to be seen as a means of dealing with the social question and the ‘threat’ 
of socialism.677  
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5.2.1 The Social Question 
 The rise in labour militancy in France in the period continuing up to the eve of the 
First World War was nothing of a ‘French exception’. As Judith Stone has pointed out, 
all over the industrialising world, the combination of democracy and increasing political 
awareness among workers led to the growth of organisations such as trade unions and 
political parties with the aim of getting workers’ demands onto the political agenda. 
While the number of labour disputes was increasing at an international level, in France 
specifically trade union membership rose from 139 000 in 1890 to just over one million 
in 1913 and the number of strikes not only multiplied but since 1870 had also become 
unionised.678 Historical landmarks such as the first national May Day protests in 1890, 
the shooting of nine workers by government troops at Fourmies in 1891 or the long strike 
at Carmaux the following year all bore witness to a labour movement that was 
progressively gathering force. This meant not only increasing trade union activism and 
strikes, but also the growth of and electoral gains for a variety of socialist political groups 
representing workers in the political arena.679  
 It is worth noting first that in this period the term ‘socialism’ did not refer to any 
one specific, united movement but to a number of diffuse positions. The main groups 
included: the Blanquists, with Edouard Vaillant as a central figure, who traced their roots 
back to the revolutionary tradition, 1848 and the Commune; the Parti ouvrier français led 
by Jules Guesde with a Marxist ideology of economic determinism and class struggle; 
there were the Allemanists, of the Parti ouvrier socialiste révolutionnaire, which was anti-
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parliamentary and anti-militarist, emphasised above politics the role of workers’ 
organisations such as the trade unions and attracted a number of intellectuals; and finally 
a number of ‘independent’ socialists who were not in any party but who espoused broadly 
socialist aims and sought to represent these in parliament.680  
 Of course, this is necessarily a very brief and inadequate sketch. But the point is 
simply that in terms of the nature of the movement’s aims (economic change or also the 
generation of new ideals), the type of action it prioritised (economic or political) and in 
terms of means (gradual reforms or revolutionary action) as well as its view of the French 
Revolution and republican institutions, ‘socialism’ could, in practice, mean various 
different things. However, in the context of mounting social unrest and the fear of dis-
order, aggravated by a series of anarchist bombs that exploded in a number of public 
locations in Paris in the early 1890s, ‘socialism’ in the dominant discourse came to be 
depicted as a threat to society and equated with a doctrine of violent, international class 
struggle to overthrow property and ‘bourgeois’ political institutions. It was not, in short, 
to be seen as the logical development of the ideals of the revolution, or the left wing of 
republicanism. Adopting a ‘new spirit’, an attitude most closely associated with Jules 
Méline, the prime minister between 1896 and 1898, the conservative republicans, or 
‘progressists’ as they were called, no longer saw the old religious right as the main 
opponent, but situated the danger squarely on the left. They used the horror provoked by 
the anarchist attacks to insist on resolute opposition to socialism and argue in favour of a 
strategy of alliance with those members of the old traditionalist right who had ‘rallied’ to 
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the Republic.681  The strategy of ‘no enemies on the left’ of republican defence had, for 
the moment, clearly come to an end. With an increasing number of   independent socialist 
deputies in parliament and the development of a branch of radical republicanism (left-
radicals and solidarists), in favour of social reform legislation, a new right-left division 
began to emerge not around education and the religion as before but around the social 
question.682 
 In sociology, this political state of affairs also had its repercussions. Up until this 
point Leplayist social economy had been, since the fall of the Second Empire, a marginal 
movement preaching paternalism and had always been associated with Catholic 
traditionalism. While the school of Le Play itself did not come back to life as a scientific 
and institutional power to be reckoned with, its conception of social economy as a tool 
for dealing with the social question while also maintaining the existing power structure 
came to be annexed to republican ideology and adopted by more modern social scientists. 
In this transformation, one of Le Play’s disciples, Émile Cheysson, was particularly 
influential and it is to his conception of sociology that I shall turn next.  
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5.2.2 Émile Cheysson’s  ‘Social Engineer’ 
 In 1882, when the social question was still very much a marginal political issue, 
the Leplayist Émile Cheysson was employed to teach political economy at the École libre 
des sciences politiques. In his opening lecture he anticipated intellectual developments of 
the following decade. Defining ‘sociology’, as synonymous with ‘social economy’, that 
‘vast synthesis embracing all sciences with man in society as their object’, he stated that 
the changes in the nature of production and work relations that accompanied 
industrialisation had made such studies particularly relevant.683  His own century, the 
‘age of steam and electricity’ was one of great material progress, and yet the de-
stabilisation of the ‘moral order’, of the internal organisation of societies, had thrown a 
shadow on this very progress. The century had in short become ‘the century of social 
questions’.684 While the term ‘social economy’, appearing in France in the 1830s and 
appropriated as it was by Frédéric Le Play certainly did have traditionalist connotations, 
Leplayists such as Cheysson were actually ahead of their time in that they had already 
recognised the socially de-stabilising effect of industrial development, the emerging 
antagonism between workers and capitalists. Long before the 1890s they had had already 
founded organisations for the specific purpose of monitoring working-class activism and 
solving the ‘social question’ within the existing framework of industrial society.685 
 However much Le Play had stressed the moral benefits of the patriarchal family 
and of religion, however much he lamented the threats to traditional social stability, 
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neither he nor Cheysson would have wished to revert to a pre-industrial era.686  Cheysson 
insisted on the benefits of industrial expansion and of the capitalist mode of production, 
and argued that having once been ‘dominated by nature’, mankind has been able to make 
‘the animals, water, the wind, the sun, steam, electricity’ work in its service towards the 
‘blossoming of material progress, which is the legitimate pride of our time’.687 Although 
one may not always clearly see its advantages, he argued that the tendency of production 
towards concentration in large factories was the condition of the ‘productive boom of 
human activity’.688  Pauperism and extreme poverty may throw ‘shadows’ on this 
‘brilliant picture’ but the ‘socialist’ claim that the tendency of industrial society was to 
make ‘the rich even richer and the poor even poorer’, he argued, was simply not true: 
there was no necessary antagonism between ‘moral progress’ and ‘material progress’.689  
 Never questioning the rightness of the hierarchical division of modern society into 
industrialists and manual labourers, Cheysson called on the socially ‘superior’ classes, 
the economic, political and intellectual elites, to take up the rich man’s burden: 
‘Supériorité oblige! To be forgiven for it, we must fulfil the duties that it imposes. It puts 
into our hands a force that we have no right to leave inert and sterile. Devotion to others 
must be the price we pay for this privilege. Too often hatred from the people is merely 
the response from below to indifference from above, of the egoism of those who suffer to 
the egoism of those who live well and the former is far more excusable than the latter!’690  
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 Speaking here, in 1909, on the occasion of his own nomination as president of the 
Ligue nationale contre l’alcoolisme, what Chyesson meant was that the ‘social duty’ of 
those of wealth and ‘superior’ birth required them to undertake charitable work through 
reform associations such as this one (other examples were the Ligue nationale de la 
prévoyance et de la mutualité, the Alliance d’hygiène sociale or the Société française des 
habitations à bon marché). When it came to factory management, the ‘social duty’ of 
enlightened company bosses was paternalistic reform for the material and moral 
improvement of workers (involving wage incentives, healthier working conditions, 
employer-sponsored housing programmes, company shops with cheap food and clothing, 
industrial training). This, on the one hand could promote social peace and prevent strikes, 
while the prospect of higher wages, better housing and promotion could also generate 
competition between workers for the favour of their employers. Against the socialist 
language of class struggle, Cheysson depicted industrialists and workers combined as a 
large family, involving both relations of power and authority but also mutual respect and 
solidarity.691 In this sense the term ‘solidarity’ had a definite conservative, anti-socialist, 
connotation.  
 Among Cheysson’s various audiences were the charitable reform associations 
mentioned above, large industrialists (whom he reminded of their ‘social duty’), and 
workers (whom he told that capital was not their enemy). To the intellectual elite, his 
message was that through the dispassionate study of modern social conditions, social 
economy could give political economy a tool to guarantee social peace. While he told 
bosses that they had an important role in generating the conditions for peace, it was, he 
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added, the role of the social economist to study problems such as unemployment, strike 
patterns, wages, poverty, housing and alcoholism, to investigate the source of disorder 
and propose reforms to restore the peace.  
 Having himself, like Le Play, trained as an engineer at the École polytechnique 
and at the École des ponts et chaussées, and practiced as an engineer, Cheysson lectured 
at institutions such as the École des mines and the École des ponts et chaussées, as well 
as at the École libre des sciences politiques. He seemed to conceive of ‘social economy’ 
as a sort of ‘social engineering’ and of the social economist/sociologist as a social 
engineer. 692 If, as Cheysson told his listeners in the Société des ingénieurs civils, the 
industrialist needed in a sense to ‘double as a social engineer’, to develop the 
paternalistic institutions necessary for the prosperity of his business and the good of his 
workers, good intentions on the part of the bosses were not enough. This is because, he 
argued, very often ‘the distance between the workers and management is considerable’ 
and what may have been intended as a ‘generous measure’ is not always appreciated 
when it reaches its destination. 693 So, just as ‘one would not place the control of some 
technical operation... in the hands of an engineer with good intentions but without the 
professional know-how’ it would be ‘imprudent to abandon to someone with little 
knowledge of social science the organisation and maintenance of these social 
mechanisms which require much tact and experience’. 694 Although in this speech 
Cheysson’s message to real engineers was that they could contribute to the creation of 
social peace through acting as a middle force between the boss and the workers (with the 
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day to day running of the mine, the hiring and firing of workers, the establishment and 
distribution of prizes and promotions), we can, I suggest, also interpret the idea of a 
‘social engineer’ as more in line with the work Cheysson himself, did, a civil engineer by 
training who became an expert in social science, an advisor to industrialists with the task 
of building the social machinery of modern industrial integration.695  
 In the 1870s and 1880s, the social economists were alone in their insistence on the 
urgency of, and the potentially catastrophic consequences of ignoring, the social question. 
However, after the ‘ralliement’ and the political re-alignment that occurred within 
republicanism in the same decade around the social question, they became respectable 
among conservative republican politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals. At the same 
time, through the figure of Cheysson Leplayist social reform detached itself from 
religious and partisan politics and its themes could become part of the dominant 
framework for the discussion of the social question in the 1890s.696  
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5.2.3 Social Economy and Republican Ideology 
 Nothing better testifies to the entry of Leplayist inspired social economy within 
the realm of the political respectability in the 1890s than the return of the social economy 
exhibit to the Universal Expositions in Paris. Having appeared at the first Universal 
Exposition in 1867 under the direction of Le Play (assisted by Cheysson), it had been 
excluded in 1878 only to be back to much acclaim in 1889 and 1900 under the direction 
of Cheysson. 697 In a book describing the full range of the social economy initiatives on 
display in the 1900 Exposition, Charles Gide, a professor of social economy at the Paris 
faculty of law, proclaimed what the Leplayist social economists had been saying for 
decades, that there was no opposition between political economy and social economy: if 
the ‘science of wealth’ can tell us nothing about the social difficulties arising from 
economic development, it was the achievement of Le Play to have first proposed social 
economy as a tool to help society reap the full benefit of industrial progress. 698 On show 
at the Exposition were a whole range of initiatives undertaken to promote ‘social peace’ 
within the existing socio-economic framework, the various institutions for the elevation 
of the material and moral condition of workers from the promotion of healthier working 
and housing conditions, healthier diets and pastimes to the eradication of drunkenness 
and debt.  699   
 In all of this activity, the various initiatives of the philanthropist, the Comte de 
Chambrun merit particular attention. It was he who endowed the Musée social in 1894, 
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which was to house resources for the study of the social question and where part of the 
1889 social economy exhibit went on permanent display.700 It was also he who had 
endowed Cheysson’s chair at the École libre des sciences politiques (becoming a chair of 
social economy in 1887), as well as Espinas’s chair in the history of social economy at 
the Sorbonne and Charles Gide’s chair in social economy at the Paris faculty of law 
created in 1898.  The figure of Chambrun himself is indicative of the passage of social 
economy to political respectability, and however much he himself may have been drawn 
to the Leplayist ideas, he also saw, perhaps influenced by his personal secretary Dick 
May, the importance of adapting social economy to the new political context, of 
dissociating it from traditionalism so as to prioritise the goal of  ‘social peace’.701  
 Ignoring the fact that socialism was not a homogenous movement, that many 
French socialists were idealists who saw their movement as the logical extension of the 
republican ideal, the initiatives of Chambrun were aimed at creating a barrier against 
socialism. In an article for René Worms’s Revue internationale de sociologie Cheysson 
could argue that socialism was anti-republican, since it preached international class 
solidarity above national solidarity, and the abolition of private property above the 
extension of property-ownership to all individuals. 702 The critique of laissez faire 
economics, co-operation versus class antagonism, the reciprocal social duties of workers 
and bosses...all these were dominant themes of the 1890s, which formed part of the 
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justification for the promotion of sociological studies.703 If Charles Gide had earlier on 
distinguished between the traditionalist school (that emphasised the importance of the 
traditional forms of moral authority, church and patriarchal family) a collectivist school 
(that emphasised the need for greater equality) and the ‘new school’ of solidarity (that 
emphasised co-operation and reciprocal duties), by the mid-1890s he was able to correct 
himself: these three schools were no longer all that distinct but were increasingly coming 
together around the idea of social solidarity.704  
 Whereas Durkheim sought to avoid contact with the International Sociologists, 
Émile Cheysson, Charles Gide and Alfred Espinas all had in common their collaboration 
with this group and the fact that their academic chairs were all endowed by Chambrun. It 
was in the Revue internationale de sociologie that Espinas’s opening lecture at the 
Sorbonne was published, a lecture in which he defined the aim of social economy in 
completely practical terms, as the effort to alleviate the ills arising from problems with 
modern social organisation.705 Here, his message was that although one cannot remake 
the world in accordance with an abstract ideal, social economy could help work out 
principles of action that would be valid for modern European societies where all 
individuals, from the most humble workers and the most powerful industrialists, were 
inter-dependent. Social economy had shown the modern division of labour to be the 
source of national unity and that in order to deal with the social question one did not need 
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to rid society of all relations of subordination but nurture a new respect for discipline.706 
Praising the ‘œuvres de secours’ of industrialists, he called for laws to protect workers, 
while at the same time arguing that the methods of ‘radical socialism’ were the ‘worst of 
all’, and followed this up with a lengthy critique of Marx.707  
 If Espinas had begun with an opening statement on the practical aims of social 
economy, it soon became clear over the following months that his lectures actually were 
developping more of a historical focus, not exactly, it seems, what his backers had hoped 
for.708 This was not to be the case with Charles Gide however who, in his opening lecture 
in 1898, stated that his course would have a far more practical focus. Publicly thanking 
the Minister for Public Instruction Léon Bourgeois and the initiative’s financial backer 
Chambrun, he described his course as a foretaste of what was to come in eighteen months 
time at the 1900 Universal Exposition.709  References to Le Play, Cheysson, to the 
Universal Expositions, the Musée social abound and again we have the standard 
declaration of opposition to laissez-faire capitalism and praise for reform initiatives to 
fight problems such as alcoholism and unemployment. He recognised that some liberal 
economists were still against social economy, but reassured his audience that social 
economy stood opposed to socialism and excessive state intervention, and that its 
ultimate aim was to create the conditions of industrial peace.  
 However well intentioned, there were nevertheless definite assumptions as to the 
hierarchical nature of society behind these efforts on the part of this ‘small group of men 
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from the elite’ to encourage manual workers to live ‘healthy’, ‘moral’ lives.710  The case 
was however stated more explicitly by Jean Izoulet in his opening lecture in 1897 at the 
Collège de France, and with this new chair of social philosophy directly created by 
government initiative, we can say that Izoulet perhaps best represented the established 
government position. The concern again was to block the advance of socialism and to 
legitimate a conception of the social hierarchy adapted to industrial and democratic 
society.  711  Already in his doctoral thesis, Izoulet had proposed his ‘bio-social’ theory of 
society, where he drew on the organic metaphor to depict society as a structured body 
characterised by hierarchy and interdependence, and to present egalitarianism and 
disrespect for authority as a threat to ‘civilisation’.712  
 Intellectually progressive in the 1870s and 1880s, when it had challenged the 
intellectual hegemony of spiritualism, now the biological metaphor had become distinctly 
conservative in that it served to legitimise the existing order and discredit egalitarian 
demands. In short Jean Izoulet saw the elite as responsible for all the higher order things 
in society (spiritual life, science, government, industry), while he described manual 
workers and colonised people as having intellectual capacities closer to those of animals 
and as hardly capable of higher thinking or action at all. For this reason, he argued, they 
were like children, in need of guidance and discipline from the elite, an elite, which 
Izoulet warned, must also become aware of its social duties. While the ‘elite’ Izoulet 
referred to may in theory be, as Charle has argued, an ‘open elite’ where positions of 
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power would potentially be accessible to all regardless of birth, in a world where access 
to education already presupposed privilege, to depict social hierarchy as merely reflecting 
fundamental intellectual inequalities seems a rather cynical manipulation of Gambetta’s 
argument about the ‘new social strata’.713  
 In his opening lecture of 1897 Jean Izoulet paid homage to both Raymond 
Poincaré and Léon Bourgeois who ‘by common agreement asked the government to 
create this chair of social philosophy’, though for reasons primarily to do with practical 
concerns about the social question rather than any disinterested concern for new 
science.714  Indeed, the course would be occupied with the four problems to which social 
transformation in modern Europe had, in Izoulet’s view, given rise: the revolution in 
religious society (the relationship between God and nature), in political society (between 
the government and the governed) in economic society (between property owners and the 
propertyless, the rich and the poor, bosses and labourers) and in domestic society (man 
and woman).715 The whole point of the course Izoulet told his ‘elite audience’ would be 
to inquire into the nature and cause of the transformation occurring in each of these 
spheres.716 His suggestion was that although ‘many people imagine that the four 
subordinate terms...were going to take their revenge and negate the four hitherto 
dominant terms’, this would actually be to go completely against ‘nature’; the revolt of 
woman against man, the worker against the boss, the people against the prince, would be 
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like the ‘revolt of nature against God’. 717 His aim therefore would be to show how, in the 
transformed social context, these ‘natural’ relations of authority could be re-established 
on a more legitimate footing.  
 While this model of sociology was dominant in the 1890s, the question we now 
need to ask is whether it is the one that Durkheim’s sociology can easily fit. While in 
political terms his work in the 1880s did certainly aim to contribute to the consolidation 
of the opportunist republic, in the 1890s, his position seems to have been slightly more 
ambiguous.  Indeed it was just around this time that we see a passage, on the part of 
numerous figures among the intellectual avant-garde, away from a position of solid 
support for the Republic to a more critical stance.718 The next question is therefore how to 
read Durkheim’s sociology in the 1890s, starting with his Division of Labour: was it, in 
line with the social economy model, a call for scientific social management, or was it 
more a departure from his effort to contribute to the legitimation of the Republic, the 
beginning of a sociology of social critique? 
                                                 
717 Izoulet, Les Quatre problèmes sociaux , p. 26. 
718 Charle, La Naissance des ‘intellectuels’, pp. 82-86 and ‘Les Normaliens et le 
socialisme’, pp. 133-68; Ahearne, p. 11. 
 
293 
5.3 The Sociologist as Social Critic 
 Since its beginnings in the 1850s therefore, social economy or ‘sociology’ had a 
very definite political orientation. Welcoming economic development and 
industrialisation, while at the same time regretting the dissolution of traditional morality, 
it sought new ways to maintain and legitimate hierarchy and authority within the changed 
context. Once the social question had become a pressing enough issue in the 1890s and 
once the Leplayists could be dissociated from reactionary partisan politics this conception 
of sociology could become one aspect of republican ideology.  Critics such as Robert 
Nisbet who have interpreted sociology as more modern re-formulation of the 
traditionalist argument against the French Revolution, have long been opposed by writers 
who point out that Durkheim was in fact in fact a republican who embraced the ideals of 
1789, who was not hostile to socialism.  Yet, although the mere fact of being a republican 
did not necessarily mean that (by the 1890s) one was not conservative, if Nisbet had 
based his argument on long forgotten figures such as Jean Izoulet rather than Durkheim 
we would perhaps not be so quick to criticise his reading. Sociology, in one sense of the 
term, was certainly conservative in orientation. Yet while I have so far looked at this idea 
of sociology as social engineering, I suggest that there is also another conception of 
sociology, one that we can indeed find Durkheim’s work, that of sociology as a form of 
social critique.  
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5.3.1 Durkheimian Sociology and Social Economy 
 There is of course much in Durkheim’s work, his work before 1898 in particular, 
that would allow us to classify his sociology within the social engineering model. Indeed, 
writers such as Judith Stone and Sanford Elwitt have cited Durkheim in their wider, 
historical discussion of social science as an ideological defence of the modern social 
order.719 In terms of vocabulary, arguments about mutual dependence and the need for 
co-operation, the concept of ‘organic solidarity’ would seem to resonate with the 
language of Charles Gide who, for his part, cited Durkheim’s Division of Labour as one 
of the key works marking the turn away from the idea of liberty and competition to that 
of solidarity and co-operation.720 
 In his description of the ‘new school’, of social economy, the school of solidarity, 
Charles Gide listed five defining characteristics: firstly, the rejection of classical 
liberalism and its idea of social harmony being produced spontaneously from the free 
play of individual interests; secondly a concern with social change and what new 
problems this may give rise to; thirdly the linkage between ‘science’ and ‘art’, and a 
concern to deal with modern social problems through basing reforms on empirical social 
research; fourthly, the belief that the individual and the collectivity were not opposed, 
and that co-operation rather than competition was the condition of individual fulfilment; 
finally, its position as equally opposed to classical political economy (the school of 
freedom),  to the conservatives who lamented the decline of the patriarchal family and 
religious moral authority (the school of authority)  and to the collectivists or ‘socialists’ 
who preferred a revolutionary overhaul of the existing unequal and hierarchical property 
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regime (the school of equality). As such the new school could be described by Gide as 
the ‘school of solidarity’.721  
 There is much in Durkheim’s work that would fit perfectly with Gide’s 
description here. In terms of his appreciation of modern industrial society, we have 
already seen that in the Division of Labour he did not display the unreserved optimism of 
classical liberalism, yet neither did he hold a pessimistic view of social change. Modern 
society, he argued, could become just as cohesive as traditional society, although this 
would not result from the free play of individual exchange but needed to be nurtured 
through laws and institutions. Insisting on the importance of developing a historical 
perspective on our own beliefs and values, and in particular the modern ideal of 
individual freedom, Durkheim also sought not to take such ideals as absolute truths but to 
try to develop a ‘scientific’ understanding of them, which meant asking what they 
expressed about the nature of society and its course of development. 722 It is on the basis 
of this ‘science’ that one can begin to discern what reforms needed to be made, and just 
as with Gide, ‘social art’ (reform) for Durkheim was to be guided by ‘science’.  
 Using terms like solidarity, normality and pathology, art and science, Durkheim 
did employ the vocabulary of social economy, and as a sociologist of his time there is 
every reason to expect to find in his work traces of this model of sociology, which was 
after all the dominant one in the 1890s. However, there are also a number of reasons for 
questioning the classification of his sociology under ‘social engineering’. To begin with 
from as early as 1885, in his first published review article, Durkheim always criticised as 
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an over-simplified caricature the common depiction of socialism as a doctrine of 
international class struggle for the abolition of private property.723  He had a far more 
positive view of socialism and was far more knowledgeable about its various forms than 
Cheysson, Espinas, Izoulet or Gide seemed to be. In contrast to Cheysson who depicted 
socialism as being in opposition to the patriotism and solidarity of the French Revolution, 
Durkheim understood socialism as having grown out of the ideals this same Revolution, 
whose very existence as a social movement reflected the fact that a more equal and just 
society was still something to be created in the future. Socialism was, in Durkheim’s 
view, not a threat to society, but rather presented legitimate demands for change in the 
nature of social relations. The condition of a future social solidarity was not teaching 
workers to happily accept their subordinate condition, but to respond to their demands for 
greater equality. Durkheim did agree with the argument of Gaston Richard, that as a 
scientific assessment of the modern industrial society, historical materialism was 
mistaken, but, he continued, against Richard, this did not mean that socialism itself was 
wrong: its ideals rather were the legitimate expression of the needs of nineteenth century 
society, just as the ideals of the French Revolution had been in the previous century.724   
  Durkheim may have criticised abstract philosophies about how society ought to 
be that had no basis in empirical observation, but he was in fact more the rationalist 
philosopher than any of the social economists. While the focus of the social economists 
was entirely with practical industrial questions (dealing with strikes, the education of 
workers, factory management) Durkheim was more concerned with explaining 
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consciousness. He wanted, as we have seen in chapter 3, to make the ‘moral science’ of 
the philosophers more rigorously scientific. He aimed to explain collective beliefs and 
ideals, and then pose the question of what society ought to aspire to. In spite of the 
organic metaphors in his early work and concept of organic solidarity, a term he never 
systematically used again after the Division of Labour, the similarity between his 
vocabulary and that of the social engineers is deceptive. Although writers such as Charles 
Gide started out from a philosophy of co-operation, they actually continued to hold onto a 
rather individualist and idealist conception of the intellectual elite as the ‘brain’ of 
society, implementing reform in accordance with a pre-conceived idea. In fact, Durkheim 
criticised Alfred Fouillée’s abstract dialectical reconciliation of individualism and 
socialism and his simplistic view that democratisation and the expansion of education, in 
short political action pursued by an enlightened elite, would suffice.725  
 In any case, if the institutionalisation of sociology in the 1890s had conservative 
aims behind it, conceived of as it was as a barrier against socialism, the same discipline, 
but in another guise could also be perceived as being synonymous with socialism. Indeed, 
when the appointment to the new chair of at the Collège de France was being made, 
politicians were warned that attention was needed lest one ended up actually nominating 
a partisan of socialism, rather than someone who opposed it.726 According to Christophe 
Charle it was precisely for these ideological reasons that Durkheim, who, although on 
scientific merit alone would have been a better candidate than Izoulet, was passed over in 
the nomination to the Collège de France in 1897: in the ideological climate of the 1890s 
Durkheim was perceived as being too radical, whereas the ideas of Izoulet better 
                                                 
725 See Émile Durkheim, ‘Fouillée’, p. 453.  
726 See the file on the creation of this chair in the National Archives F/17/13556. 
298 
expressed the government position.727 Worthy of note too is also the fact that Durkheim 
made only extremely rare references to Leplayist sociology, and where he did he 
dismissed it as ‘apologetic’, hardly worthy of consideration as science at all. He also did 
his best to avoid association with the international sociologists gathered around René 
Worms and the teaching institutions of Dick May.728  
 Yet Durkheim was neither a complacent positivist who envisioned sociology as 
pure scientific observation with no further reformist aims. When he criticised those social 
philosophers who practiced ‘social art’ rather than ‘social science’, the point was not that 
science excluded social action altogether but simply that one must start from the 
observation of the empirical facts of social life rather than from an abstract ideal of how a 
society ought to be. In this sense, as I have already suggested, his subsidiary thesis on 
Montesquieu offers a good window onto what Durkheim understood himself to be doing 
with sociology: developing a way of answering questions on how his own society ought 
to be, but one which would also allow for the diversity of human institutions and ways of 
life.729 In this, he retained a view of intellectual work rather similar to that of his 
philosophical predecessors such as Paul Janet who saw their ‘moral science’ as 
meditation on the higher principles governing civilisation. Durkheim’s primary concern 
in his sociological analysis and discussion of the modern division of labour was not the 
day-to-day practical questions of industrial management. His point was to modernise, to 
make more rigorously scientific the ‘moral science’ of the philosophers, arguing first that 
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morality was not a universal but a historically specific, social thing and second that 
empirical observation meant not psychological introspection, but observation of the 
moral facts (which he argued were social facts) which were external to the individual. 
This rather exalted conception of sociology, as a means of inquiring into the historically 
specific principles governing a society is something different to Cheysson’s conception 
of sociology as social engineering. If, apart from his work on education, Durkheim had 
still very much remained outside politics, it was during the Dreyfus Affair that we see 
how this conception of sociology would express itself in practical political terms.   
300 
5.3.2 The Dreyfusard Turning Point 
 One of the most famous miscarriages of justice in modern European history, the 
condemnation in 1894 of Alfred Dreyfus for high treason would in the space of a few 
years turn into a major affair enveloping fin-de-siècle French society. The upheaval to 
come was hardly expected and when Dreyfus was initially sentenced to life in the penal 
colony of Devil’s Island the verdict was widely accepted, the only lament being that he 
had not been given the death penalty.730 Yet the prosecution’s case had been flimsy, 
based as it was on a resemblance between Dreyfus’s handwriting and that of the 
‘bordereau’ found in the German embassy in Paris, while evidence ultimately decisive in 
the guilty verdict had not been shown to the defence for ‘reasons of state’. Starting out on 
his campaign to free his innocent brother Mathieu Dreyfus initially met with considerable 
hostility from politicians and journalists. Gradually however, especially after he found 
out about the illegally used ’secret evidence’, a small band of supporters including the 
Jewish literary critic Bernard-Lazare and the vice-president of the Senate, Scheurer-
Kestner, began to gather around him.731 After Colonel Picquart at the War Ministry 
stumbled upon the real culprit, Major Esterhazy, the growing Dreyfusard camp was 
confident that all that was needed was to present the new evidence for a review to be 
obtained and Dreyfus exonerated. This was not to be the case, however as the 
government stood by the verdict of 1894 and in December 1897 Esterhazy, the real 
author of the ‘bordereau’ was tried by court-martial and acquitted.  
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  Putting order above fundamental principles the government would have preferred 
to simply bury the affair, to avoid any unnecessary tension with the army and continued 
to insist up until mid 1898 that the case was a chose jugée, that there was ‘no Dreyfus 
Affair’. Indeed, it must have seemed to contemporaries that the conservative republican 
government led by Jules Méline, had completely broken with the old idealism of previous 
decades. 732  Shocked by this attitude, by the acquittal of the real culprit, and concerned 
by the increasing virulence of the anti-Semitic mobs on the streets, many intellectuals 
began to raise their voices in defence of the principles of truth and justice. It was in this 
context that Émile Zola, in his famous open letter to the President of the Republic, 
accused the military officials, judges and handwriting expert of condemning an innocent 
man and seeking to cover up their mistake. Indeed Zola was just the most famous of a 
massive mobilisation of writers, artists, philosophers and scientists who signed petitions, 
wrote articles, demonstrated in the streets and formed leagues to defend fundamental 
principles and demand revision. 733 A firm supporter of the regime in the 1880s and 
attached to the ideals of the French Revolution, Durkheim too was immensely saddened 
and disillusioned by political events. What was most worrying he wrote to Marcel Mauss, 
was the reaction against ‘all sorts of principles we believed acquired’ and the ‘profound 
moral dis-organisation’ that he believed lay beneath the outbreak anti-Semitism. 734 
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Against this situation it was necessary to ‘fight back’, to force the government and 
society to return to its moral principles.735 
 A Dreyfusard from early on, at the time when only a handful of ‘troublemakers’ 
dared to question the judgement of seven honourable officer judges and a founding 
member of the Ligue des droits de l’homme, Durkheim, in his article, ‘Individualism and 
the Intellectuals’ took direct aim at one of the main intellectual representatives of anti-
Dreyfusism, the literary historian and member of the Académie française Ferdinand  
Brunetière.736 Brunetière’s argument was the classic anti-revisionist one: the army was an 
age-old institution, vital for the well-being of the country and above question; the 
intellectuals, who persisted in questioning its judgement were bringing the country 
towards ‘anarchy’; ‘individualism’, which valued individual reason above authority, was 
therefore the source of division and disorder in society. In reply Durkheim wrote, that this 
anti-revisionism was actually based on a complete caricature of individualism, which he 
wrote, should not be confused with egoism.  
 Incorporating the conclusions of his sociological work, Durkheim argued that 
there was ‘another individualism’, that which ‘the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
sought...to translate into formulae’, which has ‘become the basis of our moral catechism’; 
far from making ‘personal interest the object of moral behaviour’ it stressed that the only 
ways of acting that were truly moral were those that were fitting for all individuals 
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equally.737 Rather than attaching us to our empirical selves this individualism impels us to 
seek out that which we hold in common with others, our common humanity, which goes 
‘so far beyond utilitarian ends that the individual appears to be marked with a religious 
character’ and is ‘considered sacred’.738 This individualism, the dignity and rights with 
which each individual is endowed does not pre-exist history and society, but has emerged 
progressively from communal life. As society has developed and grown more 
ideologically diverse, he wrote, the bond that remained as a source of unity was that of 
common humanity.739 Not only was individualism not anarchy, but the concern for all 
that is human soared  ‘far above private goals’, and was itself of a ‘religious character’. 
As such this individualism was the only ‘system of beliefs capable of assuring the moral 
unity of the country’.740 In Durkheim’s view the people who were outraged by the assault 
on individual rights in the Dreyfus case were therefore not ‘troublemakers’ threatening 
national unity but the true patriots who understood that the miscarriage of justice risked 
putting the entire national existence in jeopardy.  
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5.3.3 Collective Effervescence  
 The Dreyfus Affair gave rise to much ‘cowardice’ and ‘lies’, wrote Durkheim in 
another letter to Marcel Mauss, but however ‘heart-breaking’ the situation it nevertheless 
had a positive aspect in that it brought together a group of like-minded people, who 
would support each other in the fight for justice, truth and democracy.741 The ‘taste for 
combat’ that had lain dormant for some while had been re-kindled and if the ‘sad story of 
Dreyfus’ had divided many people, it also had the advantage of bringing others  
together.742 In this, in his belief in the importance of the mobilisation and unity of 
intellectuals in defending moral principles there was also a parallel with the direction 
Durkheim’s scientific work was taking. It was around this time that he began to direct his 
attention towards totemism and the sociology of religion, and what, as we have seen, 
distinguished the new Durkheimian sociology of religion from the English 
anthropological school was the idea that the sacredness of a religious thing was generated 
and re-vitalised through collective practice. Applying this idea to modern society 
Durkheim argued, it was the human person that, as the source of social unity, was 
‘considered sacred’, and endowed with ‘something of the transcendental majesty which 
Churches of all times have given their Gods’. 743 In France the principles of 1789 ‘have 
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been a religion which had had its martyrs and apostles, which has profoundly moved the 
masses and which...has given birth to great things’.744   
 Yet, what the sociology of religion indicated to Durkheim was that, just as with 
the totem in clan-based society, the modern belief in the sacredness of the individual 
derived from social life and that this sacred character could only be re-affirmed and made 
stronger through collective practice. Far from holding a naively optimistic faith in the 
goodness of social life, from being incapable of foreseeing the triumph of authoritarian 
ideologies later in the twentieth century as Zygmunt Baumann has argued, I would 
suggest on the contrary that Durkheim’s sociology of religion and reading of the Dreyfus 
Affair contained a warning as to the fragility of the human ideal.745  If individual rights 
and dignity are modern collective representations, made stronger when people come 
together to re-affirm them, they also risk growing weak and dying out if people do not 
mobilise to defend them when they are threatened, if people compromise too often on 
fundamental principles. For this reason the Dreyfus case was not just about justice for 
one man, and the whole fate of modern French society was in question.  
 The Dreyfus Affair, in Durkheim’s view, showed that these values should not be 
taken for granted and if it had a positive side it was that it did bring people out of 
isolation to re-affirm their beliefs through collective action and the moral principles at the 
source of modern social life were for the meantime renewed. If modern individualist 
society had been suffering from a lack of ideals or ‘moral coldness’ since the last great 
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period of collective effervescence in 1870-71, Durkheim hoped that the stirring of 
passions during the Dreyfus Affair would finally bring this period of moral stagnation to 
a close.746 Times such as these were in his view, were ones of great moral vitality, a 
rather positive view of collective fervent for a writer commonly known as a ‘theorist of 
order’.  
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5.3.4 Two Conceptions of Sociology and Social Action 
 What should at least be clear from the argument so far is that, to overturn the 
reading of Durkheim as a conservative sociologist it is not enough to simply point out 
that he was an enthusiastic supporter of the Republic from early on, that he identified 
with the ideals of the Revolution, or that through his scientific and pedagogical work he 
contributed to the elaboration and teaching of the new, secular morality. While it might 
suffice in relation to the 1870s and 1880s, where to be a conservative was to support the 
‘moral order’ coalition against the opportunists, in the following decades, where the 
political landscape was becoming increasingly polarised around the social question, it 
was not so clear-cut. If we interpret conservative to mean an anti-socialist response to the 
social question, which saw socialism as a threat to society, we can say that as a form of 
social action the type of sociology practiced by the social economists, aimed at 
maintaining and legitimising rather than questioning the status quo, was indeed 
conservative. Detached from its old imperialist and religions associations in the 1890s, 
this Leplayist conception of sociology became annexed to republicanism, and sociology’s 
capacity to defend the new order became one of the strongest arguments in favour of the 
institutionalisation of the new discipline in French academia.   
 Durkheim himself understood well enough the demands of the field to be 
concerned to show that his sociology too could be a form of social action, which was 
indeed what he had tried to do with Suicide. 747 However, it also seems that he was not 
totally comfortable with the type of sociology labelled here as social engineering. In fact, 
we can, I have argued, trace another idea of social action where sociology would be a 
                                                 
747 On this point see my chapter 4.  
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form of social critique, most clearly at work during the Dreyfus Affair. In this 
Durkheim’s role as a public intellectual was closer to that of the Enlightenment 
philosophe calling for change in accordance with an ideal, rather than as an engineer 
seeking to build a fortress against challenges to the status quo.  
 In this sense, we also see, in the discipline of sociology, Edward Saïd’s distinction 
between two alternative forms of action for the public intellectual: on the one hand, 
action directed towards the generation of critical awareness, intellectual commitment as a 
form of dissent, and on the other one which serves merely to reinforce the theses of 
power already in place. The difference here however is that we can see how, as 
Christophe Charle has argued, the type of action Durkheim and indeed other Dreyfusard 
professors pursued as public intellectuals also had much to do with their intellectual 
habitus, their educational and professional trajectories and positions within the reformed 
university.748 In any case, in the post-Dreyfus Affair context with the electoral victories 
of radical republicanism, a political agenda far less hostile to socialism, far more 
favourable to Durkheim’s sociology would come to be established. Having already laid 
the scientific foundations with the Année sociologique from 1898, in the changed 
political context of the early 1900s the Durkheimian school would flourish. 
                                                 
748 Charle, La Naissance des ‘intellectuels’, pp. 183-200. 
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5.4 Towards Consecration  
 Among the factors which can help explain how Durkheimian sociology came to 
be established as the French school of sociology and how Durkheim himself arrived at a 
hegemonic position in the French intellectual field, I have already referred to the 
university reform movement and the new scientific ideal, the relationship of sociology to 
academic philosophy and the foundation of the Année sociologique journal. In this I have 
tried to avoid directly deriving Durkheim’s intellectual success from a correspondence 
between his political sympathies and the political situation, and indeed his rise to 
prominence was, as we have seen, far from assured by the mere consolidation of the 
Republic. Yet the political context was also important and just as the dominant political 
consensus of the 1890s worked against the Durkheimians in the years after the Dreyfus 
Affair a new political climate would seem to have worked in their favour.  The aim of 
this final section is to discuss the general political sympathies of the Année sociologique, 
the correspondence between these and the political situation of the early 1900s and how 
this may have contributed to the school’s ever increasing intellectual prestige.  
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5.4.1 A New Consensus? 
 Both in the intellectual and political fields the Dreyfus Affair had its victors and 
its vanquished, with a triumph for the intellectuals who had recalled state and society to 
fundamental principles and of the political groups that had supported them.749 In the 
university, it was a victory for the avant-garde of the reformed university, the ‘New 
Sorbonne’, over the more traditional academics and faculties.750 And many of those who 
had mobilised in support of revision remained convinced of the continued importance of 
their social role of spreading the critical spirit and defending society against injustice, 
ignorance and reaction. In this way, initiatives such as the Ligue des droits de l’homme or 
the shorter-lived Universités populaires outlived the specific circumstances of their 
creation.751  Gabriel Séailles, the Dreyfusard professor of philosophy at the Sorbonne and 
president of the Société des universités populaires, in his inaugural address to the 
‘Coopération des Idées’ of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine in Paris, expressed well the 
prevailing spirit: events had highlighted the necessity for intellectuals to come out of their 
ivory tower, to spread knowledge and give instruction, to prevent people being misguided 
by reactionary ideas; it was time for the  ‘cooperation of ideas’ or mutual exchange 
between manual workers and intellectuals for the benefit of society.752 
  Meanwhile, the continued disorder on the streets and the belligerency of 
nationalist groups such as the Ligue des patriotes had brought politicians back to the 
                                                 
749 Mayeur and Rebérioux, pp. 204-06.  
750 Ibid and Charle, La Naissaince des ‘intellectuels’, pp. 185-200. 
751Mayeur and Rebérioux, pp. 210-214. On the ‘Universités populaires’ and their 
relationship to the Dreyfus Affair see Mercier, pp. 32-38. 
752 Gabriel Séailles, La Coopération des idées. Éducaton et Révolutoin: conférance faite 
à l’inauguration de l’Université Populaire (Paris: Société des Universités Populaires, 
1899), pp. 2-3, p. 5.  
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strategy of ‘republican defence’.753 In parliament it was a victory for the republican 
groups to the left of the progressists, the radicals, most of whom had eventually come to 
support revision, while Méline’s conservative coalition was driven from power.  In July 
1899 a new ministry was formed with the main purpose of closing the Affair and, led by 
René Waldeck-Rousseu, had a core majority of radicals, the support of half the socialist 
deputies and some ex-progressists who had supported revision over concerns about rising 
clericalism. 754 Seeking as broad an appeal as possible, the new government included a 
socialist minister for the first time, with Alexandre Millerand as the Minister for 
Commerce, but also, at the other extreme, General Galliffet, remembered for his brutal 
repression of the Paris Commune, as Minister for War. It was an arrangement that 
provoked much debate among socialists, with the question of ministerial participation one 
of the biggest obstacles to founding a unified socialist party.755 Yet this government 
nevertheless stood as testimony to a changing political consensus, a departure from the 
paranoid anti-socialism of the 1890s with its tendency to equate all of socialism with 
class struggle and economic determinism, and a recognition that the reforms called for by 
socialists could be seen as coherent with radical republican principles, that the aims of 
radical republicanism and those of a certain form of socialism were in fact not all that 
different.756   
                                                 
753 Agulhon, The French Third Republic, p. 93. 
754 Ibid 
755 Goldberg, pp. 322-42.  
756 Such was the conception of radicalism presented by Ferdinand Buisson, La Politique 
radicale: étude sur les doctrines du parti radical et radical-socailiste (Paris: Giard & 
Brière, 1908). On the crisis the Millerand affair and the question of ministerial 
participation caused on the socialist left see Goldberg, pp. 249-59.  
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 Of course, even after the official organisation of the party in June 1901, what 
‘radicalism’ actually meant, beyond republican defence, anti-clericalism and the 
extension of individual rights, including that of property, to all individuals equally, is, as 
most historians point out, rather difficult to pin down.757 In the 1890s, radicalism had 
been very generally speaking, to the left of the dominant position; it had only once been 
in power during this decade, for a short period during this in 1895-96, with a ministry led 
by Léon Bourgeois and with the collaboration of some independent socialists such as 
Millerand.  
 An important part of radical ideology was the concept of solidarism theorised by 
Léon Bourgeois, who argued that society was characterised by interdependence rather 
than conflict and that its strong and successful members owed a social debt to the less 
well off. While the solidarists like the more conservative republicans, rejected class 
ideology and never questioned the legitimacy of existing economic regime, they differed 
from conservatives in that they called for state intervention and legislation to attenuate 
the injustices of the current system. If in the 1890s, the idea of solidarity had been 
annexed to the ideological opposition to socialism, for the solidaristes and the left wing 
of radicalism the idea was more of a hand outstretched towards the working class and 
collaboration or coalition with the parliamentary socialists.758 And yet, while this type of 
‘radical-socialism’ was presented by Ferdinand Buisson as the essence of radicalism, it 
was in fact actually just one strand within a broader and more diffuse movement, just as 
the humanistic parliamentary socialism represented by Jean Jaurès was itself just one 
                                                 
757 Robert Gildea, France, 1870-1914, 2nd edn (London and New York, 1996), pp. 60-63, 
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strand within a broader movement. To describe the situation between around 1899 and 
1904, we might say that it was a period in which these strands within radicalism and 
within socialism were closest together, when one could be most optimistic about the 
possibility of joint action in parliament.759 If the effort to bring them together  in a ‘bloc 
des gauches’ would itself flounder after 1905, it is nevertheless important in 
understanding the political identity of the Durkheimian group and how the different 
political poles within the group cohered.   
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5.4.2 Politics and the Année: Célestin Bouglé’s Radicalism 
 In the period under consideration here, stretching from around 1880 to 1914, what 
the intellectual field demanded of its successful academic journals - from the Revue 
philosophique to more specialised publications like the Année sociologique - was a 
commitment to intellectual freedom within the boundaries of science. And when 
members of the Année group (Durkheim, Bouglé and Mauss all provide examples) had 
something explicit to say about politics they tended to do it elsewhere. When, for 
example, the possibility of a merger was brought up between the Année sociologique and 
the far more politically orientated, Notes critiques. Sciences sociales, to which most of 
the Durkheimians apart from Bouglé, Paul Lapie and Dominique Parodi contributed 
anyway, it was decided that the two reviews should keep to their separate paths: the aims 
of the Année sociologique, explained Paul Fauconnet, were first and foremost scientific, 
theoretical, and not strictly speaking political.760 Yet politics also had its part in the 
success of the Année sociologique and while shared social trajectories, institutional ties 
and a common understanding of what it meant to do scientific work combined to forge a 
coherent programme, so did shared political ideals help consolidate a sense of common 
purpose.   
 Just as it is possible to distinguish two intellectual poles within the Année team - 
one personified by Marcel Mauss, a relatively marginal figure institutionally, but with 
high scientific capital, embodying the figure of the professional researcher, the other 
centred around Célestin Bouglé, a more traditional university academic with high 
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institutional capital - we can also distinguish two political poles.761 Célestin Bouglé, to 
begin with, having all the right credentials (studies at the École normale with first place 
in the philosophy agrégation in 1893, travel scholarship to Germany the following year, 
lycée teaching until 1898, publications in the Revue de métaphysique et de morale and 
personal friendships with its founders) became a dominant university figure in the early 
1900s, moving from his chair in Toulouse to take over from Alfred Espinas at the 
Sorbonne in 1908. 762 And out of all of the Durkheimians, it was perhaps he who was 
closest to the political ideas that had come to dominate after the Dreyfus Affair.  
  A Dreyfusard, an early member of the Ligue des droits de l’homme of which he 
would later become vice-president, he also joined the radical party and even stood for 
election on several occasions as a representative of its radical-socialist wing.763 Fully 
embracing the ideology of cooperation and mutual education characteristic of the 
Universités populaires, Bouglé took an active interest in the effort to bring intellectuals 
and manual workers into closer contact.764 His collection of public lectures on 
contemporary political themes, Pour la démocratie française, was prefaced by Gabriel 
Séailles, who situated them directly within the context of the Universités populaires 
movement. Bouglé’s effort, wrote Séailles, was part of the wider response to the Dreyfus 
Affair, which had reminded intellectuals of their social mission to work towards the 
consolidation of democratic principles among the people and to demonstrate why such 
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762 Vogt, 123-24.  
763 Ibid 
764 Célestin Bouglé, Pour la démocratie française: conférences populaires (Paris: 
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ideals were worthy of respect by all free and rational beings.765 In this vein, in one of his 
lectures Bouglé took direct aim at the well-known anti-Dreyfusards Maurice Barrès and 
Ferdinand Brunetière who argued that national sentiment was instinctual and in 
contradiction with critical thought. On the contrary, Bouglé argued, it was only when one 
did reflect rationally on the sentiment of national identity that one could see what it truly 
involved: cooperation, justice, humanitarianism, the rule of law, and the principles of 
1789, which were themselves a product of a long process of historical development. It 
was these principles, he told his audience, that were the true expression of the French 
national tradition and what made France respected abroad.766 In another lecture on the 
army and democracy he was careful to emphasise that the Dreyfusism did not mean ‘anti-
nationalist’ nor stand for general dis-order and indiscipline; what it called for was more 
an order and an army that reflected and defended the real values of the nation, that was in 
harmony with its conception of justice and respected individual rights.767  
 In public lectures to audiences of a more academic composition, in the university 
faculties and to groups such as the Ligue des droits de l’homme or the Ligue de 
l’enseignment Bouglé again brought up explicit political themes: the need to continue to 
oppose nationalism and nurture a tradition of respect for reason and legality, to defend 
the right of the state in education, its role in spreading a culture of critical reason among 
all citizens, while avoiding the extreme anti-clericalism in education where the state 
alone would control all schools. 768 What is most clear from this collection of public 
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lectures is not only his support for radicalism in a broad sense, but his precise 
understanding of both radicalism and of socialism as two political philosophies with very 
little dividing them, which, in theory, should not have too much difficulty in joining 
together to pursue common political aims. Embracing Léon Bourgeois’s idea of 
solidarity, Bouglé however agued that a society characterised by harmonious relations 
had not yet come into being, that great changes were still needed: increased intervention 
of the state into economic life for the benefit of all members of society, the introduction 
of a minimum wage to guarantee everyone a humane standard of living, free education at 
all levels and the limitation of the working day so that everyone would have an equal 
chance to develop their human potential. From the idea of solidarity, according to 
Bouglé, we can derive this entitlement of each individual to the ‘right to life’, the ‘right to 
work’, the ‘right to education’ and the ‘right to leisure time’, demands which, he claimed, 
also echoed those of socialism. 769 Criticising class struggle and collectivism, which 
destroyed solidarity within society and subordinated the individual to the state, Bouglé 
stressed the closeness of his idea of solidarism, which took justice as its starting point and 
individual freedom as its aim, to a more humanistic, idealistic and democratic form of 
socialism. 770 Just as classical liberalism, in its opposition to social intervention, 
presented a very restricted understanding of individual freedom, so too did historical 
materialism present a very restricted vision of justice. 771  
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 Even in his scientific work, as Vogt has noted, Bouglé’s primary concern seemed 
to be politics and the defence of democracy, over and above scientific research for its 
own sake.772 His doctoral thesis, for example, was a sociological study of the 
morphological factors that contributed the emergence of egalitarian ideas in the modern 
democratic nations, with egalitarianism meaning for Bouglé the equality of all individuals 
before the law, the recognition of both individual difference and common humanity. 773 
And when he took an interest in the Indian caste system, it was purposely constructed as 
the opposite pole of modern democracy. After a very unflattering description of Hindu 
society as the best example of a society of this type (that is, one characterised by a rigid 
social hierarchy based on biological inheritance, a horror of people from outside one’s 
own caste and specialisation in social roles according to caste) he concluded that it was a 
society where there had been a ‘stoppage of sociological development’. 774 It was one in 
which the ‘unifying levelling of modern society’ had met with strong resistance and 
where what had long been ‘dissolved’ in modern Europe had become ‘ossified’. 775 
 Another one of his targets was the use of ‘science’ (or what he depicted as 
‘pseudo-science’) to legitimise an anti-egalitarian modern social order. In this, he 
explicitly recognised that the development of science, which had initially been 
emancipatory, could and did become in the 1890s annexed to an anti-democratic and anti-
egalitarian political agenda. Attacking overtly racist theories that derived arguments 
about society from inherited biological characteristics of individuals or groups, he sought 
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to rescue science for progressive politics. 776 He seemed to find more mainstream theories 
such as organicism particularly dangerous, precisely because the argument was actually 
half true. While society does actually become more differentiated with social 
development, organicist theory suggested a movement towards a scientifically managed 
caste system, within which liberty and equality would be lost.777 Indeed, argued Bouglé, 
the very fact that the theory was still the object of discussion every year at the annual 
congress of the Institut International de Sociologie bore testament to its mainstream 
credibility. 778  
 The problem with biological theories of society was however that they were not, 
according to Bouglé, genuinely scientific. The question of whether or not we believe 
society to be governed by the same laws as the biological organism was, he argued, a pre-
determined metaphysical position. Biology and sociology studied two different orders of 
facts; genuine social science involved starting out from empirical observation of the 
social reality, and not importing laws and concepts ready made from biology, interpreting 
them and their relevance for social research in accordance with one’s own pre-conceived 
ideas about society. When one does undertake a genuinely scientific sociological study of 
social development, he argued, one finds on the contrary that specialisation is indeed 
increasing, but that this liberates individuals from the grip of a caste-like social structure 
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as the traditional barriers between individuals from different groups come down and we 
come to belief in equality before the law.779  
 Apparently unconcerned about the problem posed by his own political opinions 
for the scientific status of his own work, we can say that Bouglé, the sociologist and 
university professor was also very close to the radical-socialist political views  that came 
to prominence in France in the first few years of the twentieth century. A more marginal 
figure in the academic establishment, less integrated in the national education system and 
closer to the model of the professional scientific researcher, Marcel Mauss as we shall see 
next also presented another type of politics.  
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5.4.3 Politics and the Année: Marcel Mauss, Socialism and Cooperation  
 Having been away on a travel scholarship in Holland and England during 1897-
98, it was only when he was back in Paris in the summer of 1898 that Marcel Mauss 
established contact with the Dreyfusard organisers, Lucien Herr and Charles Péguy. From 
this point he became, as his biographer tells us, one of the most dedicated followers of the 
librairie Bellais, the bookshop recently bought by Péguy and one of the centres of the 
revisionist movement in the Latin Quarter.780  
 Of the Durkheimians Mauss was not however the only one to be close to Lucien 
Herr and in an account of a Dreyfusard march at Longchamps on the 11 June 1899 we 
find François Simiand, Herr and some other friends at the head of one contingent. In spite 
of confrontations with political opponents and with the police, the day was described by 
one witness as a great success, ending with a march down the Champs Elyssée to cries of 
‘Vive Loubet! Vive Picquart! Vive Dreyfus!’781 We also find Simiand on the 
administrative council of the Société nouvelle de librairie et d’édition created after the 
near bankruptcy of the librarie Bellais, the publishing house behind another new review 
the Notes critiques which had Paul Fauconnet as editor.782 If Lucien Herr had earlier been 
critical of Durkheim’s Division of Labour, there nevertheless seems to have been much 
mutual respect between the two. 783 This would explain how, in addition to the scientific 
and institutional credentials of the individual members of group, the Année sociologique 
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was able to attract the new generation of graduates from the École normale, where Herr 
was librarian and held in much esteem by students.784 
  Going back to the relationship between Lucien Herr and Mauss however we can 
say that Herr himself was known for his socialist political views and that one of the 
distinguishing ideological features of the group around him was a conception of socialism 
as stretching beyond the workers movement to embrace universal and humanistic ideals. 
Whereas other groups within the socialist movement had argued that the Dreyfus Affair 
was a bourgeois matter and had refused involvement, these ‘intellectual’ socialists, 
(among whom Jean Jaurès, after his initial hesitation and decision to join the 
Dreyfusards, was perhaps the most well-known) were active revisionists.785 Far from 
socialism being anti-republican, as in Cheysson’s blanket description, this group 
identified itself as both republican and socialist. On the march with Herr from 
Longchamps in June 1899, for example, we are told that songs from 1789 and 1848 could 
be heard together with the International. Indeed, the following day in parliament when 
the confrontation with the police was brought up by Edouard Vaillant, to exclamations 
from the right that the marchers had formed a ‘colonne de manifestants’, the extreme-left 
shouted back in defence that it was a ‘colonne de républicains’.786 These intellectuals 
associated with the Société nouvelle de librairie et d’édition were, on the one hand, 
motivated by the same spirit as the Universités populaires, the desire to put intellectual 
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work at the service of social change, of ‘justice and truth’ of the ‘education of the 
people’. However with its series called the ‘bibliothèque socialiste’, publishing works on 
socialist themes and with its links to the ‘École socialiste’ which gave courses on socialist 
theory, history and organisations, it also clearly anchored itself in the socialist 
movement.787  
 As both Marcel Mauss’s biographer Marcel Fournier and Henri Desroche have 
highlighted, it was as a journalist for Hubert Largardelle’s paper, Le Mouvement 
socialiste (also closely associated with Herr’s group) that Mauss made an important 
contribution to the theorisation of this humanistic socialism.788 Coherent with the 
principles guiding his sociological work, Mauss’s socialism was neither materialist nor 
idealist, and he criticised the tendency within the socialist movement towards economic 
determinism, the tendency to read Marx’s work as if it were a closed book.789 Social facts 
were, he argued, objective or ‘real’ in that they corresponded to given social structures, 
but this did not mean that they were literally material facts, as they only really existed to 
the extent that they were represented in the consciousness of people in society.790 Now 
socialism was itself a collective movement that took the present bourgeois society as a 
ruinous entity and aimed at the general transformation of this society, so that it would be 
one day governed in the collective interest.791 However since social facts were also 
psychological in nature, this transformative action must necessarily work on 
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consciousness to bring about a ‘new way of seeing, thinking and acting’, a ‘new law’, a 
‘new social hierarchy’, ‘a new system of values’, a ‘new moral system’. 792  
 Political action (parliamentary or otherwise) was always secondary for Mauss, a 
viewpoint which perhaps led him to underestimate, in another article, the major question 
dividing socialists (the issue of parliamentary participation) as a secondary question of 
tactics. 793 For Mauss the revolution in consciousness required by socialism began not 
with the seizure of political power and the imposition of a new order from above by a 
new socialist lawmaker; it grew up gradually from within the contours of existing society, 
from workers’ associations such as trade unions and cooperatives. These, he argued, did 
not just have the economic goal of material improvements, but prepared the society of the 
future and gave political action a firm base.794 Since its foundation in the 1880s the 
cooperative movement of Charles Gide and the École des Nîmes had been conceived of 
as a barrier to class antagonism, which purported to avoid political position taking and to 
simply unite workers and the bourgeoisie for their mutual material benefit as 
consumers.795 While socialists had been up until now generally hostile to the idea of 
cooperation, Mauss’s argument reflected a change in ideas that occurred in the mid-
1890s, when cooperatives, if controlled by class-conscious workers and joined to the 
political movement, came to be seen as potential instruments of social revolution.796  
 In terms of his political activities, we know that Mauss, who attended the Japy 
congress of 1899 where the prospect of founding a united socialist party was on the cards, 
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was also in favour of unity. Unity, he wrote in Largardelle’s paper, was all the more 
important at this particular point in time, when the movement had ‘heavy 
responsibilities’.797 This reflected his belief that socialism went far beyond the workers’ 
question, that it had an important role in defending democracy and in preparing the 
society of the future. 798 Socialism was never just about material, economic gains for 
workers but was itself ‘moulded by justice, right and freedom’. As such it represented the 
‘true interest of humanity’.799  
 In his attachment to such ideals and in his belief that one could begin working 
from within existing society towards the future, Mauss could well agree with the position 
of Bouglé. Where the two differed most clearly was perhaps on the role they accorded to 
political action, and whereas Bouglé placed his faith in reforms enacted by parliament, 
Mauss believed that a new moral system needed first to grow up from below, hence his 
attachment to the socialist cooperatives. So within the Année sociologique group itself we 
can see a correspondence with the political rapprochement between radicalism and 
socialism in the early 1900s, with a radical pole around Bouglé and socialist pole around 
Marcel Mauss.  
                                                 
797 Mauss, ‘Le congrès. Ses travaux’, pp. 642-43.  
798 Mauss, ‘L’action socialiste’, pp. 451-52.  
799 Ibid, pp. 461-62.  
326 
5.4.4 Durkheim between Science and Politics 
 In terms of the political sympathies that show through in Durkheim’s own work, 
the ideal of a future society characterised by both individual difference and social unity 
and critique of classical liberalism would seem to resonate well with the position of 
Célestin Bouglé. However, like Mauss, Durkheim considered parliamentary political 
action to be secondary, and although he was a supporter of educational reform, he would 
have differed from the solidaristes and from Bouglé in that he did not believe that 
reforms enacted by politicians in parliament would suffice to solve the problems of 
society.800 New ideals and moral values came, in his view, from below, from associations 
engaged in collective action, and in the modern industrial world he saw, as Mauss did, 
workers groups such as cooperatives as the generative source of a new morality.801  In 
addition, he also considered socialism to be a social fact stretching beyond the workers 
question, and with the ‘new aspirations’ having developed out of the ideals of 1789 he 
argued that ‘socialism had its beginning in the French Revolution’.802 Of the two main 
branches of socialism that existed in these years before the foundation of the SFIO in 
1905 - the humanistic, parliamentary socialism represented by Jean Jaurès and the 
                                                 
800 Lukes, Émile Durkheim, pp. 353-54. 
801 The role of workers’ associations in solving problems of the forced and anomic 
division of labour in industry, and in protecting individuals against anomie and egoism 
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economic determinist, class-based socialism represented by Jules Guesde - it is not 
surprising to find that Durkheim sided with Jaurès.803 At the same time he seems to have 
been far more critical of the prospect of a united socialist party that would bring together 
the Jaurès, Guesde and the revolutionary blanquist strand represented by Edouard 
Vaillant, than Mauss or the other socialist Durkheimians were. Describing the socialism 
of Guesde as a socialism of ‘uncultivated and hate-filled people’, he wrote to Mauss in 
1899 he couldn’t fathom why Fauconnet was saddened by the scission between the three 
groups, that it was actually a positive thing for ‘Jaurès and his friends’ to distinguish 
themselves from the ‘class-based socialism that reduced the social question to the 
workers’ question’. Although, he wrote, he could ‘understand it and support it as far as it 
is legitimate’ he could not ‘accept its principle’. 804 
 Overall we can say that the changed political context aided Durkheim and his 
school in its path towards consecration in three principal ways: firstly, shared political 
ideals gave the group further internal cohesion and a sense of common purpose in 
addition to its shared scientific goals, without such unity being imposed from above by 
Durkheim himself; secondly the connections to Lucien Herr and avant-garde intellectual 
politics meant that the Année sociologique continued to be able to attract the new 
generation of graduates from the École normale before 1914; and thirdly more 
established academics, such as Bouglé who took over Espinas’s Parisian chair in 1908 
                                                 
803 For the main points of contention between in the debate between these two positions 
see Jules Guesde and Jean Jaurès, Les Deux méthodes: conférence à l’Hippodrome Lillois  
(Lille: Bibliothèque du Parti ouvrier française, 1900). 
804 Émile Durkheim, Letter to Marcel Mauss, July, 1899, in Durkheim, Lettres à Marcel 
Mauss, pp. 224-26. 
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and Durkheim himself who moved to the Sorbonne in 1902 to take over the course in the 
science of education, acceded to dominant institutional positions. 805 
 However, having himself (with the Izoulet affair in 1897) been on the receiving 
end of being politically out of favour, Durkheim was, I suggest, wary about the 
subordination of scientific aims to political aims, whatever the political implications of 
his own social theory. He expressed distaste for the day-to-day business of politics and 
called ‘Guesde and tutti quanti....miserable politicians, the first in a line of 
opportunists’.806 When it came to actual involvement in practical political activities, 
Durkheim was not involved in initiatives such as the Universités populaires, and indeed 
severely reprimanded his nephew for investing time and money in a short-lived 
cooperative bakery in Paris.807 He was, it is true, involved in some solidariste inspired 
initiatives, such as the Congrès international de l’education sociale in 1900, where Léon 
Bourgeois, Alexandre Millerand and Charles Gide also gave speeches.808   However, such 
interventions were rare and Durkheim seems to have been far less involved in the daily 
business of politics than is sometimes suggested.809 Unlike Bouglé furthermore, 
Durkheim did not prioritise the defence of specific political values over his scientific 
work, and whereas Bouglé chose to study caste society and depict it in unfavourable 
terms, as the very antithesis of the modern ideal, Durkheim’s priority was always the 
scientific one of explaining consciousness.810 If this was congruent with democracy it 
                                                 
805 Lukes, Émile Durkheim, p. 360. 
806 Durkheim, Letter to Marcel Mauss, July, 1899.  
807 Fournier, Marcel Mauss, p. 233; Émile Durkheim, Letter to Marcel Mauss, June 1902, 
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was in the sense that democracy required not the inculcation of specific values but the 
capacity for individuals to critically reflect on, to debate and to rationally articulate the 
moral values of the society in which they lived.  The distinguishing feature of modern 
democracy was for Durkheim, not so much the election of the sovereign authority by 
universal suffrage, nor the direct reflection of mass opinion, but more its reflective and 
communicative capacity.811 Democracy, in his view, involved reciprocal communication,  
with ideals worked out from below becoming the object of rational reflection then more 
clearly articulated and upheld by the state.812  The political role of the sociologist was that 
already expressed in his lectures on moral education, one of rational reflection on the 
nature of society. The aim of sociology was therefore ‘to determine what morality ought 
to be at a certain point in time’ and to be able to distinguish between ‘what is moral and 
what is not’. 813   
 Intellectuals were not in Durkheim’s view made for direct involvement in daily 
political life. His priority as a sociologist was first the development of the new science 
and the explanation of consciousness, and then as an educator, ‘enlightening’ society as 
to the rational moral principles underlying its existence.814 There may be times, as in the 
Dreyfus Affair when the urgency would be such as to require more direct political action 
but the next question of such proportions would however not arise until 1914.  
                                                 
811 Irving L. Horowitz, ‘Socialization without Politicization: Émile Durkheim’s Theory of 
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Conclusion 
 In terms of his overt political sympathies therefore we can say that Durkheim was 
a republican, who supported the opportunists and their secularising policy in the 1880s, 
and through his academic work sought to contribute to the consolidation of the new 
regime.  While in the following decade of increasing social unrest his sociology could 
seem to take the form of a conservative effort to deal with the social question, I suggest 
that it would be more correct to see his position in this period as one critical of the 
existing state of affairs. There can be little doubt that politics also mediated the fortunes 
of the Durkheimian school, and if the more conservative context of the 1890s could 
hinder Durkheim’s own professional advancement, the political triumph of the radicals 
and radical-socialists after the Dreyfus Affair created a more favourable situation within 
which the school could flourish. Yet, for all this Durkheim never considered his work to 
be any less scientific or that his political sympathies necessarily diminished his work’s 
scientific status. Rather than being directly involved in day-to-day practical political 
matters, Durkheim saw his role as an intellectual as one of explaining morality and 
consciousness. He believed that sociology should serve to further knowledge about a 
society and to help develop the critical, collective self-awareness, necessary for 
autonomy and democratic government.  While during the Dreyfus Affair his still rather 
marginal institutional position made it possible for him to play the role of social critic, by 
1914 as we shall see, consecrated at the Sorbonne, this work of critique would be far 
more difficult.  
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Chapter 6 
Durkheim at the Sorbonne: The Hegemonic Period 
   
 In 1887 with his appointment as chargé de cours in social science and pedagogy 
Durkheim had made a breakthrough for sociology, gaining an initial foothold for the 
discipline within the French university system. If the creation of this position was one of 
the early results of the university reforms, we can in a sense say that Durkheim’s 
nomination to the Sorbonne in 1902 marked both the completion of these reforms and the 
beginning of the hegemonic period of French sociology. The first decade of the twentieth 
century witnessed therefore both the political consolidation of radical republicanism after 
the Dreyfus Affair and the intellectual consolidation of a whole generation of scholars 
who had, since the 1870s sought to transform higher education in France.815 
 Yet although this political and intellectual re-configuration laid the conditions for 
the success of Durkheimian sociology and although Durkheim was often singled out as 
the ‘chef de file’ of the New Sorbonne, it is not the case that his position within the 
reformed university was without tension. 816 On the contrary, the relationship between 
sociology and the neighbouring discipline of history was a rather ambiguous one and it is 
to this question of disciplinary rivalry that I shall first turn. 
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6.1 The Durkheimians and the Historians 
 Perhaps one of the most striking points of contrast in the field of philosophy as 
one moves from the mid-nineteenth century towards the latter part of the century was its 
failure to re-produce another figure of the stature and influence of Victor Cousin.   
Although within the discipline itself the legacy of Cousin was largely continued by Paul 
Janet, from a wider perspective, it was, by the turn of the century, a historian who had 
become the dominant figure in French academic and intellectual life. One of the principal 
representatives of a new, scientific school of historical scholarship, Ernest Lavisse is 
remembered as someone who sought to change both the face of historical studies and of 
higher education in France, and as an academic who ended up wielding an influence that 
extended far beyond his discipline and academia to political and social life as a whole. 817  
 The rise to power of Lavisse can be taken as reflective of the final success of the 
republican reform of higher education and the consolidation of the new school of thought 
in history, the ‘École méthodique’.818  Given the parallel rise of sociology and the social 
sciences within the same setting, it is understandable why Durkheim is often placed 
alongside Lavisse as one of the figureheads of the New Sorbonne.  
                                                 
817On Lavisse see Christian Amalvi, ‘Ernest Lavisse’, in Dictionnaire biographique des 
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6.1.1 The Rise of the ‘Méthodiques’ 
 Having begun his professional career under the Second Empire and as someone 
who, according to Pierre Nora, seemed rather half-hearted about the Republic in its early 
period, the position of Ernest Lavisse within the academic institutions of the Third 
Republic has something paradoxical about it.819 Graduating from the École normale 
supérieure in 1865 with an agrégation in history, Lavisse like most ‘normaliens agrégés’ 
began by teaching for a number of years in various lycées, before being appointed as 
private tutor to the son of Napoleon III, with whom he remained in correspondence until 
the latter’s death in 1879. Yet it was under the Republic that Lavisse really rose to 
prominence both within his own discipline of history and within the academic edifice 
more generally. In 1880 he gained his first university position as substitute to Fustel de 
Coulanges in medieval history at the Sorbonne, going on to be chosen by Jules Ferry as 
the first director of historical studies again at the Sorbonne and, in 1888, was made 
professor of modern history at the same institution. By 1892 he had been nominated to 
the Académie française and in 1904 became the director of the École normale.820 In 
addition to these official positions, Lavisse was also a founding member and lifetime 
general secretary of the powerful reform-orientated pressure group the Société de 
l’Enseignement Supérieur, which published the Revue internationale de l’enseignement 
and a lifetime member on the advisory board to the Minister of Public Instruction, the 
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Conseil supérieur de l’instruction publique.821  By the turn of the century Lavisse was, all 
agree, the  ‘uncrowned king of the Sorbonne’, a historian who presided over everything 
from history students to the publishing houses of the rue des Écoles, who had contacts 
and influence at the Ministry of Public Instruction.822  
 With the consolidation of the Republic Lavisse seems to have become, in the 
manner of the politician Adolphe Theirs, a republican by default, seeing this regime as 
the best possible guarantor of stability and national unity. Yet, it is also likely that he 
considered the new regime as an opportunity to introduce the types of changes he wished 
to see in history and in French higher education.823 Critical of the type of education that 
he himself had received - one heavily focussed on the Greek and Roman classics and 
aimed at developing the ‘general culture’ of the young gentleman - Lavisse just like 
Durkheim, was known for his opposition to this ‘abstract’ and ‘colourless’ learning that 
offered little contact with concrete historical facts, people and places.824  Even at the 
École normale, he recalled, students were back then never ‘trained in research methods’, 
or ever called upon to explain a given historical text in a seminar, and one never heard 
lectures start off with ‘this lesson is based on such-and-such documents and this is the 
degree of confidence they deserve’.825  
 Although tentative steps had been taken towards the promotion of historical 
studies in the late 1860s with the foundation of the École pratique des hautes études, it 
was really only with the university reforms that got underway during the Third Republic 
                                                 
821 Keylor, p. 61. 
822  Nora, pp. 245-46 and Amalvi, pp. 181-83. 
823 Garcia, p. 68. 
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825 Ibid, p. 19 and Keylor, pp. 38-39. Also see above 2.2.1. 
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that a programme of proper training for historians could be developed.826 In this context 
Lavisse became one of the pioneers of the professionalisation of his discipline. Not 
surprisingly, when he arrived at the Sorbonne in 1880 one of his first points of attack was 
the practice of the public lecture, which he likened to a form of entertainment for an 
audience of curious amateurs, and he insisted on the importance of constituting a body of 
serious students in history. He may not have been able to completely bar the general 
public from attending his own lectures in medieval history, but through organising 
student registration lists and identification cards, and reserving the front rows of the 
lecture theatre for regular students he did what he could to prioritise the ‘real students’ 
and discourage the ‘amateurs’.827  
 That this tactic was at all possible, however, depended on wider changes 
occurring in the university, where the creation of scholarships and the introduction of 
disciplinary specialisations in 1880 (history, literature and philosophy) at degree level 
meant that for the first time there was actually a body of potential history students for 
Lavisse to appeal to in the first place. Thus, he could promote the first four-year course of 
specialised historical study in France, with the first two years devoted to completing the 
history ‘licence’ and the second two to the agrégation. As part of the wider university 
reform programme small seminar rooms, offices and specialised libraries were 
constructed which again served the double purpose of discouraging the curious public 
and permitting an apprentice-like relationship between students and the teachers who 
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offered the technical training necessary for the specialised scientific research of a 
professional historian.  
 In this drive towards professionalisation Lavisse however was just one of the 
leading figures of a wider movement, a new school of thought in history which we can 
call the ‘École méthodique’, and which the foundation of the Revue historique in 1876 
provided its first manifesto. In his introduction to the first issue of this new journal, 
Gabriel Monod (another normalien, graduating in history with Lavisse in 1865) in fact 
anticipated Lavisse’s effort at the Sorbonne by some four years, as he emphasised the 
importance of scientific method in history and of developing structures for the training of 
future historians in these methods. Like Durkheim, Monod was also impressed by the 
advances of German science and after his agrégation spent some time studying in 
Germany. On his return he was nominated to the history and philology section of the new 
École pratique des hautes études and it was from this base that he sought to introduce to 
France the methods of German historical scholarship.828 In his 1876 introduction to the 
newly founded journal this admiration for German scholarship was again apparent, as 
Monod praised the taste for ‘patient research and erudition’ that predominated in 
Germany. With their well-organised universities imbued with the spirit of ‘libre examen’, 
the Germans, in Monod’s view, had made the greatest contribution to the progress of the 
historical sciences in the nineteenth century, and indeed to the progression of science 
more generally.829   
 What was distinctive about German historical writing was not however an 
exclusive focus on the minute details of empirical research and it was not pure erudition 
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devoid of any unifying theory; the German historians did generalise, but the point Monod 
emphasised was that these theoretical generalisations were slowly and rigorously 
established on the basis of concrete evidence.830 Monod was thus not exactly calling for a 
break with a ‘literary’ type of history characteristic of the French romantic historians, nor 
was he praising the virtues of erudite, empirical scholarship. What he wanted to see was a 
synthesis of two hitherto separate traditions in French historical writing, a synthesis of the 
patient erudition that had flourished in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries 
joined with the philosophical spirit of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.831 He hoped that the promotion of ‘healthy methods of work and of critique’ 
would help reduce the perceived antagonism between literature and erudition and that a 
‘more adequate conception of historical science’ would take root. Having understood the 
‘danger of premature generalisations, of vast a priori systems that aimed to embrace 
everything and explain everything’, but also the ‘slight interest presented by research of 
pure curiosity guided by no overriding idea’ historians in France, he argued, were 
gradually coming to see their work as a process of  ‘slow and methodical investigation, 
advancing gradually from the particular to the general, from the detail to the whole’.832   
 The biggest obstacle to the development of scientific history Monod lamented, 
was, again in contrast to Germany, the complete absence of any ‘effective form of higher 
education’, any ‘general scientific training’ or ‘directing authority’.  833 If it was through 
the reform of the education system that this new scientific spirit could take root, in the 
meantime Monod saw his journal as an alternative way of developing a sense of 
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professional solidarity among historians. The Revue historique, would in this way not 
only promote the publication of ‘original and serious’ historical work on specific 
subjects, but also to act as a link between all those working in the multi-faceted field of 
history and offer ‘precise information on everything that is being accomplished at the 
present time in the various domains of the historical sciences’. Thus the journal aimed to 
contribute to the training of ‘young people who want to pursue a career in history’ and to 
serve as a ‘rallying point and a centre of information’ for all.834  
  In short, the new school of thought in history which crystallised around the twin 
figures of Gabriel Monod and Ernest Lavisse in the late 1870s and early 1880s, can be 
summed up in the two terms methodological and professional.  Rather than seeking to 
‘defend certain religious and political ideas’, Monod claimed that the aim was to remain 
‘independent of all political and religious opinion’, to promote ‘disinterested and 
scientific research’ and study ‘history...for its own sake’. In this way the Revue historique 
could be described as a journal of ‘positive science and free discussion’, closed off to 
overreaching ‘political and philosophical theories’.835 Methodological, professional, the 
new type of historical scholarship would also therefore be impartial. In an era when the 
scientist was represented as the main figure capable of a disinterested public role, not 
only did Monod and his journal’s eminent patrons believe impartiality to be entirely 
possible, but the idea that ‘scientific’ history should also serve the cause of national 
regeneration did not seem to strike anyone as a contradiction. Here again we find a 
resonance with the one of the central themes of Durkheim’s scientific sociology.  
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6.1.2 History and the Promotion of Social Science 
 There are two senses in which these historians saw their effort to develop a 
‘scientific’, ‘impartial’ approach to their subject as having a social role, as making a 
contribution to the society in which they lived. In the first place, in a time when scientific 
achievement was just one indicator of a nation’s prestige and when the advances of 
German science stood as an only too clear reminder of French concerns about decline, the 
effort to develop the historical sciences in France also formed part of an effort to rebuild 
national prestige after the defeat of 1870.836 Both Monod and Lavisse had, at different 
times, studied in Germany, and whereas the former sought to introduce the methods of 
German historical scholarship to France, the latter devoted much of his own historical 
research to exploring the sources of Prussian and German strength.837  
 In another sense, an ‘impartial’ ‘scientific’ history presented as independent of the 
political ideologies and religious doctrines that had hitherto divided the nation could also, 
they claimed, help forge a sense of national unity and stabilise politics. For Monod, 
impartiality meant not letting history become the weapon of any one religious or political 
tradition, and trying ‘to explain and to understand’ the different traditions which have 
divided people. Instead of being  ‘the defender of one side against the other’, the 
historian’s job was to ‘disentangle’ the causes, to ‘define’ the character and ‘determine’ 
the nature of contested institutions and events in French history.838 Unlike the divisive 
histories that ‘mutilated national unity’ this kind of impartial and accurate account of the 
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past could in fact help re-awaken the ‘soul of the nation’. This would allow people to see 
the links between all the different periods of French historical development and 
understand their shared heritage as ‘all sons of old France, and at the same time all 
citizens...of modern France’.839 Indeed it was precisely in this spirit that the history of the 
revolution itself became for the first time an object of scientific study, with Alphonse 
Auland being nominated to teach a new course in the subject at the Sorbonne in 1886, a 
position which would in 1891 become the chair in the history of the French revolution840  
As Aulard stated in his opening lecture, the aim of the new course would be to approach 
this divisive period of French history with a ‘critical method’, founded on solid 
documentary evidence and rather than becoming the apologist of one or the other side the 
historian would seek to judge the revolution with the ‘spirit of modern science’.841 
 In terms of the language they used and themes they broached - the emphasis on 
methodology, on professional specialisation and on the social role of  ‘scientific’ history - 
these historians seemed to be speaking in very much the same terms as the Durkheimians 
and we can say the ascent of the ‘méthodiques’ was certainly advantageous to sociology. 
Prominent historians such as Lavisse and Alfred Croiset, who became the Dean of the 
Sorbonne in 1898, indeed used their influence to promote the social sciences and it was 
after all, on the call of Lavisse that the Comte de Chambrun had offered to endow the 
chair in the history of social economy at the Sorbonne.842 As Terry Clark has also pointed 
out, it was Dick May’s contacts with Croiset that facilitated the foundation of a new 
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school for the social sciences, the École des hautes études sociales which had grown out 
of an internal disagreement within the Collège libre des sciences sociales during the 
Dreyfus Affair. Not only did the patronage of Croiset help the school to secure official 
state approval almost immediately, but he also lent his name to the institution by 
lecturing there, as did Lavisse and another Sorbonne historian, Charles Seignobos.843  
 At the same time, these historians were also involved in the explosion of activity 
and government-sponsored initiatives to promote ‘social education’ that followed the 
Dreyfus Affair and the political victory of radical republicanism. The two international 
congresses organised in 1900 as part of the Universal Exposition alongside the 
impressive  ‘social economy’ exhibit are a case in point. While the one held in July dealt 
with the teaching of the social sciences in France and abroad, the other one held in 
September aimed to promote the diffusion of solidariste ideas in the education system, 
and the radical politician Léon Bougeois presided this second congress and numerous 
discussions. Almost echoing the combined aim of both of these congresses the declared 
aim of the new École des hautes études sociales was to promote the teaching of social 
science in higher education and to spread solidarism as a source of moral unity.844  
 Not only did the new historical school help to promote the social sciences taken as 
a whole, but we can also say that Durkheim himself directly benefited from the political 
and intellectual reconfiguration that occurred after the Dreyfus Affair which had placed 
the historians, already to the forefront of the university reform movement and influential 
on the governing councils of universities throughout the country, in a position of pre-
                                                 
843 On the split in the Collège libre des sciences sociales and the influence of Alfred 
Croiset see Clark, Prophets and Patrons, pp. 159-60. These lectures are gathered together 
in Croiset and others, L’ Éducation de la démocratie. 
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eminence. It was through the efforts of Croiset and Lavisse, now Dean of the Sorbonne 
and director of the École normale respectively, that the latter institutions became linked 
to the University of Paris. As an offspring of this initiative it was decided in 1902 to 
organise a theoretical course in pedagogy, to be delivered by a Sorbonne professor, a 
course that would be obligatory for all agrégation candidates regardless of their 
specialism. Having been recently promoted from Bordeaux to substitute Ferdinand 
Buisson in the chair in the science of education in Paris it was to Durkheim that this new 
task fell. Within two years of his arrival at the Sorbonne, Durkheim thus found himself in 
a situation of immense institutional power in that his sociologically informed pedagogy 
course was the only one that all agrégation candidates took regardless of whether their 
actual specialism was in history, literature, philosophy or modern languages.   
 It was in this context, as Maurice Halbwachs tells us, that Durkheim put together 
his lecture course on the history of pedagogy in France first delivered in 1904-05.845 In 
his opening lecture to this course it is not surprising, therefore, to find that the aims 
outlined here resonated with those of the New Sorbonne historians and with reformist 
principles more generally. As someone who had himself come from within the folds of 
the École normale, Durkheim had first hand experience of the educational ideals and 
assumptions that permeated this elite milieu, where the classical humanist ideal dating 
from the Renaissance period and centred on the study of Latin and Greek was, up until 
quite recently, held up as the hallmark of a truly ‘human’, ‘universal’ education. The 
whole purpose of the new course, Durkheim argued, was to help give future teachers a 
more  ‘complete awareness of their role’, and it was for this reason that the chosen object 
                                                 
845 Émile Durkheim, L’Évolution pédagogique en France, introduction by Maurice 
Halbwachs, 2 Vols (Paris: Alcan, 1938), i: Des origines à la renaissance.  
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of study was the evolution of pedagogical ideals over the course of history.846 His point, 
in doing this, was to encourage his listeners begin to think critically about the classical 
humanist ideal itself and understand how it too had emerged as an expression of 
underlying social needs. Anticipating the objection that agrégation candidates with their 
higher level of ‘general culture’ already had this capacity for critical reflection, Durkheim 
pointed out that while all areas of social life - the ‘political, economic and moral regimes’ 
- had transformed over the past few centuries, the pedagogical ideal that emerged during 
the Renaissance period, ‘that which inspired the Jesuit colleges’ in the 1600s had in fact 
resisted all change. This immobility, he argued, would indicate that the critical spirit had 
not in fact played such as considerable role in education as one might imagine, given that 
the whole point of critical reflection was to prevent ‘habits taking on an immutable, rigid 
form’.847  
 Implicitly referring to the wider context and the reform of French higher 
education set in motion during the Third Republic, Durkheim admitted that by this point 
most people had indeed come to agree that education could not permanently remain the 
same. And yet, the question of what it ought to become, he pointed out, was still unclear. 
While in other periods of history, in the Middle Ages or in the Renaissance, the ideal in 
accordance with which educators worked was always clearly definable, the worrying 
                                                 
846 Émile Durkheim, ‘L’évolution et le rôle de l’eneignement secondaire en France’, in 
Émile Durkheim, Éducation et sociologie, introduction by Paul Fauconnet (Paris: Alcan, 
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thing about contemporary society was, he argued, that ideal towards which education was 
tending, the ideal that teachers ought to pursue, could only be seen very confusedly.  
 So if Durkheim’s first aim was to subject the classical ideal to scientific critique, 
his second aim was to explore the nature of the ‘new system’ in the process of 
formation.848 In this he presented the sociological point of view as the key. While a 
common response to the question would be to make students into ‘men’, in reality he 
argued this was no solution at all since every society ‘at every moment of its history’ has 
‘its own conception of man’. The point was rather to work out, based on an awareness of 
the nature of one’s own society, ‘what idea we ought to have of man, us Europeans, or 
more specifically still, us French in the twentieth century’.849 Rather than making an 
argument against classical humanism Durkheim’s point seems more that the meaning of a 
truly ‘human education’ could not be taken for granted, and to encourage his listeners to 
engage in a critical reflection on the human ideal implicated in the nature of their own 
society. Ultimately over the course of lectures to follow Durkheim’s own suggestion 
would be that in the contemporary context it was the scientific and educational ideals of 
the French Revolution, and the reforms pursued during the Third Republic that were 
perhaps most faithful to the spirit of a ‘truly human’ education, more so than the 
aristocratic classical ideal dominant in the seventeenth century.850 
 The crowing achievement of the university reforms, Durkheimian sociology was 
gradually introduced to the Sorbonne, as his position as chargé de cours in the science of 
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850 See Émile Durkheim, L’Évolution pédagogique en France, ii: De la Renaissance à 
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education became a permanent chair in 1906, and by 1913 he had gained enough 
influence to have the word ‘sociology’ finally added to the title of his chair.851 While it is 
certainly for this reason that he has been cited alongside the Sorbonne historians as 
embodying the spirit of the new university, it is however not the case that the relationship 
between the sociologists and the ‘École méthodique’ was seamless. As we shall see next, 
when it came to the question of methodology in the social sciences it was in fact with 
these historians that the Durkheimians vied for influence.  
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6.1.3 Simiand and Seignobos on Method 
 If the Durkheimians and the historians of the ‘École méthodique’ echoed each 
other in their concern for method and if both schools rose to prominence within the 
contours of the reformed university, it was however precisely on the question of 
methodology in the social sciences and the role of history therein that the rivalry between 
the two came into the open. In a sense the debate can be traced back to 1898, to the 
opening statement of the Année sociologique, where the Durkheimians assigned to 
history an essential but nevertheless secondary role as a tool in establishing sociology as 
a positive science.852 Whereas for the Durkheimians, it was a common historical and 
comparative sociological method that guaranteed the unity of the social sciences the 
historians of the ‘École méthodique’ argued the opposite, that there was no such thing as 
a ‘scientific’ sociology and that thing uniting the various social sciences was the 
application of a common historical method, or the same procedures in the study of social 
facts that the historians applied when studying historical facts. With the publication of 
Charles Seignobos’s La Méthode historique et son application aux sciences sociales in 
1901, which had incidentally first been presented as a series of lectures at the École des 
hautes études sociales, and Durkheim’s reply in the Année sociologique followed by the 
more developped response of François Simiand of 1903 in Henri Berr’s Revue de 
synthèse historique, the issue came fully to the surface.853   
 In partnership with Charles-Victor Langlois, Seignobos had already written part 
of a methodological treatise (a first of its kind in French historical scholarship), originally 
                                                 
852 See Durkheim’s prefaces to the first two issues of the Année sociologique. 
853 Émile Durkheim, ‘Seignobos, Ch, La Méthode historique appliqué aux sciences 
sociales’, AS, 5 (1902), 123-27 and François Simiand, ‘Méthode historique et science 
sociale’, Revue de synthèse historique (1903), 1-22,129-57. Also see Garcia, pp. 100-101. 
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intended as a university textbook on historical methodology.854 Both were leading 
Sorbonne academics - Langlois having being nominated professor of methodology (the 
first chair of its kind) in 1896, while Seignobos, who was described as Lavisse’s ‘right-
hand man at the Sorbonne’, taught historical pedagogy from 1890, and substituted 
Lavisse in chair of modern history from 1898. Both Langlois and Seignobos had a zeal 
for correct method, and sought to ensure that the proper ways of locating, identifying and 
handling historical sources were taught to university students, as a way of guaranteeing 
the accuracy of historical work.855  
 In its relationship to sociology however, their manual was important not so much 
for its discussion of the task of the historian in locating documents and the techniques of 
analysis and synthesis that went into the creation of a work of scholarship, but primarily 
its conception of evidence. A discipline built on ‘indirect’ evidence, ‘traces’ of the past 
left behind in documents, history, they claimed, could never be of the same scientific 
status as the natural sciences, however carefully and accurately one worked.856 For this 
reason history, according to Langlois and Seignobos, could never by truly ‘objective’. At 
the same time however, if an element of subjectivity was always inevitable, through the 
careful application of the historical method - the techniques of identification of sources, 
of criticism, analysis and synthesis they outlined in their manual - the historian could 
                                                 
854 Charles-Victor Langlois and Charles Seignobos, Introduction aux études historiques 
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855 Garcia, p. 77, Noronha-DiVanna, p.209, pp. 217-220 and Antoine Prost, ‘Charles 
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348 
give, if not the whole truth, at least an accurate account of past events.857 Whereas the 
Durkheimians, in line with a conception of science drawn from French academic 
philosophy, defined sociology as that which studied a given set of facts (social facts) 
distinct to those studied by all other sciences, Seignobos in his 1901 treatise argued by 
contrast that historical facts were not historical ‘by their nature’.858 Again insisting on the 
difference between history and the natural sciences, he repeated that historical facts were 
defined by their ‘position’, as those facts which could not be observed directly because 
they no longer existed: there was no ‘historical character inherent in facts’ and history 
was ‘not a science, but a procedure of knowledge’, studying not the events themselves, 
but the ‘traces’ left behind by those who did experience them, traces which usually 
consisted of written documents.859  
 Yet it was not so much Seignobos’s argument about the nature of historical 
scholarship that the Durkheimians had a problem with but more his attempt to reduce the 
social sciences to this type of history. According to Seignobos, the historical method was 
‘indispensable’ to the social sciences since, like history, these disciplines did ‘not directly 
observe the facts’ but worked from the subjective accounts or documents left behind by 
observers, which is why he concluded that the social sciences also needed to incorporate 
the historical method. In this way, Durkheim complained, Seignobos had made the social 
sciences  ‘disappear into history’.860 Beyond this assault on the independent status of 
social science, what Durkheim most objected to was the ‘imprecision, the conjectural and 
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subjective nature’ that Seignobos held to be the distinctive trait of the human sciences. 
Whereas Durkheim could not disagree with Seignobos when he described social life as 
‘made up of representations’ he could only but protest at the conclusion drawn from this 
that social facts could not therefore be studied objectively.861  As we have seen in chapter 
four, objectivity, for the Durkheimians, was defined not by the nature of the facts studied 
but by the rigour of the method employed, and facts of an immaterial or psychological 
nature could indeed, they held, be studied in an objective and scientific manner. If we can 
accept the claims of ‘contemporary psychology’ to treat individual representations 
objectively, why, Durkheim asked, ‘should it be otherwise for collective 
representations’? 862  
 It was a point that Simiand had long emphasised in his writings for the Année and 
as if almost exasperated from repeating himself he again emphasised ‘OBJECTIF signifie 
et ne signifie pas autre chose que indépendant de notre spontaneité individuelle’.863 For 
Durkheim and for Simiand sociology was not essentially different to any other science 
and the materiality or immateriality of things did not fundamentally change the nature or 
aims of science. 864 Indeed, wrote Simiand, if psychological and subjective meant the 
same thing one would have to declare that the subject-matter of physics, for example, was 
subjective, just like the subject-matter of social science: ‘are not’ he asked, ‘sounds, 
colours, impressions of heat and cold, by nature, sensations, psychological phenomena, 
subjective phenomena’? The difference here however is that we have become used to 
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recognising what is objective in these phenomena and tend to forget ‘the subjective 
element that exists and subsists in all sensations’. The role of positive science, he argued, 
was to ‘draw out the objective from the subjective in order to study it’ and to make it 
possible to discuss, analyse and express in terms of laws these tastes, colours and 
sounds.865 Like all other sciences this was also what sociology sought to do and, he 
continued, thus sociology also had its own object, with a ‘sui generis character’, that was 
independent of individual sensation: ‘it is a reality, in the same sense that, for positive 
knowledge, the so-called material world is a reality; it is an object just like the so-called 
exterior world is an object’.866   
 If this debate between Seignobos on the one hand and Durkheim and Simiand on 
the other is worthy of attention within this effort to explain Durkheim’s intellectual 
ascent before 1914, it is because it shows that, although Durkheim in part owed his 
success at the Sorbonne to a more congenial political and intellectual context, we also 
need to look beyond the general enthusiasm for the social sciences and the triumph of the 
university reform movement. Indeed, this enthusiasm for the social sciences, manifest in 
the Universal Exposition and the two congresses of 1900, could just have easily benefited 
the competitors of the Année sociologique pole.867 While Durkheim, Célestin Bouglé and 
François Simiand were involved in the initiatives of 1900, they were not the dominant 
figures. On the contrary, it seemed to be Durkheim’s sociological rivals - Alfred Espinas, 
Emile Cheysson, Charles Gide and Gabriel Tarde, all figures associated with either the 
‘international sociologists’ or the Leplayists - who shared the limelight. Whereas 
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Cheysson and Gide, as we have seen, were the main figures responsible for the social 
economy exhibit, it was Dick May who acted as secretary for the congress on the 
teaching of the social sciences, while the task of presenting the outline of the situation of 
the social sciences in French higher education fell to Gide.868 In fact what is striking 
about Gide’s outline was its almost complete silence on the teaching activities of any of 
the Durkheimians, apart from one very short reference to Durkheim and Bouglé under the 
heading ‘sociology’. Minimising the importance of the Durkheimian idea of a general 
sociology and sociological method as a unifying fulcrum for the different branches of 
social science, Gide was perhaps implicitly announcing his opposition to the Année 
school of thought and siding with Seignobos on the question of method.  
  However, according to William Keylor, it was just at the point where historians 
of the ‘École méthodique’ had reached the height of its institutional power in the first 
decade of the twentieth century, that they began to be criticised for their incapacity to 
bring together researchers in different disciplines, to create a synthesis of knowledge and 
to create a new foundation for higher culture and learning. 869 It was in this context, as 
Keylor tells us, that Durkheimian sociology could come to replace the ‘École méthodque’ 
as the dominant force in the new university. And in order to explain the process by which 
Durkheim and his school could come into this very position, I suggest that we need to go 
back again to the relationship of his sociology to the ‘crowning discipline’ of philosophy.  
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6.2 Philosophical Distinction 
 As I proposed near the beginning of this thesis, Durkheim’s capacity to move with 
the newest intellectual trends while still being able to draw on more traditional sources of 
intellectual legitimacy, can go a long way towards explaining his success in founding 
sociology. Here again we see how, although the university reform certainly worked to his 
advantage, Durkheim would continue to cultivate his roots in philosophy, even after the 
foundation of the Année sociologique. If the social sciences - described in 1903 as ‘tarte à 
la crème de toutes les réunions mondaines’ - had become so ‘terribly fashionable’, it was 
through this continued association with the elite world of philosophy that Durkheim 
distinguished his scientific enterprise from the efforts of competing schools in the social 
sciences.870 At the same time the field of philosophy was itself changing and although 
Durkheimian sociology had initially been met with a rather reserved reception from 
philosophers it would gradually, I shall show here, gain the acceptance or even the 
endorsement of leading figures both at the Sorbonne and at the avant-garde journal the 
Revue de métaphysique et de morale.871  
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6.2.1 The Bankruptcy of Science 
 There is little to disagree with in Célestin Bouglé’s remarks that Durkheim’s first 
two books, the Division of Labour and methodological treatise, the Rules of Sociological 
Method, initially kindled up quite a lively chorus of disapproval among philosophers who 
considered sociology to be ‘a new form of empiricism just as powerless to explain reason 
as to guide conscience’. 872 In the pages of the new avant-garde philosophy journal the 
Revue de métaphysique et de morale - whose stated aim was to return to ‘the general 
theories of thought and action’ - Durkheim’s positive moral science met with little 
enthusiasm, while the individualist sociology of his main competitor Gabriel Tarde was 
welcomed.873 With a distinct ‘feel for the game’ however, Durkheim recognised the 
capacity of this organ of avant-garde philosophy to consecrate, and rather than cultivating 
links with other groups of sociologists, with the Institut International de Sociologie for 
example or even with the Leplayists, he felt that it was more important to gain acceptance 
within the discussion forum represented by this new journal.  
 Defined by its founders as an ‘organ of free thought’, the new journal would be 
open to anyone who ‘drew inspiration from reason’, and it was precisely on this question 
of reason that Durkheim took aim at Tarde.874 Insisting over and again that his own effort 
to study social facts in a genuinely scientific manner was neither materialist nor 
empiricist but essentially rationalist, he characterised Tarde’s method, which placed 
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individual instinct at the root of sociological explanation, as, on the contrary, the very 
negation of science875  
 The year was however 1895 and if any one factor can be said to have given 
weight to Durkheim’s effort to return to this fold of elite philosophy it was not primarily 
his political involvement in the Dreyfus Affair, which was yet to reach its culminating 
point, but the debate over the ‘bankruptcy of science’.876 In a way this debate can be 
traced back to the very philosopher from whom Durkheim drew inspiration, the neo-
criticist Émile Boutroux. Nominated to the Sorbonne in 1885 as professor of the history 
of philosophy and one of the most authorative representatives of philosophy by the end of 
the century, Boutroux himself is generally remembered for two principal theses: one, 
which we know influenced Durkheim, that each science dealt with a distinct order of 
reality and was therefore governed by it own principles and methods, the other, that each 
order of reality was autonomous and irreducible to any other, and that as one moved from 
physical matter to the body and to consciousness, the more contingency increased.877 Yet 
it is not so much the critique of scientism and mechanical reductionism in Boutroux’s 
work that is of most interest here, but the suggestion that no scientific knowledge was 
ever completely adequate to the phenomena it studied. For Boutroux, the natural world 
was characterised by complexity and incompleteness. Nature was living and constantly 
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changing, and scientific laws were imperfect human creations, representations neither 
absolute nor logically necessary, but only valid under specifically defined conditions.878   
 Although Boutroux’s thesis was not meant as a negation of reason or a denial of 
the very possibility of scientific knowledge, it nevertheless helped point certain authors in 
the direction of anti-rationalism and anti-intellectualism.  In this regard it is interesting to 
read that the anti-positivist novelist Paul Bourget was present at Boutroux’s defence of 
his doctoral thesis, De la contingence des lois de la nature in 1874, as it was precisely 
Bourget’s book Le Disciple published in 1889 that would ignite a controversy about the 
moral influence of positivistic ideas and set the context for the debate over the 
‘bankruptcy of science’.879 The main character of Bouget’s novel, Adrien Sixte, provided 
an unfavourable caricature of the modern ‘savant’ and enthusiast of positive science. 
Influenced by the likes of Hippolyte Taine, Théodule Ribot and Herbert Spencer, Sixte, 
we are told, sought to apply the law of evolution to the various facts of the human heart 
and taught that everything, even the things of the soul, was bound up in the most 
complete determinism, that there was ‘neither crime nor virtue’,  that our ‘desires are 
simply facts of a certain order governed by certain laws’.880 
 Telling of the romantic seduction of a girl for a psychological experiment by one 
of Sixte’s students and of the subsequent suicide of the girl, Bourget’s novel had 
generated a literary debate as to the moral responsibility of Sixte and his teaching. From 
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his authoritative chair at the Académie française the critic Ferdinand Brunetière had taken 
the lead, denouncing the morally and socially pernicious influence of positivism.881 Then, 
in 1895, having already drawn up the battle lines, Brunetière intensified his assault and 
publicly declared the ‘bankruptcy of science’ as a source of knowledge about human 
nature and of human progress, its failure to live up to the elaborate promises that had 
been made in its name.882 Even before becoming, with Maurice Barrès, the ‘chef de file’ 
of intellectual anti-Dreyfusism, Brunetière was already the figurehead behind whom the 
opponents of science and reason lined up. 
 Yet as Durkheim well understood, this anti-rationalist attack on science would 
have posed something of a dilemma for philosophers. If certain philosophers had begun 
to elaborate a critique of scientific mechanism, to consider the limitations of reason in its 
capacity to grasp the essence of things and see concepts and laws as human creations 
subject to change, this by no means implied a complete departure from the rationalist 
paradigm, nor an admission of the ‘bankruptcy of science’.883  On the contrary, as 
Boutroux himself wrote in 1908, philosophy involved a constant effort to understand the 
creative activity of the mind in its search for the ‘laws of nature or rules of action’ and the 
conditions permitting the ‘reduction of things to clear ideas’. It may have lost its taste for 
dogmatism, and Boutroux admitted that the day may never actually arrive when ‘all of 
nature and all of what ought to be will be condensed once and for all in adequate 
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formulae’, but the discipline nevertheless remained true to the tradition of Descartes.884 
 Durkheim realised that what his critics in the world of philosophy had a problem 
with was not the idea of a science of society itself but more with materialism and 
empiricism. In an era characterised by a mounting offensive against rationalism, 
Durkheim understood how to convince philosophers of the legitimacy of his project. 
Directly referring to the Brunetière controversy and presenting himself as defender of 
reason and science, he situated his own work square within the rationalist tradition and 
argued that when it came to social facts, the only way of seriously refuting the thesis of 
the ‘bankruptcy of science’ was to accept his own point that social things existed as a 
distinct set of facts governed by their own laws, and not to trace them to an ultimately 
unexplainable work of individual creation.885  
 This strategy seemed to have worked and within the space of a few years 
Durkheim had managed to attract a number of younger philosophers who were already 
writing for the Revue de métaphysique et de morale - Célestin Bouglé, Dominique 
Parodi, Paul Lapie and François Simiand - to his project of founding the Année 
sociologique. At the same time, the avant-garde philosophy review very soon began to 
solicit the odd contribution from Durkheim and from 1898 if he published his original 
articles anywhere else other than in the Année, it was no longer in the Revue 
philosophique and but in this newest organ of rationalist philosophy.  
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6.2.2 Durkheim, Metaphysics and Morals 
  A landmark year at the height of the Dreyfus Affair, the year of the foundation of 
the Année sociologique and of Durkheim’s turn towards the sociology of religion, the 
year 1898 was also signposted by Durkheim’s first article in the Revue de métaphysique 
et de morale, where he proclaimed the study of ‘collective representations’ to be at the 
centre of the sociological focus. Seeking to present sociology in the most congenial terms 
possible to his philosopher-readers, he started off with an analogy to psychology.886 Just 
as, Durkheim argued, the individual representations studied by philosophers resulted 
from a fusion of elements which then became a distinct reality governed by their own 
laws and independent of any underlying base, he argued that the collective 
representations out of which social life was made up, also developed out of a “fusion” of 
individual representations, which then recombined to form new representations and 
which in turn formed a distinct set of facts governed by their own laws, independent of 
any material base.887 Thus he could depict sociology as a science in the philosophically 
legitimate sense of the term in that it had as its object, a set of facts distinct from those 
studied by all other sciences, which were not reducible to a material, empirically 
quantifiable substructure, but were collectively generated ideas, representations owing 
their existence to the fact of association. 
 As well as contributing this article to the Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 
Durkheim also attended the sessions of the scholarly society associated with the journal, 
                                                 
886 Émile Durkheim,‘Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives’, in 
Émile Durkheim, Sociologie et philosophie, preface by Célestin Bouglé (Paris: Alcan, 
1924), pp. 1-48 (pp. 1-2), first publ in RMM, 6(1898), 273-302. 
887 Durkheim, ‘Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives’, pp. 32-35, 
pp. 41-43.  
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the Société française de philosophie, which met regularly from 1900, and he also 
delivered a paper at the international congress of philosophy in Bologna in 1911. In an 
effort to emphasise the ties between Durkheimian sociology and French academic 
philosophy Célestin Bouglé brought together in a collection published after Durkheim’s 
death the 1898 article on collective representations, one of Durkheim’s papers delivered 
to the Société française de philosophie in 1906 and his presentation at the Bologna 
congress. 888  
 Both the 1906 and 1911 papers may seem to deal with rather different subjects: 
one, starting out from the definition of moral facts as phenomena characterised by the 
obligation and desirability, the other proposing a discussion of value judgements and 
judgements of reality. 889 And yet if Bouglé brought these papers together alongside the 
1898 article it was that they had the shared common denominator of seeking to elaborate 
a justification for sociology from a base that French philosophers could easily identify 
with. The philosophical argument made in both presentations was that neither moral 
judgements nor indeed any judgements of value were empirically given in the act or 
object concerned itself. In both cases what one was dealing with were ‘synthetic 
judgements’, which unlike ‘analytical judgements’, could not be explained on the basis of 
any mechanical effect or tangible property of the act or thing itself. Demonstrating his 
own distance from the empiricist and utilitarian point of view, Durkheim’s point in both 
                                                 
888 Émile Durkheim, ‘Détermination du fait moral’, in Durkheim, Sociologie et 
philosophie, pp. 49-90, first publ. in the Bulletin de la société française de philosophie 
(hereafter BSFP), 6 (1906), 113-38, 170-200, 205-9, 212; Émile Durkheim, ‘Jugements 
de valeur et jugements de réalité’, in Durkheim, Sociologie et philosophie, pp. 117-42, 
first publ. in the RMM, 19 (1911), 437-53. 
889 Durkheim, ‘Détermination du fait moral’, pp. 50-55 and ‘Jugements de valeur’, pp. 
117-20.  
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papers was that mankind had the capacity to find something else in things that were not 
empirically there, to represent the material reality in ideal form.890  
 Yet, far from being an original postulate of Durkheimian sociology, his definition 
of the moral fact as characterised by the Kantian notion of duty (the moral act as the 
fulfilment of one’s duty) combined with that of ‘desirability’ (that we gain a certain 
satisfaction out of doing our duty) can be traced back to the eclectic-spiritualist tradition, 
where although central to Paul Janet’s definition of the moral good, the harsh Kantian 
morality of duty was mitigated by the spiritual ‘joy’ that living a good moral life brought. 
Typical of the eclectic tradition which sought to distil and combine the element of ‘truth’ 
contained in different philosophical systems, Paul Janet had admitted - making a 
concession to utilitarianism - that doing one’s duty was a source of happiness while at the 
same time rejected actually founding morality in the notion of interest, be it individual or 
social.891 Acting in accordance with the moral law may ultimately make us happy but it is 
not because something makes us happy that it can be defined as good; the good and 
indeed the true and the beautiful, for the eclectic-spiritualists, existed outside the 
individual and independently of utility, as a sort of higher or transcendent spiritual realm.  
 It is, I suggest, this culture that resonated in Durkheim’s effort to answer the 
question as to how certain value judgements could take on an objective character: it was 
not because these things had some empirical qualities making them of use to the 
individual or even to society that they could come to be judged as objectively good, 
beautiful or true; certain things, he argued, were indeed adored or venerated regardless of 
                                                 
890 Durkheim, ‘Détermination du fait moral’, pp. 60-61 and ‘Jugements de valeur’, pp. 
128-29.  
891 Janet, La Morale, pp. ix-xii and chapter 1. Also see above section 3.2.3. 
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their practical advantages.892 Moral facts, like all judgements of value expressed, for 
Durkheim, a relationship of things to an ideal realm that was transcendental and 
impersonal in relation to individuals.893 However, he continued, now making the case for 
sociology, if such judgements of value were not be put outside the boundaries of science 
and reason, one could not explain them as part of an order written into the universe by 
God before all time. And yet, the only thing beyond the individual, that would explain the 
immanent and transcendent character of value judgements, as well as the fact that they 
varied with time and place, Durkheim suggested, would be society.894 For this reason he 
argued that sociology could help to answer a philosophical question concerning the 
nature of value judgements, providing a solution that would avoid both the reduction of 
the ideal to the empirical but also the other extreme where the ideal would be placed 
outside the boundaries of critical reason.   
 Beyond these articles and papers it is worth noting that Durkheim corresponded 
occasionally with the editor of the Revue de métaphysique et de morale Xavier Léon, 
who was also the organiser of the Société française de philosophie and of the first 
international congress of philosophy held in Paris in 1900.895 If some of this 
correspondence dealt simply with the presence and reception of sociology in the pages of 
the Revue, other letters reveal a relationship of mutual respect between the two figures. 
After the Izoulet affair for example Durkheim seems to have received an expression of 
support from Léon, support which, Durkheim replied was ‘particularly precious’, coming 
                                                 
892 Durkheim, ‘Jugements de valeur’, pp. 120-27.  
893 Ibid, p. 137 and Durkheim, ‘Détermination du fait moral’, pp. 77-78.  
894 Ibid, p. 74, p. 77-78 and Durkheim,  ‘Jugements de valeur’, pp. 130-37. 
895 On Xavier Léon’s initiatives see Bouglé, Les Maîtres de la philosophie universitaire, 
p. 71. 
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as it did from ‘a disinterested friend of philosophy’.896 After the nomination of Gabriel 
Tarde to the chair of modern philosophy at the Collège de France in 1900 Durkheim 
again also seems to have received an expression of support from Léon. In his reply to the 
second letter, Durkheim demonstrated his own adherence to the basic principles of the 
philosophical field, and echoed the opening statement of the Revue where philosophy was 
declared to be, although not a ‘stranger to science’, nevertheless a ‘domain... distinct 
from all others’ and ‘sufficient unto itself’.897 Thanking Léon for his letter, Durkheim 
wrote that he never imagined that this nomination could have concerned him anyway, 
‘not being a philosopher, in the professional sense of the word’ and that he regretted as 
much as Léon did both for ‘sociology and for philosophy which have every interest in 
remaining distinct’, the confusion of the two disciplines manifested in the election of 
Tarde.898   
 In this way, Célestin Bouglé could look back on the period and tell us that the 
‘metaphysicians grouped around Xavier Léon’ did not haughtily refuse to entertain 
sociology as the old ‘spiritualist tradition’ had, ‘for a long time’,  done. Indeed, suggested 
Bouglé, Durkheim perhaps managed not only to persuade philosophers that his 
sociological approach to morality was neither materialist nor empiricist, but even 
convinced some that in the ‘struggle that they saw themselves engaged in, against a 
                                                 
896 Émile Durkheim, Letter to Xavier Léon, 19 August, 1897, in  Durkheim, Textes ii, pp. 
462-63. On the Izoulet affair see above 4.1.1. 
897 Darlu, 2-4.  
898 Émile Durkheim, Letter to Xavier Léon, 7 February, 1900, Durkheim, Textes ii, p. 
464. 
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narrow positivism on the one hand and a vague mysticism on the other, sociological 
rationalism could be useful, from some points of view even a precious ally’.899 
                                                 
899 Bouglé, Les Maîtres de la philosophie universitaire, p. 86. 
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6.2.3 An Ally at the Sorbonne  
 Having come himself from within academic philosophy, having managed to 
convince philosophers as to the essentially rationalist character of his sociology and 
having proved his left-leaning republican political credentials during the Dreyfus Affair, 
it is not surprising to read that it was with the backing of the philosophers Émile 
Boutroux, Victor Brochard and Ferdinand Buisson that Durkheim was nominated to the 
Sorbonne by the council of the arts faculty.900 In the interval between 1893, when he had 
presented his doctoral thesis, and 1902 there had indeed been something of a changeover 
in philosophy at the Sorbonne, as the last two representatives of the Cousinian orthodoxy, 
Paul Janet and Charles Waddington, had since passed away, while the neo-criticists 
Boutroux and Brochard reigned supreme in the chairs of the history of philosophy and 
ancient philosophy respectively. 901 In a field that now prided itself on its open and non-
dogmatic character, on the fact that it no longer supported any ‘official doctrine’, 
philosophers of other persuasions such as neo-spiritualism, neo-criticism or positivism 
could certainly find a place. 902 We know from the letters to Mauss that the holder of the 
science of education chair before Durkheim, Ferdinand Buisson, approved of the idea of 
basing the pedagogy course on ‘a sociological teaching’ from which, according to 
Durkheim, it was ‘inseparable’.903 If the chair had been up until this point been held by 
philosophers (first by Henri Marion from 1882, followed by Buisson from 1896) with the 
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appointment of Durkheim, the university now officially recognised the legitimacy of a 
sociologically informed pedagogy. 
 Not only this but soon after his arrival in Paris Durkheim also had the support of 
another Sorbonne philosopher, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, who actually endorsed and sought to 
give a more solid philosophical foundation to the postulate that sociological moral 
science was the only way towards a genuinely scientific morality. Indeed such was the 
theoretical crossover between Lévy-Bruhl - who became maître de conférences and 
director of studies in philosophy at the Sorbonne in 1899, associate professor in 1904 and 
full professor in the history of modern philosophy 1908 - and Durkheim that Jean 
Cazeneuve referred to the former as the ‘future sociologist’.904 If Lévy-Bruhl’s main 
sphere of teaching was in the history of ideas, it was through his work on the history of 
French philosophy that he came to the work of Auguste Comte, whose Cours de 
philosophie positive, reinforced, according to one witness, his doubts as to the ‘value of 
traditional metaphysics’.905 Having already published a collection of letters exchanged 
between Comte and John Stuart Mill Lévy-Bruhl produced in 1900 a biography of Comte 
in which he drew out those parts of Comte’s doctrine that deserved to be retained and 
those better-off discarded.906 What resulted was a non-authoritarian, non-dogmatic Comte 
whose methodological insights deserved to be retained, but whose later religious-like cult 
of science needed to be discarded.907  
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 This however was only the first initial step in a path towards the sociological 
perspective, and in 1903, Lévy-Bruhl published a book on the question of ‘moral science’ 
in which he expressed a position very close to that of Durkheim.908 Starting out from the 
distinction that philosophers made between the ‘practical morality’ that guides our 
everyday behaviour and a purer, disinterested meditation or ‘theoretical morality’ set 
apart from practical concerns - again the distinction between ‘art’ and ‘science’ - Lévy-
Bruhl, very much as Durkheim had sought to do in the original introduction to his 
doctoral thesis, raised a question mark over the claims to scientificity of existing 
theoretical moral systems.909 Whether a moral system was derived from a general 
biological, psychological or sociological theory, or whether it was presented as the result 
of metaphysical reflection, neither could be genuinely scientific. While in ‘theoretical 
morality’ philosophers saw themselves as seeking out moral truth, as inquiring into the  
higher moral principles governing civilisation, they then sought in their work on 
‘practical morality’ to prescribe moral behaviour on the basis of  such ‘true’ knowledge 
of the moral law. For Lévy-Bruhl however, it was impossible to combine these pure 
theoretical and practical aims, and rather than practical moral rules being derived from a 
‘true’ principle, he argued that all ethical systems tended, on the contrary, to reflect 
current accepted moral practice, customs and rules of behaviour.910 So, he continued, if 
theoretical morality was to become genuinely scientific then it needed to limit itself to 
studying the moral systems that exist or have existed.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Auguste Comte, ed by Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (Paris: Alcan 1899). Also see Cazeneuve, pp. 
ix-xi.  
908 Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, La Morale et la science des mœurs (Paris: Alcan, 1903).  
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 Against a moral philosophy that started out from a universal and timeless human 
nature, and after having undermined the claims to scientificity of existing ‘theoretical’ 
moral systems Lévy-Bruhl went on to argue that the only genuinely scientific morality 
was one that stuck to the observation of positive moral facts and sought to establish their 
laws. The aim of moral science ought not to be to found a universally valid morality but 
to analyse and explain different moral realities, and the laws it established would be valid 
only in  given social and historical contexts.911 So for moral science to become genuinely 
scientific one must recognise that human nature was not fixed and unchanging, that it 
varied from one civilization to the next and that sociological analysis was therefore a 
necessary part of a rational moral science.912 A point that Durkheim had sought to make 
in the early 1890s to much resistance from the philosophical establishment, it is hardly 
surprising that he highlighted Lévy-Bruhl’s book as an important work and praised it in 
the pages of the Année sociologique.913  
 Involved with the avant-garde philosophy journal and proceedings of its 
professional society, Durkheim now also had his position on the question of moral 
science vindicated by one of the leading philosophers at the Sorbonne. Beyond the study 
of morality however, Durkheim’s effort to expand his sociological research programme 
into the exploration of the nature of human reason would also, as we shall see, resonate 
with demands from the field of philosophy.  
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6.3 Sociology and the Renovation of Rationalism 
 As an indication of the scientific legitimacy that the disciplines of experimental 
psychology and sociology, new and controversial in the 1870s and 1880s, had come to be 
accorded, Émile Boutroux now made space for both of these in his outline of the 
evolution of the field of philosophy during the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Indeed, not only was sociology recognised as scientifically legitimate, but Durkheim and 
the Année were now given by far the most space under the heading sociology, in contrast 
to the one-line references that Tarde, Fouillée and Worms received.914  Yet, not only did 
Boutroux’s outline tell of an expanded disciplinary field, but the appearance of a new 
sub-division, the philosophy of science, among the branches of philosophy also reflected 
a transformation of, though not a complete departure from, the classical rationalist 
tradition. Having moved away from a dogmatic conception of truth and lost its taste for 
the construction of exclusive systems, it was, wrote Boutroux, through the enquiry into 
the nature and conditions of scientific knowledge that philosophers actually remained 
true to the Cartesian tradition of critical thought. In this, he argued, the positive sciences 
could actually provide ‘the point of departure for philosophical reflections’ on how the 
human mind created science, and on the nature and degree of certainty of scientific  
knowledge.915  
 Written in 1908, Boutroux’s account was contemporary with the expansion of the 
Année sociologique research programme into the new area of the sociology of 
knowledge. Seeking to bring sociological research to bear on the philosophical debate 
concerning the nature of human reason and science, Durkheim here, beyond simply 
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having a place within philosophical establishment, also sought to present his sociology as 
having an important contribution to make to this effort to re-new the French rationalist 
tradition.  
370 
6.3.1 Durkheim and Mauss on Classification 
 In his final article on sociology dating from 1915, Durkheim located his discipline 
directly within the Cartesian tradition characterised by its ‘passion for distinct ideas’ and 
taste for critical reflection. Recognising the excessive ‘simplisme’ of traditional 
rationalism, he suggested like Boutroux that it was actually by recognising the extreme 
complexity of reality that the ‘fundamental principle’ of Cartesianism - the effort to 
subject this reality to critical reflection - would be retained. If sociology was of the 
Cartesian spirit it was in the sense that its guiding aim was to open up complex social 
realities to critical thought and the procedures of science.916  Indeed in his doctoral thesis 
and first published book Durkheim had already insisted that the only way for ‘moral 
science’ (hitherto a branch of philosophy) to approach a more adequate understanding of 
a very complex reality was if the practical scientific work of sociologists were to inform 
philosophical reflection on the question of how society ought to be. It thus makes sense 
that in the early 1900s, when philosophers had begun to explore the nature of scientific 
knowledge and its relationship to things, that Durkheim and other members of the Année 
group should also seek to expand the sociological programme into this area through 
pursuing the sociology of knowledge.  
 The first major statement from the Durkheimians on this question came in the 
form of an article signed by Durkheim and Mauss in the 1903 issue of the Année 
sociologique on ‘primitive classification’, which they described in their subtitle as a 
‘contribution to the study of collective representations’. If the theory of collective 
representations had been pursued up until this point mostly in relation to morality and its 
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social variability, in a manner completely in tune with the direction philosophy was 
taking, Durkheim and Mauss now extended it into the sphere of knowledge. Building 
their argument from ethnographic work on Australian and North American tribes, they 
started by pointing out the ‘complexity’ of logical operations such as the capacity to 
define, deduct, induct and to classify. Developing specifically the case of classification - 
the human ability to classify ‘beings, events, facts about the world into kinds and species, 
subsuming them one under the other, and determining their relations of inclusion or 
exclusion’ - they argued that the way in which Western civilisation had come to classify 
things was far from being the only way, and that in different types of societies one finds 
very different classificatory systems.917 While we tend to assume that our way of 
classifying things, of organising things in distinct groups with clearly defined lines of 
demarcation, either derives from an inherent property of the things classified themselves 
or is a necessary result of individual mental activity, the way in which we classify is 
actually ‘relatively recent’, not extending back much further than Aristotle. So, not only, 
they argued, does our current mode of classification have a history but ‘this history itself 
supposes a considerable prehistory’. 918 Their contribution to the study of collective 
representations was thus intended as an exploration of a philosophical question, being an 
enquiry into the nature of the categories of understanding, though one built on scientific 
research in sociology.  
 Things, Durkheim and Mauss argued, neither presented themselves for 
observation already grouped nor were they subsequently grouped by an inherent faculty, 
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an ‘elementary framework’ of classification built into the individual mind. So the 
question of how we have come to bring these things together in ideal space and why the 
form of this logical operation has varied throughout history, was one that needed to be 
answered. Towards this end Durkheim and Mauss begin by examining the most 
‘rudimentary’ classificatory systems observed by ethnographers.919 Summarising the 
findings of this first sociological incursion into the ‘problem of reason’ Mauss and Henri 
Hubert would later write that the study of the idea of classification in various societies 
showed that the category of genus had for its model human social groupings, that is was 
‘following the manner in which men organise themselves in their societies that they order 
and classify things according to species and genus’.920 For the native Australians, their 
tribe provided the model for the idea of totality, and every object and being in the 
universe belonged to the tribe. Just as the members of the tribe were divided into two 
groups or ‘phratries’, which were in turn subdivided into clans, each thing in nature, 
living and non-living also had its place in this hierarchy of phratries and clans.921 
 So the ‘framework’ of society, they argued, served as the ‘framework of the 
system’: the first ‘logical categories were social categories’, the first ‘classes of things’ 
were  ‘classes of men in which things were integrated’ and it was because people were 
‘grouped, and thought of themselves in the form of groups, that in their ideas they 
grouped other things, and in the beginning the two modes of grouping were merged to the 
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point of being indistinct’.922 It was thus their nature as collective representations that can 
explain how classificatory concepts could be culturally variable but also universal, 
communicable and transcendent in relation to the individual. More than an isolated 
excursion into the question of reason, this essay marked the opening up of a whole new 
area of sociological research that would be pursed in the pages of the Année sociologique 
in the years to follow, where, having begun with genus and species, the theory of 
collective representations would be developed in relation to other categories of reason 
such as causality and time. And it was, as Durkheim pointed out in his introduction to 
another new sub-section of the Année later added specifically for the discussion of works 
on the sociology of knowledge, the 1903 essay that marked the turn of the Année group 
towards original research in this domain.923  
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6.3.2 Space, Causality and Time 
 If Durkheim and Mauss had begun their article by stressing the difference 
between the classificatory systems familiar to the modern European mind and those one  
encounters in non-Western societies, in the end however they came back to an argument 
of a more universalist nature. The form that modern European reason takes was, they 
argued, a product of history, and while we may not at all recognise as ‘rational’ the 
classificatory systems of the tribal societies described, ultimately both systems shared the 
same speculative end. Just like scientific classification, argued Mauss and Durkheim, the 
systems of ‘primitive classification’ they had met with in researching this article had as 
their principal goal not to ‘facilitate action’ but to ‘advance understanding’ and to ‘make 
intelligible the relations that exist between beings’.924  
 At a more fundamental level too, modern European reason and all of the other 
systems of classification they described, shared a similar basic structure in that all were 
built on the fact of polarity, with the totality of the universe divided into two 
complementary but mutually exclusive halves. The systems of classification encountered 
among the Australian tribes, they had argued, were built on the division of the tribe into 
two phratries, with everything in the universe belonging to one or other of these. While 
this fact of polarity was of a religious nature - with everything in one’s own phratry 
considered sacred and forbidden, and everything in the other phratry considered profane - 
it continued to act as the foundation stone of modern reason. As Robert Hertz, Mauss’s 
student at the École pratique, would argue most explicitly, it was this fundamental fact of 
religious polarity, the religious division of the world into two mutually exclusive but 
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complementary halves, the profane and the sacred, that continued to be expressed in the 
modern day dualism between right and left, and indeed all the binary oppositions of 
nature such as light and dark, day and night, east and west, high and low, right and left.925   
Pushing this argument further, the Durkheimians close to Mauss at the École pratique 
would also develop it beyond the division of space to consider the religious origins of 
other categories of understanding such as causality and time. Developing a fundamental 
point that the forms of modern reason neither derived from the nature of things 
themselves, nor from any inherent property of the mind, the Durkheimian position was 
that the categories of understanding - the fact that everything had a cause or that 
everything existed in space and time - were permeated by the idea of the sacred. As 
Mauss and Hubert had argued in their essay on sacrifice, it was the collective practice of 
sacrificial rites that gave life to ideas of the sacred and the categories could therefore take 
on different forms in different social contexts.  
 In his study of the seasonal variations in Eskimo societies, completed in partial 
collaboration with Henri Beuchat, another of his students at the École pratique, Mauss 
most clearly proved the point.926 What was characteristic about the Eskimo societies 
Mauss and Beuchat took as their object was the fact that their social morphology did not 
remain the same throughout the year, but changed drastically from winter to summer, 
which is what made them the perfect test case for the theory of collective 
representations.927 Here, Mauss observed, it was as social life moved from one extreme of 
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concentration during the winter months, to dispersion and isolation in the summer, that 
there was a corresponding change in collective representations. While in winter religious 
life could reach a feverish point, in summer society was ‘almost secularised’; in winter 
domestic morality was communal, with a family type more similar to the slav ‘zadruga’, 
while in summer the family took on a form closer to that of the nuclear family typical of 
modern European societies; similarly property believed to be held in common in winter, 
became individualised during the summer.928 This opposition between ‘the life of winter 
and the life of summer’, between high and low levels of social density and intensity of 
collective life, profoundly affected ‘collective representations, the whole mentality of the 
group’, translating not only into variations in religious practice, morals and laws from 
summer to winter, but into a division of the whole universe into things and beings of the 
summer, and things and beings of the winter.929  
 Going beyond the question of religious polarity and classification, the year after 
the essay on primitive classification, Mauss and Hubert pushed their analysis of 
sacrificial rites further, in an attempt to account also for magical rites, which although 
related to the sacred tended more to be ‘practiced by individuals, isolated from the social 
group, acting in their own interest or in the interest of other individuals’.930 As an essay in 
the sociology of religion, their aim was to show that however ‘individual’ magic may 
seem, the very fact that the magician was endowed with ‘mana’ (an extraordinary 
position and ability to influence the course of things) and that magical rites had an 
                                                 
928 Mauss, ‘Essai sur les variations saissonnières’, p. 96, p. 103, p. 116. On the different 
family types established by Durkheim see above 4.3.2. 
929 Ibid, p. 100, pp. 128-29.  
930 Marcel Mauss and Henri Hubert, ‘Esquisse d’une théorie générale de la magie’, AS, 7 
(1904), 1-146 (pp. 1-3). 
377 
efficacious power itself depended on beliefs which were of collective origin. This 
collective origin was, they argued, what magic and religion had in common.931   
 As another chapter in the sociology of knowledge however, a contribution to the 
discussion of the ‘problem of reason’, this essay was also a study of the category of 
causality as a collective representation. Opposing their theory of ‘mana’ to James 
Frazer’s reduction of magic to certain natural processes of the mind, they argued that to 
present magic as Frazer did, as an imperfect primitive application of the laws of 
sympathy (the ideas that the similar produces the similar) and the laws of contiguity (the 
idea that things in contact are or stay united) could not justify the absolute belief in the 
efficacious power of the magician.932 This, they argued, derived from a belief in ‘mana’ - 
a word Mauss and Hubert took from the Australian tribes - which was a collectively 
generated principle permeating the whole universe, a principle that the magician is an 
expert at manipulating. It was the ‘force par excellence, the real efficacity of things’. It 
was, in short, what gave things the power they had, what made the house solid, the field 
fertile, gave medicines their healing power, the arrow its killing power and so on.933 
 While Mauss in his essay on Eskimo societies, had made a reference to the idea of 
time as a collective representation, it was however his colleague at the École pratique 
Henri Hubert, who pursued further work on this subject.  Like the essay on magic, this 
article dealt again with a question straddling both the sociology of religion and the theory 
                                                 
931 Mauss and Hubert, ‘Esquisse d’une théorie générale de la magie’, pp. 124-26. 
932Ibid, pp. 6-12; Fournier, Marcel Mauss, pp. 289-91. 
933 Mauss and Hubert, ‘Esquisse d’une théorie générale de la magie’, p. 111. Fournier, 
Marcel Mauss, p. 293 and Isambert, ‘L’Élaboration de la notion de sacré dans l’école 
durkheimienne’, pp. 44-47.  
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of collective representations in relation to the question of reason.934 Beginning with the 
observation that in other epochs and in other places, time is not conceived of in the same 
way as modern science conceives of it, Hubert argued that in other cultures we can find 
an idea of time consisting of ‘quantitatively and qualitatively dissimilar periods which 
cannot be superposed and which sometimes even succeed each other in no particular 
order’.935  Having situated his essay within the parameters established by the Année 
sociologique, which assumed that the ‘acts and representations of religions and...of magic 
entail ideas of time and space that are quite different from the usual ones’, Hubert then 
made a direct connection between his work and that of the philosopher Henri Bergson 
famous for his critique of the scientific idea of time as a uniform succession of moments 
and durations.936 Whereas Bergson had sought to prove that time had not only a 
quantitative aspect (length, position and succession) but was also qualitative, Hubert, by 
contrast aimed not to ‘push the analysis of time towards the metaphysical’, but simply to 
know how time had been represented in other epochs and only then in relation to its 
permeation with religious and magical thought.937  
 In this essay Hubert’s point was therefore to show how the representation of time 
was affected by the presence of mana, and condensing the knowledge gained from the 
study of Greek and Roman civilizations and Western folklore, he outlined a general form 
                                                 
934Mauss, ‘Essai sur les variations saissonnières’, pp. 128-29; Henri Hubert, ‘Étude 
sommaire de la représentation du temps dans la religion et la magie’, in Henri Hubert and 
Marcel Mauss, Mélanges d’histoire des religions (Paris: Alcan, 1909), pp. 189-229. 
935 Marcel Mauss, ‘Hubert, H, “Étude sommaire de la représentation du temps dans la 
religion et la magie” ’, AS, 10(1907), 302-04. 
936 On Bergson and his reception in France and internationally before 1914 see Pierre 
Soulez and Frédéric Worms, Bergson: biographie (Paris: Flammarion, 1997), chapters 3-
6. 
937Hubert, p. 189, pp. 190-91, pp. 210-11; Henri Bergson, Essai sur les données 
immédiates de la conscience, (Paris: Alcan, 1889). On Bergson see Parodi, chapter 8.  
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of this ‘primitive representation’ of time, one which preceded the ‘scientific notion’. This 
he argued could be reduced to the five following propositions: ‘critical dates interrupt the 
continuity of time’; ‘intervals bounded by two associated critical dates are, in themselves, 
continuous and indivisible’ (ie festivals interrupt time but festival time itself has perfect 
continuity and unity); ‘critical dates are equivalent to the intervals they limit’ (ie these 
critical dates represent an entire period); ‘similar parts are equivalent’ (unlike the modern 
scientific notion of time whose parts cannot be superimposed on one another, or 
considered equivalent, for magic and religion one festival is worth another, a week can be 
equivalent to a year); ‘some quantitatively unequal durations are equalised and vice 
versa’. 938 Given how its rhythms varied with social contexts and the intensity of social 
life, given its conventional character, this representation of time could not be derived 
from individual experience and did not fall within psychology, but being of social origin 
must be placed in the domain of sociology.939 Like the polar division of space, Hubert 
concluded that this division of time originated in ‘mana’, and had as its primary function 
to make religious practice possible.940  
 It was through these series of essays the Durkheimians expanded their 
sociological programme to confront the ‘problem of reason’. While these various 
members of the Année group explored different and particular aspects of the question in 
the form of essays it was Durkheim who, with the publication of Les Formes 
élémentaires de la vie religieuse, sought to build all of this work into a systematic 
                                                 
938 Mauss, ‘Hubert’, pp. 302-04 ; Hubert, pp. 198-208. 
939 Ibid, p. 224.  
940 Mauss, ‘Hubert’, pp. 302-04. 
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theory.941  
                                                 
941 Fournier, Marcel Mauss, p. 253 and Isambert, ‘L’Élaboration de la notion de sacré 
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6.3.3 The Elementary Forms and Philosophy 
 Published in 1912, Les Elementary Formes of Religious Life was Durkheim’s first 
book in fifteen years. Since the appearance of Suicide in 1897 and the somewhat 
disappointing reception it had received, Durkheim had, during the intervening years, 
invested most of his time and energy into producing the Année and into establishing a 
distinct school of thought in sociology around this journal. 942 Although his own specific 
interests were multi-faceted, ranging from the question of methodology in the social 
sciences, to the topic of the family and morality, in the overall programme of the Année 
Durkheim came, as we have seen, to prioritise the sociology of religion. If this, on the 
one hand, allowed him to keep up with scientific developments at the École pratique des 
hautes études, the route taken from the sociology of religion to the sociology of 
knowledge also allowed him to draw on a more traditional source of intellectual 
legitimacy by continuing at the same time to be involved in contemporary philosophical 
discussions.    
 Nothing better indicates Durkheim’s conception of his own work as being of 
relevance to contemporary debates in philosophy than the way in which he presented his 
new book to the intellectual field both before and after its publication. Rather than any 
sociological journal Durkheim chose the Revue de métaphysique et de morale in 1909 as 
the privileged forum to explain, in what would become the introduction to his long 
awaited and final book, the relevance of his work on religion. And here, if this research 
was described as having a double focus, as being both a contribution to religious 
sociology and to the sociology of knowledge, the problem of reason was presented as a 
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central one.943 Beyond being concerned with what he now referred to as the ‘old 
problem’ of the origin of religion, his work on religion also sought to explain the 
‘fundamental notions that dominate our whole intellectual life’, those which are at the 
root of all our judgements and which philosophers since the time of Aristotle have called 
the ‘categories of understanding’.944 These were the notions of time, space, cause, genus, 
number, substance and personality etc., which corresponded to the ‘most universal 
properties of things’ and which formed the ‘solid frames that confine thought’. Since it 
was impossible ‘think of objects that are not located in time or space, that cannot be 
counted’, these categories were the ‘skeleton of thought’, a framework which, although 
necessary to rational thought, was, as Durkheim and his team had shown, a ‘product of 
religious thought’.945  
 Time for example, ‘is not my time that is organised in this way; it is time as it is 
conceived of objectively by all people of the same civilisation, which, he continued, by 
itself was enough to make us see that such an organisation would have to be collective’; 
space, like time, was also divided and differentiated between right and left, high and low, 
east and west, that is in compartments, which, not existing by themselves, implied a 
‘social origin’.946 So with the hypothesis of the social origins of the categories, Durkheim 
suggested an alternative to both the apriorist theory (which considered the categories as 
logically anterior to experience and inbuilt in the structure of the human mind) and the 
empiricist reduction of reason to sense experience. While the first could not account for 
                                                 
943 Émile Durkheim, ‘Sociologie religieuse et théorie de la connaissance’, RMM, 17 
(1909), 733-58. The introduction to the Elementary Forms is contained in the first two 
parts of this article and my references below are to the book introduction.  
944 Durkheim, Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse, p. 12; trans, p. 8. 
945 Ibid, p. 13; trans, p. 9. 
946 Ibid, p. 14, p. 16; trans, pp. 10-11. 
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the cultural variability of the categories, the second ignored their transcendent and 
exterior character in relation to the individual; a sociological approach, which considered 
the categories as collective representations, could however account for their universality 
and necessity, as well as their variability.947 
 From what we know about French philosophy in this period, we can say that there 
was nothing illegitimate about putting sociology to work in shedding light on 
philosophical questions. On the contrary, in developing the sociology of knowledge 
Durkheim displayed his good sense for the opportune.  He did not furthermore stop at the 
categories of reason, but extended his work into a whole theory of human nature. When, 
after the publication of the Elementary Forms Durkheim spoke once more to the 
intellectual public on the significance of his book, it was not the social scientists of the 
École des hautes études sociales that he choose to address but the philosophers of the 
Société française de philosophie. Out of the two ‘principal ideas’ he emphasised in this 
paper - one the theory of human reason and morality, the other being a theory of human 
nature - both were essentially philosophical problems. The first problem returned to the 
topic of his 1906 address, anticipated the 1911 paper, and dealt with the human capacity 
to imagine and live in an ideal world, to elevate itself above the empirically given, which, 
Durkheim held, had its origins in collective existence and a religious practice that set in 
motion ‘forces sui generis’.  These forces elevated individuals above their empirical 
existence and transported them into another milieu where they lived a ‘higher and more 
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intense’ existence and became capable of viewing the world in ideal form.948 Clarifying 
this point further he also spoke of the ‘dynamogenic’ character of the collective practice 
that characterised religious life, its capacity to generate the ideal. 949 Tied to the concept 
of collective effervescence, which as I suggested earlier,  Durkheim began to think about 
during the Dreyfus Affair, this idea refers to how ideals and values are generated during 
times of  feverish social activity.950 
 The second ‘principal idea’ had to do with human nature and the old 
philosophical question of the body-soul dualism. A reasoning, moral being, with a power 
to act in the world, the human being had long been considered in the French 
philosophical tradition as invested with certain immaterial qualities, as participating in 
something external to it own material being. It was from this condition, wrote Durkheim, 
that the idea of the duality of human nature derived or the feeling that there was in 
ourselves, ‘two beings which never completely come together, that very often are 
opposed to and mutually contradict one another’. In the ‘order of knowledge’ there was 
sense experience on the one hand, and on the other ‘the understanding and conceptual 
thought’, while in the sphere of action there were our ‘egoistic appetites on one hand, 
religious and moral activity on the other’. It was this ‘antithesis’ between the two sides of 
our nature that religions translated in their conception of human nature as a double 
substance, a body and a soul which were ‘perpetually struggling against one another’ like 
                                                 
948 Émile Durkheim, ‘Le problème religieux et la dualité de la nature humaine’, in 
Durkheim, Textes, ii, pp. 23-59 (p. 23), first publ. in the BSFP, 13 (1913), 65-75, 80-87, 
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949 Ibid, p. 26. 
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the holy and the profane.951 Whereas empiricism (in the theory of knowledge), 
utilitarianism (in moral theory) and materialism (in the theory of being) simply denied or 
made the antagonism disappear, idealism on the other hand took this opposition as 
written into nature before all time. With a sociological approach however Durkheim 
suggested that this duality could become intelligible without being explained away: 
‘collective forces have the power to elevate the individual and make live a different life 
to that implied in individual nature’. It was, he concluded, because the individual was 
social that the human being was double, and there are in reality ‘two different and almost 
antagonistic sources of life in which we participate simultaneously’.952  
 So while the research programme of the Année sociologique was gradually 
extended into many areas - religion, morals, methodology, economics, linguistics, 
knowledge - Durkheim himself very much sought to remain in the company of 
philosophers, using his sociological research to shed new light on old questions in 
philosophy. One of the principal debates his work in this period gave rise to was also, as 
we shall see next, conducted within the contours of the field of philosophy and concerned 
this question of the nature of reason and science.  
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6.3.4 The Question of Science 
 For a scholar known for his effort to constitute sociology as a positive science this 
emphasis on the religious origins of reason may seem somewhat contradictory. On this 
point it is interesting to return again to the parallel between Durkheim and the 
philosopher Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, as a way of understanding what exactly Durkheim meant 
by ‘science’. In a similar manner to the Durkheimians, Lévy-Bruhl, after his book on 
moral science, had also begun to direct his attention towards the question of reason and 
the different ways of perceiving and knowing the world that one encounters in other 
cultures. Sharing a common starting point with the Durkheimians, he recognised that, just 
as in different societies one finds moral codes and institutions very different to the ones 
we are familiar with, there are also different ‘mentalities’. For this reason he criticised the 
English anthropological school and ‘certain philosophers’ for postulating the ‘identity of 
the human mind’ and always trying to reduce ‘mental operations to a unique type’.953 
These efforts, he argued, always ended up just affirming the European way of thinking to 
be inbuilt into the nature of the mind, and assimilating representations found in non-
Western cultures to our own, as simply imperfect applications of our own principles of 
logic.954 In a combined review of both his own Elementary Forms and Lévy-Bruhl’s 
recent publication also dealing with the sociology of knowledge, Durkheim also 
emphasised their shared hypothesis that ‘types of mentalities’ varied with ‘types of 
societies’.955 
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387 
 Yet, if Lévy-Bruhl’s position can act as a source of insight into the Durkheimian 
conception of science it is perhaps more in the contrast between the two works, a contrast 
that Durkheim himself highlighted. Built around two opposing mental types, one 
characteristic of non-Western, ‘primitive’ societies, the other characteristic of the modern 
European, or rational type, Lévy-Bruhl’s argument was that these two mentalities were 
opposed and mutually excluded one another. In total contrast to modern logic, primitive 
thought was ‘essentially religious or mystical’, as beings and things were  ‘represented in 
the mind with very different properties to those revealed by sense experience’. Unlike 
modern logic, this other mentality was ‘refractory to all experimental proof’ and whereas 
modern thought obeyed the principle of contradiction, in a manner totally 
incomprehensible to the modern mind, primitive representations were dominated by the 
‘law of participation’. Thus, wrote Durkheim quoting from Lévy-Bruhl,  ‘objects, beings 
and phenomena can be...at one and the same time themselves and something other than 
themselves’ and to this type of mentality Lévy-Bruhl gave the label ‘pre-logical’.956  
 Where Durkheim departed from this was not so much in the characterisation of 
primitive collective representations as ‘essentially religious’, but more in the argument 
that there was a veritable antithesis between this religious-like thought and scientific, 
modern thought. For the latter, which was governed by the ‘principle of identity’, Lévy-
Bruhl argued that the ‘sovereignty of experience’ was ‘uncontested’; the former, by 
contrast, displayed an almost ‘complete indifference to experimental demonstration and 
to contradiction’.  For Durkheim however, these two mentalities were actually not all that 
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different.957 Both were born out of collective life and modern reason he held, still retained 
the stamp of its religious and collective origins.958   
 According to Lévy-Bruhl, the principle of participation became diluted and ‘less 
mystical’ with social development and classifications founded on something other than 
the ‘articulations of the social group itself’ came into being. In this way, things could 
start to be classified according to ‘more objective’ properties, and thought could become 
‘more permeated by experience’, ‘more sensitive to contradiction’.959 It was when 
sufficiently defined concepts of beings and things were formed that one could come to 
see the ‘absurdity’ of certain relations that ‘collective representations’ have established 
between ‘beings, objects and phenomena’. It is when, for example, the objective, 
observable characteristics of natural objects come to predominate over mystical 
characteristics that it becomes inconceivable that ‘stones can talk, that fire may not burn, 
that the dead can be alive’ or that a ‘woman can give birth to a snake or a crocodile’.960  
 Durkheim’s point was however that not even the concepts of modern science were 
totally derived from experience and devoid of all extra-rational residues, nor could they 
ever express the essential properties of things. The objectivity of concepts did not mean 
devoid of all things immaterial or unobservable, but simply impersonality relative to 
individual sensation. Firstly, Durkheim argued, against Lévy-Bruhl, that the principle of 
contradiction, implied in the fact of religious polarity, did exist in these tribal societies, 
albeit in a different form to what we recognise today, and human beings, animals, colours 
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and celestial objects could indeed be placed together in the same totemic classes without 
necessarily entailing contradiction. Added to this he argued that modern science was no 
stranger to law of participation, but that on the contrary our modern ideas, just like those 
of before ‘participate in one another’, indeed that participation was the ‘very condition of 
logical life’. 961 So there was always, in Durkheim’s view, an extra-logical component to 
reason conditioning our perception of the world.962 
 In line with the spirit of a renovated rationalism, this did not necessarily mean 
however that scientific knowledge was impossible or that modern science could promise 
no better knowledge of the universe than religion and Durkheim was not declaring the 
‘bankruptcy of science’. The difference between religious thought and scientific thought 
was not that one was dominated by the law of participation and the other wasn’t but the 
way in which ‘participations are established’.963 The ultimate goal of science was not to 
fortify collective sentiment, but to generate correct knowledge however difficult this may 
be, and for this reason there was a constant concern in science to verify existing 
knowledge, which could always be subject to critique or revision. Dominated by emotion, 
religious representations by contrast ‘defy all analysis, or at least lend themselves badly 
to it’, while the social group did not allow ‘individuals to freely judge the notions 
elaborated by society’. In modern society classifications were established through a 
rigorous, ongoing process of conceptual analysis and experimentation, and this, he 
argued, had only become possible through the progressive weakening of the ‘element of 
social affectivity’ which had given more freedom to the ‘reflective thought of 
                                                 
961 Durkheim, ‘Lévy-Bruhl, Les Fonctions mentales’, p.37. Schmaus, Rethinking 
Durkheim, p. 8. 
962 Durkheim, ‘Lévy-Bruhl, Les Fonctions mentales’, p. 37. 
963 Ibid. 
390 
individuals’.964 For Hubert and Mauss too, the difference between magic and religion on 
the one hand, and science on the other was that in the former, beliefs were not subject to 
the demands of critical reason, while with science one can always go back to the 
beginnings of a theory, seek out its justification and if necessary rectify it at each step 
along the way.965 Unlike magic and religion therefore, which were almost wholly ‘a 
priori’, and only analytical and experimental in a very weak sense, science was ‘positive 
and experimental’, ‘a posteriori’, with conclusions constantly being submitted to critical 
examination and depending only on the power of evidence.966  
 In spite of the difference between the position of Lévy-Bruhl and the 
Durkheimians on the question of science, the imprint of the times can be clearly felt in 
each case. For neither one nor the other, the day would never arrive when the scientific 
mentality would completely take over from the mystical one. Lévy-Bruhl’s ‘logical 
mentality’ seemed to describe more of an ideal type than the actual practice of modern 
science. He concluded that the ‘prelogical mentality’ continued to exist alongside the 
rationally organised concepts of science and that even if scientific concepts could be 
completely purged of their mystical elements, when it came to morals and to questions 
about the essence and purpose of the human world, the mystical mentality would 
continue to hold sway.967 For Durkheim and Mauss, however much science progressed 
from its magical and religious origins it could never be able to offer a wholly adequate 
expression of reality and, they argued, if the ‘faraway influences’ of primitive logic had 
disappeared they nevertheless left behind something that would always be present in the 
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‘very framework of classification’.968   With the progress of science we can begin to 
establish judgements rationally and a posteriori, rather than ones based on faith. Although 
this would never be wholly adequate knowledge, as science ‘is not and will never be 
complete’, it was still an ‘enlightened’ vision of the world.969  
 Neither a naively ‘positivistic’ conception of science, out of touch with 
contemporary developments in philosophy, nor an admission of the ‘bankruptcy of 
science’, Durkheim’s sociology of knowledge was, I suggest, firstly a call for awareness 
about the nature of science itself, the limits of knowledge and a warning against 
dogmatism. As Lévy-Bruhl also pointed out, it was when the mind shut itself off to 
experimentation and critical reason, when one came to accept as ‘adequate’ 
representations of the reality, concepts and relations, that are in fact ‘very distant’ from it, 
that science ceased to progress.970 In their agreement that science may only ever offer an 
imperfect representation of the world but yet that the unending work of experimentation 
and exercise of critical reason still offered the only hope of ever approaching truth, both 
Lévy-Bruhl and Durkheim, seemed perfectly at home within the parameters of renovated 
rationalism. At the same time, their emphasis on the continued existence of a mystical or 
religious mentality in modern times also pointed towards the huge difficulties that 
confronted any effort to establish sociology as a genuinely critical science of society.  
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6.4 The ‘Scientist’ and the War 
 Nothing better testifies to the degree of confidence of Durkheim in his 
sociological project and to its dominant position within the French intellectual field than 
the ambition he announced in his final lecture course at the Sorbonne before the outbreak 
of the First World War. 971 In this course, aimed at introducing his students to the new 
philosophy of pragmatism, he welcomed the pragmatist critique of classical rationalism 
and its ‘dogmatic’ conception of truth, while however voicing his concern over the failure 
to provide any other satisfactory theory of truth. If much of Durkheim’s research over the 
past decades had gone towards developing a sociological approach to problems hitherto 
discussed by philosophers, problems relating to the nature of morality and human reason, 
now he claimed that it was precisely the theoretical vacuum, brought to the fore by the 
pragmatists, that his sociology could fill.972  
 Embroiled in the world of philosophy and proposing a sociological theory of truth 
as the only way of defending the rationalist tradition as a whole, Durkheim in his 
conception of the role of the scholar in public life also embraced what Bourdieu has 
called the ‘scholastic point of view’, dear to philosophers since the time of Plato.973 An 
ideal of the disinterested search for truth and justice as distinct from knowledge 
subordinated to practical ends, it was perhaps only during the First World War that the 
contradiction inherent in his worldview would become explicit.   
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6.4.1 Between Thought and Action 
 Having emerged in the United States between 1895 and 1900 through the efforts 
of William James, pragmatism had grown out of a similar critique of classical rationalism 
as characterised French philosophy of the same period. It was, Durkheim told his 
listeners at the Sorbonne in 1913-14, the ‘actuality of pragmatism’ that had motivated his 
choice of topic for his lecture course on the relationship between this new philosophy and 
sociology. Distilling what he considered to be the element of truth from pragmatism, 
Durkheim argued that it was in its ability to throw light on the ‘weakneses of the old 
rationalism’, the need for it to ‘be reformed...to meet the demands of modern thought’, 
that pragmatism merited attention and that a parallel could be drawn between it and 
sociology.974 His effort to introduce his students to this body of thought was thus both a 
way of developing their philosophical culture and presenting sociology as being astride 
with avant-garde ideas at an international level.   
 As a theory of truth, which was the aspect of the doctrine that Durkheim was 
interested in, pragmatism had sought to replace the classical rationalist conception where 
the true idea was that which was in conformity with things, ‘an image, a copy of objects’, 
the ‘mental representation of the thing’. If Durkheim could agree that this rationalist 
conception was a ‘dogmatic’ conception, it was in that truth was only every seen as a 
‘transcription of an external reality’, which the mind had no active role in constructing: 
exterior, impersonal, it was a ‘completed system, a complete whole independent of time 
and becoming’. Truth conceived of as such was above human life and had a  ‘rigid’ 
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character and was unable to ‘conform to the demands of circumstances and differing 
temperaments’. 975 Going back to Plato, it was through reason that one could gain access 
to truth, and thus reason itself, in classical rationalism, ‘remained unexplained and placed 
outside of scientific analysis’. 976  It was precisely in its effort to take away this ‘absolute 
and sacrosanct character’ of truth, to tear it away from this ‘state of immobility that 
removes it from all becoming, from all change and...all explanation’ and  makes reason 
into ‘something that can be analysed and explained’ that, Durkheim argued, there was 
parallel between pragmatism and sociology. Sociology applied the ‘historical point of 
view to the order of human things’, considered ‘man as a product of history, therefore of 
a becoming’ with ‘nothing in him...given or defined in advance’. From the sociological 
point of view truth and reason were also therefore products of human life whose 
principles and categories were ‘made over the course of history’.977 
 Yet not only did Durkheim present sociology in these lectures as perfectly in tune 
with the current state of philosophy in its opposition to dogmatism and exclusive systems,  
he also suggested that sociology could actually go beyond pragmatism and provide a 
more satisfactory theory of truth, one which would allow for the renovation of the whole 
rationalist tradition. The problem with pragmatism, he continued, was not the critique of 
the dogmatic conception of truth but the fact that it proposed to do away with the idea of 
necessary truth altogether. For this reason he could describe it as a threat not only to the 
‘essentially rationalist’ French philosophical culture but to the ‘entire philosophical 
tradition’, which, from the ‘very beginning of philosophical speculation’, has been 
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‘inspired by rationalism’. Even if empiricism and idealism explained the necessary 
character of truth differently, both at least admitted that ‘necessary judgements’ did 
indeed exist; with pragmatism however this ‘obligatory force of logical judgments, this 
necessity of true judgments’ disappeared and the mind remained ‘free with regard to 
truth’.978  
 Asserting truth to be not a ‘copy of a given reality’ but something still to be done, 
thought, for the pragmatists, resulted from a feeling of ‘malaise’ about the existing 
reality, which in turn gave rise to the idea, and this gave rise to action. 979 The ‘true idea’ 
for the pragmatists was that which facilitated action, the false idea that which hindered or 
impeded action. The moral implications of this thesis was, according to Durkheim, that 
the ‘good like the truth’, served our “interests”’ - both were just ‘different aspects of the 
useful’. 980 No longer a ‘slave to things’ or ‘chained to reality’, thought for pragmatism 
could become the ‘creator of its own object’ and the ‘value of ideas’ was to be measured 
according to their ‘degree of utility’.981  
 Yet, argued Durkheim, it was one thing to ‘cast doubt on the correspondence 
between symbols and reality’, but ‘quite another to reject, along with the symbol, the 
thing symbolised’. The fact was, he argued, that people have always recognised truth as 
something which ‘imposed itself on us’, something ‘independent of the facts of 
sensibility and individual impulses’, and not only, Durkheim continued, must ‘such a 
universally held conception of truth... correspond to something real’, but ‘this pressure  
that truth is seen as exercising on minds is itself a symbol that must be interpreted’. 
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However pragmatism, in equating the true with the useful, had no means of explaining 
the necessary, obligatory and impersonal character of truth. Sociology, which, by 
contrast, recognised the duality between ‘the mentality which results from individual 
experiences and that which results from collective experiences’ tells us that the ‘social 
always possesses a higher dignity than what is individual’. The ‘sociological point of 
view’ thus had the advantage of allowing truth, reason and morality to keep their ‘higher 
value’, while still opening up that ‘august thing, truth’ to analysis.982   
 While, for sociology as for pragmatism, truth was subject to change, sociology 
held that there were types of truth that varied with social types. In the moral order 
sociology recognised that there was ‘no single morality’ and refused to condemn as 
‘immoral the moral systems that preceded ours’. Just as it refuted the idea of  ‘one 
religion, one morality, one political regime’ and established ‘different types of  religion, 
types of morality, types of political organisaton’ it also recognised this same diversity in 
the theoretical order. It was in short,  ‘impossible’ for sociology to admit that the 
‘generations which have preceded us were capable of living in total error’. 983 In line with 
the theory of collective representations, sociology could account for the ‘higher’ 
character of truth while still allowing for its historical and social variability. Unlike 
pragmatism, sociology placed itself in front of recognised truths - that is, representations 
considered to be expressions of reality or  ‘adequately conveying reality’ - and asked not 
whether one was right to believe them but sought to explain why they were believed.984   
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 Far from putting a question mark over the very possibly of a positive science of 
society as one might expect, from this critique of the ‘dogmatic conception of truth’ 
Durkheim actually managed to build a case in favour of his scientific sociology. On the 
one hand, he argued that although nowadays we may think of truth in terms of ‘scientific 
truth’, truth did indeed exist before modern science, in, for example, ‘mythologies’ or 
‘bodies of truths which were considered to express the reality and which imposed 
themselves on people with an obligatory character which was just as marked as moral 
truths’.985 On the other hand however, these constituted two different types of truth - 
‘mythological truths’ and ‘scientific truths’. Whereas the former type consisted of a 
‘body of propositions accepted without verification’ and expressed the ‘ideas that society 
has about itself’, the latter aimed to ‘express the world as it is’.986   
 In social science, it was, Durkheim argued, August Comte who first sought to 
represent society from this type of objective standpoint, although he admitted that Comte 
had been overly optimistic as to the extent to which this was possible when it came to the 
human world, where is was necessary to ‘act’ and ‘live’, regardless of the state of 
scientific knowledge. 987 For this reason people usually decided and acted on the basis of 
truths of a mythological type and political ideas such ‘democracy’ and ‘class struggle’, 
Durkheim argued, were all truths of this type. If there were two tendencies in the 
representations of the modern social reality, one towards the scientific truth and the other 
towards mythological truth, the force of these mythological truths was, according to 
Durkheim,  ‘one of the greatest obstacles which obstruct the development of 
                                                 
985 Durkheim, Pragmatisme et sociologie, p. 172; trans, p. 87. 
986 Ibid, p. 173, p. 175; trans, pp. 87-88. 
987 Ibid, pp. 181-84. 
398 
sociology’.988 As a sociologist Durkheim saw his role as one of a interpreting and 
explaining different types of truth found in different social contexts; as an intellectual, 
committed to the betterment of his own society, it was, he believed, the role of the 
sociologist to work towards the triumph of scientific truth and to stay out of day-to-day 
party politics.   
 Practical action, politics, mythology on the one hand, the disinterested search for 
truth on the other - on the question of the social role of the sociologist Durkheim also 
retained what was essential to the philosophical tradition stretching back to Plato. 989 
Against pragmatism which held that knowledge only existed for action Durkheim 
asserted that there was an ‘antagonism between thought and action’, that thought and 
action actually worked against one another. While too much thought impeded action, so 
too did the demands of action paralyse thought, and from here came the ‘opposition’ he 
saw between those ‘two very different human types the man of action and the 
intellectual’. Whereas the latter acted on the basis of strong ideas but ‘almost 
unthinkingly’, the intellectual, for whom the ‘time for reflection is unlimited’, ‘violates 
his intellectual temperament’ when he does decide to act. Far from knowledge having 
only ‘practical ends’, Durkheim concluded on the contrary that ‘thought and action were 
not akin in nature’.990  Earlier on in his career, particularly in his work on suicide, 
Durkheim had seemed caught between social ‘science’ and social ‘action’ and toyed with 
a more interventionist conception of sociology closer to that of the ‘international 
sociologists’ or the Leplayist social economists, one preoccupied with aims like the 
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promotion of industrial cooperation or the ‘crusade against alcoholism’.991 Now however, 
in complete contrast to these competitors of his school of sociology - a school that had 
formed around the Année sociologique, remained closely linked to the state arts faculties 
and largely conditioned by academic philosophy - Durkheim insisted that the role of the 
sociologist as an intellectual was to seek out truth for its own sake, unconcerned about the 
practical utility of research.992 
 In this final lecture course at the Sorbonne before the outbreak of the First World 
War, Durkheim, in tune with the fin-de-siècle mood, thus admitted the insufficiency of 
classical rationalism. However while pragmatism proposed a complete departure from 
rationalism, sociology would on the contrary renovate classical rationalism and act as the 
defender not only of the French tradition but of the philosophical tradition in its entirety 
dating back to Plato. 993 With this course, as Marcel Mauss tells us, Durkheim made a big 
impression on ‘a wide audience’, especially on a number of ‘keen young minds’.994 His 
sociology had by this point reached a degree of consecration that it would never again 
attain, at least not in France, in the post-war era.  
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6.4.2 L’Obscurantisme des lumières? 
 However successful Durkheim was in Paris, the chorus of critique that had always 
accompanied his work since 1890s did not suddenly disappear and sociology did still 
manage to generate a very lively negative reaction from intellectuals. The only difference 
now was that rather than coming from professional academics and philosophers as 
before, it was more of a polemical nature coming from journalists and literary figures, 
many of whom - Henri Massis, Alfred de Tarde and Paul Lasserre are examples - were 
members of extremist political organisations such as the Action française, or were, 
disgruntled ex-leftists like Charles Péguy, disillusioned with the republican 
establishment.  Directed against the reformed university and against Durkheim personally 
as a representative of this institution, these critics denounced what they saw as 
Durkheim’s ties to the centres of political and administrative power and the influence he 
wielded within the university, over students and especially over the agrégation candidates 
for whom his pedagogy course was obligatory.995  
 Yet given the polemical nature of these texts, I would suggest, rather than seeking 
to weigh up the validity of their various allegations, that these writings can themselves be 
explained as an expression of underlying political tensions that had not gone away. Even 
after the Dreyfus Affair had brought the political victory of radical republicanism and the 
final triumph of the pro-reform agenda in the academic sphere, beneath the surface the 
ashes of the anti-Dreyfusard movement were smouldering, and from around 1908 began 
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to develop into a nationalist revival led by Action française.996 Lashing out wildly at its 
ideological opponents, without any regard for whether or not their arguments were well 
founded, Action française actively cultivated anti-German sentiment and gave itself the 
mission of rooting out ‘German spies’. In this the New Sorbonne, inspired as it had been 
by German advances in science and the German model of higher education, became the 
number one target. Indeed, it was Charles Andler who was first to experience the 
nationalist wrath when Action française organised a series of demonstrations at the 
Sorbonne in 1908 continuing right throughout the academic year in response to his 
organisation of a student trip to Germany.997 An ex-Dreyfusard, whose work on education 
had contributed to the political consolidation of republican institutions and who was now 
the dominant figure at the New Sorbonne, Durkheim was another one of the intellectual 
targets of Action française and all those who attacked the republican regime and its 
institutions. 
 Yet it was perhaps not so much this movement of reaction that marked the first 
turn towards the descent of sociology from a position of intellectual pre-eminence as, 
paradoxically, the temporary end to the antagonism between the ‘revolutionary right’ and 
the university academics in 1914. With many ex-Dreyfusard academics rallying to the 
government’s war effort and accepting Action française’s call for a truce, the outbreak of 
the First World War can be said to mark the end of an era, the end of the ‘heroic’ period 
of the Dreyfusard intellectual as a disinterested social critic recalling government and 
society to higher principles of truth and justice.998 Like many of his colleagues, 
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Durkheim, who had been a Dreyfusard in 1898, was also unyielding in his support for the 
government when war broke out. This almost unanimous support on the part of those 
who had less than twenty years previously been Dreyfusards, and who had up until quite 
recently considered their social role in terms of a disinterested search for truth and justice 
can perhaps go some way towards explaining the criticism that would be levelled at 
intellectuals like Durkheim after the conflict.999 
 Durkheim’s main area of activity during the war was in the creation, publication 
and distribution of anti-German propaganda destined for the neutral countries. Towards 
this end he organised the ‘Comité d’études et de documents sur la guerre’ of which he 
himself was secretary, with Ernest Lavisse as president and in which other important 
academics including Andler, Bergson, Boutroux, Seignobos and the literary critic 
Gustave Lanson were also involved.1000 Departing starkly from his own rigorous, 
sociological approach to moral questions, Durkheim’s first wartime pamphlet stands out 
as an example of the type of work he had spent his entire career criticising. With the main 
aim being to boost support for the French cause and to damage the German image 
Durkheim, in his explanation of the immediate causes of the conflict, traced the 
declaration of war to the intentional actions of individual diplomats and governments, 
and it comes as no surprise that he laid ultimate responsibility for the outbreak of war on 
Germany.1001  Indeed it feels as if the documentary evidence on display simply functions 
to confirm this apriori truth. Of course Durkheim was under no illusions as to the nature 
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of his wartime tracts, which he explicitly referred to as, ‘our propaganda industry’, 
something he no doubt considered as entirely different to ‘disinterested’, ‘scientific’ 
study.1002  
 His second pamphlet, which looked at the pan-Germanist ideas of Heinrich von 
Treitschke, can be viewed in two different ways. On the one hand, as a work of 
propaganda, Durkheim took the theories of Treitschke as representative of the type of 
mentality in accordance with which Germany conducted its war, and contrasted this 
mentality with the humanitarian and democratic type. What he found in Treitschke, 
Durkheim told Mauss, was   ‘a monstrous theory’, which conceived of the state as above 
all moral concerns and considered anything that contributed to its greater glory as 
legitimate. It was this theory of the state, wrote Durkheim, which could explain 
Germany’s disregard for international law and the rights of neutral powers during the 
war.1003 This domineering mentality was characterised by an abnormal or ‘morbid’ desire 
for ‘absolute independence’, for ‘universal hegemony’, and could not accept the 
necessary interdependence that in reality characterised human and international 
relations.1004 At the same time however, this indirect reference to the idea of normality 
and pathology also brings to mind Durkheim’s sociological theory and could perhaps be 
considered as an effort to encourage his contemporaries in France to think critically about 
their own society and the fragility of the humanitarian and democratic type.  In a 
normally functioning democratic society, he believed, there ought to be a system of 
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communication between the state and the people, each being ‘two aspects of a single 
reality’, with the state connected to its social base, expressing, defining and articulating a 
collective morality. Whereas in the modern democratic world a humanitarian morality 
respectful of the rights of individual citizens and of the other nations should, in a situation 
of ‘normality’, limit state power, in the vision of Treitschke, the state was wholly external 
to its citizens which it governed by coercion alone and, detached from any collective 
moral base, was above any moral considerations towards its own citizens or the rest of 
the community of nations.1005 As such this mentality could perhaps be considered as not 
an essentially German trait but the product of an abnormal social state, and which could 
indeed develop in any modern society where the organic connection between citizens and 
institutions had been severed. However, the pamphlet overall leaves us in no doubt as to 
Durkheim’s principal ideological focus, as he continually insists on the barbarity of the 
recent German conduct.1006  
 If nationalism and conceptions of French national identity could take different 
forms, in Durkheim’s wartime pamphlets France is presented as the bastion of democratic 
and enlightenment culture, and Durkheim seems to have genuinely believed in the 
humanitarian and moral mission of his country to put a halt to a barbarous German 
advance. As he wrote to Mauss, there had never before been a war like this one ‘posing a 
moral problem before the universal conscience’.1007 Yet Durkheim’s legitimation of the 
French war effort in terms of a humanitarian and democratic mission would seem 
completely in contradiction with the sort of ideas that he had developed throughout his 
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career - his interest in German social science, his contention that the definition of the 
‘human’ varied with time and place, his sociology of knowledge that saw reason itself as 
socially and historically conditioned and his insistance on the truth value of traditional 
forms of belief. 
  On the one hand, this attempt to justify the war effort in humanitarian and 
democratic terms may strike us as an example of what Bourdieu has referred to as the 
‘obscurantism of Enlightenment’, a ‘fetishism of reason’ and a ‘fanaticism of the 
universal’ that can result from a ‘scholastic point of view’, blind to its own social and 
historical conditions of possibility.1008 If Durkheim had described his sociological 
research as the disinterested study of society, the search for truth for its own sake, this 
very idea of scholarly work already pre-supposed institutional alignments with academic 
philosophy and the state university to begin with,  and ties to the republican regime. On 
the other hand however, rather than resulting from a blind spot in Durkheim’s conception 
of his own position as a scholar, his wartime pronouncements could perhaps also be 
explained in terms of the awkward situation in which he would have found himself in 
these years. With a number of his own family members mobilised (his son André was 
killed in the war while his son in law Jacques Halphen and nephew Mauss were also 
away, involved in the fighting), as well as students and younger colleagues from the 
Année (including Maxime David, Antoine Bianconi, Jean Reynier, Robert Hertz, who 
were also killed in the war) he wrote to Mauss that he simply had to do something.1009 At 
the same time the anti-German and anti-Semitic campaign of Action française, which had 
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begun to intensify its crusade against the ‘enemy within’, may have also made 
Durkheim’s situation uncomfortable. 1010 Himself of Jewish origin and known for his past 
admiration of German intellectual achievements, Durkheim was accused by a journalist 
for the anti-Semitic Libre parole of being a German spy, an accusation subsequently used 
in March 1916 by senator M. Gaudin de Vilaine to call for an enquiry into the situation of 
‘Frenchmen of foreign descent, such as M. Durkheim’ by the parliamentary commission 
charged with reviewing the residence permits issued to foreigners. The incident however 
did end in Durkheim’s favour, who, from his letters to Mauss seemed to have been 
exhilarated by the support he received from Louis Liard, various politicians and the 
Minister of Public Instruction, Paul Painlevé, who forced the senator to withdraw his 
accusation.1011  
 With most of the younger generation that had been attracted to the Année 
sociologique killed in the fighting, with Durkheim himself, who had almost single-
handedly run the journal, passing away in 1917, the war decidedly marked the end of the 
hegemonic period of French sociology. As an increasingly critical view of the pre-war 
intellectuals and their role in the legitimation of the conflict emerged in the 1920s, not 
only did sociology fall from favour but holes were also pierced through that monopoly on 
disinterest the scientist had enjoyed in the early decades of the Third Republic, a 
representation that had up until now justified the belief in the social role of science.1012 If, 
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on a positive note, Durkheimian sociology may have come to be forever equated with the 
‘French school of sociology’, it would not however not regain the dominant position in 
French intellectual life that it had established on the eve of the war.  
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Conclusion 
 The political victory of radical republicanism after the Dreyfus Affair was 
accompanied by the triumph of the university reform movement and Durkheim, after 
being held back from academic advancement throughout the 1890s, certainly owed 
something of his success in Paris to this changed political and intellectual climate. Yet, at 
the same time, the relationship of sociology and the social sciences to the reform 
movement and to the radical republicanism was not without tension. The Durkheimian 
school did flourish in this new context, but whereas the intellectually dominant New 
Sorbonne historians and the solidariste politicians seemed to gravitate towards the type of 
practical, reformist sociology more typical of the Année’s competitors, Durkheim himself 
by contrast cultivated his ties with philosophy.  Accepted as a legitimate player in this 
disciplinary field, a field which had also evolved over the course of the past two decades, 
Durkheim distanced himself from practical everyday politics, to devote himself to 
‘science’. If we can say that part of the attraction of his sociology in this era lay in its 
capacity to respond to the most recent developments in the human sciences while 
nevertheless retaining what was essential to traditional rationalism, his adherence to the 
ideal of completely disinterested research also left him in an impossible position in 1914. 
Indeed it was perhaps his effort to reconcile his own intellectual ideal with the demands 
of the political situation that led him to justify his support for the war effort in terms of 
humanitarian and democratic ideals. It was perhaps also this that would do most to 
discredit Durkheimian sociology among the next generation of intellectuals.  
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General Conclusion 
 Having started out from a general interest in the role of intellectuals in the public 
life of the French Third Republic before 1914 and in the case of Émile Durkheim 
specifically, I found that the question of Durkheim’s politics was indeed a topic of much 
debate.  However, in the assortment of works on Durkheim where he is presented either 
as an illiberal, anti-individualist theorist of order or, on the other hand, as a left-leaning 
figure concerned with the consolidation of democratic ideals and institutions, I found that 
a more fundamental issue had been neglected. At this point my question became one of 
explaining how, in the context of late-nineteenth and early twentieth century France, 
Durkheim actually became a public figure of some importance, how he became someone 
with a political voice that mattered in the first place. Drawing on the sociology of 
intellectuals developed by Pierre Bourdieu and on Christophe Charle’s historical work on 
intellectuals in turn-of-the-century France I sought to trace the sources of Durkheim’s 
legitimacy as a public intellectual. From this perspective, Durkheim’s educational 
background and career trajectory, the journals, publishers and teaching institutions he 
was aligned with, all became factors in my explanation of how he managed to accumulate 
a specific type of intellectual legitimacy. Working on the assumption that these 
institutional alignments also conditioned his intellectual worldview, I proposed that this 
line of investigation would also help to explain Durkheim’s politics and his view of his 
own role in public life.  
 From my readings of both his work and of biographical information on his life, 
Durkheim struck me as someone with a capacity for sensing and moving with the most 
innovative intellectual trends but who nevertheless could continue to draw on more 
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traditional sources of intellectual prestige. This, I suggested, can explain his success not 
only in establishing himself as a prominent university academic, but also in gaining sole 
recognition as the founder of the French school of sociology. Graduating in philosophy 
from the prestigious École normale in 1882, Durkheim had already made a first step into 
the French intellectual elite, and yet in both the field of philosophy and in the wider 
academic field change was underway. It was, as I argued in chapter two, Durkheim’s 
capacity to respond to the new demands that allowed him to introduce sociology into the 
university and present himself as the legitimate representative of this new discipline. In 
the first two decades of the Third Republic there was unparalleled enthusiasm for science 
as a source of social progress and national regeneration. At the same time however the 
military defeat of 1870 had also brought with it an awareness of the advances in German 
science and a parallel concern about French scientific decline. In this context, the 
promotion of scientific research and the reform of the university became pressing 
questions and the scientist was glorified in public discourse as a sort of national saviour. 
In the human sciences specifically - in history, in psychology and in philosophy - the 
introduction of a new more ‘scientific’ perspective was in demand and the rhetoric of 
scientificity combined with knowledge of developments in the human sciences in 
Germany served as a hallmark of distinction for new entrants to the field.  
 More than just critical reviews and overviews of the state of the field, Durkheim’s 
first articles, written between 1885 and 1890 and published in the recently founded Revue 
philosophique and reform-orientated Revue internationale de l’enseignement, 
demonstrated that he was up to date with the most recent intellectual trends in Germany.  
In his very choice of journals for his early articles, the type of recognition Durkheim 
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sought out was already apparent: rather than kindling ties with existing Leplayist 
structures that dated back to the 1850s, Durkheim chose to develop his ideas in the Revue 
philosophique as one part of an expanding field of philosophy. At the same time, the 
reform of higher education had permitted the creation of junior positions within the 
university faculties, opportunities for recent agrégés outside of lycée teaching, and the 
expansion of the university curriculum to include new fields of study. Having laid the 
foundation for the scientific legitimation of sociology through his early articles, 
Durkheim, with his appointment as ‘chargé de cours’ in social science and pedagogy at 
Bordeaux gained an initial foothold for both himself and the new discipline of sociology 
within the arts faculty of the state university.  
 However, Durkheim’s early pronouncements on sociology are in a sense slightly 
misleading in that the opposition he often drew on between social ‘science’ and ‘art’ - 
that is between a scientific perspective on society involving the observation of social 
facts and one that started out from an abstract ideal of how society ought to be - could 
indeed come across as an opposition between sociology and philosophy itself. While this 
opposition may have been plausible within the avant-garde intellectual circles of the 
Revue philosophique where there was a thirst for innovation and where rebellion against 
one’s predecessors could function as a sign of distinction, it would not however have 
stood up in front of a jury of Sorbonne philosophers. Therefore in chapter three, as a way 
of gaining a more accurate picture of the relationship between sociology and philosophy, 
I looked at how Durkheim presented his doctoral thesis, the Division of Labour in 
Society, to his adjudicators at the Sorbonne in 1893. And in spite of his combative early 
rhetoric, we saw here that ‘scientific’ sociology did not literally stand opposed to an 
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‘unscientific’ philosophy. As Durkheim would have been well aware, philosophers in the 
eclectic-spiritualist tradition in which he himself had been educated also considered their 
discipline a science in terms of its aims (knowledge of a distinct part of reality) and 
methods (reason combined with observation). With his doctoral thesis Durkheim inquired 
into the moral value of the division of labour, and was in fact working within the 
contours of ‘moral science’, which had long been, in the French academic tradition, 
considered to be a branch of the ‘philosophical sciences’. At the same time, in his 
assumption that the role of the scholar was to address big moral questions of relevance to 
contemporary man, Durkheim shared with the philosophers on his jury a very serious 
conception of academic work and its role in society. Furthermore, in his critique of 
utilitarianism and Spencer’s perspective on social progress we can find the echo of his 
education in a philosophical tradition which refused to reduce moral ideals to material 
interests and which held up morality as higher, spiritual law.  
 Where the originality of Durkheim’s thesis lay was that he sought to introduce 
what he considered to be a more genuinely scientific perspective into the study of moral 
life. Whereas moral philosophy had hitherto considered psychological introspection as a 
form of scientific observation Durkheim argued in the introduction to the first edition of 
the Division of Labour that one needed to look outside the human psyche to external facts 
such as law codes or even statistics. Through the observation of such exterior moral facts 
Durkheim suggested, one could approach the questions of what contemporary man ought 
to desire in a more scientific manner than through psychological introspection. However 
since these type of facts varied according to social milieu, the implication he drew was 
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that for ‘moral science’ to become genuinely scientific, it would have to become a branch 
of sociology.  
 Durkheim was of course awarded his doctorate from the University of Paris and 
not only was his thesis unanimously approved by the jury but he also seems to have 
highly impressed the public who came to view the defence. However, having presented a 
case for the incorporation of a branch of philosophy (‘moral science’), within sociology it 
is also not surprising that this thesis and the methodological treatise explaining the 
principles behind it also received a mixed reaction from the wider field of academic 
philosophy. Although it was a decade in which three of Durkheim’s four major works 
were first published - the Division of Labour in Society, the Rules of Sociological Method 
and Suicide - the mid-1890s seemed to bring temporary halt to Durkheim’s intellectual 
fortunes. Not only had viable competitors grouped around sociological journals and 
professional associations now emerged, but although these had, unlike Durkheim, little 
connection to traditional fonts of intellectual prestige (ie the École normale, philosophy 
and the arts faculty) they nevertheless managed to benefit from the wave of enthusiasm 
for the social sciences in this period. When increasing concern about the urgency of the 
social question led to calls for the further institutionalisation of the social sciences and the 
creation of new chairs at dominant Parisian institutions Durkheim was passed over in the 
choice of candidate for these new positions; at the same time, his effort in Suicide to 
demonstrate that his sociology could also tackle the problems of modern industrial 
society seemed at the time to have fallen on deaf ears. 
 It was in this context that Durkheim, in collaboration with a number of younger 
associates that he had managed to attract to his sociological project, founded in 1898 a 
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new journal, the Année sociologique. With a team made up of mostly recently qualified 
philosophy ‘agrégés’ a number of whom had come from the École normale, it was from 
the basis of these affinities of educational backgrounds and future career trajectories 
rather than any dogmatic imposition of a given theoretical line that a distinct school 
formed around this new journal. While the prestige of the journal grew as individual 
members of the Année team progressed in their careers within prestigious institutions 
either in the university faculties or in École pratique des hautes études, through investing 
in the expanding field of religious science and following developments in English 
anthropology, the journal was also at the cutting-edge of new trends in the human 
sciences. In chapter four I argued therefore that more than any of Durkheim’s major 
works of the 1890s it was the foundation of this journal that most contributed to putting 
the Durkheimian school back on the path towards intellectual consecration in the first 
decade of the twentieth century.  
 Chapter five moved on to another factor influencing the fortunes of the 
Durkheimian school, and one that is sometimes presented as if it were the only factor - 
the political climate of republican France. There can be little doubt that the very 
emergence of Durkheimian sociology, unlike Leplayist social economy, was born and 
flourished with the Third Republic. Political concerns - the defeat by Germany and the 
spectre of decline, educational reform, secularisation and the consolidation of republican 
power - mediated the promotion of social science. If, as we have seen in chapter two,  the 
new science of sociology  could be presented as one way of re-building national prestige, 
in chapter five I showed how Durkheim also contributed to the political consolidation of 
the Republic. Through his position as a lecturer at the University of Bordeaux Durkheim 
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was involved not only in the training of a whole new generation of primary school 
teachers but with his sociologically informed pedagogy also provided a strong case in 
favour of secular moral education and thus helped to legitimate the republican position 
against its political opponents in the 1880s.  
 However, when it came to the social question that surged to prominence in the 
following decade, the republican block, once it had consolidated power, developed a 
number of different strands. As a more conservative grouping came to dominate 
parliament, a type of interventionist sociology inspired by Leplayist social economy 
seemed to take the limelight. With Durkheim being perceived as too radical on the social 
question, it was only after the Dreyfus Affair, which momentarily discredited the 
conservative republican coalition and brought the victory of radical republicanism, that 
the political climate began again to favour the Durkheimians. If there had ever been any 
doubt among critics as to the democratic credentials of his sociology, Durkheim’s 
intervention in the Dreyfus Affair confirmed his commitment to principles of justice and 
the ideals of moral individualism. Although other members of the Année team were more 
actively involved in radical and socialist politics, Durkheim himself, in an effort to 
distinguish his sociology from the practically orientated Leplayist social economy, took a 
step back from politics. The role of the sociologist was, he came to insist, one of seeking 
out scientific truth for its own sake, above the mêlée of day-to-day politics.  
  My final chapter dealt with what can be referred to as the hegemonic period of 
French sociology, when Durkheim became the dominant figure in French intellectual life 
and when his sociology enjoyed popularity as a legitimate part of the university 
curriculum. This rise to intellectual prominence was certainly mediated by political 
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factors, as the radical victory brought with it the appointment of Durkheim to the chair in 
the science of education at the Sorbonne. With the subsequent creation of his pedagogy 
course that was obligatory for all agrégation candidates, Durkheim found himself in a 
position of immense institutional power. From this base in Paris he could attract the most 
promising agrégation candidates from the École normale and the Sorbonne to his 
sociology, while other members of the Année team continued to work their influence at 
the École pratique des hautes études.  
 While Durkheim is often considered, alongside Ernest Lavisse, as one of leading 
figures of the ‘New Sorbonne’, I suggested in chapter six that it was his capacity to both 
benefit from the university reform while cultivating a more traditional source of 
intellectual prestige that can explain how his project continued to gather momentum, 
reaching the height of its popularity on the eve of the First World War. Whereas the 
Sorbonne historians seemed at times closer to the Année’s sociological competitors, 
Durkheim distinguished himself by insisting on the rationalist credentials of his work. 
Situating his sociology square within the French philosophical tradition stretching back to 
Descartes, he now argued that his sociology offered a way of renovating classical 
rationalism, of adapting it to the demands of modern science. In an era where the attack 
on reason and science had become associated with anti-republican and anti-democratic 
politics, Durkheimian sociology could thus become accepted by philosophers as an ally 
in the defence of this rationalist heritage. At the same time, by expanding the sociological 
project into another new domain, the sociology of knowledge, the Année sociologique 
again proved itself to be perfectly up to date with the most avant-garde ideas in the 
human sciences.  
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 In a sense the figurehead of a whole era, an era that stretched from around 1880 to 
1914, Durkheim, on the outbreak of the First World War was in a dominant position in 
the French intellectual field. Rather than starting out with Durkheim as the founder of the 
French school of sociology and as an important public figure, I have throughout this 
thesis sought to explain how he became so, or how he and the discipline he came to 
represent progressed from a position of relative scientific and institutional marginality to 
one of intellectual consecration. In this, I presented what I considered to be the most 
important factors: the early review articles and Bordeaux appointment (chapter two); the 
doctoral thesis and relationship to academic philosophy (chapter 3); the foundation of the 
Année sociologique (chapter 4); the political climate and intervention in politics (chapter 
5); the relationship of Durkheimian sociology to the New Sorbonne historians and 
continued ties to academic philosophy (chapter 6).  
 At the same time I also sought to show how the strategies of legitimation he 
pursued - the journals he published in, the scholars he attracted to his project, the 
academic institutions his sociology became associated with - were all informed by his 
intellectual habitus and how this also gave the Durkheimian school a distinct identity, 
setting it apart from its competitors. Not only did this manifest itself theoretically in the 
type of sociology that Durkheim and the Année team produced but it also conditioned 
Durkheim’s politics, and within the existing body of scholarship on this question, it is 
here I believe, that the originality of my work lies. Rather than seeking to read a certain 
political position directly into Durkheim’s published work or relate this to a given body 
of political thought, I have tried to explain how his politics and conception of own role as 
public intellectual were guided by an intellectual habitus formed within the contours of 
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late nineteenth century French philosophy and academic life. If, in accordance with the 
Dreyfusard ideal of intellectual commitment to higher principles of truth and justice, 
Durkheim came to see his role as one of seeking out truth for its own sake, it was his 
failure and indeed the failure of a whole generation of intellectuals to live up to this ideal 
in 1914 that perhaps best signaled the end of an era. 
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